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Although he does not know it, the man on the Clapham omnibus is a presentist.  Or 
to put it more accurately, the man on the Clapham omnibus has ideas about time, 
which (at least) imply much of presentism.  Or so I argue in this thesis.  While some 
of our pre-theoretic ideas about time are no doubt under-determined in certain 
respects, the man on the bus might be alarmed to learn that the majority of 
philosophers claim that our intuitive views about time are naïve and wrong.   This is 
a serious claim.  And it requires a clear explanation; for it suggests that ordinary 
people are living under the illusion that temporal reality is a certain way, when in fact 
it is not.  Starting from the assumption that presentism is the common-sense view of 
time, this thesis asks the following questions.  Is presentism a viable theory?  Are 
the metaphysical theories of time presented as the alternatives to presentism viable 
theories?  And in what respects, if any, are these alternative theories superior to 
presentism, such that they require us to give up or amend our common-sense ideas 
about time?  To answer these questions, I explain what each of these theories are, 
and what their commitments are.  This is in order to clarify what the dispute between 
presentism and its rivals is really about.  I then argue that despite facing a number 
of serious objections, there are versions of presentism that can meet these 
objections.  I also argue that the alternatives to presentism have serious problems of 
their own.  I therefore conclude that not only is the dispute between presentism and 
its rivals not settled, but also that there are good reasons to prefer presentism, as it 
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People like us, who believe in physics, know that the distinction between past, 
present and future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion.1  
                                       Albert Einstein 
 
 




Metaphysical theories of time are concerned with discovering the truth about the 
nature of temporal reality, and what it is to exist at a time.  The questions they 
typically consider include the following.  Is time real or illusory?  Is time fundamental 
or emergent?  Is only the present time real, or are other times also real?  Do non-
present entities exist on a par with present entities?   Does time really pass or flow?  
Does time have a fixed direction?  Is time circular, linear, or branching?  What 
explains the apparent asymmetry in the direction of time?  Why do we only have 
conscious experience of the present?  Does our use of grammatical tense 
accurately represent, or correspond to, an objective distinction between past, 
present, and future in the world?  What is the relation between time and change?  
And so on.  These questions are often run together with distinct but closely related 
questions about persistence.  For example, if objects persist, are they three-
dimensional entities that persist by enduring; that is, by being wholly present at one 
time?  Or are they four-dimensional entities that persist by perduring; that is to say, 
by being spread out in time (as most events are), and having distinct temporal parts, 
which exist on a par?  
 
Different metaphysical theories of time provide different answers to these questions.  
A minority of philosophers hold that time is unreal.2  Anti-realists about time have to 
explain why we experience a timeless reality as something temporal.3  The majority 
of philosophers, however, are realists about time.  Realists about time disagree as 
to whether only the present exists, whether only the present and the past exist, or 
whether all times exist.4  Some realists about time hold that time really passes; 
others claim that time does not pass.  Realists about passage typically disagree as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Einstein	  (1955),	  	  p.215.	  2	  McTaggart	  and	  Bradley	  are	  anti-­‐realists	  about	  time.	  3	  Even	   if	   time	   is	  unreal	   and	   its	   appearance	   is	  delusory,	   it	   is	  not	   a	  delusion	   that	  we	  experience	  time	  as	  successive.	  	  So	  anti-­‐realists	  about	  time	  owe	  us	  an	  explanation	  of	  how	  such	  delusions	  are	  not	  actually	  successive.	  	  4	  For	  example,	  presentism,	  the	  growing	  block,	  and	  eternalism,	  respectively.	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to whether the passage of time consists in some kind of property change, or in 
propositions changing their truth-values, or in the coming into existence and going 
out of existence of times.  In contrast, anti-realists about passage explain passage 
as some kind of psychological illusion, and/or provide deflationary accounts of 
passage, explained in terms of relations to times.  Some realists about time are 
realists about tense.  Realists about tense claim that tensed sentences express 
propositions that can change their truth-value.  Some realists about tense claim that 
this is because one time is more special than another; others deny this, claiming 
instead that as tensed propositions are purely due to the perspectival nature of our 
beliefs, they can be given tenseless truth-conditions.5  Anti-realists about tense 
claim that all propositions are eternal, and hence cannot change their truth-value.  
Anti-realists about tense employ various ‘detensing’ strategies, which either 
translate tensed sentences into tenseless propositions, or analyse them in terms of 
tenseless propositions.6  And so it goes for other questions about temporal reality; 
each theory providing different, and often conflicting, answers to such questions 
than rival theories.   
 
Faced with such an array of competing ideas, and often confusing answers, how are 
we to judge which theory is closest to correct?  And what qualities make one theory 
more credible than its rivals?  One of the aims of this thesis is to try and make these 
things clearer.  In the section on methodology below, we consider which qualities (or 
desiderata) a metaphysical theory of time ought to include when it comes to 
answering questions about time.  Among the candidates for these are elegance, 
parsimony, coherence with common sense, coherence with ordinary language, and 
coherence with our best current scientific theories.  As will be explained, some of 




 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  David	  Lewis	   and	  D.	  H.	  Mellor	   are	  B-­‐theorists	  who	  accept	   the	   existence	  of	   (so-­‐called)	   ‘tensed	  propositions’.	   	  More	  accurately,	  Mellor	  allows	  that	  there	  are	  “A-­‐propositions”,	  which	  are	  made	  true	   by	   “B-­‐facts”.	   	   For	   Lewis,	   ‘propositions’	   are	   typically	   more	   like	   properties	   of	   worlds.	  	  However,	   Lewis	   allows	   that	   the	   objects	   of	   propositional	   attitudes	   can	  be	  perspectival;	   as	   they	  can	   be	   properties	   of	   particular	  worlds,	   persons	   and	   times.	   	  He	   therefore	   treats	   the	   objects	   of	  some	  propositional	   attitudes	   as	  non-­‐eternal;	   i.e.	   as	   things	   that	   can	  be	   true	   at	   some	   times	   and	  false	  at	  other	  times.	  	  We	  discuss	  these	  issues	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  	  6	  Translation	   schemes	   include	   date	   or	   token-­‐reflexive	   analyses	   of	   tensed	   sentences.	   ‘Soft-­‐detensers’	  accept	  that	  more	  than	  eternal	  propositions	  are	  needed	  to	  capture	  what	  we	  mean	  by	  tensed	  sentences	  and	  tensed	  verbs.	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1.2  The question this thesis examines 
 
The particular question this thesis examines is whether any form of the 
metaphysical theory of time known as ‘presentism' is defensible.  Presentism has 
the immediate appeal of appearing to cohere with (or be supported by) our 
common-sense ideas about time, and with our ordinary temporal language.  As will 
be explained in detail in Chapter 4, the label ‘presentism’ does not actually describe 
a single theory of time; rather it describes a variety of nuanced theories.  However, 
what all versions of presentism have in common is that they afford an ontologically 
privileged status to the present and presently existing objects. 7   
 
1.3  Presentism: the core claim 
 
For a clear definition of what I shall take to be a standard version of presentism, 
here is Ned Markosian’s definition.  Note that although Markosian uses the term 
‘objects’ to describe what presently exists, we could equally well use the more 
general terms ‘things’ or ‘entities’.  He writes: 
 
Presentism is the view that only present objects exist.  According to 
Presentism, if we were to make an accurate list of all the things that exist – 
i.e. a list of all the things that our most unrestricted quantifiers range over – 
there would not be a single non-present object on the list.  Thus, you and I 
and the Taj Mahal would be on the list, but neither Socrates nor any future 
grandchildren of mine would be included.8 
 
For the standard presentist, existence and temporal location are necessarily tied 
together.9  Thus, according to presentism, to exist is to be located at (and only at) 
the present time.  It is worth emphasizing that like most philosophers (both 
presentist and non-presentist), Markosian is taking the neo-Quinean view that there 
is only one type of existence, which is properly represented by the existential 
quantifier.10  According to Quineanism, what exists exactly equals what there is.  
Thus for the presentist who accepts neo-Quineanism (the idea that existence and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  The	  theories	  known	  as	  ‘Degree	  Presentism’	  and	  ‘Williamsonian	  Presentism’	  are	  not	  presentist	  theories,	  because	  they	  deny	  that	  the	  present	  is	  ontologically	  privileged.	  	  See	  Chapter	  3.	  	  	  	  8	  Markosian	  (2004),	  p.76.	  9	  Markosian	  (2013),	  p.130.	  10	  In	   logic,	   the	  existential	  quantifier	  (symbolized	  as	  ∃)	  expresses	  that	  the	  statements	  within	   its	  scope	  are	  true	  for	  at	  least	  one	  thing.	  	  ∃	  means	  ‘for	  some’,	  or	  ‘there	  is	  at	  least	  one’	  or	  ‘there	  exists’.	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quantification go hand in hand), what there is exactly equals what there is presently, 
and what exists presently.  The standard presentist therefore does not want to say 
that there are some merely past and merely future things, which do not exist now; 
rather they deny that there are such things.  Hence, for any object x, if there is such 
an object, then x exists presently.  
 
However, as Markosian’s examples of non-present objects indicate, presentism is 
not meant to be a temporal version of solipsism.  That is to say, it is not the view 
that there never were, or never will be, any objects other than the objects that exist 
now.  Rather, standard presentism is the view that many non-present objects have 
existed at past times (such as Socrates), and many others will exist at future times 
(such as future grandchildren).  Thus standard presentists are committed to the view 
that some objects exist temporarily, because some objects come into existence and 
go out of existence.  Moreover, presentism is not the view that presently existing 
objects only exist instantaneously.  According to presentism, the majority of present 
objects, including ourselves, are objects that have existed in the past, and will 
(hopefully) continue to exist in the future.  So for the presentist, although nothing 
exists outside of the present, many presently existing objects are continuants.  That 
is to say, they existed prior to the present time and will continue to exist beyond the 
present time.  Hence presentism is meant to be a ‘persistence friendly’ theory. 
 
Presentism seems like a common sense view, because it appears to accord with 
our everyday intuition that existing in time is fundamentally different from existing in 
space.  A useful way to bring this out is to consider the difference between the way 
we use the spatial term ‘here’ and the temporal term ‘now’, with respect to existence.  
For example, if we think of the extension of the term ‘here’, we naturally think of it as 
having limited extension.11  That is to say, we do not use the term ‘here’ to indicate 
every place that exists; rather, we use it to refer to a particular place - very often the 
place where we are.  We know that other places (and their contents) exist in places 
we call ‘there’.  So we use the term ‘here’ to distinguish what is spatially present 
from one perspective, from what is spatially non-present (from that perspective).  As 
the distinction between ‘here’ and ‘there’ is purely perspectival, no one thinks of this 
as an ontological distinction between what exists and what does not exist.  Rather 
we think that other places exist in the same sense as the place we call ‘here’ exists. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  The	  extension	  of	  a	  term	  is	  the	  set	  of	  things	  the	  term	  is	  true	  of/applies	  to.	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When it comes to existence, the distinction between ‘now’ and ‘then’ is very different.  
We use the term ‘now’ to distinguish the present time from other times; times we 
can refer to as ‘then’.  However, we do not ordinarily think that the correct 
application of the term ‘now’ is merely a matter of perspective.  This is because we 
do not think that other times are like other places; that is, places which exist on an 
ontological par with ‘here’.  Instead, we typically think of non-present times as times 
when non-present objects and events either did exist or happen, or will exist or 
happen, but we do not think of them existing or happening on a par with objects and 
events that exist or happen now.12  For example, most people do not think that an 
event, such as last year’s Christmas dinner, exists in a different location (some 
months earlier-than now), or that tomorrow’s dinner exists in a location one day 
later-than now.  Rather, we normally think that last year’s Christmas dinner does not 
exist because it is no longer there in the past, and tomorrow’s dinner does not exist 
because it is not yet there in the future.  Similarly, if we wanted to know how many 
people exist in the world, we would intuitively expect to count the people that exist 
now, as opposed to also counting people who have died and those yet to be born.  
So unlike ‘here’, which is merely a sub-category of all existing places, we ordinarily 
think of ‘now’ as the only time when individuals exist and events are happening.  
Thus when it comes to existence, there is a sense in which we intuitively use the 
term ‘now’ to include everything that exists, and to distinguish these things from 
things that either did exist or will exist.13  Presentism tries to capture this common-
sense intuition that time is not like space, by insisting that the term ‘now’ does not 
have limited extension, because applied correctly, it includes everything that exists. 
 
Although presentism has the immediate appeal of appearing to cohere with (or be 
supported by) our common-sense ideas about time and with our ordinary temporal 
language, its opponents challenge it on both these issues.  The majority of these 
objections focus on the following issue: namely, that by restricting the sum total of 
what exists to the present, presentism is too sparse a theory to accommodate many 
of our other common-sense ideas, or to enable us to say many of the things we 
ordinarily want to say.  These include ideas and statements about change, 
causation, truth, cross-temporal relations, and temporal passage.  There is also the 
objection that presentism is too replete.  According to this objection, presentists (and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  As	  non-­‐philosophers	  sometimes	  use	  words	  like	   ‘exists’	   in	  ambiguous	  ways,	  they	  might	  think	  that	  the	  past	  exists	  in	  some	  sense.	  	  We	  consider	  which	  ideas	  constitute	  our	  ‘common-­‐sense	  view	  of	  time’	  in	  §1.16	  below.	  	  	  13	  Although	  again,	  see	  footnote	  12.	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other A-theorists14) postulate unnecessary ontological baggage, by positing tensed 
facts. 15   Opponents of the A-theory claim that not only are tensed facts not 
necessary, because the ultimate true description of reality can be given in tenseless 
terms, but also that tensed facts must to be reduced to tenseless facts, if we are to 
avoid the contradiction known as McTaggart’s paradox (explained below).  
Furthermore, presentism faces the major empirical challenge of appearing to conflict 
with the Special Theory of Relativity.  So despite its intuitive appeal, the default 
position in the philosophy of time is that presentism is false.16  Presentism, therefore, 
is a theory in need of defence.  
 
Attempts to defend presentism from the objections it faces have led many 
presentists to develop and augment their theories in a number of different ways.  As 
already mentioned, we shall examine the various versions and characterizations of 
presentism in Chapter 4.  However, for now let us take the term ‘presentism’ to 
mean the standard type of ontological thesis, which accepts the neo-Quinean view 
that existence and quantification go hand in hand, and is characterized by 
Markosian as the claim that ‘only present objects exist.17  If we want to include 
‘times’ in our ontology, an alternative characterization of standard presentism is the 
view that ‘only the present time and its contents exist.’18  (For ease of expression I 
shall sometimes use either articulation.)  I shall also sometimes speak of events as 
existing; this is mainly because eternalists often describe their ontology in terms of 
events.  However, talking about events ‘existing’ is controversial, especially for 
presentists.  One reason for this is that most events are spread out over time, so for 
the presentist they cannot be included among the things that exist, simply because 
they are too big to fit into the present.  So, at most, the presentist could accept that 
instantaneous events exist.  Others deny that events are things that ‘exist,’ and 
prefer to describe all events as ‘things that happen’.19  In the light of issues about 
the existence of times and events, we could also adopt the following more general 
characterization of standard presentism: presentism is the view that in our most 
unrestricted domain of quantification we find only presently existing entities. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  A-­‐theorists	   claim	   that	   tensed	   properties,	   such	   as	   pastness,	   presentness	   and	   futurity	   are	  monadic	  properties	  of	  things,	  which	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  relations	  to	  times.	  	  15	  	  Tensed	  facts	  are	  facts	  that	  can	  vary	  in	  truth-­‐value.	  	  16	  	  This	  is	  a	  prejudiced	  default,	  because	  the	  majority	  of	  philosophers	  of	  time	  are	  B-­‐theorists.	  17	  	  ‘Objects’	  includes	  people	  and	  things.	  18	  	  Some	  presentists	  make	  a	  distinction	  between	  abstract	  and	  concrete	  times.	  	  On	  this	  view,	  only	  the	  present	  time	  is	  concretely	  realised.	  	  Other	  times	  form	  an	  abstract	  times	  series	  (or	  ersatz	  B-­‐series),	  which	  stands	  at	  no	  temporal	  distance	  from	  the	  present.	  	  	  19	  	  For	  example,	  Arthur	  Prior	  denies	  the	  existence	  of	  events.	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To sum up, let us say that according to standard versions of presentism (hereafter 
presentism, unless otherwise stated), only present objects exist.  Or, more 
generally: presentism is the view that in our most unrestricted domain of 
quantification we find only presently existing entities.  This is the core claim of 
presentism.  On this view, past things, such as dinosaurs and Queen Victoria did 
exist, but do so no longer, and future things, such as the first human colony on Mars 
will, or possibly will exist, but they do not exist yet.  Presentism therefore takes the 
distinction between past, present and future to reflect an objective feature of reality.  
More specifically, presentists can be described as realists about the existence of the 
present and present objects, and anti-realists about the existence of the past and 
the future and merely past and merely future objects.  Presentists are also realists 
about tense, as they claim that our use of tense in language is not just a matter of 
perspective, but rather that it reflects the fact that present is ontologically privileged. 
 
1.4  Eternalism 
 
Presentism is standardly contrasted with a rival theory of time known as eternalism.  
As with presentism, the label ‘eternalism’ does not describe a single theory of time.  
Rather it describes a variety of theories, all of which hold that time is ontologically 
uniform, in that past, present, and future objects (or times and their contents) all 
exist.  According to the eternalist, all these objects exist in time and are spread out 
in the four-dimensional manifold.20  On this view, dinosaurs, Queen Victoria, and 
(perhaps) the first human colony on Mars all exist in their various temporal 
locations.21  Although some eternalists claim that the present is metaphysically 
special in some way, others disagree.  Eternalist B-theorists claim that when we 
distinguish a particular time as the present (or ‘now’), we are merely describing the 
view from our own particular temporal location.22  Eternalist A-theorists claim that 
the present is objectively special in some non-ontological way.  However, all 
eternalists agree that there is no ontologically privileged present moment or set of 
objects.  Eternalists therefore think that the existence of non-present times and their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  The	  four-­‐dimensional	  manifold	  is	  typically	  described	  as	  a	  manifold	  of	  spacetime	  events.	  21	  Meghan	   Sullivan	   presents	   a	   non-­‐standard	   version	   of	   A-­‐theoretic	   eternalism;	   according	   to	  which	   dinosaurs	   exist	   non-­‐concretely,	   and	   thus	   do	   not	   have	   a	   spaiotemporal	   location.	   	   We	  discuss	  this	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  	  	  22	  	  Hence	  B-­‐theorists	  deny	  that	  the	  present	  is	  objectively	  or	  metaphysically	  special.	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contents is much like the existence of non-present places.23  For example, no one 
would claim that dogs do not exist, just because there are no dogs located in the 
place where we are located (i.e. here).  Likewise, for eternalists, if we are assuming 
that the quantifiers are wide-open, it is not strictly or literally true to say ‘dinosaurs 
do not exist’, just because there are no dinosaurs located at the time when we are 
located (i.e. ‘now’).  According to the eternalist, dinosaurs exist; they just are located 
in the past.  However, when people say ‘dinosaurs do not exist’ in the context of the 
present time, this context provides a restricted domain, according to which the 
statement is true.24   
 
Eternalists are therefore realists about the existence of past, present, and future 
times and their contents.  As we shall see in Chapter 3, some eternalists are realists 
about tense, and others are anti-realists.  Eternalists are also divided with regard to 
how to explain change.  Eternalist A-theorists hold that reality is dynamic, and thus 
reality changes as time passes.  B-theorists reject this idea, and provide accounts of 
change that do not involve reality itself changing.  
 
1.5  Semi-eternalism 
 
In between presentism and eternalism there is a third kind of theory, which I call 
semi-eternalism.  The most common version of semi-eternalism is the growing 
block.25  According to growing block theorists, things that there were and things that 
there are exist, but not things that there will be (unless they are already in existence).  
On this view, to be present is to be located at the edge of the growing block of 
reality; a reality that continues to grow as new events come into existence 
successively.  Growing blockers are therefore realists about the existence of the 
past and present, but they are anti-realists about the existence of the future.  They 
are also realists about tense. 
 
To sum up thus far.  We have seen that the core claim of presentism is the claim 
that only present objects (or entities) exist.  And we have also seen that this claim is 
contrasted with that of rival theories; namely, eternalism and semi-eternalism, both 
of which deny that only present objects exist.  In standard versions of presentism, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Again,	   some	  care	   in	  needed	  with	   this	  claim.	   	   Issues	  about	  what	  existing	  at	  non-­present	  times	  consists	  of	  will	  be	  fleshed	  out	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  24	  Lewis,	  for	  example,	  thinks	  that	  certain	  claims	  said	  now	  (such	  as	  ‘there	  are	  no	  dinosaurs’)	  can	  be	  strictly	  and	  literally	  true,	  because	  the	  context	  automatically	  provides	  a	  restricted	  domain.	  25	  Another	  version	  of	  semi-­‐eternalism	  is	  Storrs	  McCall’s	  ‘Shrinking	  Tree’.	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the claim that only present objects exist is typically coupled with a second related 
but distinct key claim, which is the claim that time flows or passes.26  Presentists see 
this additional claim as another merit of their theory, as our experience of the 
passage of time is a fundamental part of our common sense ideas about time, and 
what it is to exist at a time.  However, before we examine this additional claim, there 
is a particular objection to the core claim of presentism, which I want to address.  
This is called the triviality problem.27  Although the main objections to presentism 
are discussed in later chapters, my reason for bringing this particular objection up 
here is to get it out of the way.  The triviality problem touches upon a number of 
related issues, which will be discussed in later chapters.  
 
1.6  The triviality problem  
 
Presentists clearly consider themselves to be engaged in a substantial 
disagreement with eternalists.  As the presentist Trenton Merricks writes:  
 
Presentism and eternalism differ most fundamentally with respect to the 
nature of time and, relatedly, with what it is to exist at a time (and to have 
properties at a time).28   
 
While most eternalists agree with their presentist rivals that there is a substantial 
disagreement between them, there are a number of eternalists (and others) who 
challenge this. 29   Philosophers sceptical about whether the dispute between 
presentism and eternalism is substantial, typically target the presentist’s core claim 
that ‘only present objects exist’.  These sceptics argue that there is a temporal 
equivocation in the way eternalists and presentists use the term ‘exists’, and that 
once the term ‘exists’ is disambiguated, it becomes clear that presentism is either 
trivially true, or obviously false.  On this view, presentism is either false, or it is 
compatible with eternalism, in which case presentists and eternalists are just talking 
past one another.   
 
The dilemma is presented as follows.  The presentist claims that only present 
objects exist.  The presentist typically takes existence as a primitive notion, which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  K.	  Miller	  (2013),	  p.	  346.	  	  	  27	  The	  triviality	  problem	  is	  seen	  as	  an	  objection	  to	  presentism,	  because	  eternalists	  do	  not	  need	  to	  articulate	  their	  view	  in	  an	  ontologically	  restrictive	  sense.	  	  28	  See	  Merricks	  (2007),	  p.124.	  	  	  29	  For	  example,	  Savitt,	  Callender,	  Dorato,	  and	  Meyer.	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includes everything our most unrestricted quantifiers range over.  So the question is, 
does the presentist take the verb ‘exists’ to be tensed or tenseless?  If ‘exists’ is 
tensed, then to predicate the property of existing of some objects will mean that 
those objects have the tensed property of existing; i.e. the property of presently 
existing (or existing now).30  In this case, the presentist’s claim amounts to the claim 
that: 
 
Only present objects exist presently (or exist now).  
 
The problem here is that although this claim is true, it is trivially true.31  The 
presentist has not said anything the eternalist would disagree with.  The eternalist 
can accept that only present objects exist presently, and still accept that past and 
future objects exist in other temporal locations.  So it seems that the presentist has 
not made a substantial or interesting claim.   
 
Alternatively, suppose the presentist takes the verb ‘exist’ to be untensed (i.e. 
tenseless).  An untensed notion of existence is one that is not orientated towards 
any particular time, which is held to be the present.  Thus, to exist (untensed) 
means to exist ‘at some time or other’.  In this case, to predicate the property of 
existing of some objects is to say that those objects have the untensed property of 
existing, which will mean something equivalent to ‘did exist, exists, or will exist’.  The 
presentist’s claim thus becomes:  
 
Only present objects did exist, exist now, or will exist.   
 
The problem here is that this claim is obviously false.  It is obviously false because 
there are lots of past and future objects that are not present.  For example, Queen 
Victoria did exist, but she is not a present object.  Martian outposts will exist (let’s 
assume), but they are not present objects.  So the dilemma seems to be that 
whether the presentist formulates her theory using a tensed or tenseless notion of 
existence, she either says something trivially true, or obviously false.  So even if 
presentism is true, it is not a substantial or interesting thesis, because the presentist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  If	  ‘exists’	  is	  always	  tensed,	  it	  will	  be	  part	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘exists’	  that	  if	  a	  thing	  exists,	  it	  exists	  now.	  31	  It	  is	  trivially	  true	  because	  under	  any	  interpretation	  of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  exist,	  this	  claim	  will	  be	  true.	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1.7  How might the presentist respond?   
 
There are a number of ways for the presentist to respond, and I shall briefly outline 
three of these.  One response, suggested by Markosian, is to say that we can 
understand a tense-neutral notion of ‘exists’.  A tense-neutral notion of existence is 
one that is not tied, in virtue of its meaning, to a particular temporal domain.33  That 
is to say, ‘exists’ in this sense is neither tied to the domain of just present things, nor 
tied to the domain of things that exist at some time or other.  Supporters of this view 
claim that they can use this tense-neutral notion of existence to articulate their 
disagreement (between presentism and eternalism) in a substantial way.  As 
Markosian explains, ‘once the two parties accept that `x exists' and `x is present' are 
not synonymous, they can agree that their dispute is over the question of whether 
these two expressions are always co-extensive.’ 34   For example, suppose the 
presentist says,  
 
In the tense-neutral sense there are no dinosaurs. 
 
What the presentist means is that according to her most unrestricted domain of 
quantification there are (or there exist) no dinosaurs.   
 
Similarly, suppose the eternalist says,  
 
In the tense-neutral sense there are dinosaurs.   
 
What the eternalist means is that according to her most unrestricted domain of 
quantification there are (or there exist) dinosaurs.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  	  In	  order	  to	  be	  interestingly	  true,	  the	  presentist	  needs	  to	  distinguish	  her	  view	  from	  eternalism	  by	  expressing	   it	   in	  such	  a	  way	  as	   to	  avoid	  ontological	  commitment	   to	  merely	  past	  and	  merely	  future	   objects.	   	   The	   eternalist,	   however,	   is	   under	   no	   such	   pressure	   to	   restrict	   her	   ontological	  commitments	  in	  order	  to	  make	  her	  view	  interestingly	  true.	  	  33	  We	  could	  also	  call	  this	  existence	  simpliciter.	  34	  Markosian	  (1994),	  p.245.	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By using this tense-neutral notion of existence (instead of using a primitive tensed 
notion of exists) the presentist can articulate her claim and avoid making the trivially 
true claim that no dinosaurs exist presently (or now).   Likewise, by using this tense-
neutral notion of existence (rather than an untensed one), the eternalist can state 
her view in such a way that presentism does not turn out to be committed to the 
obviously false claim that dinosaurs did, do, or will exist.  Because they can 
formulate their respective claims using the same (tense-neutral) notion of existence, 
the presentist and the eternalist can claim that they are not just talking past each 
other.  They can therefore have a substantial dispute, because it becomes clear 
about what they disagree about; namely, which temporal entities exist in our most 
unrestricted domain of quantification.  
 
Not everyone would want to accept this tense-neutral account of existence.  Indeed, 
some presentists insist that their notion of exists is irreducibly tensed.35   However, 
here is another argument that recommends a ‘neutral’ understanding of existence.  
This argument focuses on the modal dispute between actualists and possibilists.  
Actualism is the modal doctrine that only actual objects exist.  The actualist 
therefore claims that there are no non-actual or merely possible objects.36  There 
are two types of possibilist.  Classical possibilism (hereafter possibilism) is the view 
that there are non-actual or merely possible things.  On this view, other possible 
worlds are seen as some kind of abstract objects, which have a different ontological 
status from the actual concrete world.  The Lewisian possibilist or modal realist 
disagrees.  Lewis claims that there is no difference in ontological status between 
what is actual and what is merely possible.  According to Lewis, as other possible 
worlds exist on an ontological par with our world, the term ‘actual’ should be seen as 
an indexical term, which functions much like the term ‘here’.37  On this view, ‘actual’ 
functions as a relative and perspectival term, as it indicates the world belonging to 
the speaker; but it does not function as an absolute term, which indicates an 
ontologically privileged world.  Lewis therefore uses the term ‘concrete’ to describe 
the nature of alternative possible worlds and the nature of this world (which we call 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  For	  example,	  Prior	  and	  Ludlow.	  	  We	  consider	  whether	  Prior’s	  tensed	  notion	  of	  ‘exists’	  avoids	  the	  triviality	  objection	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  	  36	  Hence	   presentism	   is	   the	   temporal	   analogue	   of	   actualism,	   as	   the	   presentist	   claims	   that	   only	  present	  objects	  exist.	  	  	  37	  Lewis	  (1973),	  p.86.	  	  	  For	  Lewis	  actuality	  is	  not	  ‘all	  there	  is’.	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‘actual’), as they all exist on a par.38  Modal realism is thus a radical type of 
possibilism, which no one other than Lewis endorses. 
 
It is widely accepted that the dispute between actualists and possibilists is a 
substantial one.  But in order for this dispute to be substantial, the actualist and the 
possibilist have to come up with a notion of existence that is independent (with 
respect to meaning) from actuality.  Otherwise, when the actualist says ‘only actual 
things exist’, she would mean the trivial truth that: 
 
Only actual things exist actually.  (Or, only things that exist in the actual 
world exist in the actual world.)   
 
The problem here is that no one would disagree with this claim, so it does not say 
anything substantial that distinguishes actualism from either possibilism or modal 
realism.  For example, both the possibilist and the Lewisian modal realist can accept 
this claim, and still hold that there are other things that exist; i.e. possible things 
(which for the possibilist are abstract, and for Lewis are concrete). 
 
Suppose then that ‘exists’ does not mean ‘exists actually’ (or ‘exists in the actual 
world’), but means ‘exists in the actual world or exists in some possible world.’  On 
this understanding, the actualist’s claim (‘only actual things exist’) would be 
equivalent to the claim that: 
 
 Only actual things exist in the actual world or in some possible world.  
 
The problem here is that this claim is obviously false.  It is obviously false because 
there are lots of things that do exist in other possible worlds, which do not exist in 
the actual world.  For example, my merely possible younger sister is not an actual 
sister. 
 
The point being made here is this.  If we accept that there is a substantial dispute 
between actualists and possibilists (as most people do), then there must be some 
kind of ‘world-neutral’ notion of existence that makes this dispute substantial.  As 
metioned above, this needs to be a notion of existence which is independent (with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Lewis	  is	  aware	  that	  the	  distinction	  between	  ‘abstract’	  and	  ‘concrete’	  can	  be	  used	  ambiguously.	  He	   therefore	   considers	   four	   different	   ways	   of	   understanding	   this	   distinction,	   to	   show	   that,	  properly	  understood,	  the	  term	  ‘concrete’	  applies	  to	  worlds.	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respect to its meaning) from actuality.  So, the argument here is that because it is 
accepted that there is a substantial dispute between actualist and possibilist, then 
by parallel reasoning it should also be accepted that there is a substantial dispute 
between presentists and eternalists.  
 
A third way to illustrate that the issue that presentists and eternalists disagree about 
is substantial is suggested by Chris Wuthrich.  This involves considering how some 
physicists describe the dispute between presentism and eternalism, which is in 
terms of what comprises the sum total of physical existence.  Wuthrich says that on 
this view, presentism and eternalism are ‘taken to disagree as to which sets of 
events or spacetime points they quantify, cum ontological commitment qua physical 
existents, or as to at which spatiotemporal locations existing entities can be.’39  For 
example, Wuthrich explains that eternalists award existence to all events in the four-
dimensional manifold, with their spatio-temporal properties given by the relations 
among them.  In contrast, presentists take the sum total of physical existence to be 
comprised of a spatially extended universe-wide moment; a global ‘now’, or absolute 
present, containing a single slice of events (or set of objects), related by an 
equivalence relation (simultaneity).40  Wuthrich says that on this view, ‘time, for the 
presentist, then is the one-dimensional linearly ordered quotient set induced by S 
[the simultaneity relation]’.41  Hence he says: 
 
As can be directly seen from these formulations, presentism and eternalism 
have a substantive disagreement.  Their respective sets of existing 
spacetime events are simply non-identical in that the presentist’s is a proper 
sub-set of the eternalist’s.  Furthermore, presentism requires a well-defined 
equivalence relation, but eternalism does not.42 
  
Wuthrich says that although it is open to a critic of presentism to deny that these two 
positions are empirically distinct (because they are experimentally equivalent),43 this 
does not undermine the fact that the two positions are at least metaphysically 
distinct.  Thus this illustrates a way in which presentists and eternalists see 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Wuthrich	  (2012),	  p.446.	  40	  An	  equivalence	  relation	  is	  a	  binary	  relation,	  which	  is	  at	  the	  same	  time	  a	  reflexive,	  symmetric,	  and	  transitive	  relation.	  	  	  41	  Ibid.	  42	  Ibid.	  43	  According	  to	  this	  objection,	  presentism	  and	  eternalism	  merely	  describe	  different	  perspectives	  on	   the	   same	   reality.	   	   The	   presentist	   describes	   a	   perspective	   from	   within	   time,	   whereas	   the	  eternalist	  describes	  a	  perspective	  from	  outside	  time.	  	  (See	  also	  C.	  Callender	  (2012)	  pp.93.)	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themselves as having a substantial disagreement.  We shall revisit these issues in 
other contexts in later chapters.  But this should make it clear that the dispute 
between presentists and eternalists is not trivial.  
 
1.8  Presentism: the second claim – time passes 
 
As mentioned above, in standard versions of presentism, the claim that only present 
objects exist is typically coupled with a second (but distinct) claim, which is that time 
flows or passes.  The so-called ‘passage of time’ is the process in which events that 
are at one time held to be future are said to become present, and then subsequently 
to recede into the past.  This idea is closely linked to ideas about change.  All 
philosophers of time agree that we experience time as a continual and ordered 
updating process, one in which each present moment or ‘now’ is succeeded by the 
next.  What they disagree about is how this ‘dynamic’ or apparently changing aspect 
of our experience is to be explained.  According to eternalists, the passage of time is 
not to be explained in terms of ontological change, as for them reality is ontologically 
uniform.  This is because eternalists are committed to the view that reality consists 
of an unchanging domain of permanently existing objects, which are spread out in 
time across a four-dimensional manifold.  They therefore have to explain the ‘so-
called’ passage of time in ways that are consistent with an unvarying domain.  
Because eternalists differ quite a lot amongst themselves about other metaphysical 
commitments, different eternalists provide very different accounts of temporal 
passage.44  We shall consider these accounts in Chapter 3.    
 
For the presentist, however, the claim that time passes is an ontological claim.  It is 
a claim about the nature of the physical world.  That is to say, the passage of time is 
the physical updating process in which unique moments of time are continuously 
coming into existence and going out of existence.  More specifically, this updating 
process consists in a continuous and ordered series of fleeting moments, in which a 
new present moment comes into existence, and the previous present moment goes 
out of existence, and hence becomes past.  Presentists are thus committed to the 
view that reality consists of a changing domain of temporally existing objects.  The 
passage of time not only gives time its dynamic nature; it also gives time an ordered 
and fixed direction, as time is always moving towards the future.  The presentist’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  For	   B-­‐theoretic	   eternalists,	   temporal	   passage	   is	   either	   an	   illusion	   or	   variation	   in	   the	   four-­‐dimensional	  manifold.	   	   For	   A-­‐theoretic	   eternalists	   passage	   typically	   involves	   some	   kind	   of	   A-­‐property	  change,	  resulting	  in	  ordered	  succession	  of	  times	  being	  held	  to	  be	  uniquely	  present.	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account of the passage of time has implications for their views about the nature of 
change and about certain transient truths and propositions that are temporally true.  
We address these accounts in further chapters. 
 
Presentism thus typically consists of two distinct claims: the core claim about the 
privileged existence of the present, and the additional claim about the passage of 
time.45   Both these claims give presentism its intuitive appeal.  As a metaphysical 
theory of time, presentism appears to provide straightforward explanations for a 
number of our ordinary beliefs and experiences about time.  For example, it appears 
to provide a straightforward explanation of our experience of only ever being 
consciously located at the present; namely, that this is the only place we are located.  
Presentism also appears to explain our experience of the passage of time and the 
direction of time, as the present appears to be continuously updated, as we move 
towards the future.  The idea of this future-directed moving present (or moving now) 
provides an explanation for the apparent asymmetry between the past and the 
future; such as the fact that we remember the past, but have no memory of the 
future.  This, in turn, sits nicely with the intuitive idea that the future is open and the 
past is fixed.46  Presentism also corresponds to our ordinary use of tensed language, 
as we always speak about non-present times and their contents from the 
perspective of the present.  All these features suggest that there are good grounds 
for claiming that presentism is the common sense view of time. 
 
No one denies that presentism seems to have intuitive appeal.  However, as 
outlined above, presentism faces a number of serious objections, both from 
metaphysics and from physics.  We can divide these objections into two groups.  
The first group of objections target problems with the core claim of presentism; 
namely, that only present objects exist.  Among these objections are difficulties with 
the notion of the present itself,47 difficulties with accounting for truths about non-
present objects, and difficulties with explaining cross-temporal relations that involve 
non-present objects.  In response to the first objection, the presentist has to find a 
plausible argument to show that the notion of the present depends on a distinction 
between intervals of time and instants of time.  In response to these last two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  A	   presentist	   need	   not	   be	   committed	   to	   this	   claim	   about	   passage.	   	   For	   example,	   in	   a	   world	  consisting	   of	   just	   one	   static	   instant	   of	   time,	   presentism	   would	   be	   true.	   	   However,	   most	  presentists	  are	  committed	  to	  dynamic	  presentism	  and	  the	  commonsense	  view	  that	  time	  passes.	  	  46	  However,	  note	  that	  both	  passage	  and	  the	  asymmetry	  between	  past	  and	  future	  are	  compatible	  with	  the	  future	  being	  fully	  determined	  and	  fixed.	  	  47	  For	  example,	  Augustine’s	  ‘vanishing	  present’.	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objections, the presentist either has to find ways to talk truthfully about non-present 
objects that are not ontologically committing, or find substitutes or paraphrased 
explanations for such truths.  There are also non-standard versions of presentism, 
which employ different strategies to account for truths about, and relations to, non-
present objects.  
 
The other serious objection to presentism’s core claim comes from physics. 
Standard interpretations of the special theory of relativity (hereafter SR) tell us that 
there is no such thing as absolute simultaneity.  Without the notion of absolute 
simultaneity, the notion of an absolute present or ‘global now’ cannot be had.  For 
example, we saw above that presentism requires that physical reality is comprised 
by a unique ontologically privileged set of events (or objects or entities), which are 
related by a two-place relation of simultaneity, according to which every event is 
absolutely simultaneous with every other event. However, SR (as standardly 
interpreted) tells us that simultaneity is a three-place relation, such that e and e* are 
simultaneous with respect to a frame F.  This means that while e is simultaneous 
with e* in frame F, e may not be simultaneous with e* in a different frame F*.  Thus, 
it is claimed that if simultaneity is frame-relative, what is happening now is frame-
relative.  But it cannot be that what exists is frame-relative.  So there exists no 
uniquely privileged set of events that are happening now.  Thus presentism must be 
false.  We explore how the presentist might respond to this objection below.  
 
The second group of objections focus on problems with the presentist’s account of 
the passage of time; namely, that the passage of time consists in the coming into 
existence and going out of existence of times.  These include difficulties with the 
notions of change, temporal succession, and difficulties explaining the rate at which 
time passes.  As will be explained, even if these objections do not prove fatal to 
presentism, they challenge the idea that presentism is a common sense view of time 
in two ways.  Firstly, this is because presentists often find themselves pushed into 
positions where they have to tell quite complicated stories to account for many of 
our ordinary ideas about the passage of time and the rate of flow.  Second, as non-
presentists provide alternative accounts for the passage of time, they claim to 
capture our common sense ideas about time in ways that the presentist cannot.  We 
look at these issues in Chapter 3. 
 
There is another objection, which does not target presentism specifically.  This is the 
objection that the A-theory of time is false.  Presentism comes under the banner of 
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metaphysical theories of time known as A-theories, so if the A-theory is false, 
presentism will also turn out to be false.  This objection cuts across both the core 
claim of presentism and the claim about the passage of time.  This objection is 
addressed in Chapter 2.  However, I shall now explain what the A-theory and B-
theory are. 
 
1.9  The A-theory and the B-theory  
 
The A-theory of time and the B-theory of time are theories that have developed from 
McTaggart’s original 1908 distinction between the A-series and the B-series.  As we 
shall consider McTaggart’s argument in detail in Chapter 2, it is just summarized 
here.  McTaggart distinguished the two ways of ordering events in time, which he 
called the A-series and the B-series.  We can also describe this as two ways of 
ordering times.  The A-series is the series of events (or times) running from future to 
present to past.  Positions in the A-series are not permanent, because whether 
something is future, present, or past changes over time.  The London 2012 
Olympics for example, was once future, then it became present, and now it is past.  
A key feature of the A-series is that A-characteristics, such as being past, yesterday, 
or next year, can only be ascribed from a standpoint within the series, which is taken 
to be the present.  A-characteristics are typically described as monadic properties, 
which can be ascribed to events, objects, and times.48   
 
In the B-series, there is an ordering over the events, and the relation of is-earlier-
than, is-later-than, or is simultaneous-with, for all events.  It is thus assumed that 
this gives a complete linear ordering.49  So for all events, it’s fixed whether one is 
earlier-than, later-than, or at the same-time-as, every other event.50  The terms of 
the B-series, known as B-relations, are thus permanent relations.  This is because if 
event E1 is earlier-than event E2, E1 will always be earlier-than E2, regardless of 
whether E1 is present and E2 is future, or E1 is past and E2 is present.  For example, 
the Rio Olympics will always stand in the later-than relation to the London Olympics, 
regardless of whether the Rio Olympics are past, present, or future.  Hence a key 
feature of the B-series is that B-characteristics, such a being four years earlier-than, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Whether	  one	  is	  happy	  to	  ascribe	  properties	  to	  times,	  depends	  on	  whether	  times	  are	  accepted	  into	  one’s	  ontology.	  	  McTaggart	  thought	  of	  A-­‐characteristics	  as	  relations	  (between	  an	  event	  and	  something	  outside	  time),	  although	  he	  admitted	  he	  could	  be	  mistaken.	  	  McTaggart	  (1927)	  §328.	  	  49	  The	  ordering	  relation	  on	  the	  series	  of	  events	  is	  antisymmetric,	  transitive	  and	  total.	  	  	  50	  Hence	  the	  B-­‐series	  assumes	  eternalism	  –	  because	  all	  relata	  (events)	  in	  the	  series	  must	  exist	  in	  order	  to	  be	  related	  by	  these	  temporal	  B-­‐relations.	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or lasting one week, do not appear to involve a relation to a particular present or 
standpoint from within the time series.   
 
Having distinguished these two series, McTaggart argued that without the A-series, 
the unchanging and permanent relations of the B-series are not a time series, as 
time requires change.  So without the A-series, time does not exist.  However, 
McTaggart then argued that the A-series is paradoxical, because it is inherently 
contradictory (explained in Chapter 2).  He therefore concluded that time is unreal.  
 
Although almost no one accepts McTaggart’s radical conclusion, the distinction 
between the A-theory and the B-theory remains a major fault line in the philosophy 
of time.  For A-theorists, the distinction between past, present, and future is central 
to their view.  For them, tense is a feature of reality, as opposed to being merely a 
convenient and perspectival feature of language.  A-theorists typically agree with 
McTaggart’s idea that the B-series is unable to account for change, or provide an 
adequate account of the passage of time.  They also claim that the tenseless 
relations of the B-theory leave out something essential to time; namely our 
embedded perspective from a particular present.  However, B-theorists typically 
claim that the A-theory is false for a number of reasons.  Many B-theorists claim the 
A-theory cannot escape McTaggart’s paradox (see Chapter 2).51  B-theorists also 
claim that it is the A-theory, and not the B-theory, which cannot adequately account 
for change and passage.  Moreover, B-theorists argue that the A-theory adds in 
unnecessary ‘A-properties’, (such as pastness, presentness and futurity) which do 
not exist in reality.  B-theorists claim instead that all statements phrased in tensed 
language are made true by tenseless B-theoretic facts (B-facts).  Hence they either 
deny the existence of tensed or A-theoretic facts (A-facts) and tensed truth-makers, 
or deny that these are necessary when it comes to giving the ultimate true 
description of reality.   If these arguments against the A-theory are successful, they 
will also be successful arguments against presentism.  Thus part of the task of 
defending presentism will involve answering these objections from the B-theory.  We 




 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Some	  B-­‐theorists	  accept	  that	  presentism	  escapes	  McTaggart’s	  paradox.	  	  However,	  they	  reject	  presentism	  as	  a	  viable	  solution,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  presentism	  is	  false.	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1.10  Outline of the thesis 
 
This thesis consists of four main chapters, followed by a short conclusion.  Chapter 
1 is largely introductory, and sets the scene for the rest of the thesis.  It includes an 
overview of the issues examined in each chapter, and explanation of some 
methodological issues.  It also looks at some of the initial reasons for claiming that 
our pre-theoretic or commonsense ideas about time are best captured by 
presentism.  Chapter 2 examines McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time, 
and explains how the A- and B-theories of time have developed as responses to 
McTaggart’s paradox.  We then consider some of those responses.  The first A-
theoretic response considered is Michael Dummett’s reconstruction of McTaggart’s 
argument, and this is followed by an overview of other A-theoretic responses.  The 
B-theoretic responses considered here include a discussion of the various attempts 
to eliminate tense from language.  We then consider D.H. Mellor’s indexical B-
theory, where Mellor argues that although some tensed statements cannot be 
reduced to tenseless statements, this is unproblematic because we do not need any 
tensed facts in order to make tensed statements true.     
 
Chapter 3 focuses on non-presentist metaphysical theories of time, and explains 
how they have developed as responses to McTaggart paradox.  The chapter has 
two main parts.  Part one focuses on the B-theory.  Here we outline some 
motivations for the B-theory, and then consider B-theoretic accounts of change.   
Part two focuses on non-presentist A-theories.  Here we consider A-theoretic 
eternalism, including the moving spotlight theory, a version of ‘Williamsonian 
Presentism’ and ‘degree presentism’, versions of semi-eternalism, including the 
growing block theory and the ‘shrinking tree’.  The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of Kit Fine’s non-standard realism about tense.    
 
Chapter 4 focuses on presentism.  The chapter begins by explaining some of the 
main problems facing presentism, and explains how the different varieties of 
presentism have developed as responses to those challenges.  The chapter divides 
the versions of presentism into two main groups.  The first group contains versions 
of presentism that accept the Quinean idea that what exists exactly equals what 
there is.  Due to their sparse ontology, presentists in this group have to develop 
various ways to account for truths about non-present entities, and relations involving 
such entities.  The second part of the chapter considers versions of presentism that 
accept the neo-Meinongian idea that what exists is a sub-set of the domain of what 
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there is.  I call these versions of presentism Neo-Meinongian presentism.  Neo-
Meinongian presentism avoids many of the difficulties that standard versions of 
presentism have when it comes to explaining truths about non-existent objects and 
relations involving non-existent objects.  
 
Chapter 5 contains a short conclusion, which involves a cost-benefit analysis of the 
issues involved in defending presentism.   
 
1.11  Metaphysics and Physics 
 
As this outline makes clear, the majority of the objections to presentism considered 
in the thesis are metaphysical objections.  One reason for this is that I am not a 
physicist, and therefore lack the expertise to examine the objections from physics in 
any great detail.  The discussion of the issues physics raises for presentism 
therefore relies heavily on what people who have a better understanding of the 
physics have written on the subject.  However, it is also because the metaphysical 
objections to presentism are interesting in their own right.  Very often the case 
against presentism is presented as a cumulative argument; that is to say, as a 
series of inconclusive metaphysical arguments, with the argument from SR added in 
to sound the death knell.  The problem with this approach is that it tends to obscure 
what is right or wrong with the individual arguments against presentism, and thus 
obscures what is right or wrong with presentism itself.  Treating the metaphysical 
objections to presentism individually and independently from the objections from 
physics (wherever possible) therefore brings greater clarity to the whole debate.  
Moreover, if presentism cannot meet the a priori or metaphysical objections against 
it, then it becomes irrelevant to ask whether presentism can meet the empirical 
objections to it from physics.  Of course, one might object here that it is equally 
irrelevant to ask whether presentism can meet the metaphysical objections to it, if it 
cannot meet the objections from physics.  So let me briefly say something about this.   
 
For some, the claim that presentism is incompatible with SR is reason enough to 
dismiss presentism out of hand.  I agree that if there were no viable responses 
available to the presentist with which to address the objection from SR, then trying 
to defend presentism by considering whether it can meet the metaphysical 
objections to it would be rather pointless.  However, there are responses available 
to the presentist, with which to resist the objection from SR.  One option involves 
amending presentism, in order to make it compatible with standard interpretations of 
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SR. 52  However, as this invloves saying that being present is a relative matter, it is 
not an attractive option for traditional presentists.  The more popular option is to 
challenge standard interpretations of SR in various ways. 53   Opponents of 
presentism are critical of these responses, often charging non-standard 
interpretations of SR with being ad hoc.54  However, as long as there are defensible 
responses available to the presentist, this is all she needs to justify her claim that 
considering whether presentism can meet the metaphysical objections to it is an 
important question to ask.  These considerations lead nicely into a discussion of 
methodological issues; but before we consider these, I want to make a slight 
digression to say something more about physics. 
 
1.12  A slight digression 
 
It is important to be aware that what physics tells us about the nature or reality of 
time is not a settled question.  Physicists who are non-instrumentalists are, like 
metaphysicians, looking for realist explanations of the world.55  That is to say, they 
do not want their theories to merely provide successful predictions; they want their 
theories to describe the world as it really is.  The current situation in physics is that 
despite the undisputed empirical success of general relativity and quantum 
mechanics, these theories are not compatible.  What this means is that physics 
does not yet have a theory of quantum gravity, or ‘theory of everything’ which unites 
these two theories, and describes the world as it fundamentally is.  The fact that the 
rules of general relativity do not apply in black holes or at the big bang, suggests 
that there are some other, more fundamental, rules at play in physics.  This has led 
respected theoretical physicists to develop theories such as string theory (where 
there are eleven dimensions in the universe); and interpretations of string theory 
according to which we actually live in a two-dimensional ‘hologram universe’, 
consisting of quantum information, which is stored on the event horizon of a black 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  For	  example,	  Stein’s	  ‘point	  presentism’,	  and	  an	  amendment	  of	  this	  view,	  which	  Hinchliff	  calls	  ‘cone	   presentism’	   (or	   ‘here-­‐now	   ism’).	   	   These	   views	   involve	   the	   idea	   that	   what	   is	   present	   is	  
relative	  to	  an	  individual’s	  light-­‐cone,	  resulting	  in	  a	  fragmented	  view	  of	  time.	  	  	  53	  Presentist	  strategies	  include	  denying	  that	  SR	  is	  one	  of	  our	  best	  physical	  theories	  or	  claiming	  that	  SR	   is	   false.	   	  Presentists	   in	   this	   category	   include	  Zimmerman,	  Markosian,	  Craig,	  Prior,	   and	  Bourne.	  54	  For	  example,	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  Lorentzian	  interpretation	  of	  SR	  is	  empirically	  equivalent	  to	  the	  Minkowski	  interpretation	  is	  held	  to	  be	  ad	  hoc.	  55	  In	   contrast,	   ‘instrumentalists’	   think	   that	   theories	   are	   useful	   for	   explaining	   and	   predicting	  physical	   phenomena,	   but	   they	   do	   not	   necessarily	   describe	   the	   world.	   	   Instrumentalism	   is	  informally	  summed-­‐up	  by	  the	  phrase	  ‘shut	  up	  and	  calculate’.	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hole.56  Although these views sound extreme, the point being made here is that 
physicists accept that the four-dimensional spacetime manifold described by 
Einstein and Minkowski, does not describe reality as it fundamentally is.  
 
Quantum mechanics is also a theory with problems to solve, as it seems to be 
based on rules that are contradictory.  Quantum theory describes the behaviour of 
atomic and sub-atomic particles in terms of probabilities.  More specifically, the 
mathematical formula known as the wavefunction describes the behaviour of a 
particle (known as its quantum state) as it evolves in time.  And it does this 
according to another equation, known as the Schrödinger equation.57  However, the 
wave in question describes the evolution of the whole quantum state, not just the 
wave characteristics of the individual particle.  Because of this, quantum theory can 
only predict the probability of finding a particular particle in one location rather than 
another; and hence the wave is known as a ‘probability wave’.  We can understand 
this as analogous to the fact that a casino can predict with great accuracy the 
chances of winning a game, but it cannot predict when a particular individual will win 
that game.  According to quantum mechanics, the only way to find out the actual 
position or state of a particle is to observe or measure it.  Thus, it is only at the point 
of measurement that all the probabilities of the particle being here or there ‘collapse’ 
into one certain outcome; otherwise its state remains genuinely uncertain.  That is to 
say, it remains in a state of probabilities until it is measured.  This strange result has 
become known as ‘the measurement problem.’ 
 
Einstein refused to accept that there was any uncertainty in physics.  He therefore 
devised a thought experiment (known as the EPR experiment58) to show that 
quantum theory was incomplete, and that particles behaved in a fully deterministic 
way.  What the EPR thought experiment showed was that for any particle split into 
two, these two new particles are such that even when they are separated by vast 
distances, if we measured the properties of one particle we would know for certain 
what the properties (or quantum state) of the other particle are.  This strange 
prediction is known as entanglement.59  Entanglement predicts that two particles 
can become entangled if they are close together for their properties to be linked. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56 	  String	   theorsts	   include	   Brian	   Greene	   and	   Ed	   Witten.	   Leonard	   Susskind	   developed	   the	  holographic	  interpretation	  of	  string	  theory.	  57	  The	  value	  of	  the	  wave	  function	  of	  a	  particle	  at	  a	  given	  point	  of	  space	  and	  time	  is	  related	  to	  the	  likelihood	  of	  the	  particle’s	  being	  there	  at	  the	  time.	  58	  Einstein,	  Podolski	  and	  Rosen	  (1935).	  	  	  59 	  Entanglement	   is	   a	   theoretical	   prediction	   that	   comes	   from	   the	   equations	   of	   quantum	  mechanics.	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Einstein took this as proof that these outcomes were completely determined 
beforehand and that no probabilities were involved.  He therefore claimed that 
quantum mechanics was a correct but incomplete theory. 
 
However, Einstein’s deterministic interpretation of the EPR experiment was not the 
only option.   A different interpretation takes entanglement to show something very 
different.  For example, the results of the EPR experiment could also be interpreted 
as showing that for any two particles that become entangled, those particles remain 
connected in such a way that even when vast distances separate them, measuring 
the properties of one particle instantaneously affects the properties of the other.60  
This interpretation violates Einstein’s rule that nothing can travel faster than the 
speed of light.  Einstein called the idea that particles could communicate or affect 
each other in this way ‘spooky action at a distance.’  Einstein denied that such a 
thing was possible, and as there was no way to establish which interpretation was 
correct, he continued to maintain that quantum mechanics was incomplete.  
However, in 1964 John Bell devised a way to show whether ‘spooky action at a 
distance’ really did account for the communication between entangled particles.  
Bell also provided equations to show that if ‘spooky action at a distance’ did not 
account for the apparent communication between entangled particles, then QM was 
not merely incomplete; it was wrong.  Moreover, Bell’s equations showed a way for 
this to be tested empirically.61  The phenomenon of ‘spooky action at a distance’ has 
since been confirmed empirically.62  What this shows is that the rules of quantum 
mechanics do seem to be inherently contradictory.  That is to say, the dynamical 
predictions of quantum mechanics (the deterministic evolution of the wavefunction 
described by the Schrödinger equation) are contradicted by what happens when we 
make measurements (the indeterministic rules that govern the collapse of the 
wavefunction).  The measurement problem is thus confirmed as the problem of 
quantum mechanics.  It is the problem of accounting for the relation between this 
collapse process and the dynamical predictions it seems to contradict.  
 
According to physicists, the explanation can only be one of three things. Bell 
outlined two of these in his famous statement about the measurement problem.  He 
said, ‘either the wavefunction as given by the Schrodinger equation is not everything 
or it’s not right.’  Some physicists maintain that ‘it’s not right’, because the probability 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Greene	  (2004),	  pp.80-­‐84.	  61	  Hence	  Bell	  turned	  the	  theoretical	  question	  into	  an	  experimental	  question.	  62	  Bell’s	  equations	  were	  first	  confirmed	  empirically	  by	  John	  Clauser	  and	  Alain	  Aspect	  in	  1972.	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wave collapses into a definite outcome as soon as we measure or observe it.63  This 
view implies that absolute simultaneity is involved when a measurement is made, as 
collapse affects entangled particles instantaneously regardless of the distance 
between them.  Others maintain that ‘it’s not everything;’ that is to say, there must 
be some hidden variables in play that are as yet unaccounted for.  This implies that 
quantum mechanics is still incomplete.  On this view, collapse is only something 
phenomenological.64  Neither option (being incomplete or mistaken) is satisfactory 
for quantum theory.  The third option is the Many Worlds interpretation of quantum 
mechanics.  According to the Many Worlds interpretation, the wavefunction as given 
by the Schrödinger equation is everything (is complete) and it is right.  This 
interpretation is also known as Everettian quantum mechanics or the Everettian 
interpretation.65 
 
According to Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) we do not live in a single 
universe with linear time.  Rather, we live in a multiverse, in which different times 
are actually different universes, billions of which are branching off at each moment; 
that is, each time an observation or measurement occurs.  EQM presents us with an 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is completely deterministic.  On this 
view, all Einstein’s worries about uncertainty are taken care of because there are no 
merely probable outcomes.  Instead, there are such an infinite number of these 
other universes (or times) that everything that can happen does happen.  The 
‘apparent’ collapse of the wavefunction is thus explained by the branching nature of 
the multiverse, which determines all outcomes. EQM therefore explains the 
relationship between apparently indeterminist rules that govern collapse and the 
dynamic predictions of quantum mechanics, by showing that in reality there is no 
collapse, and hence there is no conflict between the rules of quantum mechanics. 
As EQM is the only interpretation that properly explains the measurement problem, 
it is held to be our best current physics, and accordingly, all these other branches 
are held to be real.  Of course, this is contested by those who favour alternative 
interpretations of quantum mechanics. 
 
The point of this digression is to make it clear that what physics tells us about the 
fundamental structure of world (and hence time) is not a completely settled question.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  For	  example,	  Nils	  Bohr’s	  Copenhagen	  Interpretation.	  64	  This	  option	  does	  not	  rule	  out	  the	  possibility	  that	  absolute	  simultaneity	  might	  be	   involved	  in	  some	  way.	  	  65	  Based	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Hugh	  Everett	  III.	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This is not to say that any possible alternatives to the orthodox view (the view that 
we live in the four-dimensional spacetime manifold, as described by Einstein and 
Minkowski) are necessarily going to favour presentism.  Rather, it is to point out that 
those who are very quick to dismiss presentism as false, on the grounds that it 
conflicts with SR, need to bear in mind that whichever alternative metaphysical 
theory of time they favour, that theory might also not be standing on such firm 
scientific ground.  For example, if ‘in reality’ we live in a two-dimensional hologram 
universe, then the four-dimensional manifold is just an illusion.  In this case, 
eternalism would have no advantage over presentism, as far a science goes, and 
both theories would simply be left with the task of explaining the phenomenology of 
our temporal experience.  However, it is also possible that new discoveries in 
physics could favour presentism.  So what we can conclude from this is that as long 
as physics remains inconclusive as to the fundamental structure of reality, we 
should at least bear in mind that the orthodox view might not be the correct picture 
of reality.  As most non-presentists take compatibility with physics to be an 
advantage their theories enjoy, they should at least be aware that this might not be 
the case.  What our best current physics is telling us about the world might be quite 
different.  With these points made, let us move on to the methodology.  
 
1.13  Methodology 
 
In her paper ‘On methodology in the metaphysics of time’, Heather Dyke (2012) 
provides a thorough discussion of the desirable qualities a philosophical theory 
could have, listing their various merits and demerits.  Among the candidates for 
these qualities are coherence with current science, ontological parsimony, elegance, 
coherence with common sense beliefs, and coherence with ordinary language.  She 
concludes that coherence with common sense, coherence with ordinary language, 
and burden-of-proof strategies, do not in fact provide us with any means for settling 
metaphysical debates in the philosophy of time.66  Dyke explains that the burden-of-
proof strategy takes one theory to be the default position, and then works on the 
assumption that this theory is only to be abandoned in the face of overwhelming 
evidence.  She says that this strategy is not consistent with an investigation that 
aims at truth.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  In	  a	  burden-­‐of-­‐proof	  strategy,	  one	  party	  in	  the	  debate	  has	  a	  higher	  bar	  to	  reach	  than	  the	  other.	  	  Dyke	  (2012),	  p.168.	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Dyke then explains that both ordinary language and common sense are a result of 
evolutionary processes, which have given us adaptive representations of reality.  
Because of this, she argues that we should be cautious about appealing to common 
sense intuitions and ordinary language, as these things tell us more about how we 
conceptualize the world, rather than how the world is.  For example, in the debate 
about tense, she argues that although our belief that there is a difference between 
past, present and future motivates adaptive behaviours, such beliefs do not have to 
correspond to reality.  She therefore concludes that common sense intuitions about 
time and language are not good guides for establishing truth in the metaphysics of 
time, and that they are therefore not desirable qualities in metaphysical theories of 
time that aim at truth.  Dyke would no doubt approve of Einstein’s famous quote:  
 
Common sense is actually nothing more than a deposit of prejudices laid 
down in the mind prior to the age of eighteen.67        
  
Dyke insists that coherence with our best current science is the quality that should 
be given the most consideration when aiming to answer questions about time.  She 
says that the value of qualities such as parsimony and elegance can sometimes be 
rated above coherence with science, but this would only be when a theory was 
aiming at parsimony or elegance.  When it comes to aiming at truth, coherence with 
science should be the quality that gets prioritized.   
 
Not all philosophers agree with everything Dyke says.  There are some philosophers 
who maintain that our beliefs about the world lead us to debates about the language 
with which we describe the world, which in turn can settle metaphysical debates 
about the world.  Among these would be Mellor, Prior, and Goodman.   I am on the 
side of those who agree with Dyke on this point; that is to say, at least to the extent 
that considerations about language should not trump considerations about 
compatibility with our best current physics.68  However, this is not to deny that 
metaphysicians should want to be able to provide a logical representation of their 
theory, such that the ontological commitments of their theories are spelled out by 
formally compelling arguments. 69   Moreover, it is a legitimate question to ask 
whether it is a defect of a metaphysical theory if it cannot do this.  In the debate 
between presentists and non-presentists, these concerns become important when it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  Attributed	  to	  Einstein	  by	  Lincoln	  Barnett	  (1948).	  68	  This	  would	  include	  Markosian,	  Wuthrich,	  and	  James	  Ladyman.	  69	  	  By	  using	  tense	  logic,	  for	  example.	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comes to weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of various theories.  For 
example, some eternalists claim that Priorian tense logic is problematic for A-
theorists who have varying domains (i.e. presentists and growing blockers). 70  
However, I completely agree with Dyke that coherence with our best current science 
is a key desideratum if a metaphysical theory is aiming at truthful description of how 
things are in the world.   
 
Where I differ most from Dyke is in her views about common sense.  I agree that 
common-sense intuitions can often be very misleading and can also be based on 
accepted prejudices.  What I disagree about is completely writing-off coherence with 
common-sense intuitions as a desirable quality for a metaphysical theory, which 
aims at truth.  Instead, I think a more nuanced approach is called for.  This nuanced 
approach is also a more practical approach, as it allows for us to start with our 
common-sense opinions, even if we do not end up keeping all of them.  More 
specifically, this process is practical in the sense that we need to be given very clear 
reasons if we are to be persuaded to let go of our deeply held common-sense 
opinions.  We cannot just be told that they are wrong.  To explain why I think this, let 
us consider what David Lewis writes on this subject.  
 
According to Lewis, the role of metaphysics is to try and find ways of expanding our 
pre-existing opinions into an orderly system.  Lewis explains this as follows: 
 
One comes to philosophy already endowed with a stock of opinions.  It is not 
the business of philosophy either to undermine or to justify our pre-existing 
common-sense opinions, to any great extent, but only to try to discover ways 
of expanding them into an orderly system. … [Such an attempt at 
systematizing our opinions] succeeds to the extent that (1) it is systematic, 
and (2) it respects those of our pre-philosophical opinions to which we are 
firmly attached.  Insofar as it does better than any alternative we have 
thought of, we give it credence.  There is some give and take, but not too 
much: some of us sometimes change our minds on some given points of 
common opinion, if they conflict irremediably with a doctrine that commands 
our belief by its systematic beauty and its agreement with more important 
common doctrines. …   And so it is throughout metaphysics.71 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  	  See	  Sullivan	  (2016).	  	  71	  Lewis	  (1973),	  p.87.	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There are a number of points worth highlighting here.  First, it is worth noting here 
that for Lewis, when it came to thinking about possibilities, the process of 
‘expanding common sense opinions into an orderly system’ took him to conclusions 
that were not part of anyone’s ordinary common sense views; that is to say, his 
modal realism.  So Lewis himself is a clear example of a metaphysician who is 
prepared to let go of his previous common sense opinions if they appear to conflict 
with superior (or less negotiable) ones.  It is also worth noting that the process of 
systematizing common sense opinions took him to conclusions that were made 
independently of physics, but which have also recently become of interest to 
physicists.   What I mean is that just by doing metaphysics, Lewis came to hold a 
worldview that tells us that reality is radically different from the reality we think we 
inhabit.  And what is interesting is that Lewis’s modal realism has now become a 
point of discussion among theoretical physicists in their attempts to understand 
some of the consequences of the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics.  
For example, issues about counterparts, uniqueness, and personal identity.  
 
I take Lewis’ statement as a paradigm ‘mission statement’ for the methodology in 
this thesis.  This is how I understand it.  To ask whether presentism is a viable 
theory is not about trying to justify our common-sense ideas about time, or treat 
them as infallible.  Rather, it is to ask: can our common-sense ideas about time be 
expanded into an orderly system?  And if so, can that orderly system be rightfully 
called presentism?  (We address the question of whether these ideas can be 
reconciled with physics below.)  To see if it can, it needs to be systematic, which I 
take to mean that it must be internally consistent and coherent, and not 
contradictory.  It also must, as Lewis says, respect those of our pre-philosophical 
opinions to which we are firmly attached.  Here, alarm bells might start to ring of the 
‘burden-of-proof’ variety, which Dyke rejected.  However, I do not think this is what 
Lewis means.   
 
Lewis writes a practical paragraph, explaining that we have certain pre-philosophical 
opinions about how things are, and that these are what we are aiming to 
systematize.  He says that these opinons are important when it comes to 
distinguishing between versions of things that respect our opinions and those that 
do not.  For example, Lewis says ‘so long as it is my firm opinion, I must make a 
place for it when I do metaphysics’.  Here I take Lewis to mean that metaphysics 
must respect our pre-philosophical opinions, because we will not really have time for 
doctrines that deny them.  Hence it is a desideratum of a metaphysical theory that it 
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respects and properly considers pre-philosophical opinions, rather than simply 
dismissing them.  
  
Lewis explains this further in On the Plurality of Worlds.  He writes: 
 
Common sense has no absolute authority in philosophy. … It’s just that 
theoretical conservatism is the only sensible policy for theorists of limited 
powers. …  Part of this conservatism is a reluctance to accept theories that 
fly in the face of common sense.  But it is a matter of judgement.  Some 
common sense opinions are firmer than others, so the cost of denying 
common sense opinions differs from case to case. … It is not that a 
philosophical theory should agree with anything that the man on the street 
would insist on offhand. …  The proper test, I suggest, is a simple maxim of 
honesty: never put forward a philosophical theory that you yourself cannot 
believe in your least philosophical and most commonsensical moments.72  
 
(He adds, ‘the incredulous stare is a gesture that is meant to say that modal realism 
fails this test.’)   
 
As far as not conflicting irremediably with a doctrine ‘that commands our belief by its 
systematic beauty and its agreement with more important common doctrines’, I take 
this to mean that to be credible, a particular metaphysical theory should not conflict 
with one that is more credible in some relevant way.  However, part of being 
credible means not being incompatible with other accepted theories, such as 
scientific ones.  It is here that compatibility with physics must always be taken into 
account.    
 
So what we can conclude from all this is the following.  When it comes to providing a 
credible metaphysical theory of time, that theory should at least be compatible with 
our best current physics.  It should also, where possible, respect our common-sense 
opinions.  Where common-sense opinions come into conflict with one another, we 
should employ a cost-benefit approach to decide which opinions deserve to be 
favoured over others.   I have already indicated that what physics tells us about time 
is not a settled question, so these issues about common-sense opinions will 
become all the more important when it comes to seeing whether presentism does 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  Lewis	  (1986a),	  pp.134-­‐135.	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better than alternative theories of time in expanding our common-sense opinions 
into an orderly system.  Part of answering this question will involve seeing how 
presentism fares in face of the metaphysical objections it faces.  As we shall see, 
many presentists find themselves pushed into adopting views that are not so 
commonsensical in order to try and meet these objections.  These include accepting 
the existence of non-present times as abstract entities, or adopting some kind of 
Meinongian assumptions about existence predicates,73 or evoking some sort of 
ersatz B-series.74  As mentioned above, coherence with common sense is seen as 
one of presentism’s major advantages.  Without this, even if presentism can defend 
itself in the face of the objection from SR, it will be a less attractive option.   
 
1.14  The manifest image and the scientific image 
 
Some physicists (and some philosophers) are sceptical about the value of 
metaphysics in general; but they are particularly so when metaphysical theories 
concern issues that have to do with physics.  Part of this scepticism involves the 
idea that metaphysics is motivated by a concern not to let the gap become too wide 
between everyday experience and the ‘fundamental story about the world’ 
suggested by our best scientific theories.  For example, the fundamental story might 
include quite exotic things, such as quantum information, strings, points on a 
configuration space, and so on.  The sceptical complaint here is that metaphysics is 
motivated by a concern to avoid the philosophical problems that such gaps cause, 
and thus it involves a kind of backward-looking ‘save the appearances’ agenda.  
Science, on the other hand, is motivated by very different concerns; scientists are 
much more engaged in working out forward-looking schemes and theories, and the 
task of recovering ordinary things from these theories is not their primary concern.75  
 
This type of complaint is shortsighted for a number of reasons.  First of all, as we 
have already seen, when it comes to the gap between appearance and reality – or 
as Wilfrid Sellars calls it, the gap between ‘the manifest image’ and ‘the scientific 
image’ – ‘reality’ might not be so firmly established as scientists would like.  And 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  The	   idea	   that	   ‘there	   is’	   does	   not	   equal	   ‘there	   exists’;	   so	   there	  are	   some	   things	   that	   are	   not	  among	   the	   things	   that	   exist.	   	   As	  we	   shall	   see,	   some	  philosophers	   think	   such	   ideas	   are	  part	   of	  common	  sense.	  (e.g.	  Chisholm	  and	  Parsons.)	  	  74	  An	  ersatz	  B-­‐series	  is	  ‘an	  ordering	  of	  abstract	  times/representations	  that	  represents	  a	  genuine	  B-­‐series.	   	  Though	  standing	   in	   the	  equivalent	  of	  a	   temporal	  order,	  non-­‐present	   times	  are	  at	  no	  temporal	   distance	   from	   the	   present	   so	   they	   can	   be	   quantified	   over	   and	   serve	   as	   truthmakers	  right	  now.’	  	  (See	  Crisp,	  2007,	  p	  98.)	  75	  For	  an	  illustration	  of	  such	  a	  complaint,	  see	  postscript	  X	  in	  Many	  Worlds?	  (2014).	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independently of how firmly the scientific image is established, in seeking to 
understand the implications (i.e. for our ordinary intuitions) of such ‘gaps’ or 
differences between the two images, philosophers are not motivated by wanting to 
avoid philosophical trouble.  Rather philosophers are motivated to seek explanations, 
or what Sellars describes as wanting to know ‘how things hang together.’  Thus, 
according to Sellars, the aim of philosophers in general, and metaphysicians in 
particular, should be: ‘Knowing one’s way around with respect to the subject matters 
of all the special [scientific] disciplines and building bridges between them’.76  
 
In Sellars’ opinion, it is the scientific image that has the final say so.  However, this 
does not mean that a complete scientific account of the world does not have to 
explain things such as our experiences of change and transience (if science 
suggested these were illusory, for example).  Sellars took ‘things’ and ‘hang 
together’ to be understood in the broadest sense of those terms.  ‘Things’, therefore, 
does not just mean physical things, such as concrete particulars or scientific 
phenomena.  It also includes phenomenological things, such as our experience of 
living in a world where time passes and things change.  And it seems correct to say 
that our experience of change and passage needs explaining, even if ‘in reality’ 
there is no change or passage of time.  That is, we cannot deny that our experience 
is real (part of reality), even if change is not.  As Chris Wuthrich explains, ‘At the end 
of the day, a complete scientific account will have to explain our experiences as of 
change and as of transience.’77 
 
1.15  Why does this thesis question matter? 
 
Why does it matter whether presentism is defensible or not?  Metaphysical theories 
aim to tell us something true about the world, and metaphysical theories of time aim 
to tell us truths about the nature of time and the temporal reality we live in. 
Presentism is typically thought of as the common-sense view of time, because the 
picture of reality that it gives us seems to correspond to many of our ordinary 
temporal experiences.  As we have seen, these include our conscious experience of 
only existing at the present time, our experience of the present time being transient 
and future directed, our experience of effects never preceding their causes 
(assuming time is not circular).  If presentism is false, then at very least we are 
going to need alternative explanations of some of our everyday experiences, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  Sellars	  (1962)	  77	  Wuthrich	  (2012),	  p.	  448.	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also whether these alternative explanations require us to give up some of our 
ordinary beliefs about time and what it is to exist at a time.  This question should at 
least be important for anyone who is interested in whether temporal reality is the 
way it appears to be.   
  
It may be that alternative theories of time can provide acceptable explanations of 
our common sense opinions about time and existing in time.  But this needs to be 
shown.  Some of the objections to presentism are also objections to the A-theory, so 
if these objections are successful, we need to be clear about to what extent (if any) 
a B-theoretic picture of reality preserves our common-sense opinions about time.  
Most people are not willing to accept that they have temporal parts, or that change 
is merely variation in a four-dimensional manifold, for example.  And if other times 
and their contents are just as real as the present, we need to be clear about what 
the implications of this are for many of our other common-sense opinions.  Such as, 
life and death, free will and so on.  The point is that anyone interested in the truth 
about the world we live in should want to know whether time is real or illusory, and 
whether other times are just as real as the present, and what the implications of this 
might mean.  For the final section of this chapter, I want to consider the reasons why 
presentism is thought to be the common sense view of time. 
 
1.16  Time on the Clapham Omnibus 
 
In the thesis abstract I wrote the following: although he does not know it, the man on 
the Clapham Omnibus is a presentist.  Or more accurately, the man on the Clapham 
omnibus has ideas about time, which (at least) imply much of presentism.  In this 
final section I want to support this claim, by spelling out which of our common sense 
ideas about time imply much of presentism.  To do this, let us imagine that ‘the man 
on the Clapham omnibus’ really is an individual man, who is on the bus making his 
way to work on a Monday morning through the London traffic.  What might his 
thoughts tell us about our intuitive and pre-theoretic ideas about time? 
 
Perhaps he is tired and wishes it were a bank holiday so he could spend the day at 
home, or that it was already Friday instead of Monday.  Or perhaps he anticipates a 
difficult meeting that afternoon, and wishes that it were already over.  As the bus 
crawls along in unusually heavy traffic, he might wish that he could go back in time 
and start his journey fifteen minutes earlier, or that he had taken the tube instead.  
And as he checks his watch, he might think that by now his children will be at school 
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and some of his colleagues will already be arriving at work.  As the bus comes to a 
standstill, he might wish that time would stand still too, so that he would not be late.  
Or he might deliberate about whether it would be quicker to get off and walk.  And 
as the seconds seem to drag by, perhaps he turns his thoughts to the wedding he 
attended at the weekend, and reflects upon how much some of his old friends have 
changed since he last saw them, and how nice it would be to see them more often.   
 
These typical thoughts tell us a number of things concerning our intuitive ideas 
about time.  A useful way to bring out these ideas is to contrast our thinking about 
time from our thinking about space.  The first contrast we shall consider is between 
temporal location and spatial location.  Initially, there is an obvious similarity 
between our spatial location and our temporal location; namely, that once we are 
located at a particular time and a particular place, we no longer have the option to 
be anywhere or ‘anywhen’ else; that is to say, at a different place and a different 
time.  Thus, if I am here now (in London at 8.50am on Monday), I cannot be there 
now (in Paris at 8.50am on Monday).  So we can only be in one place at one time.    
 
However, this is where the similarity ends.  For we can choose whether to be in one 
place or another (at a given time), whereas there does not seem to be something 
analogous to that for time.   For example, suppose that at 8.50am on Monday our 
man on the bus is stuck in traffic at Hyde Park Corner.  Although he cannot now be 
anywhere else, he could have been somewhere else.  For example, he could have 
been in his office in Trafalgar Square by now (had he chosen to travel by tube), or at 
home (were it a bank holiday), or at a meeting in Paris.  However, he could not 
choose to be located at any time other than the present.  This is because wherever 
else he might have been (at home, at work, or in Paris), he would still find himself 
located there ‘now’, or at the present.  So this is one way in which being temporally 
present is different from being spatially present.  We can choose our spatial location 
from a vast amount of options, but in the temporal case we only seem to have one 
option; namely, to be located in the present.   
 
The second point about location is one we have already considered.  This concerns 
the existence of other places.  The man on the bus does not think that the place 
where he happens to be is the only place that exists, just because he is located 
there.  For example, he does not think that Paris does not exist, just because he is 
in London.  Such a view would not only be extremely egocentric, it would also have 
radical implications for other places and the people and things located at them; 
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namely, it would imply that they did not exist when they were not spatially present.  
This is clearly not part of our intuitive thinking about existence.  Instead, when he 
thinks of other places throughout the world, he thinks of them - at that very moment 
- existing on a par with his current location.  And likewise for the people located at 
those places; he thinks of them as existing now, at the same time as himself.  So it 
is part of our intuitive thinking about space to think that people and places that are 
not spatially present exist on a par with people and places that are spatially present.  
Hence, there is nothing unique (or ontologically privileged) about the existence of 
our present spatial location. 
 
Our intuitive thoughts about time, however, are very different.  Although the man on 
the bus thinks that other places exist on a par with his present spatial location, he 
does not think the same about other times.  For example, he would not be puzzled 
by the phrase ‘kangaroos exist, but not here’, but he would be puzzled by the 
phrase ‘dodos exist, but not now’.  This is because unlike spatially non-present 
entities, we intuitively think of merely past entities as things that no longer exist, and 
merely future entities as things that do not exist yet.  (When the eternalist says 
‘Socrates no longer exists’ and ‘Martian outposts do not exist yet’, she understands 
such expressions in terms of domain restriction within a larger domain of 
permanently existing objects.  In contrast, the man on the bus assigns no sense to 
expressions such as ‘exists, but no longer exists’, or ‘exists, but does not yet exist’.)  
So, unlike being located ‘here’, which merely describes reality from our own 
perspective, the man on the bus thinks that being located ‘now’ describes how 
reality is itself, independently of our particular perspective.  So, intuitively, we think 
that the distinction between the privileged present and other times reflects a genuine 
ontological distinction in the world.  Hence the reason that the man on the bus has 
no choice about his temporal location is not because he lacks the means to travel to 
other times.  Rather, it is because those other times do not exist as destinations to 
travel to in the first place.78  So it is part of our common-sense view of time that the 
present exists in some important sense in which both the past and the future do not.  
 
Nevertheless, he might think that there is another sense in which the past ‘exists’, 
and in which the future does not.  He might think the past exists because he can 
remember it, or because the past is something that has already happened, and in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  For	  example,	  Markosian	  says	  that	  choosing	  to	  get	  into	  a	  time	  machine	  and	  leaving	  the	  present	  would	   amount	   to	   an	   act	   of	   suicide.	   	   (In	  discussion	   at	  PERSP	  Workshop	  on	  the	  As	  and	  Bs	   in	  the	  
Philosophy	  of	  Time,	  Barcelona	  19-­‐20	  September	  2013.)	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that sense is fixed.  But even if he thinks that the past exists in this sense, he is 
unlikely to think that past things exist, or that past events are happening.  For 
example, suppose that when the bus finally arrives at Trafalgar Square, he thinks 
about the Battle of Trafalgar.  When he thinks of that battle, he thinks of it as 
something that happened in the past; he does not think that it is happening off the 
coast of Spain, in an earlier temporal location.  Similarly, when he thinks of Admiral 
Nelson, he thinks of him as someone who existed in the past.  He does not think 
that Nelson exists in the way that he himself exists, albeit in another temporal 
location; rather he thinks of Nelson as someone who ceased to exist over two 
centuries ago, and hence no longer has any actual (physical) temporal location.  
(Again, he might be happy to accept as true statements such as ‘Queen Victoria and 
Queen Elizabeth II exist at different times’, but he is unlikely to think that they exist 
in the same way, albeit at different temporal locations.) So although there is a 
respect in which he might think the past exists, there is also an important respect in 
which we intuitively think that the present (and/or its contents) exists, whereas both 
the future and the past (and/or their contents) do not.  The difference between ‘now’ 
and ‘then’ does not seem to be about a perspective from his own temporal location, 
but rather reflects a difference in reality itself. 
 
This difference between ‘now’ and ‘then’ does not just concern the existence of 
people who no longer exist (like Admiral Nelson), or the occurrence of events that 
are no longer happening (like the Battle of Trafalgar).  It also concerns the existence 
of people who presently exist and the occurrence of events that are presently 
happening.  In the case of people who presently exist, when the man on the bus 
thinks back to the wedding he attended at the weekend, he does not think that he 
(or a temporal part of him) is at the wedding.  That is to say, he does not think that a 
‘past part’ of him exists at a different temporal location (a ‘last Saturday’ location) 
and is celebrating along with ‘past parts’ of his friends and family.  Rather, he thinks 
of himself, and his family and friends, as people who exist at, and only at, whichever 
time is present.  So when Saturday was present, he existed at that temporal location 
and no-when else, and now that Monday is present, he exists then and no-when 
else.  It is not part of our ordinary thoughts about what it is to exist at a time to think 
of ourselves as objects that persist by being ‘spread out’ over time.  Rather, we think 
of ourselves as a ‘complete’ object that exists at, and only at, the present moment.   
 
In contrast, it is more normal to think of an event as something that is spread out 
over time.  Events are not normally thought of as things that exist; rather they are 
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things that happen; and most events have a number of different stages that happen 
over time.  A football match, for example, has a first half, a second half, injury time 
and so on.  While the football match is being played, there is a sense in which we 
can say that that event ‘as a whole’ is happening.  But there is also another sense in 
which only a part of it is happening; the part that is happening now, which is why we 
say at half time that the first half is over and the second half is yet to be played.  
Most events are too big to fit into the present.  The man on the bus might think of his 
life as an event which spreads out across time, and that it is an event that is 
happening now.  But as the whole event that is his life as a whole is too big to fit into 
the present, there is only one part of that larger event that is happening now.   
Moreover, the man on the bus clearly thinks of himself as one and the same 
individual who exists at all of the various stages of his life.  But as these stages are 
only happening when they are present, he exists when, and only when, they are 
present.  His life is an event that has different stages spread out across time; he 
does not think of himself as an individual who is spread out across time.  So at each 
stage of his life, he is wholly present when that stage is present, rather than a part of 
him being present when that stage is present.  
 
The man on the bus has other intuitive ideas about the contrasts between time and 
space.  These concern the direction of time, the order of time, and the pace at which 
time passes.  In each case, it appears that we have a single option with time, and 
multiple options with space.   For example, we can only move forwards in time, 
whereas we can move in any spatial direction.  Time appears to flow at the same 
rate for everyone, whereas we can move through space at different rates and also 
remain at a single location for some time.   And with time, one moment follows the 
next in a strict order, whereas in space we can travel from A to B by many different 
routes and return to the same location again and again.  However, as these 
differences are independent of the presentism/eternalism debate, they do not 
support my claim that our intuitive ideas about time imply much of presentism.  I 
shall therefore not elaborate these differences between space and time.   
 
What all this shows is this.  Although ordinary people may have ideas about time 
that are in some respects underdetermined (such as the idea that past entities might 
exist ‘in some sense’ which future entities do not), they nevertheless have ideas 
about time that largely concur with presentism.  This is because the man on the 
Clapham omnibus typically thinks of space and time in very different ways.  For 
example, unlike spatial locations, he thinks that for each moment that is present, 
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that moment or ‘now’ is unique, because it has never been present before, and will 
never be present again.  Hence, his view of time is largely a Newtonian one, 
according to which there is a unique and privileged present moment, which divides 
the past from the future.79  On this view, time ticks away uniformly for everyone 
everywhere, and as it does it carries us from a fixed past into an open future.  I 
therefore conclude that presentism is the pre-theoretic common-sense view of time.  
If we follow Lewis in his explanation of what a metaphysical theory should do, it is 
these pre-theoretic common-sense intuitions about time that we are to try and 
systematize.  That is to say, it is these common-sense opinions about time that we 
will aim to organize into an orderly system.  Once we have done this, we will be in a 
position to see which of these common-sense opinions (if any) we will have to let go 
of in order to have a credible metaphysical theory of time.  At that point, we will be in 
a position to clearly see whether presentism really is the common-sense view of 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  Although	  they	  have	  probably	  heard	  something	  about	  relativity	  theory,	  most	  non-­‐philosophers	  typically	  do	  not	  think	  that	  what	  is	  ‘now’	  from	  their	  own	  perspective,	  is	  just	  one	  of	  many	  equally	  valid	  alternative	  perspectives	  about	  what	  is	  ‘now’.	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Chapter Two.  McTaggart’s Paradox and the A-Theory and 
the B-Theory 
 
2.1  Introduction  
 
In the last chapter we briefly introduced the standard positions in the metaphysics of 
time (eternalism, semi-eternalism and presentism), and the A-theory of time and B-
theory of time.  In the next chapter we explain in more detail what the non-presentist 
metaphysical theories of time are, spelling out their motivations and ontological 
commitments.  The purpose of this will be to gain a clearer understanding of what 
the dispute between presentism and its opponents is really about.  Understanding 
what these non-presentist theories are committed to is important, as presentism can 
only be properly understood in terms of what it will not accept.  However, in order to 
understand these different metaphysical theories of time, and the disputes between 
them, we first need to understand the way in which these theories are motivated by 
the distinction between the A-theory of time and the B-theory of time (hereafter the 
A-theory and the B-theory).  And in order to properly understand the A-theory and 
the B-theory, we need to understand how these theories have developed as 
responses to McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time (known as McTaggart’s 
paradox).  Hence the purpose of this chapter is to examine McTaggart’s paradox, 
and consider some A- and B-theoretic responses to that paradox.1  We also explain 
the relationship between the A- and B-theory and the positions known as tense-
realism and anti-realism about tense.  This sets the background for the next chapter, 
where we focus on non-presentist metaphysical theories of time.2  I shall now say 
something about the structure and content of this chapter.  
 
Part one contains a discussion of McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time, 
and considers some of the metaphysical background to that argument.  In this 
context, we also introduce McTaggart’s C-series. 3  The C-series will be explained 
further when we briefly consider arguments for timelessness in Chapter 3.   Part two 
explains how the A-theory and the B-theory have developed from McTaggart’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  In	  many	   respects,	   the	   examination	   of	   the	   A-­‐theory	   and	   B-­‐theory,	   as	   responses	   to	   the	   issues	  raised	  by	  McTaggart’s	  paradox,	  continues	  throughout	  the	  thesis.	  	  2	  This	   includes:	   theories	  of	   timelessness;	  B-­‐theoretic	  eternalism,	  known	  as	   the	  block	  universe;	  A-­‐theoretic	  versions	  of	  eternalism,	  such	  as	  the	  Moving	  Spotlight	  and	  Williamsonian	  presentism;	  and	  semi-­‐eternalism,	  such	  as	  the	  Growing	  Block	  and	  the	  Shrinking	  Tree.	  3	  According	  to	  McTaggart,	  the	  C-­‐series	  is	  the	  non-­‐temporal	  series	  of	  events,	  which	  belongs	  to	  the	  timeless	  reality	  in	  which	  we	  live.	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original distinction between the A-series of time and the B-series of time; and in 
particular, how they have developed as attempts to avoid McTaggart’s conclusion 
that time is unreal.  Understanding McTaggart’s paradox enables us to see how the 
distinction between the A-theory and the B-theory motivates some major fault lines 
in the metaphysics of time.  These include debates about the nature of change, how 
to understand temporal passage, and the reality (or otherwise) of tense.  As we shall 
see, the debate about tense is not merely seen as a semantic debate about the 
language with which we describe the world.  Rather, it involves a metaphysical 
debate about whether the world is such that it can only be completely and 
accurately described using a tensed language.  For example, whether temporal 
reality is fundamentally constituted by tensed facts (facts that are true at one time 
and false at another), or merely by tenseless facts (facts that are permanent and 
eternally true).  We shall also see that the distinction between realism about tense 
and anti-realism about tense does not always map neatly onto the distinction 
between the A-theory and the B-theory.  I shall now say something more about the 
debate about tense. 
 
A-theorists claim that the world is such that there is a fundamental distinction 
between the past, the present and the future.  According to A-theorists, this is 
because the present is objectively and ‘metaphysically privileged’ in some way that 
past and future times are not.4  Moreover, A-theorists claim that because time is 
dynamic, objects and events are only present temporally.  It follows from this, for the 
A-theorist, that to adequately express some of the ways in which things in the world 
change, we need to use tense.  That is, we need to distinguish ways an object is 
(objectively) from ways it was or will be.5  For example, the world is such that 
Elizabeth II is Queen, but she was not always Queen, and will not always be Queen.  
(As will be explained, this is standardly thought to commit A-theorists to using 
primitive tense operators, in order to express what was or will be the case.6)  Thus 
A-theorists are realists about tense, as they claim that tense is a feature of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Being	   ‘metaphysically	   privileged’	   does	   not	   necessarily	  mean	   being	   ‘ontologically	   privileged’.	  	  Hence	  I	  shall	  use	  the	  term	  ‘metaphysically	  privileged’	  to	  distinguish	  between	  two	  views.	  	  1)	  The	  present	   is	   metaphysically	   privileged,	   but	   not	   ontologically	   privileged	   (i.e.	   it	   is	   merely	  metaphysically	  privileged).	  	  2)	  The	  present	  is	  both	  metaphysically	  and	  ontologically	  privileged.	  	  As	   we	   shall	   see,	   different	   A-­‐theorists	   have	   different	   accounts	   of	   what	   makes	   the	   present	  
metaphysically	  privileged.	  5 	  As	   opposed	   to	   the	   B-­‐theoretic	   idea	   that	   change	   is	   adequately	   captured	   by	   a	   tenseless	  description.	  	  6	  This	   is	   because	   the	  A-­‐theorist	   cannot	   give	   a	   complete	   account	   of	   how	   things	  were	   or	  will	  be	  different	  at	  other	  times	  in	  tenseless	  terms.	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extra-linguistic world, and not merely a feature of language.  That is to say, the 
representational function of tense is to pick out some objective feature of reality. 
 
According to A-theorists, a tenseless, or B-theoretic description of reality, cannot 
account for ‘genuine’ change in the world, because it leaves out this dynamic 
component of reality.  A-theorists often express this dynamism in the following way: 
the most accurate complete description of the world right now is true, but it has not 
always been true, and it will not always be true.7   As we shall see, different A-
theorists explain this dynamic aspect of reality in different ways; either in terms of 
some sort of tensed or ‘A-property’ change, or things coming into existence and 
going out of existence, or in terms of the unfixity of the future.8  However, despite 
their differences, all A-theorists agree that tensed properties and tensed facts are 
not merely perspectival, or time-relational, and that change cannot be explained 
merely in terms of some kind of variation in the manifold or space-time block.  
 
In contrast, the B-theorist denies that there is an objective distinction between the 
present and other times.  For the B-theorist, space and time are both held to be 
parts of the manifold, which is typically understood as the four-dimensional space-
time block described by Einstein and Minkowski.9  On this view, all locations in the 
spacetime manifold exist on a par.  This latter claim (that all times exist on a par) is 
something the eternalist A-theorist agrees with.  However, what the eternalist A-
theorist and B-theorist disagree about is the extent to which time is thought to be 
like space.  For example, the B-theorist claims that objects in the manifold are 
extended in time, in much the same way as objects are normally held to be 
extended in space.10  More specifically, the B-theorist holds that just as there is no 
objective ‘here’ or ‘there’ when it comes to spatial location, so too is there no 
objective ‘now’ or ‘then’ when it comes to temporal location.  Hence the B-theorist 
denies that there is an objective or metaphysically privileged present viewpoint 
within the manifold.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  This	  view,	  known	  as	  propositional	  temporalism,	   is	   the	  view	  that	  the	  world	   is	  such	  that	  some	  propositions	  can	  change	  their	  truth-­‐value,	  and	  hence	  that	  some	  truths	  are	  not	  eternally	  true.	  8	  Or	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  ‘shrinking	  tree’	  dynamism	  involves	  some	  sort	  of	  branch	  attrition.	  9	  A	  manifold	   is	   a	   space,	   which	  may	   be	   curved,	   and	   have	   a	   complicated	   topology,	   but	   in	   local	  regions	   looks	   just	   like	   flat	   Euclidian	   space	   (i.e.	   three-­‐dimensional	   space).	   	   The	   manifold	  described	  by	  Einstein	   and	  Minkowski	  merges	   the	   three	   spatial	   dimensions	  with	   the	   temporal	  dimension,	  giving	  us	  a	  four-­‐dimensional	  spacetime.	  	  However,	  a	  manifold	  could	  also	  have	  more	  than	  four	  dimensions.	  	  For	  example,	  string	  theory	  suggests	  there	  are	  eleven	  dimensions.	  	  10	  ‘Objects’	   here	  means	  what	  Austin	   calls	   ‘medium-­‐sized	   dry	   goods’,	  which	   exist	   at	  more	   than	  one	  time.	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According to the B-theorist, objects (and events) located at different regions of the 
manifold are related by tenseless relations, such as being earlier- or later-than one 
another; and objects located at the same region of the manifold are related by the 
tenseless relation simultaneous-with.  The key feature of these tenseless B-relations 
is that they are permanent.  For example, it is always the case that Queen Victoria’s 
reign is later-than Queen Anne’s reign, and earlier-than that of Queen Elizabeth II.  
As tenseless B-relations are permanent relations, the B-theorist cannot appeal to 
their being either lost or gained in order to give an account of change.  Instead, the 
B-theorist explains change in terms of variation within the manifold.  For example, B-
theorists standardly claim either that Elizabeth stands in not-Queen-at relation to t1 
and the Queen-at relation to t2, or that Elizabeth has a temporal part that has the 
property not-Queen at t1 and a different temporal part that has the property is Queen 
at t2.11  On either account, the fundamental temporal characteristics an object has 
are the characteristics it always has.12  Thus for the B-theorist, change does not 
involve distinguishing how an object is (simpliciter) from how it was or will be; rather 
it involves distinguishing how an object is (simpliciter) with respect to different parts 
of the manifold.  As all change is ultimately explained in terms of some sort of 
variation, the B-theorist claims that an adequate account of change, and the 
passage of time, can be given in purely tenseless terms. 
 
The tenseless picture of reality the B-theorist gives us is one in which locations in 
the spacetime manifold are like positions on a map; this tenseless ‘map’ being both 
complete and unchanging.  This is because it is standardly assumed that the B-
series provides a complete linear ordering of events; and hence, for all events, it is 
fixed whether one is earlier-than, later-than, or at the same time as, every other 
event.13  The B-theorist therefore claims that all the temporal facts are available to 
be grasped from a completely impartial or ‘temporally neutral’ viewpoint.  On this 
view, any temporal facts that involve ascribing tensed properties to events or objects 
from within the time series, merely describe the subjective viewpoint of an observer 
within the time series, but they do not describe reality itself.  Hence according to B-
theorists, all tensed statements have tenseless truth-conditions.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Advocates	  of	  the	  temporal	  parts	  view	  claim	  that	  this	  provides	  an	  adequate	  account	  of	  change,	  as	  it	  allows	  that	  an	  object	  can	  have	  different	  intrinsic	  properties	  at	  different	  times.	   	  A-­‐theorists	  deny	  this	  is	  genuine	  change,	  since	  different	  temporal	  parts	  have	  these	  properties	  permanently.	  12	  Mellor	   is	   a	   B-­‐theorist	   who	   tries	   to	   combine	   B-­‐theoretic	   variation	   with	   endurantism.	   	   We	  consider	  this	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  13	  However,	  note	  that	  tenselessness	  is	  independent	  of	  linearity.	  	  Thus,	  one	  could	  hold	  that	  reality	  is	  tenseless	  and	  that	  time	  is	  circular.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  earlier-­‐than	  relation	  would	  not	  provide	  a	  strict	  ordering	  of	  events.	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When it comes to explaining how tense in ordinary language can be explained in 
terms of a tenseless reality, B-theorists have various strategies.  Tensed language 
involves distinguishing between past, present and future, and the present is typically 
the reference point from which tensed statements are evaluated.14  What the B-
theorist needs to show is that our use of tense in language does not mean that the 
extra-linguistic world is tensed in some important way.  Or to put it another way, the 
B-theorist needs to show that tense is merely a feature of language.  As will be 
explained, some B-theorists have attempted to eliminate all tense from language, by 
providing tenseless translations of the tensed sentences in ordinary language.  
Other B-theorists accept that tense cannot be eliminated from ordinary language 
and thought.  These B-theorists either deny the existence of tensed facts, or hold 
that tensed facts are merely perspectival, and are thus ultimately reduced to and 
made true by tenseless truth-conditions, or tenseless truthmakers.  However, what 
unites all B-theorists is the claim that because tenseless truths are the only truths 
there (ultimately) are, the ultimate true description of reality is not subject to change.  
 
By the end of this chapter we should have a clearer understanding of McTaggart’s 
argument for the unreality for time, and how the A-theory and the B-theory have 
developed as responses to McTaggart’s paradox, and how realism and anti-realism 
about tense relate to the A-theory and the B-theory.  These issues will come into 
sharper focus in Chapter 3, where we examine the different metaphysical theories of 
time, and consider the various alliances between them and the A-theory and the B-
theory.  As we shall see, the semantic debate about tense does not map neatly onto 
the ontological debate between the various metaphysical theories of time.  Let us 
now consider McTaggart’s argument.  
 
Part 1.  McTaggart’s Paradox and the A-series and the B-series 
 
J. M. E. McTaggart’s 1908 argument ‘The Unreality of Time’ set the agenda for 
many of the contemporary debates in the metaphysics of time.15  The radical 
conclusion of McTaggart’s argument is that nothing can exist in time.  Although 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  More	   accurately,	   statements	   involving	   absolute	   tense	   (e.g.	   was,	   is,	   will	   be)	   involve	   a	   direct	  reference	   to	   the	   present.	   	   Statements	   involving	   relative	   tense	   (e.g.	   ‘she	   had	   done	   x’),	   refer	   to	  times	  other	  than	  the	  present.	  	  However	  they	  involve	  an	  indirect	  reference	  to	  the	  present,	  since	  something	  that	  is	  past	  in	  the	  past,	  is	  nevertheless	  still	  past	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  present.	  15	  Some	   contemporary	   debates	   in	   the	   metaphysics	   of	   time	   are	   not	   directly	   connected	   to	  McTaggart’s	  argument.	  	  These	  include	  issues	  informed	  by	  physics,	  such	  as	  the	  topology	  of	  time,	  the	  direction	  of	  time,	  and	  the	  relationism-­‐substantivalism	  debate.	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nearly all philosophers reject this conclusion, establishing what is wrong with his 
argument continues to be a matter of dispute, between both A-theorists and B-
theorists, and between presentists and non-presentists.  McTaggart’s argument is 
rather like a philosophical Pandora’s box, releasing a host of difficult issues that 
continue to plague the philosophy of time.  These issues include questions about 
the nature and reality of time, change, tense, temporal becoming, and temporal 
properties and relations.  McTaggart also reformulated and extended his original 
1908 argument, and this was published posthumously in The Nature Of Existence 
(volume 2) in 1927.  It is important to note that McTaggart is an idealist philosopher, 
who makes a significant distinction between appearance and reality.  Hence, to 
properly understand his arguments about time, these need to be understood within 
the context of this distinction.  We can see the relevance of this distinction between 
appearance and reality by briefly considering the content and overall structure of 
The Nature of Existence (hereafter NE).  This provides some valuable (and often 
overlooked) background to McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time. 
 
2.2  The background metaphysics 
 
In the first volume of NE, McTaggart presents what he takes to be a priori 
arguments about ontology.  He takes these arguments to establish the nature of 
what it is to be real and to exist in absolute reality (reality as it is in itself), as 
opposed to apparent reality (how things appear).  McTaggart’s arguments are just 
summarized here.  McTaggart argues that nothing can be real unless it exists; 
hence existence and reality coincide.16  He also argues that everything in existence 
(and hence in reality) is constituted by substances that possess properties and hold 
relations.17  According to McTaggart there are multiple substances, each of which 
can be differentiated into proper parts that are also substances.  A number of things 
follow from this.  First, there are no real but non-existent entities, such as abstract 
propositions or abstract facts.18  Instead, McTaggart thinks that facts are substances, 
which exist and possess properties or stand in relations to other existing things or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  McTaggart	  (1927)	  vol.	  2,	  chapter	  2,	  section	  6.	  17	  Ibid.,	   chapter	   4-­‐6.	   	   For	  McTaggart,	   a	   substance	   is	   anything	   that	   is	   able	   to	   have	   any	   kind	   of	  property	  and	  stand	  in	  any	  kind	  of	  relation.	  	  	  A	  substance	  need	  not	  be	  a	  material	  entity.	  18	  McTaggart	   is	   reluctant	   to	   accept	   the	   existence	   of	   propositions.	   	   In	   his	   argument	   for	   the	  unreality	  of	  time,	  he	  postulates	  the	  existence	  of	  tensed	  propositions,	  but	  this	  is	  only	  for	  the	  sake	  of	   conditional	   arguments.	   	   He	   does	   not	   think	   such	   propositions	   exist.	   	  McTaggart	   thinks	   that	  propositional	  content	  only	  exists	  as	  qualitative	  states	  of	  mind,	  or	  ‘beliefs’,	  which	  are	  states	  of	  a	  substance.	  	  He	  describes	  such	  beliefs	  as	  ‘psychical	  facts’.	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substances.19   Hence for McTaggart, a fact is an existing state of affairs, as 
opposed to a truth about an existing state of affairs.20  Secondly, there can be no 
non-actual things.  For example, if things were real but non-existent, those things 
would be non-actual; but for McTaggart, as existence and reality coincide, 
everything is actual.21  Thirdly, as the only way to be real is to exist, reality must 
exist in its entirety.  Hence absolute reality exists as a perfect and complete whole.22 
 
In the second volume of NE, McTaggart considers the consequences of this 
ontology for empirical matters, such as time.  Here, he takes these empirical 
considerations to be established by a phenomenological analysis, rather than an 
ontological or a priori one.  His arguments about time therefore begin with the 
empirical observation that everything appears to be in time.  However, what 
McTaggart wants to know is whether these empirical considerations about the 
nature of time (how reality appears in present experience), are compatible with the 
nature of existence of absolute reality, which he takes to be established a priori. 
 
Given McTaggart’s ideas about ontology, there are a number of things that he is 
presupposing in his arguments about time.  For example, when McTaggart talks 
about time, he sometimes characterises this in terms of relations holding between 
various times.  However, given McTaggart’s ontology, if there are such things as 
relations holding between times, this can only be because there are substances 
located at various times, which stand in those temporal relations.23  Similarly, if there 
are temporal properties, this is only because there are substances located at 
various times, which possess these properties.  McTaggart calls these temporally 
located substances ‘events’.  Thus, according to McTaggart, if time is real, it is 
dependent on the temporal relations between existing substances (events) located 
at various times, and the temporal properties possessed by those events. 24 
Moreover, for McTaggart, a substance possessing a property, or standing in certain 
relations, is what constitutes a fact.  Thus temporal facts can only exist if the 
different events, which possess temporal properties or stand in temporal relations, 
exist.  In his arguments about time, McTaggart therefore assumes eternalism (or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Ibid.,	   Chapter	   2.	   	   For	  McTaggart,	   facts	   do	   not	   belong	   to	   a	   distinct	   category	   of	   entities	   from	  substances,	  qualities	  and	  relations.	  20	  See	  Ingthorsson	  (2016),	  p.	  16.	  21	  McTaggart	   says,	   ‘there	   is	   nothing	   which	   makes	   it	   necessary	   for	   us	   to	   accept	   the	   reality	   of	  propositions,	  or	  of	  non-­‐existent	  characteristics,	  facts,	  or	  possibilities.’	  (1927)	  vol.	  1,	  §36.	  22	  Ingthorsson	  (Ibid.),	  p.69.	  23	  For	  McTaggart,	  a	  static	  set	  of	  simultaneous	  events	  would	  not	  constitute	  a	  time	  series.	  24	  See	  Ingthorsson	  (1999),	  p.4.	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temporal parity) from the outset; the view that all times, events, and facts exist on a 
par.25  This is because eternalism is the only ontological account that could be 
consistent with McTaggart’s account of absolute reality, which exists as a complete 
whole.  Keeping this assumption of temporal party in mind is key to understanding 
McTaggart’s paradox. 
 
As we shall see below, McTaggart’s empirical considerations about the nature of 
time turn out to be incompatible with his ontological views about the nature of 
existence. In line with his idealism, he therefore concludes that reality is both 
timeless and immaterial, or ‘spiritual’.  McTaggart also denies the possibility of 
change, and that of any genuine temporal distinctions.  He therefore claims that the 
appearances of such things are misperceptions.  McTaggart’s argument for the 
unreality of time therefore raises issues about the nature of time, change and tense, 
which continue in contemporary debates between A-theorists and B-theorists.  Let 
us now examine his argument for the unreality of time in detail.  
 
2.3  McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time 
 
McTaggart distinguished between two ways of characterizing events as they are 
ordered in time.26  He called these the A-series and the B-series.  Events in the A-
series are ordered in respect of what he calls ‘A-characteristics.’  These include 
characteristics such as being past, present, future, yesterday, two weeks ago, next 
year, and so on.  A-characteristics are typically referred to as A-properties.27  A key 
feature of the A-series is that A-characteristics can only be ascribed to events in 
relation to some time, which is specified as the present.28  For example, ‘yesterday’ 
can only be ascribed from the perspective of the present day, ‘next week’ from the 
perspective of the present week, and ‘last century’ from the perspective of the 
present century.  The notion of the present thus plays a key role in the A-series, as it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  See	  again	  footnote	  19	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  facts.	  26	  McTaggart	  also	  distinguished	  a	  non-­‐temporal	  series,	  the	  C-­‐series.	  	  As	  is	  explained	  below,	  this	  is	  a	  timeless	  series	  of	  ordered	  perceptions,	  which	  is	  misperceived	  as	  a	  temporal	  series.	  	  	  27	  Not	   all	  A-­‐theorists	   accept	   that	   there	   are	   such	   things	   as	   tensed	  or	   ‘A-­‐properties.’	   	   As	  will	   be	  explained,	  in	  Prior’s	  tense	  logic,	  significant	  tenses	  are	  represented	  by	  sentential	  operators,	  such	  as	  ‘it	  was	  the	  case	  that’	  &	  ‘it	  will	  be	  the	  case	  that’.	  	  Prior	  uses	  these	  tense	  operators	  to	  replace	  A-­‐predicates	  in	  his	  talk	  about	  non-­‐present	  entities.	  	  Ersatzer	  presentists	  also	  deny	  the	  existence	  of	  tensed	  properties,	  claiming	  instead	  that	  there	  are	  ersatz	  B-­‐times.	  28	  Ascriptions	  of	  A-­‐characteristics	  always	  involve	  reference	  to	  the	  present.	  	  For	  example,	  even	  an	  ascription	  such	  as	   ‘the	  future	  of	  the	  future’,	  which	  does	  not	  involve	  an	  explicit	  reference	  to	  the	  present,	  will	  nevertheless	  involve	  an	  implicit	  reference	  to	  the	  present.	  	  ‘The	  future	  of	  the	  future’	  refers	  to	  the	  future	  of	  a	  time	  t,	  but	  time	  t	  can	  only	  be	  held	  to	  be	  future	  from	  the	  viewpoint	  of	  the	  present.	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provides a privileged standpoint from within the time series, in relation to which all 
other A-positions are orientated.  This perspectival nature of the A-series is reflected 
in the fact that all A-characteristics involve tensed language.29  For example, events 
in the A-series can be described with tensed verbs, such as ‘was’ or ‘will be’, 
temporal indexicals or pronouns, such as ‘now’, or ‘tomorrow’, and predicates such 
as ‘past,’ ‘present,’ and ‘future.’ 
    
A second key feature of the A-series is that the positions of events in the series are 
not permanent.  Instead, events continuously change their A-positions as they move 
along the time line; thus McTaggart says, ‘any event that is now present, was future, 
and will be past.’30  As will be explained shortly, McTaggart claims that for an event 
to undergo a change just is for it to change its position in the A-series.  This process 
of A-series change, in which events shift from being future to present, and from 
being present to being more and more past, is known as temporal becoming.31  
Within this process of temporal becoming, what is present is also transient and 
continually changing.  Thus the present provides a dynamic perspective from which 
all A-characteristics are ascribed.  It follows from the fact that events in the A-series 
do not have their positions permanently, that truths expressed by sentences using 
A-characteristics can change in truth-value.  For example, for McTaggart, a 
proposition expressed by a sentence using a present tense verb, such as ‘it is 
raining’ will be true when uttered on a rainy day, and false when uttered on a dry 
day.32   
 
In contrast, events in the B-series are ordered in respect of what McTaggart calls ‘B-
characteristics’.  B-characteristics are two-place relations, such as is earlier-than, is 
later-than, is simultaneous-with, is two days apart, and so on.  These are also 
referred to as ‘B-relations’.  It is assumed that the B-series gives a complete linear 
ordering; hence for all events, it is fixed whether one is earlier-than, later-than, or at 
the same time as, any other event.  The key feature of the B-series, therefore, is 
that events have their B-relations permanently.  Because B-relations are not 
ascribed in relation to any privileged present moment within the series, B-relations 
hold between events irrespective of any A-characteristics that could be ascribed to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Language	  framed	  in	  terms	  of	  past,	  present,	  and	  future	  tenses.	  	  See	  Geach	  (1979),	  p.	  96.	  30	  McTaggart	  (1927)	  NE,	  p.10	  31	  Temporal	  becoming	  is	  sometimes	  called	  ‘the	  passage	  of	  time’,	  or	  the	  view	  that	  time	  ‘flows’.	  32	  More	  accurately,	  McTaggart’s	  argument	  is	  conditional.	  	  He	  claims	  that	  if	  there	  is	  change,	  then	  there	  must	   be	   propositions	   that	   change	   their	   truth-­‐value.	   	   As	   he	   goes	   on	   to	   reject	   change,	   he	  does	  not	  actually	  have	  to	  endorse	  the	  view	  that	  there	  are	  such	  things	  as	  propositions.	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them at different times.  For example, consider an event e1 (me-writing-these-words), 
which stands in an earlier-than relation to event e2 (you-reading-these-words).  As it 
is true that e1 is earlier-than e2, this relation holds regardless of whether e1 is 
present and e2 is future, or e1 is past and e2 is present, or both e1 and e2 are past.  
Hence B-relations between events do not change.  A consequence of this is that 
facts about B-relations (‘B-facts’) are either eternally true or eternally false.  Thus, if 
it is true that e1 is earlier-than e2, it will always be true.  B-relations are called 
tenseless relations, because they do not involve a relation to any point taken to be 
the privileged present. 
 
McTaggart argues that both the A-series and the B-series are essential to time.  For 
example, he says that time must be distinguished both as past, present, and future, 
and as earlier and later.  However, he then says that the A-series is more 
fundamental, because without the A-series, and its distinctions between past, 
present, and future, the B-series is not even a time series.  McTaggart’s argument 
for this is that time must also involve change, and thus the B-series without the A-
series could only constitute a temporal series if change were possible without the A-
series.  However, according to McTaggart this is impossible, as B-relations are 
permanent and hence can never change.  He therefore says, ‘without the A-series, 
there would be no change, and consequently the B-series by itself is not sufficient 
for time, since time involves change.’33  
 
McTaggart clearly thinks that on its own the B-series is not sufficient for time, as the 
permanent relations of the B-series do not capture the essence of change.  
However, McTaggart also says that it is essential to time that it is distinguished as 
earlier and later.  So this raises the question of why the B-series is not equally as 
fundamental as the A-series.  The answer to this question lies in the fact that the B-
relations of earlier-than and later-than, which McTaggart holds are essential to time, 
can be generated from another source; namely, from the combination of the C-
series and the A-series.  McTaggart’s C-series is a non-temporal series of 
permanent relations, which, being timeless, have no temporal direction.  That is to 
say, no C-series term is earlier or later than another.  However, McTaggart says that 
when the C-series is combined with the A-series, this also generates a B-series.  
For example, when the timeless terms of the C-series are ordered by the A-
positions, past, present and future, they form a B-series, because a past event will 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  	  McTaggart	  (1908),	  p.	  27.	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also be earlier-than a future event.  We shall discuss the C-series in Chapter 3, 
when we consider theories of timelessness.  The important point here is that for 
McTaggart, the B-series is not ultimate in the way that the A-series is, as the B-
series can be generated from another source (the combination of the A-series and 
the C-series).  The A-series, in contrast, cannot be generated from any other source.  
 
Having argued that the A-series is necessary for change and time, McTaggart’s next 
step is to argue that the A-series leads to a contradiction (explained below).  
According to McTaggart, this contradiction renders the A-series incoherent.   He 
therefore argues that without the A-series there can be no change and no time; and 
hence concludes that time is unreal.  McTaggart’s argument can be outlined as 
follows: 
 
1. There is no time if there is no change. 
2. There is no change unless A-characteristics actually occur in the world.  
3. To assume the actual occurrence of A-characteristics involves a 
contradiction.  
C. Therefore, there is no change and no time. 
 
McTaggart’s conclusion is generally rejected.  However, as his argument is formally 
valid, those who reject his conclusion have to identify a fault with one of his 
premises. 34   McTaggart does not really argue for premise (1), and most 
philosophers leave this premise unchallenged.35  So as premise (1) is not disputed, 
to defeat his argument either premise (2) or premise (3) must be shown to be false.  
B-theorists typically dispute premise (2), the claim that the A-series is necessary for 
change.  And A-theorists typically dispute premise (3), the claim that the A-series is 
contradictory.   
 
Before we look at these two premises, it is important to notice the type of change 
that McTaggart has in mind when he says ‘if anything changes, then all other things 
change with it’ (NE 309).  According to Peter Geach, what McTaggart means here 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Assuming	  (uncontentiously)	  that	  contradictions	  are	  never	  true.	  35	  For	   an	   interesting	   argument	   that	   time	   can	   exist	   without	   change,	   see	   Shoemaker	   (1969).	  	  McTaggart,	   however,	   would	   deny	   that	   what	   Shoemaker	   calls	   a	   ‘temporal	   freeze’	   equals	   no	  change.	   	   This	   is	   because	  McTaggart	  would	   say	   that	   even	   in	   a	   ‘temporal	   freeze’	   there	   are	   still	  changes	  going	  on,	  because	  the	  passage	  of	  time	  implies	  a	  change	  in	  what	  time	  is	  present.	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can be understood in terms of a ‘Cambridge change’.36  A Cambridge change is the 
type of change that an object O can undergo without undergoing an actual change 
itself.  For example, if I stay the same height, but my daughter grows taller than me, 
I have undergone a ‘Cambridge change’.  So although I have not changed in height, 
I have changed in relation to my daughter’s height; and thus what was true of me at 
a past time (that I am the tallest female in the family), is no longer true.  Thus a 
Cambridge change can be distinguished from an actual change.  So when 
McTaggart claims that there is no time without change, he means the type of 
relational change an event e undergoes in relation to something else, without 
implying an intrinsic change in event e itself.37  With this understanding of change in 
hand, let us look at McTaggart’s argument for premise (2).38  
 
McTaggart gives two arguments to support premise (2).  The first is that there is no 
change unless events change;39 and McTaggart says that the only way that events 
can change is by changing their position in the A-series.  He considers the example 
of the death of Queen Anne.  He says that the only way this event can change any 
of its characteristics is by changing its A-characteristics; it cannot, for example, 
change its date or its causes, as these are fixed and permanent.  Thus the only way 
it can change is by changing its position in the A-series.  That is to say, it changes 
by at one time being future, then becoming present, and then becoming past.  There 
are problems associated with treating events as the subject of change, as opposed 
to individuals or objects. 40   However, for the purposes of stating McTaggart’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Geach	  (1979),	  p.	  90.	   	  Geach	  says	   ‘An	  object	  O	   is	  said	  to	   ‘change’	   in	   this	   [Cambridge]	  sense	   if	  and	  only	   if	   there	   are	   two	  propositions	   about	  O,	   differing	  only	   in	   that	  one	  mentions	   an	  earlier	  time	  and	  the	  other	  a	  later	  time,	  and	  one	  is	  true	  and	  the	  other	  is	  false.’	  	  37	  For	  example,	  McTaggart	  says	  ‘The	  fall	  of	  a	  sand-­‐castle	  on	  the	  English	  coast	  changes	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  Great	  Pyramid.’	  	  (1927),	  vol	  2,	  §309.	  38	  Two	  clarificatory	  notes:	  (1)	  Although	  a	  Cambridge	  change	  can	  be	  distinguished	  from	  an	  actual	  change,	  a	  Cambridge	  change	  is	  never	  independent	  of	  an	  actual	  change.	  	  (For	  example,	  an	  actual	  change	   in	  my	  daughter	   is	  what	  brings	  about	  a	  Cambridge	   change	   in	  me.)	   	  However,	   given	  his	  metaphysical	  assumptions	  about	  Absolute	  Reality,	  McTaggart	  has	  already	  denied	  the	  possibility	  of	  actual	  change.	  	  So	  what	  he	  is	  considering	  here	  is	  the	  appearance	  of	  Cambridge	  change	  (what	  Geach	  calls	  ‘merely	  Cambridge	  change’).	   	  McTaggart	  will	  later	  explain	  that	  what	  we	  perceive	  as	  an	  actual	  change	  is	  a	  misperception	  of	  the	  ordered	  parts	  of	  the	  non-­‐temporal	  C-­‐series.	  	  (2)	  While	  A-­‐theorists	   typically	   describe	   A-­‐characteristics	   as	   monadic	   properties,	   this	   is	   not	   how	  McTaggart	  describes	  them.	  	  For	  McTaggart,	  A-­‐characteristics	  are	  relations,	  and	  A-­‐series	  change	  is	  relational.	  	  	  We	  return	  to	  this	  point	  below.	  	  39	  McTaggart	  says,	  ‘the	  contents	  of	  any	  position	  in	  time	  form	  an	  event’.	  40	  Russell	  and	  Prior	  claim	  that	  objects	  or	  things	  are	  the	  subjects	  of	  change,	  not	  events.	  	  (For	  Prior,	  talk	  of	  events	  ‘existing’	  is	  just	  a	  confusion.)	  	  Geach	  also	  says	  that	  basing	  an	  account	  of	  change	  on	  
events	  changing	  makes	  trouble	  for	  McTaggart.	  	  He	  says	  this	  not	  only	  entails	  that	  concrete	  things	  have	  events	  as	  phases	   in	   their	  histories;	   it	  also	  sets	   the	  argument	  off	  on	  an	   infinite	   regress	  of	  higher-­‐order	  phases	  of	  events,	  in	  which	  each	  history	  would	  have	  a	  history,	  whose	  phases	  would	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argument, we can ignore these. 41   For now, let us accept that according to 
McTaggart for any change to occur, an event must change its position in the A-
series.   
 
McTaggart’s second argument for premise (2) is that there can be no change unless 
there are (complete) propositions that vary in truth-value; and the only propositions 
that can vary in truth-value are ones involving A-characteristics.42  (McTaggart does 
not mean that change consists in propositions varying in truth-value; rather he 
means that propositions vary in truth-values as a consequence of change; namely, 
things possessing different properties at different times.)  To understand why this 
claim is controversial, we need to make a short digression to say something about 
propositions.  We also need to bear in mind that McTaggart does not want to accept 
the existence of propositions, so this whole argument must be taken as a conditional 
argument for change.   
 
Propositions are entities that are held to play a number of distinct roles.  For 
example, propositions can be held to be the primary bearers of truth-value, the 
semantic values of sentences relative to contexts, the objects of belief and other 
‘propositional attitudes’ (i.e. what is believed, doubted, etc), and the contents of 
speech acts, the referents of that-clauses, the meanings of sentences, or sets of 
possible worlds.  Here I treat propositions as the primary bearers of truth-value; and 
discuss them in terms of what is expressed by sentences in (or relative to) a context.  
Moreover, as the relevant context here only concerns time-information, I shall ignore 
issues about other parameters typically required for truth-evaluation, such as world-
information.43  So, for the purposes of this discussion I shall only focus on the issue 
of whether propositions can have different truth-values relative to different times. 
 
Let us consider the proposition expressed by the sentence ‘the poker is hot’.  This 
sentence lacks an explicit time-determination, such as a specific date or time, which 
is represented schematically by the adverbial expression ‘at t’.  Thus before we can 
evaluate whether the proposition this sentence expresses is true or false, we need 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  be	   the	   event’s	   futurity,	   presentness	   and	  pastness,	   thus	   leading	   to	   an	   infinity	   of	   times.	   (Geach,	  1979,	  p.93).	  	  41	  Moreover,	   many	   philosophers	   consider	   it	   inessential	   to	   McTaggart’s	   argument	   that	   it	   be	  formulated	  in	  terms	  of	  events;	  for	  example,	  Dummett,	  Fine,	  and	  most	  presentists.	  	  	  	  	  42	  Propositions	  vary	  in	  truth-­‐values	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  a	  difference	  in	  the	  properties	  possessed	  by	  a	  particular	  object	  (or	  objects)	  at	  different	  times.	  43	  Truth-­‐evaluation	  typically	  requires	  reference	  to	  exactly	  one	  world	  point	  and	  one	  time	  point.	  	  However,	  I	  shall	  assume	  a	  world-­‐invariant	  context	  here.	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some further information; namely, we need information that specifies when the 
poker is said to be hot.  In the case of sentences lacking an explicit time-
determination this time-information is provided by the context of utterance.  However, 
what becomes controversial in such cases is how this time-information engages with 
the proposition in question.  For example, must the time-information be included in 
the proposition, or can there be ‘time-neutral’ or temporal propositions, which only 
have their truth-values relative to times?   
 
According to the view known as semantic eternalism, the time-information 
necessary to evaluate the proposition must be specified in the proposition itself.44  
Semantic eternalists thus follow Frege in holding that there must be nothing left 
undetermined in a proposition that is required to determine its truth-value.45  For 
example, consider again the proposition expressed by the sentence ‘the poker is 
hot.’  According to semantic eternalists, if this sentence expresses a genuine 
proposition (that is to say, one that is truth-evaluable), the time-information needed 
to evaluate it must be fully specified in the proposition itself.  In this case, the 
context of utterance plays the role of fully determining which unique proposition a 
sentence expresses. 
 
To see how this works, let us suppose that the poker is hot at noon on Monday 14th 
April 2014 GMT, and cold at noon on Wednesday 16th April 2014 GMT.  Let us also 
suppose that at noon on Monday John utters the sentence ‘the poker is hot’, and at 
noon on Wednesday Jane utters the sentence ‘the poker is hot’, thus giving us two 
distinct contexts of utterance.  If the necessary time-information is included in the 
proposition, then given these two contexts of utterance, the same sentence (‘the 
poker is hot’) uttered by John and Jane will express two distinct propositions.  To 
illustrate this, let us assume that propositions are Russellian structures that contain 
their constituents.  Then the proposition expressed by John’s sentence will be: 
 
• <The poker, being hot, noon Monday 14th April 2014 GMT>  
 
And the proposition expressed by Jane’s sentence will be: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Semantic	   eternalism	   is	   not	   to	   be	   confused	   with	   the	   metaphysical	   theory	   of	   time	   called	  eternalism.	  	  Only	  some	  eternalists	  endorse	  semantic	  eternalism;	  i.e.	  most	  B-­‐theorists.	  45	  Otherwise,	   what	   is	   expressed	   by	   the	   sentence	   will	   be	   incomplete,	   and	   hence,	   according	   to	  Frege,	  will	  not	  be	  a	  proposition	  at	  all,	  because	  it	  will	  not	  be	  truth-­‐evaluable.	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• <The poker, being hot, noon Wednesday 16th April 2014 GMT>.   
 
Here we can see that when the necessary time-information is specified in the 
proposition, the same sentence (‘the poker is hot’), uttered in different contexts, 
gives us distinct propositions.  We can also see that when the necessary time-
information is included in the proposition, the truth-value of that proposition is 
temporally invariant.  For example, if the poker is hot at noon on Monday 14th April 
2014 GMT, John’s sentence expresses a proposition that is eternally true; and if the 
poker is cold at noon on Wednesday 16th April 2014 GMT, Jane’s sentence 
expresses a proposition that is eternally false.  As these propositions are fully 
specified, neither of them can vary in truth-value; hence their truth-value is absolute.  
Thus, for semantic eternalists all genuine propositions must be fully specified, and 
hence are either eternally true or eternally false.   
  
The opposite view (the view that McTaggart says is necessary as a consequence of 
change) is known as propositional temporalism.  According to this view, the 
necessary time-information does not have to be included in the proposition for it to 
be truth-evaluable.  Instead, propositions lacking fully specific time-determinations 
can be truth-evaluable relative to a context (that is, relative to a time).  Moreover, as 
the time-information is not included in the proposition itself, the same proposition 
can be true or false relative to different contexts (that is, relative to different times).  
Hence such propositions are time-neutral.  Consider the sentence ‘the poker is hot’ 
as uttered by John and Jane above.  Here, the copula ‘is’ is taken to be the present 
tense form of the verb ‘to be’, and thus indicates the A-property of being present.  
Thus John’s sentence and Jane’s sentence both express the same time–neutral 
proposition; namely,  
 
• <The poker, being hot, the property of being present>   
 
As stated above, for a proposition to be truth-evaluable, it must be completed by the 
necessary time information.46   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  On	   this	   view,	   given	  McTaggart’s	   assumption	   of	   eternalism,	   truth	   simpliciter	   and	   truth-­‐at-­‐a-­‐time	   come	   apart.	   	   Only	   omnitemporal	   truths	   (truths	   that	   are	   true	   at	   all	   times),	   and	   certain	  transtemporal	   truths	   (truths	   that	   hold	   of	   the	   entire	   time	   series	   collectively),	   would	   be	   true	  simpliciter.	  	  In	  contrast,	  a	  presentist	  like	  Prior	  can	  hold	  that	  propositions	  can	  vary	  in	  truth-­‐value,	  and	  also	  hold	  that	  what	  is	  the	  case,	  is	  what	  is	  presently	  the	  case.	  	  Thus	  for	  Prior,	  truth	  simpliciter	  and	  truth-­‐at-­‐a-­‐time	  coincide.	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However, in time-neutral propositions, as the time-information is not included in the 
proposition itself, the context of utterance provides the necessary time parameters.  
Thus to evaluate the proposition, we need to look to each particular context of 
utterance.  As John utters his sentence at noon on Monday, the proposition is true 
at that time, and as Jane utters her sentence at noon on Wednesday, the 
proposition is false at that time.  In both cases, it is the same proposition being 
evaluated.  This is because the A-characteristic ‘being present’ does not tie the 
proposition to only one specific time or event.  Rather, the property of being present 
is a transient A-property, which different events have at different times as they move 
along the A-series.  Similarly, when propositions involve other A-characteristics, 
such as those expressed by ‘tomorrow’ or ‘was’, they can vary in truth-value 
depending on the context of utterance.  Thus, for a proposition involving A-
characteristics, the truth or falsity of that proposition will only be relative to the time 
at which it was expressed.47  Thus, propositions expressed by sentences such as 
‘school starts tomorrow’ and ‘it was sunny’, can be true or false relative to different 
times.  
 
According to McTaggart, there must be temporally neutral propositions (ones that 
can vary in truth-value) if there is to be change.  His reason is that propositions with 
absolute truth-values, which are fixed according to specific time determinations 
(including permanent B-relations) cannot account for change.  For example, if it is 
eternally true that the poker is hot at t1 and cold at t2, this is not sufficient to show 
that the poker has undergone a change.  This is because the property it has at t1 it 
always has, and the property it has at t2 it always has.  So these eternally true 
propositions merely describe an unchanging relationship between these two events. 
McTaggart is explicitly rejecting the Russellian account of change.  He says that 
according to Russell, there is a change if the proposition ‘ “at the time T my poker is 
hot” is true, and the proposition “at time T my poker is hot” is false.’48  This account 
of ‘change’ does not involve any A-characteristics, as it involves specific time-
determinations (‘at time T’).  However, for McTaggart this does not constitute a 
change.  Rather, what Russell describes is merely a case of variation, in which the 
two propositions are always true and false.  Thus, according to McTaggart, if 
change is real there must be A-propositions.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47 	  This	   is	   why	   Frege	   denied	   that	   there	   could	   be	   an	   incomplete	   proposition.	   	   For	   Frege	  propositions	  are	  either	  complete	  or	  else	  what	  is	  expressed	  by	  a	  sentence	  is	  not	  proposition	  at	  all.	  48	  McTaggart	  (1927)	  vol.	  2,	  p.	  313.	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McTaggart also has a third argument that supports his claim that the A-series is 
indispensible for time.  This argument appears in a footnote in a separate chapter 
‘Further considerations about time’.49  Here McTaggart argues that the B-series 
must be defined in terms of the A-series.  For example, he considers whether the 
future could be defined as ‘what is later than the present’, and the past as ‘what is 
earlier than the present’; in which case the A-series would be defined in terms of the 
B-series.  However, he says this would be a mistake.  His reason is similar to the 
reason given above to explain why the A-series is essential in a way the B-series is 
not; namely, that without the A-series, the B-series is not a time series.  McTaggart 
says that without the changing terms ‘past’, ‘present’, and ‘future’, we would not 
have a time series.  Hence the terms ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ are only conceived of after 
the terms of the A-series are conceived of, and not the other way round.   Thus, as 
the terms ‘future’ and ‘past’ could never be derived from the B-series, McTaggart 
concludes that the A-series is indispensible for time.  
 
Having proved to his own satisfaction that the B-series depends on the A-series, 
and hence that the A-series is essential for time, McTaggart’s argument changes 
direction.  His third premise, which is designed to prove that the A-series cannot 
exist, is that to assume the actual occurrence of A-characteristics involves a 
contradiction.  Here McTaggart gives two arguments, which are both designed to 
show that A-characteristics are delusory, although only the second directly supports 
his third premise.  He begins by considering whether the terms of the A-series are 
relations or qualities (monadic properties).  Although McTaggart thinks they are 
relations, he says his reasons for rejecting the reality of the A-series will be 
unaffected even if they are qualities.   
 
His first argument for premise (3) is that if anything is ‘to be righty called past, 
present or future, it must be because it is a relation to something else …  outside the 
time series.’50  According to McTaggart, B-relations, which hold exclusively between 
members of the time-series, can never change.  (This is because if Y is earlier-than 
Z, Y is always earlier-than Z.)  So, positions in the A-series must depend on 
relations to some entity X outside the A-series.  Although McTaggart cannot think 
what such an entity could be, he says it must be found if the A-series is to be real.  
However, he leaves this issue unresolved and turns to the second argument, where 
he sees a more immediate difficulty for the reality of the A-series.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Ibid.,	  p.	  271.	  50	  McTaggart	  (1927)	  vol.	  2.	  §327.	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McTaggart’s second argument for premise (3) is that postulating the reality of A-
characteristics leads to a contradiction.  McTaggart starts by saying that past, 
present, and future are incompatible characteristics; and thus it is essential to 
change, and therefore time, that an event be one or the other, but no more than one. 
(It is essential to change because ‘the only change we get is from future to present, 
and from present to past.’)   Thus he writes:  
 
A series is an A-series when each term has, to some entity X outside the 
time-series, one, and only one, of three indefinable relations, pastness, 
presentness, and futurity, which are such that all the terms which have the 
relation of presentness to X fall between all the terms that have the relations 
of pastness to X, on the one hand, and all the terms that have the relation of 
futurity to X, on the other hand.51   
 
So, event M must either be past, present, or future in relation to some X outside the 
time series.  And for change to occur, M must either lose the A-characteristic is-
future (in relation to X), and gain the A-characteristic is-present (in relation to X), or 
lose the A-characteristic is-present, and gain the A-characteristic is-past (in relation 
to X).  However, McTaggart says, 
 
But every event has them all.  If M is past, it has been present and future.  If 
it is future, it will be present and past.  If it is present, it has been future and 
will be past.  Thus all three characteristics belong to each event.  How is this 
consistent with their being incompatible?52 
 
So for McTaggart, the incompatibly is this: recognizing that change requires that 
events in the A-series are ordered in terms of distinct positions (being either past, 
present, or future), and the incompatibility of those A-characteristics themselves.  
For example, suppose that event M is the coronation of Queen Victoria.  From our 
viewpoint, M is past, and hence it is true to say ‘Victoria has been crowned’.  But the 
pastness of this event is not constituted by M standing in the earlier-than relation to 
other times (as that relation never changes).53   Rather, its pastness must be 
constituted by M standing in the past relation to some X outside time.  However, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Ibid.	  52	  See	  also	  (Ibid)	  §329.	  53	  Remember	  that	  McTaggart	  assumes	  eternalism,	  but	  rejects	  the	  B-­‐theoretic	  account	  of	  change.	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McTaggart’s point is that M cannot stand in that relation in the past, because in the 
past, M is present and not past.  So M’s possession of pastness (standing in the 
past relation to X) must be an event located in the present and future.  In which case, 
a single event M has all three A-characteristics (being past, being present, and 
being future).  So McTaggart’s claim is that while these different temporal viewpoints 
necessarily imply one another, they are also incompatible with one another.54  Thus 
A-characteristics themselves are contradictory. 
 
The immediate response, or ‘natural rejection’, is to say that events only have these 
characteristics successively.  For example, for any present event, it is present, was 
future and will be past.  As we only get the contradiction if we describe these events 
using the auxiliary with the present tense, (‘is present’, ‘is past’, ‘is future’), it seems 
that McTaggart is just misdescribing the facts.  There is no incompatibility in holding 
that an event that is past, was present, and at an earlier time was future, or that an 
event that is future, will be present and at a later time will be past.  Thus, as no 
event has these three characteristics simultaneously, there is no incompatibility, and 
hence no contradiction.   
 
McTaggart anticipates this response, and states it himself as follows:  
 
It may seem that this can be easily explained. …  It is never true, the answer 
will run, that M is past, present, and future.  It is present, will be past and 
was future.  Or it is past, has been future and present, or again is future, and 
will be present and past.  The characteristics are only incompatible when 
they are simultaneous, and there is no contradiction in the fact that each 
term has them successively.55  
 
However, McTaggart is not claiming that events have these incompatible terms 
simultaneously.  Instead, his claim is that events cannot have these terms 
successively, because succession is incompatible with events co-existing at 
different positions in time.  To explain this, McTaggart says if we think about the 
statement ‘M is present, has been past, and will be future’, we see that it means: 
 
M is present at a moment of present time, past at some moment of future 
time, and future at some moment of past time.  But every moment, like every 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  See	  Geach	  (1979),	  p.100.	  55	  McTaggart	  (1927),	  §	  331.	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event, is both past, present and future.  And so a similar difficulty arises.  If 
M is present, there is no moment of past time at which it is past.  But the 
moments of future time, in which it is past, are equally moments of past time, 
in which it cannot be past.56  
 
To understand what McTaggart means, we must keep in mind that he is trying to 
see whether apparent reality (where events appear to lose and gain A-
characteristics) is consistent with absolute reality (where all substances exist on a 
par).  As we saw above, McTaggart holds that if time is real, an event must be a 
substance with a temporal location.  And as substances (and the relations they hold 
and the properties they possess) are what constitutes McTaggart’s reality, if time is 
real each event will be a constituent part of the temporal position at which it is 
located.  So, like the events that constitute them, all times must exist on a par.   
However, when we think of moments as being past, present and future successively, 
we get the following problem.  We want to say that a present moment of time A is 
not (is distinct from) a past moment of time B.  But because there exists a future 
moment of time at which A is past, A is equally a moment of past time.  So it seems 
that A is both B and not B.   So McTaggart’s point is that whether we talk about 
events or moments being past, present, or future successively, the incompatibility 
still arises. 
 
To try and make this clearer, consider McTaggart’s problem in terms of truthmakers 
(or what makes it true that…).  According to the natural objection, it is not true that 
‘M is present, is future, and is past’.  Rather it is true that ‘M is present, has been 
future, and will be past’.  So suppose we ask what makes ‘M is present’ true?  (Or 
what state of affairs does ‘M is present’ refer to?)  For McTaggart, it must be that 
there exists some event M, which possesses the relational quality of being present 
(or stands in the present relation to some X outside time).  This seems 
straightforward enough.57  But what makes ‘M has been future’ true?  (Or what state 
of affairs does ‘M has been future’ refer to?)  It cannot be M being present, because 
the M that is present is not future.  And it cannot be that M is not future.  The reason 
for this is that, given McTaggart’s ontology, if there exists no time such that at that 
time ‘M is future’ is true, then it will also always be false that ‘M has been future’.58  
Thus, for McTaggart, in order for ‘M has been future’ to be true, it must be that M’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Ibid.	  57	  At	  least,	  if	  we	  ignore	  McTaggart’s	  worry	  that	  he	  cannot	  think	  what	  such	  an	  X	  could	  be.	  58	  I	  follow	  Ingthorsson’s	  argument	  here.	  	  See	  Ingthorsson	  (2016),	  p.47.	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possession of futurity (standing in the future relation to X) is an existing event 
located in the past.   
 
Similarly for ‘M will be past’.59  For this to be true, there must exist some M, whose 
possession of pastness (standing in the past relation to X) is an event located in the 
future.  Thus, since for McTaggart all temporally located substances must exist on a 
par (if time is real), we get the following problem.  If we say that M is present, has 
been future and will be past, this implies that M is present in the present, is future in 
the past, and is past in the future.60  And this requires that a single event M is the 
constituent part of three incompatible and co-existing times.  So the natural 
objection that events only have these characteristics successively, does not avoid 
the incompatibility.   
 
If McTaggart accepted a B-theoretic account of change, he could avoid the apparent 
incompatibilitly.  For example, McTaggart could claim that events are four-
dimensional substances, which are extended in time and have different temporally 
located parts.  He could then claim that different temporal parts of four-dimensional 
substances have these incompatible properties (or relations), not the four-
dimensional substances themselves.  Consider a football match that has a boring 
first-half and an exciting second-half.  According to certain B-theorists, when we 
report on this, we only ascribe these incompatible properties to different temporal 
parts of the match.  Thus we avoid ascribing incompatible properties (being both 
boring and not-boring) to the match as a whole.  However, this account is not an 
option for McTaggart.  For McTaggart, a temporal parts account of change is not an 
account of change, because it merely describes variation across an unchanging 
domain. 61   Nor is it an option for McTaggart to say that a four-dimensional 
substance stands in permanent relations to different times.  For example, that the 
football match bears the boring-at relation to t1 and the not-boring-at relation t2.  
Again, for McTaggart, this account describes variation across a permanent domain, 
but not change.  For McTaggart, if time is real, there must be a viable account of A-
series change.  But this is what he cannot find. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  For	  example,	  what	  makes	  ‘M	  will	  be	  past’	  true,	  cannot	  be	  M	  being	  present,	  because	  the	  M	  that	  is	  present	  is	  not	  past.	  	  And	  it	  cannot	  be	  that	  M	  is	  not	  past;	  because	  if	  ‘M	  is	  past’	  is	  not	  true,	  then	  it	  will	  always	  be	  false	  that	  ‘M	  will	  be	  past’.	  	  	  60	  A	  single	  event	  stands	  in	  the	  is-­‐present	  relation	  to	  X,	  stands	  in	  the	  is-­‐future	  relation	  to	  X,	  and	  stands	  in	  the	  is-­‐past	  relation	  to	  X.	  61	  Given	   eternalism,	   if	   the	   football	  match	  has	   one	   temporal	   part	   that	   is	   boring	   and	   a	  different	  temporal	  part	  that	  is	  not	  boring,	  each	  of	  those	  temporal	  parts	  has	  those	  properties	  permanently.	  	  
	   67	  
Thus, McTaggart concludes that there is no way to avoid the contradiction that is 
inherent in the A-series.  He explains that the contradiction apparent in the three 
simple first-level predicates (past, present, and future) is not removed by the natural 
objection.  This is because when we say that events have A-characteristics 
successively, we find that we have nine second-level predicates, which are equally 
incompatible.  For example, ‘was future’ means ‘future in the past’; ‘is present’ 
means ‘present in the present’; and ‘will be past’ means ‘past in the future’.   And the 
contradiction that appears at the second-level is not removed by going up another 
level, because then we find we have twenty-seven third-level predicates, which are 
also incompatible.62  So McTaggart says that by claiming that events only have A-
characteristics successively, we embark on an infinite regress, in which the 
contradiction reappears at the next level, and so on, infinitely.  Moreover, McTaggart 
says this regress is vicious.  This is because at each stage of the regress, not only 
does another contradiction appear, but the previous contradiction is never solved.  
          
For McTaggart, the contradiction occurs because his analysis of ‘apparent time’ 
(given in present experience) conflicts with his ontological account of existence.  
According to our phenomenological experience of time, time consists of successive 
parts that do not co-exist.  But according to McTaggart’s ontology, if time exists, this 
must be because it is constituted by parts that co-exist.  It follows from this, for 
McTaggart, that each event occupies at least three different positions in the A-series.  
This, in turn, means that an individual event must be the constituent substance of 
these three positions.  McTaggart therefore concludes that the A-series is inherently 
contradictory, and must be rejected.  And without the A-series, as there is no 
change and no time, there can be no B-series.  McTaggart therefore says; 
 
Nothing is really past, present or future. Nothing is really earlier or later than 
anything else, or temporally simultaneous with it.  Nothing really changes.  
Nothing is really in time. (NE 333).    
 
Instead, we are left with our perceptions, which McTaggart says are erroneous.  And 
time is thus an illusion. 
 
To sum up.  Having distinguished the A-series and the B-series, and argued that 
they are both essential for time, McTaggart rejects them both by way of a ‘plague on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  For	   example,	   ‘present	   in	   the	  present’	  means	   ‘is	   present	   in	   the	  present	   in	   the	  present.’	   	   And	  ‘future	  in	  the	  past’	  means	  ‘is	  future	  in	  the	  past	  in	  the	  past’,	  and	  so	  on.	  
	   68	  
both your houses’ argument.  The plague on the B-series, according to McTaggart, 
is that the B-series is not sufficient to constitute a time series without the A-series.  
The plague on the A-series, according to McTaggart, is that it is inherently 
contradictory.  Having already argued that both series are essential if time is real, 
and having found reason to reject them both, the only conclusion McTaggart can 
make is that time is unreal.  Having concluded that time cannot exist without the A-
series, McTaggart provides an error theory of time.63  This is the C-series, which is 
the non-temporal series of events we misperceive as a time series.  We consider 
the nature of McTaggart’s C-series in the next chapter. 
 
Part 2. Responses to McTaggart’s Paradox  
 
McTaggart’s argument is sometimes dismissed on the grounds that it is nothing 
more than a trivial sophism.64  Those who hold this view typically claim that the 
incompatibility is removed either by a regress of tenses, or by noticing that the 
indexical nature of tensed ascriptions is merely perspectival; and hence that 
different ascriptions of A-properties can nevertheless report the same facts. 65  
However, other philosophers take McTaggart’s argument more seriously, and hence 
think it requires a more substantial response.  Among these are A-theorists who 
need to show that the A-series is not contradictory, and B-theorists who need to 
show that the B-series does not depend on the (contradictory) A-series.  The 
purpose of this section is to consider some of these A-theoretic and B-theoretic 
responses to McTaggart.  As mentioned in the introduction, saying what is wrong 
with McTaggart’s argument is not always easy.  This is partly because McTaggart’s 
complex argument is not the clearest.  Consequently, in their discussions of 
McTaggart, many philosophers reconstruct McTaggart’s argument, in order to clarify 
the issues and bring out additional points and hidden assumptions.  Below, we refer 
to the responses of two philosophers who provide their own reconstructions of 
McTaggart; an A-theoretic response by Michael Dummett, and a B-theoretic 
response by D. H. Mellor.  However, we begin by discussing A- and B-theoretic 
responses to McTaggart in general terms. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  An	  error	   theory	   is	   a	   theory	   that	   explains	  why	  we	  misperceive	  particular	   features	  of	   reality,	  taking	   them	   to	   be	   things	   that	   they	   are	   not.	   	   	   For	   example,	   mistaking	   non-­‐moral	   features	   for	  moral	  ones.	  	  Or	  mistaking	  non-­‐temporal	  features	  for	  temporal	  ones.	  64	  	  For	  example,	  C.	  D.	  Broad	  calls	  McTaggart’s	  argument	  ‘a	  philosophical	  howler.’	  	  More	  recently,	  Sider	  (2011,	  p.35,	  n.19)	  quotes	  Broad	  in	  agreement.	  	  65	  This	  is	  ‘the	  token-­‐reflexive	  objection’.	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McTaggart’s argument is formally valid.  Thus to avoid the conclusion that time is 
unreal, both A-theorists and B-theorists have to find fault with one of the argument’s 
premises.  A-theorists agree with McTaggart that the tenseless account of variation 
over time, provided by the B-series, is not sufficient for change.  So the onus on the 
A-theorist is to explain why an A-theoretic account of change does not involve 
temporal entities having contradictory properties.  Different A-theorists have different 
accounts of how to avoid the contradiction (explained below).66  However, they all 
involve the claim that tense is a feature of the world, and not merely a feature of 
language.  That is to say, that the present is privileged in some objective way in 
which the past and future are not.67  A-theorists thus take the basic temporal facts to 
be ones that exemplify A-properties.   
 
B-theorists typically accept McTaggart’s claim that the A-series is contradictory.68  
However, B-theorists claim that they can avoid McTaggart’s conclusion because the 
B-series does not depend on the A-series in order to be a time series.  B-theorists 
claim that the tenseless terms of the B-series are sufficient to account for change, 
and therefore constitute a time series.  For example, B-theorists standardly explain 
change in terms of variation within the four-dimensional manifold.  That is, either in 
terms of perduring objects varying the relations they have to different times (object X 
is f at t1 and not-f at t2); or in terms of perduring objects having temporal parts, with 
different properties (object X has a temporal part that is f and a temporal part that is 
not-f).69  As B-theorists also deny any objective distinction between past, present 
and future, they hold that all the fundamental truths involve tenseless and 
permanent B-relations.  Thus, in terms of responding to McTaggart, the onus on the 
B-theorist is to show that the B-series account for change is adequate.  As we shall 
see, part of this involves explaining how ordinary tensed language can be explained 
in terms of a tenseless reality, thereby providing an account of change that does not 
involve tensed properties or tensed facts.  
 
The various A- and B-theoretic responses to McTaggart’s paradox pave the way for 
disputes in the metaphysics of time, which will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  For	  example,	  presentists	  deny	  the	  contradiction	  because	  they	  claim	  the	  only	  objects	  that	  exist	  and	  bear	  properties	  and	  stand	  in	  relations	  are	  the	  ones	  that	  presently	  exist.	  	  Some	  eternalist	  A-­‐theorists	   claim	   that	   the	   regress	   is	   benign,	   while	   others	   claim	   that	   only	   present	   objects	   have	  intrinsic	  properties,	  or	  spatiotemporal	  locations.	  	  	  67Note	  again	  that	  ‘objectively	  privileged’	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  ontologically	  privileged.	  	  68	  For	  example,	  Mellor,	  Oaklander,	  Le	  Poidevin,	  and	  Dyke.	  	  	  69	  Mellor	   is	   an	   exception	  here.	   	  Mellor	   is	   a	  B-­‐theorist	  who	   claims	   that	   entities	  must	  endure	   in	  order	  for	  change	  to	  be	  real.	  	  We	  consider	  this	  view	  in	  Chapter	  3.	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These disputes (which take place between A-theorists and B-theorists, between 
tense realists and tense anti-realists, and between presentists and non-presentists) 
concern the nature of temporal truths, temporal existence, and the reality or 
otherwise of tense, change, and temporal passage.  The purpose of this part of 
Chapter 2 is to start untangling some of the A- and B-theoretic responses to 
McTaggart, which are continued in Chapters 3 and 4.  We shall see that the various 
responses to McTaggart do not always neatly line up, with A-theorists and realists 
about tense in one group, and B-theorists and anti-realists about tense in another.  
The reason for this is that although all A-theorists are realists about tense, not all B-
theorists are anti-realists about tense; for example, Mellor and Lewis are non-anti-
realists about tense.  Moreover, while B-theorists all share the same ontological 
picture of reality (eternalism), which underpins their different accounts of the role of 
tense, A-theorists have a number of very different ontological pictures of reality, 
which underpin their accounts of the reality of tense.  And while all A-theorists are 
realists about tense, there is an alternative A-theoretic response to McTaggart; Kit 
Fine’s ‘non-standard realism’ about tense.  Fine argues that realism about tense is 
only compatible with an incoherent or fragmented picture of reality.  We therefore 
have to differentiate the various responses to McTaggart’s argument carefully.   
 
2.4  A-theoretic responses to McTaggart  
 
A-theorists agree with McTaggart that the A-series is necessary for change, and that 
without the A-series, the B-series is not a satisfactory time series.  Hence to avoid 
McTaggart’s conclusion that time is unreal (or at least, to defend a dynamic account 
of time), the A-theorist needs to respond to McTaggart’s claim that the A-series is 
contradictory. The first A-theoretic response we consider here is that of Michael 
Dummett.  We shall then briefly outline some other A-theoretic responses to 
McTaggart, which are then considered in more detail in the next two chapters.  
 
2.4.1  Dummett’s McTaggert 
 
In ‘A Defense of McTaggart’s Proof of the Unreality of Time’, Dummett reconstructs 
McTaggart’s argument.  Dummett’s intention is to show that McTaggart’s argument 
is not a ‘trivial sophism’ because it contains a substantive thesis; namely, the 
assumption that there is a complete (observer-independent) description of reality.  
Dummett claims that once this assumption is brought out, we can see that 
McTaggart’s argument does not fall prey to the natural objection (the claim that we 
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can avoid the contradiction by appealing to the hierarchy of tenses), or to ‘the token-
reflexive argument’ (the objection that tensed statements do not report contradictory 
facts, because they are merely reporting the same facts from different temporal 
perspectives).  Hence, Dummett says that the ‘complete description thesis’ is the 
key assumption in the first part of McTaggart’s argument. 70   
 
Despite rejecting the natural objection and the token-reflexive argument (as ways of 
avoiding the contradiction), Dummett does not endorse McTaggart’s conclusion that 
the A-series is contradictory.71  Instead, he argues that there is something special 
about the nature of time, in contrast to other phenomena that we use indexicals (or 
token-reflexives72) to report on, such as place, and person.  More specifically, he 
argues that indexicals involving tense are essential in such a way that there cannot 
be a complete description of reality.  According to Dummett, the assumption that 
there can be a complete description of reality is what leads to the contradiction in 
the second part of McTaggart’s argument.  Dummett admits that there is a strong 
natural prejudice to think that there should be a complete description of reality, but 
he claims that McTaggart’s argument is actually self-refuting.  The A-theorist 
therefore has a way out of McTaggart’s paradox; namely, by giving up the idea that 
there can be a complete description of reality. 
 
Dummett’s reconstruction takes a different route than McTaggart’s original argument.  
He begins by summarizing McTaggart’s argument and the natural objection.  
Dummett has no objection to iterating tenses, but he says that the argument about 
the hierarchy of tenses is inconclusive, and hence it does not avoid the 
contradiction.73  Instead, he turns to the first part of the argument, as he claims this 
provides the key to understanding how to avoid the paradox.  Moreover, because 
Dummett’s reconstruction focuses on bringing out the difference between time and 
space, Dummett does not explicitly argue about change.  Nevertheless, his 
argument is indirectly about change.  This is because the movement of our 
consciousness through time is dynamic, and Dummett claims that we need 
indexicals involving tense (or tensed statements) to report on our experience of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  Dummett	  (1960),	  pp	  497-­‐504.	  	  	  	  71	  Dummett	  accepts	  that	  the	  A-­‐series	   is	  contradictory	  as	  McTaggart	  presents	  it,	  but	  argues	  that	  we	  can	  avoid	  this	  conclusion	  by	  rejecting	  the	  complete	  description	  thesis.	  72	  Dummett	   follows	   Reichenbach	   (1947)	   in	   using	   the	   term	   ‘token-­‐reflexives’	   for	   what	   most	  contemporary	  philosophers	  describe	  as	  ‘indexicals’.	  	  I	  shall	  use	  the	  terms	  interchangeably.	  73	  Dummett’s	   argument	   is	   carefully	   conditional.	   	  He	   says	   if	  there	   is	   a	   contradiction	  at	   the	   first	  level	   of	   tenses,	   it	   is	   not	   removed	   by	   a	   hierarchy	   of	   tenses.	   	   However,	   Dummett	  does	   seem	   to	  think	  there	  is	  a	  contradiction.	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temporal passage.  Dummett also says that it is incidental to the argument that 
McTaggart formulates it in terms of events.  He says that the issues still arise even if 
we deny that there are events, or that past, present and future are properties, 
because the argument could equally be stated in terms of objects.  Let us consider 
Dummett’s argument in detail.74  
 
After summarizing McTaggart’s argument, Dummett explains why some people do 
not take the argument seriously.  He says that in McTaggart’s original formulation, 
the incompatibility is held to occur because each of the three (incompatible) first-
level predicates ‘is past’, ‘is present’ and ‘is future’, are said to apply to each event.  
The natural objection is to say that these predicates apply successively; so for any 
event it ‘will be past’, ‘is present’ and ‘was future’, and hence there is no 
incompatibility.  McTaggart’s reply is that the incompatibility is not removed; it just 
moves up a level.  For example, an event that is ‘present in the present’, is also 
‘future in the past’, and ‘past in the future’.  Thus, if we try to avoid the 
incompatibility in the first-level predicates, we find that we have nine second-level 
predicates, which are equally incompatible.  Similarly, if we try and remove the 
contradiction at the second level by saying that each event is only ‘present in the 
present’ successively, we get a new contradiction.  For example, an event that is 
‘present in the present in the present’ is also ‘past in the present in the future’, and 
so on, resulting in twenty-seven incompatible third-level predicates.  Dummett says 
that at each level when the contradiction is removed, a different one remains.  
Hence Dummett claims the hierarchy of tenses does not remove the contradiction. 
 
Next, Dummet explains why the token-reflexive argument fails to show that 
McTaggart’s argument is a trivial sophism.  According to the token-reflexive 
argument, statements involving A-properties do not report contradictory facts, 
because they are merely reporting the same facts from different temporal 
perspectives.  (The argument is thus a deeper attempt at bringing out what the 
natural objection was trying to get at.)  However, according to Dummett, the token-
reflexive argument fails, because it fails to see that McTaggart’s argument involves 
claiming that there is something distinctive about indexicallity in relation to time, in 
contrast to space or person.  According to Dummett: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  In	   the	   following	  discussion	  I	  am	  indebted	  to	  Mike	  Martin’s	   ‘Time	  and	  Tense’	  seminar	  series,	  University	  College	  London,	  Spring	  Term,	  2012.	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A token-reflexive expression is one like ‘I’, ‘here’, ‘now, whose essential 
occurrence in a sentence renders that sentence capable of bearing different 
truth-values according to the circumstances of utterance – by whom, when, 
where it is uttered … and so forth. 75 
 
Dummett says that objectors claim that they can reconstruct McTaggart’s argument, 
bringing out the token-reflexive aspects of it, in a way that makes it clear that there 
is no contradiction.  The objector argues that ‘If we say of a predicate in which a 
token-reflexive expression occurs essentially that it ‘applies’ to an entity if there are 
any circumstances in which it can be truly asserted of that entity, and if there we call 
two such predicates ‘incompatible’ when there exist no circumstances in which they 
can both be truly asserted of any one entity, then it is possible for incompatible 
predicates to apply to one and the same entity.’76  For example, when reporting on 
the location of my cat (Wolfgang), the fact expressed by the sentence ‘Wolfgang is 
in the kitchen’ as uttered today, can equally well be expressed by the sentence 
‘Wolfgang was in the kitchen’ as uttered tomorrow.  Hence, the objector claims there 
is not really a contradiction.   
 
However, according to Dummett the token-reflexive objection does not work.  His 
argument for this is involves claiming that there is something distinctive about 
indexicals involving time.  As we shall see, this argument is not the weaker thesis; 
that there is something distinctive about sentences involving indexicallity in relation 
to time, in contrast to sentences involving indexicality with respect to space or 
person.  (Although Dummett does think there is a distinction between temporal facts, 
and spatial and personal facts.)  Rather, it is the stronger thesis; that A-series facts 
are such that if there is a sentence that expresses a particular A-series fact, then 
only that sentence, or certain suitable translations of it (ones involving the same 
tense-inflexion), can be expressing the same fact.  
 
The weaker thesis invloves the idea that there are some cases in which the same 
fact can be captured by non-equivalent sentences.  For example, for some truth 
about the spatial organization of the world, which you could express using an 
indexical vocabulary, the fact reported on can equally be reported on by some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  Dummett	  (1960),	  p.	  353.	  76	  Ibid.	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sentence that does not contain indexical vocabulary.77  Thus, if I am in the kitchen 
with Wolfgang, the fact reported on by the sentence ‘Wolfgang is here’ can equally 
well be reported on by the sentence ‘Wolfgang is in the kitchen’.  Some people have 
interpreted Dummett’s argument as the claim that, in contrast to facts involving 
personal or spatial indexicals, facts involving temporal indexicals cannot equally be 
reported on by sentences using non-indexical vocabulary.  For example, that the 
fact reported on by the tensed sentence ‘the train departs 5 minutes from now’ as 
uttered at 11.55am, cannot equally be reported on by the tenseless sentence ‘the 
train departs at noon’.  Although Dummett agrees that the tenseless sentence 
leaves out the essential information we need in order to act on it (namely, the 
relation is between now and noon), this is not Dummett’s argument for what is 
distinctive about indexicals involving time.  
 
Hence, the stronger thesis Dummett appeals to is not that tenses inform us in a way 
that cannot be captured by using non-indexical vocabulary (in contrast to statements 
about space or persons).  Rather, it is the claim that what is distinctive about time is 
that temporal facts are such that they must include the temporal relation to the 
person apprised of those facts; and crucially, that this not only means that you have 
to be in time to capture the temporal facts, but also that there are certain facts that 
can only by captured from the perspective of the present tense.   
 
Dummett argues as follows.  Someone might think that temporal facts can only be 
expressed using sentences, which have some indexical component in relation to 
time, such as sentences that involve significant use of tense.  Here, we might 
suppose that different sentences involving different temporal perspectives can 
express the same fact.  (Consider again the claim that the same fact is expressed 
by ‘Wolfgang is in the kitchen’ as uttered today, and ‘Wolfgang was in the kitchen’ 
as uttered tomorrow.)  But Dummett says the debate between tensers and 
detensers cannot simply be a debate about whether the facts reported by true 
tensed statements can only be expressed by other tensed statements, since this 
condition is too weak to capture McTaggart’s worry about the incompatibility.  To 
explain why, Dummett considers the example of a piece of paper, which changes 
from white to yellow over time.78  For example:  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  Statements	   made	   about	   the	   spatial	   organization	   of	   things,	   which	   do	   not	   use	   any	   indexical	  vocabulary,	  are	  the	  spatial	  equivalent	  of	  the	  B	  series.	  	  78	  As	  Dummett	  was	  a	  heavy	  smoker	  this	  is	  not	  actually	  a	  far-­‐fetched	  example.	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(a) On day1 an utterance of ‘The paper is white’ expresses a truth.   
(b) On day16 an utterance of ‘The paper is yellow’ expresses a truth.  
(c) No piece of paper is both white and yellow.79 
 
The incompatibility claim (c) suggests that (a) and (b) are incompatible.  However, 
by noticing the indexical vocabulary used to state these claims, we could show that 
the facts expressed by (a) and (b) are not incompatible.  For example, we could also 
hold: 
  
(d) On day16 an utterance of ‘The paper was white’ expresses a truth. 
 
The idea here is that the fact reported by (a) on day1 (the paper is white) and the 
fact reported by (d) on day16  (the paper was white) is the same fact.  And since we 
do not suppose that (d) (the paper was white) is incompatible with (b) (the paper is 
yellow), it is not clear why (a) should be incompatible with (b).  
 
Dummett’s point is that even if facts expressed by significantly tense-inflected 
sentences can only be expressed by other significantly tense-inflected sentences, 
this does not bring out the incompatibility.  (Since two suitably tensed sentences, 
such as (a) and (d), uttered on different days, might be reporting the same fact.)  
Therefore, Dummett says that the mere commitment to essential indexicality in 
sentences involving tense does not get us McTaggart’s problem, because it does 
not bring out the incompatibility.  Dummett says that McTaggart does not make this 
explicit in his argument. 
 
So to bring out McTaggart’s problem, when Dummett says that token-reflexive 
expressions enter essentially into A-series facts, he has a stronger idea in mind.  
This stronger thesis is the idea that the fact that is reported on day1 (the paper is 
white) can only be reported by a present tense inflected sentence.80  According to 
this claim, the fact reported by sentence (a): ‘the paper is white’ uttered on day1, 
cannot be the same fact as the fact reported by sentence (d): ‘the paper was white’ 
uttered on day16.  In which case, sentence (d) does not remove the incompatibility 
between the facts reported by sentence (a) and sentence (b).  Thus, the 
incompatibly we get is between the two present tense statements;  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  That	  is,	  completely	  white	  and	  completely	  yellow.	  80	  	  Or	  something	  that	  has	  the	  same	  semantic	  function	  as	  the	  present	  tense	  in	  English.	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(a) The paper is white. 
(b) The paper is yellow. 
 
Hence, Dummett’s argument is that what is special about time is not captured by 
appealing to the idea that temporal indexicals are essential, whereas some spatial 
and personal indexicals are not.81  Nor is it captured by appealing to the claim that 
facts involving temporal indexicals can only be captured by sentences using other 
temporal indexicals.  The reason for this, as we have seen, is that holding that ‘x is 
F’ and ‘x was F’ does not generate the contradiction.  Rather, Dummett’s claim is 
that what is special about time (as opposed to space and person) is that there are 
some facts that can only be captured by using the present tense.  Dummett then 
uses this claim to argue against what he takes to be the key assumption in 
McTaggart’s argument; namely that ‘reality must be something of which there exists 
in principle a complete description.’82    
 
Dummett claims that you can survey the totality of spatial facts in a way that you 
cannot survey the totality of temporal facts.  He says that there is no difficulty in 
conceiving how an observer could be outside of a space, but still be in a position to 
represent all of the spatial facts.  For example, we could imagine a map of the world, 
which represented all the spatial facts from a purely objective viewpoint.  According 
to Dummett, we do not have to picture ourselves situated within that map to grasp 
all the spatial facts.  However, in the case of time, Dummett claims that as a thinker 
you could not stand outside of a totality of temporal facts and represent them.  
Dummett’s thought here is that to represent temporal facts is always to represent 
them in some temporal relation to your current consciousness, which is a 
perspective immersed in time.  Moreover, in representing something in relation to 
your own consciousness, you are necessarily using some indexical mode, which 
can only be present tense.  Thus, in the temporal case, indexicality is always tied to 
the present perspective.  So, according to Dummett, to give a complete description 
of reality, we would have to be able to represent all the temporal facts from this 
(present tensed) perspective within time.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  This	  is	  just	  as	  well,	  since	  there	  is	  also	  an	  irremovable	  informativeness	  in	  the	  case	  of	  some	  facts	  involving	  personal	   and	   spatial	   indexicals.	   	   For	   example,	  we	   could	  not	   get	  by	  without	  using	   ‘I’,	  ‘you’,	  ‘here’	  or	  ‘there’	  in	  expressing	  some	  of	  the	  things	  we	  know.	  	  	  82	  Dummett	  (1960),	  p.	  356.	  	  
	   77	  
However, the problem with this is that as our consciousness moves through time, 
this temporal perspective that we are immersed in is always changing.  So, 
according to Dummett, there are some facts that can only be grasped from a 
perspective one occupies temporarily (such as the fact reported by the utterance of 
‘the paper is white’ on day1).  This means that as time passes, these present tense 
facts are no longer available to be reported on.  These facts still obtain, because 
they remain part of reality (assuming eternalism), but we cannot have a complete 
description of reality, because we cannot report on them from any temporal 
perspective other than the present.   
 
For Dummett, it is not an option to try to represent the same facts indexically by 
moving up a level.  For example, by claiming that we can report on the fact ‘the 
paper was white’ by representing it as obtaining at-some-time-earlier-than the 
occurrence of this (current) thought, ‘the paper is yellow’.  According to Dummett, 
this would involve adopting a neutral viewpoint, which involves standing outside of 
oneself as a subject immersed in time, and looking in on oneself, as a subject 
immersed in time.  This would involve placing the subject inside the range of the 
temporal facts; and thereby going beyond the totality of facts that the subject was 
representing.  Moreover, this would involve accepting that the subject was not able 
to represent the totality of temporal facts in the first place.  So according to Dummett, 
whereas you do not have to be in space to capture all the spatial facts, to capture 
the temporal facts the indexical tie is such that it can only be had from the particular 
perspective you have within time at a given moment.   
 
Someone might object as follows.  Even if Dummett is correct to say that you can 
represent all the spatial facts from outside of space,83 it does not follow that there 
cannot be a complete description of all the spatial facts from within space.  Similarly, 
even if we cannot represent all the temporal facts from within time, using indexical 
modes, this does not show that there cannot be a complete description of all the 
temporal facts.  However, this objection misses Dummett’s point that the tensed fact 
represented by the utterance of ‘the paper is white’ on day1 is not available to be 
reported on at some later time.  This is what Dummett has ruled out, because that 
would require us to affirm an inconsistency, or an inconsistent set of propositions.  
For example, to affirm that the paper is white and that the paper is yellow.  
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  Dummett	  has	  not	  provided	  an	  argument	  for	  this.	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Hence, Dummett claims that McTaggart’s argument cannot be dismissed on the 
grounds that it fails to notice the obvious properties of token-reflexive expressions.  
As Dummett’s argument shows, McTaggart’s assumption that there must (in 
principle) be a complete description reality, does take notice of the obvious 
properties of token-reflexive expressions.  Hence McTaggart accepts that temporal 
reality cannot be described independently of a particular viewpoint, because some 
of these token-reflexive expressions can only be had from a present tense 
perspective within the time series.  Dummett says that McTaggart’s conclusion 
follows from the complete description thesis; namely, that events have incompatible 
A-properties, and hence the A-series is contradictory, and time is unreal.  Thus, for 
Dummett, the only way to avoid McTaggart’s conclusion is to deny the complete 
description thesis.  That is, to accept that certain facts expressed by sentences 
involving temporal indexicals are no longer available to be reported on; and hence, 
we cannot reveal either their inconsistency or consistency with other facts.  So, 
according to Dummett, if we accept that tense is essential for the reality of time, we 
must also accept that there cannot be a complete description of reality. 
 
Dummett’s solution to McTaggart’s paradox rests on the claim that although certain 
facts still obtain and are part of reality, we cannot report on them.  Hence we avoid 
the contradiction.  Given McTaggart’s assumption of eternalism, and his claim that 
the A-series is essential for change, Dummett seems correct to locate the problem 
with McTaggart’s argument with the complete description thesis.  However, it could 
be objected that since Dummett’s argument is about the inescapability of time with 
respect to consciousness, he only shows that the inability to report on certain tensed 
facts is due to some psychological failing on our part.  In which case, Dummett has 
not shown that the inability to have a complete description of reality is due to the 
nature or structure of reality itself.  Realism about tense is the claim that there is 
something about tense-inflection, which is reflecting an aspect of reality.  That is, 
how reality is, independently of our perspectives and psychological limitations.  So 
Dummett’s argument does not show that there is something about temporal reality 
itself, which prevents there being a complete description of it because that 
description would be incoherent.  To show that, Dummett would need to provide 
something stronger than a psychological argument.   
 
Although Dummett does not conclusively show that reality is such that we cannot 
have a completely neutral description of it, this does not make his argument 
uninteresting.  For example, it does not undermine the claim that if there could be a 
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neutral view of reality, then A-characteristics cannot occur, and that McTaggart’s 
concluson that time is unreal would follow.  The strength of Dummett’s 
reconstruction is that it brings out two things that are not obvious in McTaggart’s 
original formuation.  First, that McTaggart’s argument relies on his key assumption 
that there is a complete description of reality, and that we can avoid the paradoxical 
result by rejecting that assumpton.  And second, that central to the debate is 
understanding how there is something distinctive about indexicality with relation to 
time, in contrast to space and person.  Namely, the stronger thesis that we cannot 
stand outside the totality of temporal facts and represent them, because to 
represent them is always to represent them as in some relation to our current 
consciousness.   
 
Let us grant that our inability to give a complete description of reality is not due to 
psychological limitiatons, but due to some aspect of reality itself.  In that case, 
Dummett has not really explained what the point of evaluation is, which is holding 
apart facts, which would otherwise be incompatible when they were all brought 
together in the complete description.  Were Dummett a presentist, there would be 
an easy answer.84  For the presentist, the present is the point of evaluation; because 
only present objects exist, and hence the only facts that there are, are the facts 
there presently are.  So it is never that case that non-present facts obtain, because 
they are not part of reality.  Thus for the presentist, the structure of reality itself is 
what prevents there being incompatible tensed facts.  (This is also why the 
presentist can easily avoid McTaggart’s paradox, because when day16 is present 
and the paper is yellow, the fact that obtained on day1 (the paper is white) is no 
longer part of reality.  So the complete description thesis is not in play for the 
presentist.)   
 
In contrast, Dummett holds that non-present facts obtain and are part of reality.  
Hence, Dummett is not an anti-realist with respect to the existence of non-present 
times and non-present facts.  So although for Dummett the present is the point of 
evaluation, it is not completely clear why this is so.   Dummett’s ‘anti-realism’ about 
the past and the future is concerned with the idea of truth being evidentally 
constrained in some way, from the perspective of the present.  For Dummett this 
might involve past and future truths not being available due to a kind of epistemic 
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indeterminism; but if this is correct, we might still ask what makes the present (or 
now) special in this case.   
 
Fine suggests that Dummett is some kind of ‘non-standard realist about tense’.85  In 
the section below, we see how Fine reconstructs McTaggart’s argument, bringing 
out what he takes to be the incompatible positions.  In Fine’s way of categorizing 
things, Dummett seems to fit best with Fine’s ‘external relativism’.  The external 
relativist avoids McTaggart’s paradox by denying that the constitution of reality is an 
absolute matter.  So the facts that constitute reality obtain relative to times, but they 
do not exhaust reality.  Hence, we cannot give a complete description of reality, 
because the composition of reality shifts with time.   
 
As we have seen, for Dummett what is distinctive about tense (in contrast to spatial 
or personal indexicals) is that we cannot think about time without addressing the 
question of how we relate to it from within time.  Hence our thinking about reality 
itself occurs in time; that is, at some time or other.  So the idea here is that athough 
reality is not restricted to the present, we experience certain tensed facts obtaining 
relative to the perspective we are conscious of (the present).  Hence the act of 
thinking is what marks the present out as the point of evaluation, although it is not a 
privileged perspective in any other sense.  And as we have different perspectives 
over time, what constitutes reality from our perspective changes over time.   So this 
is why Fine suggests that Dummett might be an external relativist.    
 
It is not clear whether Fine’s external relativism is a coherent position.  But if it is, it 
provides a way of understanding how Dummett can combine realism about tense, 
with the idea that there is a sense in which the past and the future have less reality 
than the present.  This, in turn, could explain what it is that keeps (otherwise 
contradictory) tensed facts apart, such that we cannot have a complete description 
of reality, without restricting reality to the present, as the presentist does.  
 
2.4.2  An outline of Fine’s response to McTaggart 
 
Kit Fine develops a strengthened version of Dummett’s type of argument.  Like 
Dummett, Fine reconstructs McTaggart’s paradox with the intention of showing how 
the realist about tense can avoid the paradox.  However, Fine is more explicit in 	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  Fine	  (2005),	  p.	  279n.	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arguing that the reason that we cannot have a complete description of reality is due 
to the nature of reality itself.  What follows is an outline of Fine’s argument, as a 
response to McTaggart.  Fine’s way out of the paradox involves rejecting standard 
realism about tense (or standard A-theories).  We consider his arguments for 
rejecting standard A-theories in Chapter 3.   
 
Fine reconstructs McTaggart’s argument in terms of the following four commitments, 
which he claims are inconsistent:   
 
• Realism: Reality is constituted, at least in part, by tensed facts.  For 
example, it is constitutive of reality that the paper is white, and it is 
constitutive of reality that the paper was white.  
• Neutrality: No time is privileged.  The tensed facts that constitute reality are 
not orientated towards one specific time. 
• Absolutism: The constitution of reality is an absolute matter.  So the facts 
that constitute reality are not relative to one time or another.  (For example, 
if the fact that ‘the paper is white’ constitutes reality at day1, it must 
constitute reality at dayn, even if dayn is not privileged.)   
• Coherence.  Reality is not contradictory, or constituted by inconsistent facts. 
So claims of the form ‘it is constitutive of reality that p’ are coherent, in the 
sense that all of the ps could be true. 
 
Fine then characterises the standard positions in the metaphysics of time in terms of 
which one of these four commitments is rejected.  For example:  
 
• Standard B-theorists reject Realism.  For the standard B-theorist, the 
fundamental facts that constitute reality are tenseless.  So it is not really the 
case that the paper is white or that the paper was white.  Rather, what is the 
case is that the paper is white at t, and not white at t*.86  
 
• Standard A-theorists reject Neutrality because they privilege the present.  
The presentist claims that the present is ontologically privileged.  Whereas 
other A-theorists claim that the present is metaphysically privileged in some 
other way.  A-theorists then use the notion of the privileged present to 
develop various ways to avoid McTaggart’s paradox (explained below).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  So	  the	  standard	  B-­‐theorist	  accepts	  neutrality,	  absolutism,	  and	  coherence.	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Although these two approaches are the standard ways to block McTaggart’s 
paradox, Fine is not satisfied with either.  According to Fine, in rejecting Realism, 
the standard B-theory trivialises temporal passage.  And in rejecting Neutrality, the 
standard A-theory fails to account for passage at all.87  Instead, Fine says that if we 
want to be realists about tense we should be ‘non-standard realists about tense’.  
He suggests two versions of this non-standard A-theory, which both combine 
Realism with Neutrality:  
  
• External Relativism.  This is the claim that what is constitutive of reality itself 
varies with time.  This is because reality obtains relative to perspectives, but 
none of them is privileged.  This involves upholding coherence by rejecting 
absolutism.88  
• Fragmentalism.  This is the claim that there are true claims such that ‘it is 
constitutive of reality that p’, and ‘it is constitutive of reality that q’, where 
somehow p and q do not cohere together.  This involves rejecting coherence.  
 
For reasons explained in Chapter 3, Fine favours fragmentalism over external 
relativism.  According to Fine, fragmentalism enables the non-standard realist to 
adequately account for change and avoid McTaggart’s paradox.  For example, the 
fragmentalist can hold that reality is such that the fact that it is Monday obtains and 
the tensed fact that it is Tuesday obtains, even though these tensed facts do not 
cohere.  It is not clear whether fragmentalism is intelligible, but even if it is, Fine’s 
response to McTaggart is quite radical, as it comes with the cost of giving up the 
idea that reality forms a coherent whole.89  
 
2.4.3  An outline of non-presentist A-theorist responses to McTaggart 
 
However, for most A-theorists, even if Fine’s non-standard A-theories are intelligible, 
adopting non-standard realism about tense is too high a price to pay.  Moreover, 
they claim that they do not need to.  In this section, we outline alternative ways in 
which certain non-presentist A-theorists explain how reality itself is both 
fundamentally tensed and changing, and how it can be coherently and accurately 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  Fine	  claims	  that	  the	  standard	  realists’	  account	  of	  passage	  amounts	  to	  a	  series	  of	  static	  times,	  when	  what	  we	  wanted	  was	  a	  succession	  of	  times.	  	  We	  examine	  this	  claim	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  88	  We	  examine	  External	  Relativism,	  and	  explain	  why	  it	  is	  problematic,	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  89	  In	  Chapter	  3	  we	  consider	  whether	  Fine’s	  non-­‐standard	  realism	  is	  intelligible.	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described as such, whilst avoiding McTaggart’s paradox.  These accounts are 
considered more fully in the next chapter.  We begin with the eternalist A-theories.  
 
2.4.3.1  Eternalist A-theories: The Moving Spotlight 
 
Eternalist A-theories combine two central commitments.  The first is that all times 
exist on a par; so there is a permanent domain consisting of all past, present, and 
future entities.  The second is that there is some metaphysically privileged and non-
time-relational property, which is identified with being present, such that enduring 
entities are only present temporarily.90  These A-theorists claim that the notion of a 
metaphysically privileged present enables them to use the present tense to develop 
various ways of accounting for change and the passage of time, within this domain 
of permanently existing entities.  As eternalist A-theorists claim that what makes the 
present special is some objective feature of the world (as opposed to our merely 
subjective viewpoint), each different type of eternalist A-theorist identifies what this 
objective feature is.  This is held to be having some unique property or properties, 
which all non-present entities lack.  Here we consider the most familiar version of A-
theoretic eternalism: the moving spotlight theory. 
 
The moving spotlighter identifies the property of being uniquely present with the 
property of being under-the-spotlight.  The idea here is that as the spotlight moves, 
it shines on different parts of the manifold, endowing them with the temporary 
property of being uniquely present.  On this view, objects in the manifold do not 
change with respect to their ordinary concrete properties.91   Nevertheless, the 
spotlighter holds that reality as a whole changes, because the spotlight used to be 
shining on a different part of the manifold.  This is a very minimal account of change, 
as the change occurs for different regions of the manifold, rather than for objects 
themselves.  However, by privileging just one moment of the manifold at a time, the 
spotlighter uses the notion of primitive tense to distinguish what is the case, from 
what was and what will be the case.   
 
For example, consider the reign of Queen Victoria.  At one time the spotlight was 
shining on the part of the manifold where Victoria was Queen; but now reality has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  So	   the	  notion	  of	   a	   ‘metaphysically	  privileged’	  present	   is	  used	  here	   to	  describe	  being	  merely	  metaphysically	  privileged,	  in	  contrast	  to	  being	  ‘ontologically	  privileged’.	  	  (See	  note	  4	  above)	  91	  In	   this	   respect,	   the	   spotlighter	   agrees	   with	   the	   B-­‐theorist	   that	   all	   past,	   present	   and	   future	  entities	  exist	  permanently	  and	  concretely.	  	  
	   84	  
changed because the spotlight is shining elsewhere.  According to the spotlighter, 
although Victoria is alive and reigning in her part of the manifold, her reign is no 
longer present.  So how is the spotlighter to express the fact that Victoria is no 
longer Queen?  She cannot appeal to the B-theorist’s tenseless accounts of change, 
as these merely describe variation. 92   Nor can she say ‘Victoria was Queen’, 
because this leads to McTaggart’s paradox.  (Recall that ‘M was present’, means ‘M 
is present in the past’.  And combined with the claim that all temporal entities are on 
a par, this also means that ‘M is present in the present’.  Hence we have the 
contradiction, because nothing can be both present and past.)  So in order to 
adequately express this change in an A-theoretic way that avoids McTaggart’s 
paradox, the spotlighter uses primitive tense operators.   
 
Tense logic is the modal-logic developed by Prior, where he explores the idea that 
there is a close analogy between modality and time.  Although the spotlighter adopts 
certain aspects of Prior’s tense logic, in order to express what is special about the 
dynamic present, she does not adopt all the commitments of Prior’s tense logic.  
Specifically, as an eternalist, she does not endorse Prior’s rejection of the existence 
of merely past and merely future individuals or times.93  Hence, it is important to 
remember that the view expressed below conflicts with Prior’s view about the 
existence of merely past and future entities and times.   
 
There are four Priorian tense operators.  The first two are the ‘sometimes’ operators: 
 
• P : meaning ‘it was the case’.  (Or at some past time) 
• F  : meaning ‘it will be the case’.  (Or at some future time) 
 
These correspond to the weak modal operator, possibly (formally ), meaning ‘it is 
possibly the case’.  This is standardly taken to be weak, because for any truth p, it 
follows from that that possibly p (p). 
 
The next two are the ‘always’ operators: 
 
• H : meaning ‘it has always been the case’. 
• G : meaning ‘it will always be the case’. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  A-­‐theorists	   reject	   B-­‐theoretic	   accounts	   of	   change	   on	   the	   grounds	   that	   they	  merely	   describe	  how	  things	  permanently	  are	  at	  different	  times.	  93	  Prior’s	  view	  is	  outlined	  in	  §2.4.4	  below.	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These correspond to the strong modal operator, necessarily (formally, ), meaning 
‘it necessarily is the case.’  These are standardly taken to be strong, because from 
necessarily p (p), it follows that p. 
 
Tense operators are standardly held to work in much the same way as modal 
operators, in that they restrict the quantifiers in their scope to things that are located 
at the relevant instant (or world in the modal case).   For example, in possible world 
semantics, the actual world w* is the world from which all claims about other worlds 
in the set W of worlds w are evaluated.94  Hence, it is claimed that ‘possibly p’ can 
be interpreted as meaning ‘there is some world where p at w’, where w is accessible 
from w*.  In tense logic, the present time is privileged, analogous to the actual world 
w* in the modal case.  Thus, just as alternative possible worlds are standardly held 
to exist as possible but non-actual states of affairs, in tense logic, past and future 
times are held to exist as alternative but non-present states of affairs.  (This is what 
Prior denies.)  Hence, in the modal case, the possible state of affairs Victoria not 
becoming Queen exists, but does not obtain, because it lacks the property of being 
actual (or actualized).  And in the temporal case, the past state of affairs Victoria 
being Queen exists but it does not obtain, because it lacks the property of being 
present (or how the world is now).95  For the spotlighter, this is because this state of 
affairs is no longer under the spotlight.   
 
Thus, by using primitive tense operators, the spotlighter can say: 
 
P (Victoria is Queen), meaning: ‘it was the case that Victoria is Queen’.  
 
Formally: P ∃x(Qx) 
 
Here the tense operator P does not quantify unrestrictedly over the whole domain.  
Rather, P restricts the existential quantifier (∃) to a specific part of the domain; 
namely, the past.  In this way, the spotlighter avoids quantifying over the (present) 
part of the domain in which M (Victoria’s reign) is not present or not under the 
spotlight.  And this, allegedly, enables the spotlighter to avoid making the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  More	   specifically,	   in	   propositional	  modal	   logic,	   there	   is	   a	   set	  W	   of	  worlds	  w,	  where	   each	  w	  assigns	  a	  truth-­‐value	  to	  each	  simple	  formula	  of	  the	  language.	  	  And	  one	  member	  of	  W,	  w*	  is	  the	  actual	  world.	  95	  So	  Prior	  denies	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  merely	  existing	  entities.	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contradictory claim that M is both under-the-spotlight (is present in the past) and 
not-under-the-spotlight (is past in the present).  Instead what she says is: it is now 
that case that it was the case that Victoria’s reign is under the spotlight.  This tensed 
sentence expresses a temporary proposition, because there was a time when this 
proposition was false; that is, prior to Victoria’s reign.  (We can contrast this with the 
propositions expressed by the B-theoretic claim ‘Victoria’s reign is earlier-than 
Elizabeth II’s reign’, which is permanently true.)  So this is how the spotlighter claims 
to give an A-theoretic account of change, which avoids McTaggart’s paradox.    
 
In the next chapter we consider criticisms of the moving spotlight theory, including 
the objection that it does not escape McTaggart’s paradox.  We shall also consider 
the accounts of certain eternalist A-theorists who claim to give a more robust 
account of change than the spotlighter gives.  That is to say, one in which objects 
change their A-properties in some way, rather than change merely involving reality 
as a whole changing.  These accounts include Meghan Sullivan’s version of 
Williamsonian presentism, and Ross Cameron’s ‘non-standard’ moving spotlight 
theory.  As we shall see, for these eternalist-A-theorists, the claim that the present is 
special involves stripping away all the interesting properties from non-present 
objects.  And hence they claim that change involves objects gaining and losing their 
A-properties as time passes.  We also consider another A-theoretic version of 
eternalism, called ‘degree presentism’.  However, we shall now consider how the 
semi-eternalist theory, the growing block, claims to avoid McTaggart’s paradox.  
 
2.4.3.2  Semi-Eternalism: The Growing Block 
 
According to the growing block theory, reality consists of all past and present 
entities.  Unlike the ‘static’ block of the B-theorist, this semi-eternal block is 
continually growing, as new times and their contents come into existence as they 
become present.  As each new present comes into existence, entities that were 
formerly present recede into the past section of the block.  Hence, on this view, 
being present involves being on the edge of the block.  The growing blocker is thus 
committed to the view that objects exist temporally, because they do not always 
exist.  Instead, it is only after objects come into existence in the present that they 
continue to exist permanently in the block.  The growing blocker can thus explain 
change, by claiming that objects change by losing the property of being on the edge 
of the block, and becoming increasingly past.  
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However, the growing blocker can also explain change in terms of previously open 
propositions becoming fixed.  The idea here is that the significance of tense is 
explained by thinking about the idea that the future isn’t fixed.  For example, we 
might think that although the past is all settled, there are multiple possibilities open 
to us in the future; and they will be settled by what happens today and tomorrow, 
and so on.  So there is a multiple branching future, and the actual world selects one 
of these routes.  So looking backwards there is always one line, but looking 
forwards there are multiple branches, consisting of multiple possibilities.  And it is 
because there are multiple branches that most propositions concerning the future do 
not have a determinate truth-value.  This is typically described as the unfixity of the 
future, but we might also call it the unreality of the future.  On this view, reality 
consists of all there is now and has been; but because reality is forever growing, as 
reality gets bigger, it encompasses more and more facts. 
 
Like the spotlighter, the growing blocker uses tense operators to give as complete a 
description of how reality is and was, without running into McTaggart’s paradox.  For 
example, they claim that ‘it was the case that Victoria is Queen’ does not involve 
claiming that Victoria’s reign is present in the past.  For the growing blocker, the fact 
that we cannot describe how some aspects of how reality will be is not due to any 
psychological limitation on our part; rather it is because reality is such that the future 
is not yet fixed.   In Chapter 3 we consider some objections to this view, and we also 
consider a different version of semi-eternalism, Storrs McCalls’ ‘shrinking tree’.  
 
2.4.4  An outline of Prior’s response to McTaggart 
 
In this section we outline Prior’s presentist response to McTaggart.  Prior’s account 
of presentism brings together a number of semantic and metaphysical assumptions.   
We have already seen one of these; namely, the idea that there is a close analogy 
between modality and tense.  However, in this section, we consider how Prior’s 
approach to tense and modality supports his particular account of presentism.  As 
we shall see in Chapter 4, not all presentists accept Prior’s approach to tense 
logic.96  And as we have already seen, other A-theorists adopt certain aspects of 
Prior’s tense logic, without endorsing presentism.  However, in the way that Prior 
articulates his view, tense logic and presentism fit together very naturally. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  For	  example,	  ersatzer	  presentists	  do	  not	  accept	  Prior’s	  approach.	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The background assumptions to Prior’s views on tense logic and presentism are 
found in the first chapter of Past, Present, and Future.97  They include the following.  
As an A-theorist, Prior is committed to realism about tense, so Prior is rejecting the 
position Fine calls ‘neutrality’.  Moreover, as a presentist, Prior rejects neutrality on 
the grounds that the present is ontologically privileged.  Prior is also committed to 
propositional temporalism; the view that there are complete propositions that can 
vary in truth-value.  Thus for Prior, the same proposition is expressed by the tensed 
sentence ‘the paper is white’ on different occasions, and that (tensed) proposition 
can be true at some times and false at others. 
 
Prior has a particular understanding of modality.  As we have seen, Prior holds that 
significant tenses (past, present, future) are sentential operators.  Prior also holds 
that sentence operators are prior in our understanding to truths involving a temporal 
operator (or modal operators), to any form that quantifies over events or times (or 
quantifies over worlds).  Some people suggest (contra Prior) that because ‘possibly 
p’ can be interpreted as ‘there is some world where p at w’, we should understand 
our modal operators as implicit quantifiers over worlds.  And analogously, because 
Fp means ‘it will be the case that p’, as that involves quantifying over times, that 
commits us to times.  Prior want to resist this view.  For Prior, even though standard 
models give a model theory for our tense logic in terms of times, times are not 
fundamental; instead, what is fundamental is given by the sentential operators.  
Hence, we understand talk of times in terms of propositions about what happens at 
times; and more fundamentally, in terms of how it ‘can have been the case’ or ‘will 
be the case’.  So for Prior, times are merely constructions out of propositions, and 
are not fundamental in the system.98  A consequence of this is that Prior gives up 
the idea that we can reveal our commitments to what is the case in purely 
extensional terms; that is, by quantifying over objects.99  (In contrast, the B-theorist 
can reveal her commitments to what is the case using purely extensional terms.) 
 
Fine distinguishes two way of being a presentist, which are useful for understanding 
what presentists might be committed to.100  These are:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  	  Prior	  (1967).	  98	  	  Similarly,	   for	  Prior,	  worlds	  are	  not	   fundamental	   in	  our	  understanding	  of	  modality.	   	   Instead,	  what	  is	  really	  fundamental	  is	  just	  our	  grasp	  of	  possible	  ways	  things	  could	  be.	  	  	  99	  	  The	  extension	  of	  a	  term	  refers	  to	  the	  set	  of	  all	  actual	  things	  a	  word	  or	  phase	  describes.	   	  For	  example,	   the	   extension	   of	   ‘cat’	   is	   all	   actual	   instances	   of	   cats	   (past,	   present,	   and	   future.)	   	   The	  
intension	  of	  ‘cat’	  refers	  to	  the	  logical	  conditions	  that	  specify	  the	  set	  of	  all	  possible	  things	  that	  the	  word	  ‘cat’	  could	  describe,	  including	  cats	  that	  may	  not	  actually	  exist.	  100	  Fine	  (2005),	  pp.	  298-­‐300.	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• Presentism with respect to facts (factive presentism).  This is the view that all 
that is the case is what is now the case.   
• Presentism with respect to objects (ontic presentism).  This is the view that 
everything that exists, exists now, and is some way - where that’s 
significantly tensed.  (And implicitly what that says is that our first order 
quantifiers range solely over presently existing entities.)   
 
As Fine explains, factive presentism does not entail ontic presentism, so one could 
accept factive presentism while not accepting ontic presentism.101  However, Prior is 
committed to both. 
 
Hence, for Prior, in terms of the facts, what is the case is a matter of what is 
presently the case.  So when we frame a description of reality, our present temporal 
perspective has a privilege when it comes to framing what really is the case.  And in 
terms of ontic presentism, Prior takes seriously the view that the existential 
quantifier only ranges over all the things that there presently are.  That is to say, for 
Prior, it is not true that just because it was the case that Victoria is Queen, that there 
is something that was Queen Victoria.  So for Prior, the past tense operator is not 
something you can existentially generalize out of.   
 
Before we consider how Prior responds to McTaggart, we need to address the 
question of whether Prior’s tensed understanding of ‘exists’ invites the charge of 
triviality.  In Chapter 1 we considered how using a tense-neutral notion of ‘exists’ 
enabled the presentist to avoid the triviality objection.102  I claimed there that using a 
tense-neutral notion of ‘exists’ enabled the presentist and eternalist to articulate their 
respective views using the same notion of existence; thereby making it clear what 
they disagree about, and hence that they have a substantial dispute.   However, as 
Prior claims that ‘exists’ is an essentially tensed notion, this raises the question of 
whether Prior’s articulation of presentism involves anything the eternalist would 
disagree with. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  For	   example,	   certain	   tensed	   realists	   can	   accept	   that	   there	   are	   tensed	   facts,	  which	   concern	  how	  things	  presently	  are	  (i.e.	  factive	  presentism),	  while	  also	  accepting	  that	  all	  past,	  present,	  and	  future	  objects	  exist	   (i.e.	   rejecting	  ontic	  presentism).	   	   In	  contrast,	   it	  makes	   less	  sense	   to	  accept	  ontic	  presentism	  without	  also	  accepting	  factive	  presentism.	  	  See	  Fine,	  ibid.	  102	  cf.	  pp.16-­‐22.	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Let us first consider ontic presentism, which Fine describes as an ontological claim 
about what there is.103  For Prior, everything that exists, is what exists now, and is 
some way.  (As we shall see, Prior takes ‘being some way’ to mean being within the 
range of the existential quantifier.)  Ontic presentism is a restrictive claim, as it 
excludes any objects that do not presently exist, from existing now and being some 
way.  So we can get the meaning better by saying ‘only presently existing objects 
exist now, and are some way’.  The first clause (‘only presently existing objects exist 
now’) is trivially true.  The eternalist can grant this claim because she holds that the 
first clause is consistent with her claim that non-present objects exist at non-present 
times.  Hence the first clause does not show how presentism is a restricted claim, as 
the eternalist can agree with it.   
 
So the Priorian needs to show that there is a suitable restriction on the second 
clause ‘is some way’, such that the eternalist will not agree with it.  To do this, she 
needs to show that ‘is some way’ only applies to presently existing objects; and 
hence that objects that did or will exist (but do not presently exist) are not any way 
at all.  I suggest that the presentist’s restriction on what it means to ‘be some way’ 
should be understood in the context of Prior’s tense logic, as follows.  
 
Prior is committed to a temporally varying domain; so he takes seriously the idea 
that when someone has died, they no longer exist.104  So if person X no longer 
exists, and what the existential quantifier ranges over are all the things that there 
are, then person X is not within the range of the existential quantifier.  For Prior, this 
means that person X is not some way at all.  For example, Prior denies that,  
 
(1) Victoria was Queen 
 
can be re-written as  
 
(2) Victoria is such that she was Queen.   
 
(2) would be to now present-tensely ascribe to Victoria the property of being such 
that she was Queen.  And if (1) and (2) could be made equivalent in this way, then 
(contra presentism) it would commit us to the existence of Victoria. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  See	  Fine	  (2005),	  p.	  299.	  104	  Similarly,	   something	   or	   someone	   that	   does	   not	   yet	   exist	   is	   not	   within	   the	   range	   of	   the	  existential	  quantfier.	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However, the Priorian denies that (1) is equivalent to (2).  According to Prior,  
 
(1) ‘Victoria was Queen’ should be understood as: 
 
PAST(Victoria is Queen) 
 
Here (1) is embedded within the past tense operator, from which there is no 
existential entailment.   
 
Understood in this context, it is not open to the eternalist to say that although only 
present objects exist now (which is trivially true), nevertheless past and future 
objects are some way now.  Instead, Prior is denying that past and future objects 
are any way at all now; and this is a claim the eternalist will not want to accept.  So, 
it is the second clause ‘is some way now’, that is doing the restrictive work here for 
Prior.  So even though Prior is using a tensed notion of ‘exists’, we can see what the 
presentist and the eternalist disagree about.  For the presentist, because only 
presently existing objects are within the range of the existential quantifier, only 
presently existing objects are some way now.  Whereas for the eternalist, because 
all past, present, and future objects are within the range of the existential quantifier, 
past and future objects are also some way now; namely the way they were or will be.  
 
Let us now consider factive presentism.  In contrast to ontic presentism, which is an 
ontological view about what there is (or exists), and is some way, Fine describes 
factive presentism as a metaphysical view about ‘how things are quite apart from 
what there is’.105  So factive presentism is understood in terms of facts obtaining, as 
opposed to objects existing and being some way.   
 
For Prior, factive presentism means that everything that is the case, is so in virtue of 
the facts now obtaining (or the way things are now).  So the only facts there are are 
the ones that obtain in the present.  Thus, for Prior, everything that was or will be 
the case, is so in virtue of the facts now obtaining.  For example, the fact that 
‘Victoria was Queen’ is so in virtue of facts obtaining now; namely that it was the 
case that Victoria is Queen.  However, given Prior’s tensed notion of ‘is’ (or ’exists’), 
factive presentism becomes the trivially true claim that all that is (presently) the case 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  105	  Fine	  (ibid),	  p.299.	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is what is now the case.  The eternalist can accept this claim, because it is 
consistent with her claim that facts obtain at times other than the present.  Hence 
the factive presentist needs to do more to show that they are disagreeing with the 
eternalist.  That is to say, factive presentists need to show what additional restriction 
is in play, just at the factual level, when they say that all the facts there are are the 
facts there are now.   
 
One option would be to say that factive presentism is a subset of ontic presentism.  
For example, if one held that all the facts that obtain require truthmakers, and 
understood truthmakers as the instantiation of properties in objects, then ontic 
presentism, plus the truthmaker requirement, would entail factive presentism.106  
However, this is not Prior’s understanding of factive presentism.  This is because for 
Prior, there are plenty of facts that do not involve the instantiation of properties in 
objects.  For example, the fact that it was the case that Victoria is Queen does not 
involve the claim that there is now an object (Victoria), which instantiates the 
property (is Queen), which makes this proposition true.107  
 
As was the case with ontic presentism, the way to see what the additional 
constraints are for Prior’s factive presentism is to understand it in the context of his 
tense logic.  We saw above that Prior takes tense operators to be fundamental, 
rather than interpreting tense operators as quantifiers over times.108  And we also 
saw that Prior holds that times are merely constructions out of tensed propositions.  
For Prior, the basic facts (true propositions) are always expressed by present 
tensed sentences, and the truth-value of propositions expressed by such sentences 
can vary over time.  Thus Prior takes simple sentences, such as ‘Elizabeth is Queen’ 
as equivalent to present tense sentences, and these express the basic facts.  The 
tense operators (P and F) then act as sentential operators, which modify simple 
sentences, giving complex sentences and iterated tenses; such as P(Elizabeth will 
be Queen).  So for Prior, all that is the case is so in virtue of what is presently the 
case.  And as times are not fundamental, but are merely constructions out of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  If	   facts	   require	   truthmakers,	   and	   (given	  ontic	   presentism)	   the	   only	   objects	   that	   instantiate	  properties	  are	  objects	  that	  exist	  now,	  then	  the	  only	  facts	  that	  obtain	  will	  be	  the	  facts	  that	  obtain	  now.	  	  107	  Prior	  understands	  facts	  in	  terms	  of	  true	  propositions.	  	  Prior	  holds	  that	  sentences	  can	  express	  propositions	  without	   there	   being	   an	   implicit	   reference	   or	   quantification	   over	   times.	   	   Thus	   he	  holds	  that	  tensed	  propositions	  are	  complete	  propositions,	  which	  can	  be	  true	  at	  some	  times	  and	  false	  at	  others.	  108	  As	  Prior	  holds	  that	  it	  is	  temporal	  operators	  that	  are	  fundamental,	  he	  thinks	  that	  talk	  of	  times	  is	  eliminable.	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propositions, there are no non-present times for facts to obtain at.  Thus, understood 
in the context of Prior’s tense logic, it is not open to the eternalist to agree that all 
that is (presently) the case is what is now the case, but nevertheless to maintain that 
facts obtain at times other than the present.  For the Priorian, there are no times 
other than the present, and hence the only facts that obtain are those that obtain 
now.  
 
This provides a way of making it clear what the factive presentist and the eternalist 
disagree about.  The eternalist understands ‘true at time t’ as true absolutely, but 
restricted to considering some truth from among a larger domain of times.  In 
contrast, the presentist denies that there are times other than the present; and it 
follows from this that no facts obtain other than those which presently obtain.  The 
Priorian factive presentist is therefore making a substantial claim, which the 
eternalist will not accept, so she avoids the charge of triviality.   
 
Let us consider how Prior might respond to McTaggart.  Suppose that we assume 
that Dummett’s reconstruction of McTaggart is correct, and that the complete 
description thesis is what makes the problem for McTaggart’s argument.  For a 
presentist like Prior, there is an easy way to respond.  For the Priorian presentist, it 
is not the case that we cannot describe all the alleged incompatible facts.  Rather, it 
is that the alleged incompatible facts do not obtain; so there is no incoherence or 
contradiction.  
 
According to Prior, what is asserted by the sentence ‘the paper is white’ is a 
complete proposition.  That is to say, it is not an incomplete expression, requiring ‘at 
time t’ to be added in order to make it into an assertion, and hence truth-evaluable.  
Nor is it the case that what is said using the sentence-type (the paper is white) on 
any given occasion is just true or false simpliciter.  (For example, that ‘the paper is 
white’ uttered on day1 expresses a proposition that is true simpliciter, and ‘the paper 
is white’ uttered on day16 expresses a different proposition, which is false 
simpliciter.109)  Rather, the proposition expressed by the sentence ‘the paper is 
white’ is something that can have a variable truth-value relative to time; that is, the 
very same proposition can be true at some times and not at others.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  	  The	  idea	  here	  is	  that	  a	  different	  proposition	  is	  expressed	  by	  the	  same	  sentence-­‐type	  on	  each	  occasion,	  in	  which	  case	  there	  is	  an	  implicit	  reference	  to	  time.	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For Prior, our use of tense reflects something about the way things are, and about 
fundamental aspects of the nature of time.   Moreover, for presentists like Prior, the 
distinctive role of tense is not that of quantifying over events, which change by 
losing and gaining the properties of being past, present and future.110   Rather, it is 
that significant tenses (past, present and future) are sentential operators, which 
reflect our commitments to what is the case.  And given the presentist’s 
metaphysics, there never is a temporally neutral view of reality.  Hence some of the 
facts are just irreducibly temporal facts. 
 
Let presentism (as we have defined it thus far) be the claim that the only objects that 
exist are the objects that presently exist.   For Prior, it follows from this that facts do 
not obtain at non-present times (because no non-present states of affairs exist for 
there to be facts about), and properties are not instantiated at non-present times 
(because no non-present objects exist to instantiate any properties).111  Thus for the 
Priorian, the present facts (the facts that obtain in the present) are the only facts 
there are (or the only facts that obtain simpliciter), and presently instantiated 
properties are the only properties there are.112  Let us suppose that Dummett’s 
reconstruction of McTaggart is correct, and that the complete description thesis is 
what makes the problem for McTaggart’s argument.  The Priorian presentist has an 
easy way out of the problem, because there is no such complete (or temporally 
neutral) description of reality to be had.113  According to presentism, there is only 
one temporal perspective from which facts involving indexicals can be reported; 
namely the present perspective.  So the possibility of a complete description of 
reality, which involves reporting facts involving indexicals from temporal 
perspectives other than the present, does not arise.  So whereas Dummett holds 
that such facts obtain and are part of reality, although they are unavailable for us to 
report on, the presentist can hold that such facts do not obtain, and hence are not 
part of reality.114  Thus, for presentists, there is no comparison between facts being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  	  Prior	  rejects	  events	  and	  times	  as	  fundamental.	  	  111	  	   This	   is	   why,	   for	   Prior,	   it	   is	   important	   that	   things	   are	   stated	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   truth	   of	  propositions,	  which	  can	  be	  true	  at	  some	  times	  and	  false	  at	  others.	  	  As	  we	  saw	  above,	  Prior	  holds	  that	  what	  is	  true	  now	  is	  true	  simpliciter.	  	  	  112	  	  So	  Prior	  is	  committed	  to	  presentism	  in	  relation	  to	  both	  facts	  and	  objects.	  	  Other	  presentists	  allow	  that	  facts	  can	  obtain	  in	  non-­‐present	  times;	  much	  like	  some	  actualists	  allow	  that	  facts	  can	  obtain	  in	  non-­‐actual	  possible	  worlds.	   	  For	  these	  presentists,	  non-­‐present	  times	  are	  understood	  as	   abstract	   or	   ersatz	   times,	   existing	   at	   the	  present	   time.	   	  Hence	   these	  presentists	  do	  not	  hold	  objects	  and	  facts	  together	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  Prior	  does.	  113	  	  Here	  again,	  the	  presentist	  rejects	  the	  view	  that	  Fine	  calls	  ‘neutrality’.	  	  114	  Only	  facts	  that	  presently	  obtain	  or	  exist	  are	  part	  of	  reality.	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made across time.  Hence the issue of incompatibility does not arise, and there is no 
contradiction. 
 
Like all A-theorists, the presentist agrees that significant tense reflects the 
fundamental nature of reality.  However, since they claim that the present facts are 
the only facts that there are, the presentist holds that as time passes, new facts 
obtain and previously obtaining facts no longer obtain.  Hence, for presentists, the 
shape of reality changes over time, but not because reality contains more and more 
facts, or more and more temporal properties.   Presentists accept that the utterance 
of ‘the paper is white’ on day1 expressed a truth about the paper, which it will not do 
now (as the paper is no longer white).  However, presentists also think that ‘the 
paper is white’ expresses the same proposition whenever it is uttered; and hence 
that it will report the same fact (the paper is white) when uttered truly on different 
occasions.  This is because presentists hold that there can be complete propositions, 
which do not involve an implicit reference to times.  Thus, the proposition expressed 
by ‘the paper is white’ on day1 is not tied to that particular context of utterance; and 
that same proposition can be true or false on different occasions; true on day1 and 
false on day16.  Presentists hold true propositions and facts close together, which is 
why an utterance of ‘the paper is white’ can report the same fact on different 
occasions.  For example, it can report the same fact on day3, when the paper is still 
white, because on day3 the same fact obtains.  However, this does not mean that 
the paper piles up its properties, such that reality contains too many instances of 
whiteness.115  This is because the presentist does not extract the properties from the 
facts; thus as the only facts that exist are the present ones, the only properties the 
paper has are its present properties. 
 
Similarly, as a response to McTaggart, the presentist does not have to worry that 
the hierarchy of tenses generates a contradiction.  This is because presentists do 
not accept that we can iterate tenses in the way McTaggart suggests.  Again, this is 
because for the Priorian presentist, other times do not exist.  Thus, there are no 
properties such as being past in the present, or being present in the future.   As we 
shall see in Chapter 4, for presentists it is important that we can iterate tenses; this 
is in order to make claims about non-present objects.  However, Priorian presentists 
standardly claim that the only way to iterate tenses is to use a tense operator, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  So	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  the	  paper	  has	  the	  properties	  of	  being	  white	  on	  day1,	  white	  on	  day2,	  white	   on	   day3,	   and	   so	   on.	   	   It	   will	   only	   have	   the	   property	   of	   being	  white	   at	   the	   time	   interval	  
presently	  reported.	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therefore cut off any existential commitment to other times and their contents.  Thus, 
when the presentist talks about non-present times or non-present objects they say 
things like: it was the case that ‘the paper is white’, or it was the case that ‘Victoria is 
Queen’.  But they claim that this does not commit them to the existence of some 
past time.  Hence Prior has an easy way out of McTaggart’s paradox.  For example, 
he can claim that although there once was a fact, that ‘the paper is white’ reported 
on day1, that fact no longer obtains.  It is therefore no longer part of reality.  Hence 
we avoid being incoherent. 
 
2.5  B-theoretic responses to McTaggart  
 
As we have seen, McTaggart claims that both the A-series and the B-series are 
necessary for time.  However, he also claims that without the A-series, the B-series 
does not form a time series.  The reason for this, he argues, is that change is 
necessary for time, and according to McTaggart, the B-series is not sufficient for 
change.  Thus, as McTaggart claims that the A-series is inherently contradictory, he 
concludes that there is no change and no time.  So to avoid McTaggart’s conclusion, 
the B-theorist needs to show that the B-series is sufficient for change; and hence 
that the B-series does not depend on the A-series in order to be a time series.  
 
Let us briefly remind ourselves why McTaggart claims that the B-series is not 
sufficient for change.  First, he claims that without the A-series, the tenseless terms 
of the B-series never change, because they are ordered by relations that are 
permanent.  For example, if event A occurs before event B, then A is permanently 
earlier-than B, and B is permanently later-than A, and these tenseless relations 
never change.  Secondly, McTaggart claims that for change to occur, it must be the 
case that facts change.  However, he says that the only way a fact about anything 
can change is to change its position in the A-series.  For example, a fact about the 
death of Queen Ann changes from being true in the future (Queen Ann will die), to 
being true in the present (Queen Ann is dying), to being true in the past (Queen Ann 
did die).  It follows from this, for McTaggart, that there can be no change unless 
some propositions can vary in truth-value.  That is to say, the proposition that 
Queen Ann is dead can be false at some times, and true at others. 
 
As was explained above, McTaggart is explicitly rejecting the Russellian account of 
change.  Russell says:  
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Change is the difference, in respect of truth or falsehood, between a 
proposition concerning an entity and the time T, and a proposition 
concerning the same entity and the time T’, provided that these propositions 
differ only by the fact that T occurs in the one, where T’ occurs in the 
other.116  
 
Commenting on this, McTaggart notes that Russell’s account does not describe a 
change in events in the time series; rather, it claims to describe a change 
concerning the different states in a particular entity to which those events happen.  
For example, McTaggart imagines a poker that is hot on Monday, and cold both 
before and since.  He says that on Russell’s account, although the event of the 
poker being hot does not change, the poker itself is held to change, because ‘there 
is a time when this event [being hot] is happening to it, and a time when it is not 
happening to it.’117  However, McTaggart denies that there is any change in the 
poker.  He says that without the A-series, it will always be a quality of the poker that 
it is hot on that Monday and cold at all other times; so these facts never change.   
So for McTaggart, Russell merely describes a variation between two distinct and 
unchanging propositions, each of which concerns two different states, which 
permanently belong to a particular entity at different times.118   
 
Thus for McTaggart, the B-series cannot account for change, because it involves 
unchanging and fixed relations between temporal entities, and unchanging temporal 
facts.  In order for there to be change, McTaggart says that we need the transitory 
terms of the A-series.  This is because the only way an event (or temporal entity) 
can change is by losing and gaining certain temporal characteristics, and the only 
temporal characteristics an event does not always have are A-characteristics such 
as being currently hot (or being presently hot in relation to some X outside time.) 
Similarly, the only temporal facts that can change are facts about characteristics an 
entity does not always have; namely, its A-characteristics.  Thus according to 
McTaggart, only the tensed terms of the A-series capture this dynamic aspect of 
reality, which is necessary for change, and hence time.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  116	  Russell,	  Principles	  of	  Mathematics,	  section	  442,	  quoted	  in	  McTaggart	  (1908),	  p.27.	  117	  Ibid.	  118	  McTaggart	  also	  points	  out	  that	  without	  the	  A-­‐series,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  time	  at	  which	  these	  events	  happen.	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The picture of reality the A-theory gives us is one in which linguistic tense is taken to 
reflect the fact that reality itself is tensed.  That is to say, that change involves a 
genuine difference between the ways things in the world are, were, and will be.119  
So the A-theory is seen as providing an ontological account of tense, within which 
the perspective of the present is fundamental.  In response to McTaggart, the B-
theorist needs to show that the B-series is sufficient to constitute a time series, 
because the tenseless terms of the B-series do provide an adequate account of 
change.  To do this the B-theorist either needs to show that statements made using 
ordinary tensed language can be eliminated, because they can be translated into 
tenseless ones without loss of meaning, or they need to show that even if tensed 
statements cannot be eliminated, they nevertheless have tenseless truth-conditions 
or have tenseless truthmakers.  The purpose of this is to show that reality does not 
have to change in the way the A-theorist says it does, in order for such statements 
to be true, and therefore that the A-series is unnecessary for time to be real.  Thus, 
the B-theorist typically provides reductive accounts of tense and temporal becoming.   
 
There have been a number of attempts by various B-theorists to show that the B-
series does not rely on the A-series, and also that the A-series is false.  Here we 
consider the various B-theoretic accounts of how ordinary tensed language can be 
explained in terms of a tenseless reality.  These are ‘the old B-theory of language’, 
‘the new B-theory of time’, and a modified version of the latter called ‘the Indexical 
Theory of time’.  In the next chapter, we consider the B-theoretic accounts of 
change; namely, the relational account of change, and the temporal parts account of 
change (and Mellor’s account).  We begin with the old B-theory of language. 
 
2.5.1  The old B-theory of language  
 
Proponents of the old B-theory of language include Russell, Frege, Goodman, 
Reichenbach, Smart, and Quine.  They all held the view that in the case of time, 
tense in ordinary language (or linguistic tense) was misused and had become an 
obstacle to the correct philosophical and scientific understanding of the world.120  To 
rid language of these misunderstandings, they held that tense should be eliminated 
from language.  They therefore argued that tensed sentences could be translated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  119	  The	  A-­‐theorist	   does	   not	   accept	   the	  B-­‐theorist’s	   idea	   that	   there	   can	  be	   a	  genuine	   difference	  between	  different	   slices	   (earlier	   and	   later	   slices)	  of	   the	  block.	   	  This	   is	  because	   these	  different	  ‘slices’	  of	  the	  block	  are	  permanent	  (and	  unchanging)	  features	  of	  the	  block.	  120	  That	  is,	  misused	  in	  philosophical	  discourse.	  	  See	  Goodman	  (1966),	  p.	  355.	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into tenseless sentences without any loss of meaning.  Two different accounts of 
this translation process were proposed.  The first was to replace tensed sentences 
with appropriate date or clock times.  The second was to analyse tensed 
expressions in terms of token-reflexivity.  As both of these proposed translations are 
now considered by B-theorists to be failures, I shall just outline them briefly.   
 
2.5.1.1  The date-sentence version 
 
Russell and Frege proposed slightly different versions of the date-sentence version 
of the old B-theory of language (hereafter the date-sentence version).  Here we 
consider Russell’s version and the key issues it raises.  Russell held that all 
expressions involving A-characteristics are ambiguous and should be eliminated.  
To do this, Russell claimed that sentences involving tense could be translated, 
without loss of meaning, into sentences involving tenseless verbs and given 
appropriate dates or times.  Russell’s idea involved making a distinction between 
words that can vary in meaning in different contexts, and the actual statements 
expressed by those words.  For example, Russell said that although words may vary 
in meaning at different times, any statement expressed by those words does not 
vary in meaning.  Thus, any statements expressed by the same words at different 
times will be distinct statements.    
 
Russell considered the tensed sentence ‘Mrs Brown is not at home’ (the ‘is’ here is 
tensed).  Russell said that we might ‘know what this means’ in different contexts of 
utterance, but as the statement expressed only makes an implicit reference to a 
time, its meaning is ambiguous.  To make the meaning explicit, Russell said that the 
tensed sentence ‘Mrs Brown is not at home’ should be replaced by the tenseless 
sentence ‘Mrs Brown is not at home on May 8, 1906’ (the ‘is’ here is tenseless).  As 
the statement expressed by this tenseless sentence is not variable, the meaning of 
the sentence is now clear.  In this way, Russell claimed to provide ambiguous 
tensed sentences with eternal propositions as their meanings; that is to say, 
propositions that are always true or always false.   
  
The date-sentence version was shown to be inadequate, because it became 
apparent that tensed sentences do not mean the same thing as tenseless 
sentences or ‘date-sentences’.   For example, consider Russell’s two sentences: the 
tensed sentence ‘Mrs Brown is not at home’, and the tenseless sentence ‘Mrs 
Brown is not at home on May 8, 1906’.  Suppose someone wants to visit Mrs Brown 
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at that time.  As it stands, the tenseless sentence does not convey the information 
necessary to enable that person to know whether or not Mrs Brown is at home.  The 
information that needs to be added is ‘today (or now) is May 8, 1906’, which would 
mean that what is expressed by this sentence is a tensed statement.  As the tensed 
statement (or A-statement) is informative in a way that the tenseless statement (or 
B-statement) is not, this shows that A-statements cannot be translated into B-
statements without loss of meaning.  Moreover, the fact that A-statements can be 
repeated in different contexts, in which they convey information that their ‘B-
translations’ cannot, suggests that A-statements have a role in human life which B-
statements cannot fulfil.  
 
2.5.1.2  The token-reflexive version 
 
The token-reflexive version of the old B-theory of language attempted to avoid the 
mistakes of the date-sentence version.  This account originated with Hans 
Reichenbach, but was also developed by J.J.C. Smart.  According to Reichenbach’s 
token-reflexive version, tensed sentences can be translated into tenseless ones 
without loss of meaning, by adding expressions that refer to the sentence-token 
itself. The type of words and expression that Reichenbach calls ‘token-reflexive’ 
includes any indexicals, or demonstratives, or tensed verbs that refer to their 
respective tokens used in sentences.  The idea is that when these words are used 
in sentences, they involve a relation between their respective tokens and the 
referent.  For example, the word ‘today’ means the same thing as ‘the day when this 
token is uttered’.  ‘I’ means the same thing as ‘the person who utters this token’, and 
‘here’ means the same thing as ‘the place where this token is uttered’.121  Thus 
according to the token-reflexive version, the tensed sentence  ‘Mrs Brown is not at 
home’ can be translated without loss of meaning into the tenseless sentence ‘Mrs 
Brown is not at home on the day when this token is uttered’.  
 
Reichenbach claims that the demonstrative expression ‘this token’ must be 
analysed metalinguistically.  This is to avoid a vicious infinite regress, in which ‘this 
token’ would mean ‘the token indicated by this token’, and so on.  Reichenbach 
proposes the name Ø as the name of any specific token.  Thus, ‘this token’ does not 
mean ‘the token indicated by this token’; rather it means ‘the token indicated by Ø’.  
Here ‘Ø’ is not a token-reflexive expression, so it does not refer to the sentence in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  See	  Craig	  (2000a),	  p.	  52.	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which it occurs, but rather to the original sentence in which ‘this token’ occurs.  In 
this way, indexicals such as ‘now’ and ‘here’ can be translated to mean ‘the time t 
when Ø was spoken’ or ‘the place where Ø was spoken’.  So according to 
Reichenbach’s token-reflexive account, the tensed sentence ‘Mrs Brown is not at 
home’ is translated into the tenseless sentence ‘Mrs Brown is not a home on the day 
when this sentence is uttered’.  However, this tenseless sentence is then analysed 
metalinguistically, as ‘Mrs Brown is not at home on the day when Ø’ is uttered.’   
 
However, the token–reflexive account has similar problems to the date-sentence 
version, which have to do with a loss of meaning.   Again, suppose that someone 
wants to visit Mrs Brown.  Given the token-reflexive translation, they still need to 
know the time to which the phrase ‘when this sentence is uttered’ refers.  Knowing 
that ‘the day when this sentence is uttered’ means ‘the day when Ø is uttered’ gives 
no useful information.  Smart suggests a simpler token-reflexive analysis than 
Reichenbach’s.  Smart suggests that ‘this token’ is analysed in terms of temporal 
expressions or indexicals.  But this account also runs into difficulties.  First, it 
suggests that present tense ‘this’ introduces a hidden description of time, so it is not 
clear that the translation is tenseless.  It also implies that both tensed and tenseless 
utterances cannot mean the same thing, as they will always refer to different 
utterances.  So the token-reflexive version of the old B-theory is considered 
unsuccessful. 
 
2.5.2  The new B-Theory of Time  
 
Proponents of the new B-theory of time accept that tensed sentences cannot be 
translated into (or analysed in terms of) tenseless sentences without loss of 
meaning.122  However, in the case of tensed sentences, these philosophers divide 
the semantic value of such sentences into two elements.  One element is the eternal 
proposition that a tensed sentence expresses, which is something that cannot vary 
in truth-value.  This is sometimes called the ‘official contents’ of the proposition.  The 
second element is the ‘content-like’ semantic value.  This is what is captured by the 
way a tensed sentence is presented, and is sometimes called its ‘mode of 
presentation’.  Proponents of this view, known as soft detensers, include David 
Kaplan, John Perry, and Robert Stalnaker.  As Dean Zimmerman explains, soft 
detensers use this second kind of ‘content’ (or mode of presentation) to explain two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  122	  This	  is	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘the	  new	  tenseless	  theory	  of	  time’.	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things.  First, it explains the ‘intuitive differences in belief-states reported by tensed 
and tenseless sentences’, and secondly, it explains ‘the intuitive similarities in belief-
states that have different truth-values merely because they are reported at different 
times.’ 123   
 
For example, consider again the tensed sentence ‘Mrs Brown is not at home’ 
reported on May 8, 1906.  According to soft-detensers, the ‘official contents’ of what 
is reported is the eternal proposition that Mrs Brown is not at home on May 8, 1906.   
However, what this eternal proposition does not capture is the second type of 
semantic value associated with the tensed ‘mode of presentation’; namely, the belief 
that Mrs Brown is not at home now.  Soft detensers claim that by recognizing this 
second type of semantic value, we can explain the intuitive difference between the 
belief-states reported by the tensed sentence ‘Mrs Brown is not at home’, and the 
tenseless sentence ‘Mrs Brown is not at home on May 8, 1906’.   They also claim 
that this ‘content-like’ semantic value explains the intuitive similarities in belief-states 
associated with distinct utterances of the tensed sentence ‘Mrs Brown is not at 
home’, although these sentences can have different truth-values because they are 
uttered on different days.  That is to say, they will correspond to different ‘official 
contents’; namely, distinct eternal propositions.   In this way, soft-detensers allow 
that while the date-sentence and token-reflexive accounts described above provide 
eternal propositions as the ‘official contents’ of tensed sentences, we can 
nevertheless explain the intuitive differences between tensed and tenseless 
sentences.  
 
However, other B-theorists who are ‘serious tensers’ reject the soft detenser’s idea 
that the semantic value of tensed expressions can be divided into two separate 
elements.  Such B-theorists include David Lewis and D.H. Mellor. 124   These 
philosophers accept that tensed sentences cannot be reduced to tenseless 
sentences without loss of meaning.  Thus for them, what a tensed sentence 
expresses cannot be an eternal proposition.  They therefore hold that what a tensed 
sentence, such as ‘Mrs Brown is not at home’, expresses is a non-eternal 
proposition, which can vary in truth-value.125    As B-theorists who are serious 
tensers hold that there can be non-eternal propositions, as well as eternal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  123	  Zimmerman	  (2005),	  p.	  411.	  124	  Lewis	  takes	  properties	  rather	  than	  propositions	  as	  the	  objects	  of	  attitudes.	  	  125	  Or,	  there	  is	  only	  one	  object	  of	  the	  propositional	  attitude	  reported	  by	  these	  words;	  namely,	  a	  non-­‐eternal	  proposition.	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propositions, we see here that the debate between the A-theory and the B-theory is 
a distinct debate from the debate about taking tense seriously.  This is why the 
terms ‘A-theory’ and ‘B-theory’ are not equivalent to the terms ‘tensed theory of time’ 
and ‘tenseless theory of time’ (respectively), and it is also why Mellor prefers the 
labels ‘A-propositions’ and ‘B-propositions’ instead of ‘tensed propositions’ and 
‘tenseless propositions’.  However, while B-theorists who take tense seriously and 
A-theorists both agree that tensed- or A-propositions are ineliminable, their reasons 
for doing so are very different.  
 
A-theorists claim that A-propositions are ineliminable because one time is privileged 
over other times: namely, the present.  They therefore hold that A-propositions are 
made true by tensed facts;126 that is to say, facts about how the world was, is, or will 
be, which cannot be reduced to tenseless ‘B-facts’.  B-theorists who are serious 
about tense disagree.  For them, A-propositions are ineliminable because much of 
what we think and say is perspectival.  That is to say, only tensed propositions can 
capture what is expressed by perspectival tensed sentences and thoughts.  
According to these B-theorists, as such thoughts are merely perspectival, this does 
not mean that A-propositions are made true by tensed- or A-facts, or that there are 
any A-properties in reality.  Instead, they claim that A-propositions are made true by 
B-facts; that is to say, tenseless facts about how reality is ‘in itself’.  These are facts 
about how reality is independently of the particular perspective of creatures 
embedded within time.  These B-theorists therefore disagree with Dummett’s claim 
that there cannot be a complete description of reality from outside of time.  For them, 
as all the facts that make A-propositions true are B-facts, there can be a complete 
description of reality that does not involve tensed facts.  As a complete description 
of reality consisting of only tenseless facts is all the B-theorist needs to account for 
change, and hence time, these B-theorists claim to have a legitimate response to 
McTaggart.  To explain this in more detail, let us consider Mellor’s indexical account 
of the B-theory. 
 
2.5.2.1  Mellor’s indexical B-theory 
 
In Real Time II, Mellor explains what he takes ‘taking tense seriously’ to mean.   He 
says that although in reality there is no such thing as past, present and future, this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  So	   the	   A-­‐theorist	   is	   distinguishing	   between	   facts	   and	   propositions.	   	   That	   is,	   they	   are	   not	  holding	  Lewis’	  view	  that	  facts	  just	  are	  true	  propositions	  (since,	  p	  does	  not	  make	  itself	  true).	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does not mean that it is never true to call an event e past, present or future.127   The 
important question for Mellor is: what makes statements such as ‘e is past’ true?  
Mellor denies that there are such things as A-properties; properties that make 
statements such as ‘e is past’, ‘e is present’ and ‘e is future’ true.  This is because 
he agrees with McTaggart that such statements cannot consistently be made true, 
because they will involve an event e’s having incompatible properties.128  Instead, 
Mellor says that what makes statements such as ‘e is past’ true at any time t is the 
fact that e is earlier-than t.  Similarly, what makes ‘e is present’ true at any time t is 
e’s being located-at t; and ‘e is future’ is made true at any time t by e’s being later-
than t.129  So according to Mellor, although we obviously use A-theoretic terms when 
we express some true statements, the truthmakers for A-statements are given by 
the terms of the B-theory.  
 
Mellor does not, however, endorse either the date-sentence version or the token-
reflexive version of the old B-theory of language.  Regarding the date-sentence 
version, Mellor accepts that A-statements cannot be translated into B-statements, 
without loss of meaning.130   For example, he says that an A-statement, such as ‘e is 
past’ (said at t) cannot mean the same as the B-statement ‘e is earlier than t’.  This 
is because the B-statement (if true) is always true, whereas the A-statement is only 
true after event e.  Thus, if one statement can be true when the other is false, this 
shows they cannot mean the same thing.  Mellor explains that he used to defend a 
token-reflexive view, in which (what he calls) an A-proposition, such as ‘e is present’ 
was true at a B-time t, if and only if a token of it (such as someone’s belief or a 
statement of it) would be true at t.131  However, Mellor says that this account ‘cannot 
cope with propositions like “there are no tokens now” which can be true even though 
they have no true tokens’.  As we shall see, Mellor seeks to remedy this token-
reflexive account with an indexical account, in which the truth-values of A-
propositions concerning events located at times are indexed to B-times.132  
 
Thus, instead of trying to get rid of A-statements, or give them tenseless truth-
conditions, and eternal propositions as their meanings, Mellor takes A-statements 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  127	  Mellor	  takes	  it	  as	  obvious	  that	  we	  make	  such	  statements	  and	  says	  it	  would	  be	  absurd	  to	  deny	  this.	  	  Mellor	  (1998),	  p.2.	  128	  We	  need	  not	  consider	  Mellor’s	  reconstruction	  of	  McTaggart’s	  argument	  	  here.	  	  129	  Ibid.	  130	  The	   objection	   being	   that	   as	   tensed	   statements	   cannot	   be	   reduced	   to	   tenseless	   ones,	   only	  tensed	  statements	  can	  capture	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  reality,	  which	  itself	  is	  tensed.	  131	  Ibid.,	  p.xi	  132	  Mellor	  (1998)	  p.	  xii.	  
	   105	  
seriously.  He says that we need the A-beliefs that such statements express, in 
order to know how to act in time.  For example, suppose that in March I am invited 
to a wedding on 20 June.  My B-belief about the date of the wedding does not 
change, but my A-beliefs do.  That is to say, my A-beliefs change successively, as 
the belief that the wedding is in three months, is replaced by a series of beliefs, such 
as that the wedding is in two months, two weeks, two days, and so on.  Moreover, it 
is only the A-belief that it is now 20 June that makes me go to the wedding.  Thus, 
Mellor says that it is only our transitory A-beliefs that cause us to act.  However, for 
Mellor, although these changing A-beliefs are real changes, they are not changes 
that take place in events.   Rather, they are a series of changes taking place in us.  
Mellor says that this psychological experience of A-beliefs changing is what gives 
rise to the ‘A-theorist’s myth of the flow of time’.133    
 
Mellor explains that we confuse what we observe with our experience of observing it.  
This is why we mistake our experience of successive A-beliefs as evidence for the 
reality of A-properties and the passage of time.  Mellor says that how we observe 
events (that is to say, as a series of A-times orientated by the present), does not 
mean that there is a special time ‘the present’ on which all knowledge of other 
events depends.  He explains that we can observe the time order of events, 
independently of our experience (and hence of their A-times), and he takes this to 
show that the B-time scale is independent of the A-time scale.134  For example, he 
says that seeing time-order is easy, as we can see it in anything that moves.  Thus, 
to see the second-hand of a clock moving clockwise is to see it pass 1 before it 
passes 2.  And to see it moving anti-clockwise would be to see the second-hand 
pass 1 later than it passed 2.135  Mellor says that in general, any kind of observable 
change involves seeing one event either later or earlier than another event.  
However, this is not to say that the A-series can be reduced to the B-series.  Rather 
it is to point towards the B-theorist’s claim (which Mellor admits needs to be argued 
for) that there is no extra fact about the world, over and above the B-times of events, 
such that a B-time is present.136   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  133	  Mellor,	  Ibid.	  p.4.	  134	  Ibid.,	  p.15.	  	  	  135	  Ibid.	  136	  	  Ibid.	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Mellor’s argument for this begins with a distinction between A-facts and B-facts.137  
A-facts are contingent facts about the A-times of events and of B-times.  For 
example, it is a contingent fact that as I write, the Rio Olympics is future, and July 
2016 is future.  Both these A-facts entail B-facts; that the Rio Olympics and that July 
2016 occur later-than me writing these words.  In contrast, B-facts are facts that do 
not entail any A-facts.  Some B-facts are necessary truths, such as 2 + 2 = 4; others 
are contingent truths, such as the fact that the Rio Olympics takes place later than 
the London Olympics.  The important difference is that whereas A-facts can alter 
over time, because they obtain at some times and not at others, B-facts do not alter 
over time.138  Mellor also distinguishes between A-propositions and B-propositions.  
Mellor explains that the concept of truth applies to beliefs, statements of belief, 
sentences expressing beliefs, and to their contents, which he calls ‘propositions.’139  
He says that he assumes that ‘propositions are what sentences expressing beliefs 
mean.’140  Thus an A-belief expresses an A-proposition, and a B-belief expresses a 
B-proposition.  Ultimately, what Mellor wants to show is that are no A-facts, and thus 
that what makes our A-beliefs true are B-facts.  In order to do this, he has to show 
that B-facts give A-beliefs or A-propositions their truth-values.  He admits that the 
difficulty here is explaining how they can do this, given that B-facts do not vary, 
whereas A-propositions do vary in truth-value.  
 
The types of facts that Mellor is concerned with here are truthmakers.141  And the 
issue he sees for the B-theorist is that some A-propositions are only true when their 
A-truthmakers exist.  Mellor explains:  
 
If Jim races only on 2 June, the A-proposition ‘Jim races tomorrow’ is true 
only on 1 June, which is when its A-truthmaker (that Jim races tomorrow) 
exists.  But unlike this A-fact, the B-fact that Jim races on 2 June is always a 
fact, as I say all B-facts are.  How then can such facts make propositions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  137	  	  Note:	  Despite	  making	  this	  distinction,	  Mellor	  will	  ultimately	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  no	  A-­facts.	  138	  	  Mellor	  allows	  one	  way	  in	  which	  B-­‐facts	  could	  vary.	  	  For	  example,	  a	  B-­‐fact	  could	  be	  contingent	  at	   one	   time	   and	   necessary	   at	   a	   later	   time.	   	   Thus	   he	   allows	   that	   B-­‐possibilities	   can	   change,	  whereas	  B-­‐actualities	  cannot.	  	  139	  	  Ibid.,	  p.23	  140	  	  Ibid.	  141	  	  For	  Mellor	  truthmakers	  or	  ‘truthmaking	  facts’	  are	  states	  of	  affairs,	  which	  have	  the	  property	  of	  obtaining.	   	  Truthmaking	   facts	  are	  what	  makes	   truth-­‐bearers	  (beliefs,	  statements,	  sentences,	  or	  propositions)	  true	  when	  they	  are	  true.	  	  (Ibid.,	  p.24.)	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true at some times and false at others, as most A-propositions are?  That is 
the question we need to answer.142 
 
To show how unchanging B-facts can be the truthmakers for A-propositions, which 
vary in truth-value, Mellor makes a distinction between types and tokens.  A type is 
something that can have many tokens.  For example, the word cat is a type, and like 
all words it is not a concrete object, but something abstract.  However, when I write 
or say ‘cat’ ‘cat’ ‘cat’ I produce three concrete instances or tokens of the same type 
(the type of word cat).  So a token is a particular instance of a type.  The type-token 
distinction also applies to sentences, statements and beliefs.  Thus, when I say ‘the 
cat purrs’ and you say ‘the cat purrs’, we utter two token sentences of the same 
sentence-type.  
 
Mellor then uses this type-token distinction to argue that tokens of tensed sentences 
are made true by B-facts.   First, Mellor says that because his future-belief that Jim 
races tomorrow can be shared by others, the belief is a type, whose tokens are his 
belief, Jim’s belief, and the belief of anyone else who believes that Jim races 
tomorrow.  However, Mellor says that these belief-tokens are not the tokens we 
need, as these future beliefs can (rightly) be held by someone at one time and not at 
another.143  Instead, he says that the tokens we need are people believing things at 
given moments.  For example, Mellor believing at noon on 1 June that Jim races 
tomorrow is one such token, and Mellor believing the same thing at 4pm is another 
token.  These are belief-tokens that can only be held by a particular person at one 
particular time.  
 
Mellor then says the following:   
 
This makes the belief-tokens we need facts: my believing a proposition ‘P’ at 
a given A- or B-moment t.   And if it is a B-moment, then even if ‘P’ is an A-
proposition, my believing it at t is a B-fact, entailing nothing about how much 
earlier or later anything is than the present.  Thus my believing at any B-
moment of 1 June that Jim races tomorrow is a B-fact, entailing nothing 
about the A-time of Jim’s race, 1 June or anything else.144 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  142	  Ibid.	  p.	  30.	  143	  Mellor	  does	  not	  want	  tokens	  to	  be	  beliefs	  that	  X	  holds	  at	  one	  time	  and	  not	  at	  another.	   	  This	  would	  make	  such	  beliefs	  A-­‐tokens,	  which	  is	  not	  what	  he	  wants.	  	  144	  Ibid.	  p.29.	  
	   108	  
 
So a belief-token involves a person X believing a proposition P at time t.  For Mellor, 
this means that belief-tokens are facts.  And when the time in question is a B-time 
(or B-moment), X believing P at t, is a B-fact.  If belief-tokens of belief types, such as 
‘Jim races tomorrow’ can be B-facts, then according to Mellor, this shows that B-
facts can be tokens of A-propositions.  
 
Mellor says that the same applies to all other propositional attitudes to A-
propositions, including knowledge, doubt, hope and so on.  For example, he says:  
 
For even if I know on 1 June that Jim races tomorrow, which does entail that 
he races then, this token-knowledge is still not an A-fact.  For first, all it 
entails is that my belief that Jim races tomorrow is true, not that what makes 
it true is an A-fact, which is the point at issue.  And second, my knowing on 1 
June that Jim races tomorrow entails only the B-fact that he races on 2 June.  
It does not entail the A-fact that he races tomorrow, for it does not entail that 
1 June is today.  
 
The propositional attitudes mentioned above are mental tokens of propositions.  
Mellor then considers the case of statements.  Mellor says that to avoid begging the 
question against the A-theory, he says that he will assume that we can make both 
A-statements and B-statements.145  He thus says ‘to every possible belief-type; i.e. 
to every proposition, there corresponds a statement-type.’  Mellor says that he will 
refer to statement-types as ‘propositions’ and reserve the word ‘statement’ for 
written or spoken tokens of propositions.146  Mellor explains that with inscribed 
statements, as with beliefs, the tokens we need are not what is inscribed, for 
example, a sign saying ‘back in two hours’, but rather signs bearing such 
inscriptions at particular times.  In the case of spoken statements, the token 
utterance may only exist for such a short time, such that there is only one token of 
that proposition.  Mellor says that even in this case, the utterance has a B-time on 
which its truth-value depends.  For example, if at noon, someone utters ‘back in two 
hours’, and then returns one hour later, the token-utterance will be false.  What 
makes this utterance false is a B-time; namely that noon is one hour earlier than the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  145	  Mellor’s	  concern	   is	   that	   taking	   it	   that	   the	  sentence	   ‘Jim	  races	   tomorrow’	  can	  make	  different	  statements	  on	  different	  days,	  assumes	  that	  those	  statements	  are	  B-­‐statements.	   	  If	  the	  sentence	  ‘Jim	  races	  tomorrow’	  made	  an	  A-­‐statement,	  the	  same	  statement	  could	  be	  true	  on	  different	  days.	  146	  Ibid.	  p.	  30.	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time at which the speaker returns.  Mellor therefore says that ‘all tokens of any A-
proposition ‘P’ for which we need B-truthmakers have B-times which (given ‘P’) fix 
their truth of falsity in any given world.’147   
 
Mellor then considers whether these B-facts (facts about the B-times at which 
tokens occur) provide all the B-truthmakers we need for A-propositions that have 
variable truth-values.  This is where he attempts to remedy the weakness of the 
token-reflexive theory.  Mellor says that on the token-reflexive theory, for any token 
of an A-proposition ‘P’ about an event e: 
 
Any token of ‘P’ will only be true if and only if it is as much earlier or later 
than e as ‘P’ says the present is than e. 
 
And similarly, if ‘P’ says that e is present, its tokens are true iff they are 
simultaneous with e.148  However, Mellor acknowledges that this token-reflexive 
account will not work for tokens such as ‘there are no tokens now’.  He argues that 
this is an equal problem for the A-theorist, who tries to provide token-reflexive 
truthmakers for such statements.  Mellor proposes amending his account in the 
following way.   He says that if we allow that a time t can be either an A- or B-time, 
we can replace the token-reflexive account above with an indexed theory.  For 
example: 
 
Any A-proposition ‘P’ about any event e is made true at any t by t’s being as 
much earlier or later than e as P says the present is than e.149  
 
Mellor says this now gives ‘there are no tokens now’ the right truth-value at all times.  
This is because it is a fact about t itself; namely, that there are no tokens at t.   He 
says what this indexical account shows is that we can provide B-facts that will give 
any A-propositions the right truth-value at any time.  However, what it does not show 
is that there are no A-facts.  That is to say, it does not show that nothing in reality is 
past, present or future.  This is the issue that Mellor now turns to. 
 
Mellor’s argument against the non-existence of A-facts builds over four chapters, 
which contain much ground clearing.  Part of this involves arguing that the presence 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  147	  Ibid.	  p.	  31.	  148	  Ibid.	  149	  Ibid.,	  p.	  34	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of experience can be explained away, by distinguishing our experiences from our 
now-beliefs about those experiences. 150   However, his argument against the 
existence of A-facts is finally established by his consideration of McTaggart’s 
argument.  There, Mellor claims that the A-theorist has no way to escape the vicious 
regress generated by McTaggart’s paradox.  This is because we can never give 
consistent A-theoretic or A-truth-conditions for any sentence in the sequence ‘e is 
past’ or ‘e is now past’ or ‘e is now, now, past’ and so on.   Mellor says: 
 
It is no use saying at any stage that the latest sentence is true now, since 
whether that is so depends on saying when now is.  And that generates the 
next sentence in the regress, about which the same question arises.  To give 
a final answer at any stage just produces a contradiction, since, if the 
sentence is true (at some present time) it is also false (at some other).  The 
only way to avoid contradiction is to never stop at all, thus admitting that the 
original sentence ‘e is past’ has no A-truth-conditions.  But this is to say that 
no A-fact, and in particular not the fact that e is past, makes ‘e is past’ true.  
In short, A-facts are either self-contradictory or incapable of making A-
sentences true or false.  Yet this is what they are defined to do.  So either 
way, they do not exist.   
 
Mellor then presents the argument in terms of truthmakers. 151   He says that 
according to A-theorists, A-facts are meant to provide single truthmakers for A-
propositions.  For example, what is expressed by the tensed sentence ‘e is past’, is 
meant to be made true by the single A-fact that e is past.  This means its A-truth-
condition is always that e is past.  In contrast, Mellor points out that the B-truth-
conditions of ‘e is past’ vary from time to time.  For example, for any event e (such 
as Jim’s race on 2 June), ‘e is past’ is true at all B-times later-than e (after Jim has 
raced) and false at all other times.  Thus, he says that if the A-fact that e is past is to 
be the truthmaker for ‘e is past’, this A-fact must exist at all times later than e.152  
Moreover, he says that when this A-fact exists, it will not only make the A-
proposition that event e is past, true, but also all its tokens.  This, in turn, requires 
that all the tokens of ‘e is past’ must have the same truth-value at any one time; for 
example, true at all times after e and false at all other times.    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  150	  For	  example,	  Mellor	  argues	  that	  our	  experiences,	  like	  other	  events,	  are	  neither	  past,	  present,	  or	  future.	  	  However,	  that	  we	  have	  now-­‐beliefs	  about	  them	  is	  necessary.	  	  Mellor,	  ibid.,	  p.	  45.	  151	  See	  again	  footnote	  141	  on	  truthmaking	  facts.	  152	  Ibid.,	  p.	  78.	  
	   111	  
 
Mellor explains the problem he sees with this is as follows.  He imagines the 
scenario where on 2 June, unknown to him, the time of Jim’s race is postponed from 
2.30 – 4.30.   He also imagines that at 3.30 and at 5.30 he says ‘e is past’.  Then at 
3.30 Mellor’s token utterance (a) of ‘e is past’ will be false, but at 5.30, his token 
utterance (b) of ‘e is past’ will be true.153  He says that if these two tokens (a) and (b) 
are made true by the A-fact that e is past, then ‘they must both be true when it is a 
fact and false when it is not.’   This means that at 4pm, when event e is future, both 
(a) and (b) must be false, but at 5pm, they must both be true.   
 
Mellor says that the problem here is that this is wrong.  This is because before the 
race, token (a) is false and will always be false, whereas after the race, token (b) is 
true and is always true.   Hence Mellor says:  
 
Once we distinguish propositions from their tokens, it is obvious that tokens 
of A-propositions, unlike the proposition itself, do not change their truth-
values over time.154  
 
Mellor says that the truth-value of a token utterance of a proposition ‘P’ at any time 
is not just the truth-value P has at that time.  This is because A-propositions vary in 
their truth-value.  (For example, the proposition that e is past is true at some times 
and false at others.)  Thus, any token that did not share its truth-value at all times 
would have to be both true and false.  Mellor says that expressed in this way, 
McTaggart’s contradiction ‘allows no regress and no riposte’.155  Mellor, therefore, 
says that to suggest that propositions can differ in truth-value from their tokens is 
wrong.   Moreover, he says that anyone who tries to claim that an A-token’s own 
temporal location is not what makes it true or false, has not grasped the distinction 
between a proposition and its token.   
 
The solution, Mellor concludes, is to admit that tokens of ‘e is past’, such as (a) and 
(b), can have different truth-values at a given time.  And this involves accepting that 
they cannot be made true at that time by any single fact.  He considers whether the 
A-theorist can accept this.  He says that it might seem that they can.  For example, 
at 6pm on 2 June, when Jim’s race e is now past, the single A-fact that e is past, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  153	  We	  are	  assuming	  here	  that	  Jim’s	  race	  is	  less	  than	  thirty	  minutes	  in	  duration.	  	  154	  Ibid.	  155	  Ibid.,	  p.79.	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cannot make token (a) true.156  Here it seems that the A-fact that makes (a) false is 
that (a) is more past than e, and similarly, the A-fact that makes (b) true is that e is 
less past than e.   However, Mellor says that the problem here for the A-theorist is 
that while these truthmakers are fine, they are B-facts not A-facts.  This is because 
‘what makes events past at any A- or B-time is that they are earlier than t, and what 
makes them future is that they are later then t.’157  Mellor says that in both cases, 
the A- and B-times cancel out, such that A-tokens cannot change in truth-value.   
Mellor says that any apparent A-truthmaker for an A-token, such as ‘e is past’ 
reduces to the B-truthmaker that the token be later-than e.  He therefore concludes 
that in reality, there are no tensed facts.  
 
We revisit this issue of the reality (or otherwise) of tensed- or A-facts in the next 
chapter, when we consider arguments for the various A-theoretic metaphysical 
theories of time.   Hence we shall consider the A-theoretic responses to Mellor’s 
argument against the reality of tensed facts there.   For now, we can see that B-
theorists have ways to support their claim that reality is tenseless, because reality 
consists of a totality of tenseless- or B-facts.  As a response to McTaggart, the B-
theorist can use this claim to argue that the B-theory provides an adequate account 
of change, and hence is sufficient for the reality of time.  In the next chapter, we 
examine the various B-theoretic accounts of change, and consider whether they do 
provide a satisfactory account of change.  If they do not, then it seems that the 
tenseless facts do not describe or account for everything that we need to account 
for in reality.  
 
2.6  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have considered McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time, 
and some of the A-theoretic and B-theoretic responses to that argument.  The 
purpose of this was to prepare some of the essential background to the rest of the 
thesis.  The debate between presentists and non-presentists is centred on what it 
takes to provide adequate accounts of change and the passage of time, what type 
of metaphysical and ontological picture of reality can successfully do this – and 
whether these pictures of reality are defensible.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  156	  As	  tokens,	  unlike	  propositions,	  cannot	  change	  their	  truth-­‐value.	  157	  Ibid.,	  p.	  80	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In Chapter One, we said that the different metaphysical theories of time are all 
fighting over the same ground; each claiming to provide a more accurate account of 
the nature of temporal reality, and what it is to exist at a time, than its rivals.  The 
purpose of this chapter is to explain how the various non-presentist theories of time 
claim to do this.1  This involves explaining what these theories are, what motivates 
them, and what their ontological commitments are.  In particular, we explain how the 
various non-presentist theories develop distinct ways to account for the issues 
raised by McTaggart’s paradox.  This includes questions about the nature of change, 
the reality (or otherwise) of tense and tensed truths, and temporal passage, and 
questions about the types of properties instantiated by existing entities at different 
times.  In this respect, this chapter continues the discussion of the previous chapter, 
as it explains how the various A-theoretic and B-theoretic responses to McTaggart 
are incorporated into distinct metaphysical theories of time.  As previously 
mentioned, the reason for discussing these non-presentist theories, before 
discussing presentism, is that presentism is best understood in terms of what it 
won’t accept.  So to properly understand what presentism is, and what presentists 
and non-presentists disagree about, it is necessary to see what these non-presentist 
theories affirm.  We also briefly consider a third type of response to McTaggart; 
namely, accepting McTaggart’s conclusion that time is unreal.  Theories of 
timelessness claim that we mistake certain features of reality as temporal features, 
when in fact they are not. 
 
By the end of this chapter we will have mapped out a framework of the various 
metaphysical theories of time.  This framework will enable us to understand what 
the major debates in the metaphysics of time are really about, so that we will be 
able to understand the place of presentism in them.  (We focus on the claims that 
divide presentists from non-presentists in the next chapter.)  For example, it will 
enable us to see which claims unite all A-theorists against B-theorists; namely, 
claims about dynamism, and how to understand change, and which claims divide 
the various A-theorists from one another; namely, different ontological claims about 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 	  Non-­‐presentist	   theories	   include:	   theories	   of	   timelessness;	   eternalism	   (including	   the	   B-­‐theorist’s	   Block	  Universe,	   and	  A-­‐theoretic	   versions	   of	   eternalism);	   semi-­‐eternalism	   (including	  the	  Growing	  Block	  and	  the	  Shrinking	  Tree);	  and	  Fine’s	  non-­‐standard	  realism	  about	  tense.	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what exists, and different ways to account for dynamism.  Understanding these 
issues will not only be important for understanding what presentism is, and what its 
commitments are; it will also be important when it comes to evaluating presentism.  
This is because it will help us to see the costs and benefits of the different versions 
of presentism in relation to the costs and benefits of rival theories.   
 
As we shall see, both in this chapter and the next, some of the differences between 
these theories rest on quite nuanced understandings of what it is to ‘exist at a time’. 
The majority of A- and B-theorists (including most presentists) are ‘neo-Quineans’, 
as they do not believe that existence claims are ambiguous.  This is because they 
accept the Quinean assumption that there is only one type of existence.2  This is the 
unique type of existence that is properly expressed by quantifiers and identity 
relations.  Hence Quine’s mottos ‘to be is to be the value of a (bound) variable’.  And 
‘no entity without identity.’  (So on this view, existence is not a monadic property, 
which some objects have and others lack.)  However, non-presentist A-theorists 
often stretch this ‘univocal’ sense of existence to its limits, in order to provide 
dynamic accounts of change, or to explain the passage of time. 
 
For example, as eternalist A-theorists hold that all times and their contents exist on 
a par (i.e. are all equally real), they have to provide dynamic accounts of change, 
which involve non-ontological distinctions between different times and their contents.  
(These A-theorists do not want to reduce properties to relations to times, or describe 
property change in terms of objects having a series of distinct temporal parts.  This 
is because these accounts are held to merely describe variation.)  Hence, some 
eternalist A-theorists claim that enduring objects only have concrete properties 
temporarily; that is, when they are present.3  A consequence of this view is that 
enduring objects lack concrete properties, such as having a spatiotemporal location, 
or being alive, when they exist at other times.  Similarly, in his non-standard moving 
spotlight theory (explained below), Ross Cameron claims that every past, present, 
and future entity exists, and is now a certain way simpliciter.  A consequence of 
Cameron’s view is that merely past individuals, such as Queen Victoria, have their 
essential properties, such as being concrete, and being human, but lack non-
essential properties, like height, mass or three-dimensional shape.  And similarly for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  This	  unique	  sense	  of	  existence	   is	  captured	  by	   the	  unrestricted	  existential	  quantifier.	   	  On	   this	  view	  existence	  and	  quantification	  go	  hand	  in	  hand,	  as	  what	  there	  is	  exactly	  equals	  what	  exists.	  	  	  3	  This	   is	   Meghan	   Sullivan’s	   version	   of	   ‘Williamsonian	   Presentism’.	   	   On	   this	   view	   non-­‐present	  objects	   exist,	   but	   are	  merely	   logical	   existents.	   	   (Sullivan	   distinguishes	   her	   eternalist	   A-­‐theory	  from	  the	  moving	  spotlight	  theory.)	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merely future individuals.  However, in cases where temporary properties, such as 
being non-concrete, or being not-yet-alive, or no-longer-having a shape, are 
ascribed to permanently existing objects, it might be argued that this ‘univocal’ 
notion of existence becomes quite strained, as these are very metaphysically ‘thin’ 
ways of existing.4 
 
Non-eternalist A-theoretic accounts of change rest on ontological claims; by which I 
mean, a change in what exists.  This is because non-eternalists hold that some 
objects only exist temporarily.  (For growing blockers, some objects have not always 
existed; and for presentists, some objects have not always existed and some 
objects will not always exist.)  However, when it comes to explaining how non-
existent future objects will be, or, in the case of presentism, how non-existent past 
and future objects were and will be, non-eternalists use Priorian tense operators to 
block unwanted ontological commitment to non-existent entities.5  (I am specifically 
talking about non-eternalists who accept the Quinean assumption that there is only 
one type of existence.)  The claim is that tense operators, such as F and P, enable 
non-eternalists to make true claims about non-existent entities, without saying that 
there is (exists) some thing now, such that that thing has the property of being (in 
the future) the first Martian outpost, or such that that thing has the property of having 
been a dinosaur.6  While this strategy is said to avoid quantifying over non-existent 
objects, some eternalists challenge the claim that tense operators block unwanted 
ontological commitment, and therefore question whether tense operators are really 
compatible with temporary existence.7  We return to these issues below and in 
chapter 4.  
 
Some other ‘more permissive’ types of presentists distinguish between the concrete 
present time and abstract non-present times.  (These presentists also accept the 
Quinean assumption that there is only one type of existence.)  Here, these non-
present times are understood as abstract times that presently exist, or ersatz B- 
times.  These presentists do not appeal to tense operators, but rather quantify over 
abstract (non-present) times in the object language.  As these presentists hold that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  It	  is	  open	  to	  the	  eternalist	  A-­‐theorist	  to	  reply	  that	  this	  is	  all	  she	  needs	  for	  her	  account	  of	  change.	  5	  The	  growing	  blocker	  does	  not	  need	  to	  block	  ontological	  commitment	  to	  past	  objects.	  	  And	  the	  ersatzer	  presentist	  does	  not	  employ	  tense	  operators.	  6	  In	  Prior’s	  temporal	  logic,	  the	  formal	  language	  of	  predicate	  logic	  with	  primitive	  tense	  operators	  is	  used	  to	  show	  what	  the	  real	  ontological	  commitments	  are	  of	  the	  natural	  language	  statements.	  	  The	  claim	  is	  that	  primitive	  tense	  operators	  enable	  certain	  A-­‐theorists	  to	  represent	  what	  is	  said	  without	  quantifying	  over	  non-­‐existent	  entities.	  	  	  7	  For	  example,	  Sullivan	  (2016)	  p.12.	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the present time and non-present times exist in very different ways, we might also 
wonder whether they are helping themselves to a liberal understanding of what is 
involved in the notion of univocal existence.  We might also question whether 
presentists should accept such quantification over non-present times in their 
fundamental explanation of how presently existing concrete objects change.8 
 
We shall also see how B-theoretic accounts of change challenge our ordinary 
notions of what it is to exist at a time and persist through time.  This is because B-
theoretic accounts of change typically either involve an ontology of temporal parts, 
or they explain existence in terms of individuals being three-dimensional wholes, 
which only have properties as relations to times, and hence lack intrinsic properties. 
Such views involve strange accounts of both existence and change.   Mellor is a B-
theorist who denies that these B-theoretic accounts provide satisfactory accounts of 
change.  Instead, Mellor provides a B-theoretic account of change, which allows that 
individuals persist by enduring.  (We examine this account, and the problems with it, 
below.)  In contrast to both A-and B-theories, theories of timelessness have no need 
to explain change (as they deny that reality changes).  However, their challenge is 
to explain why reality appears to change, if in fact it does not.   
 
3.2  Outline of the Chapter  
 
This chapter has two main parts.  In Part One we consider eternalism and the B-
theory.  Here, we begin a general introduction to eternalism, and distinguish B-
theoretic eternalism from A-theoretic eternalism.  Next we consider some 
motivations for B-theoretic eternalism.  Finally we consider various B-theoretic 
accounts of change and temporal passage.  In this section we consider the problem 
of temporary intrinsics, and explain the various B-theoretic responses to that 
problem.  These include relational accounts of change, the temporal parts account 
of change, Mellor’s combination of endurantism and the B-theory, and Oaklander’s 
R-theory.   
 
In Part Two we consider non-presentist A-theories.  As these A-theories form a 
much larger and diverse group than B-theoretic positions, we consider these in 
three separate sections.  First we discuss eternalist A-theories.  Here we consider 
the standard moving spotlight theory (this includes Brad Skow’s defense of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  For	  example,	  we	  might	   think	  that	   it	   is	  strange	  to	  say	   that	  a	  concrete	  object	   (such	  as	  oneself)	  can	  undergo	  a	  change	  from	  sitting	  to	  standing,	  merely	  in	  relation	  to	  an	  abstract	  object.	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theory, and Oliver Pooley’s response to Skow); Ross Cameron’s non-standard 
moving spotlight theory; Meghan Sullivan’s version of ‘Williamsonian presentism’; 
and Quentin Smith’s ‘degree presentism’.9  Next we discuss different versions of 
semi-eternalism, including the growing block theory and Storrs McCall’s ‘shrinking 
tree’.  Finally we consider Kit Fine’s non-standard realism about tense 
(fragmentalism and external relativism), and Fine’s claim that standard A-theories 
cannot account for change and passage.  As was outlined in Chapter 2, Fine claims 
that a complete description of reality cannot be had, because reality itself consists of 
fragmented and incompatible temporal perspectives.  So according to Fine, it is not 
the case that that there is one absolute truth about how things are.10  
 
3.3  A note about theories of timelessness 
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss theories of timelessness in detail.  
However, before we consider the various A- and B-theories of time, I want to very 
briefly say something about theories of timelessness.  The claim that time is unreal 
is obviously the most radical option in the metaphysics of time.  On this view, all our 
common sense ideas about time are mistaken.  A timeless reality is one in which 
there is no change, no temporal succession, no distinction between times, and no 
duration.  While no one can sensibly deny the appearance of such things, those who 
hold that reality is timeless claim that such appearances lead us into error.  That is 
to say, we misperceive certain features of reality as temporal when they are not.  
Hence, arguments for timelessness take the gap between appearance and reality to 
be highly significant.   
 
There are various arguments for timelessness, and we have already considered one 
of these; namely, McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time.  But we have not 
said anything about how McTaggart interprets his own conclusion.  Like most 
arguments for timelessness, McTaggart argues for an idealist conclusion, in which 
reality is immaterial.  According to McTaggart, this timeless reality consists of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  ‘Williamsonian	  presentism’	   is	  sometimes	  called	  a	  version	  of	  the	  moving	  spotlight	  theory	  (see	  Zimmerman	  2009,	  Deasy	  2014).	   	  Following	  Sullivan	  (2012)	  I	  do	  not	  describe	  it	  in	  these	  terms.	  	  Sullivan	   distinguishes	   her	   ‘Williamsonian’	   view	   from	   the	   spotlight,	   because	   the	   spotlighter	  claims	   that	   non-­‐present	   entities	   are	   concrete,	   whereas	   Sullivan	   claims	   that	   they	   are	   non-­‐concrete.	   	   I	   also	   discuss	   Quentin	   Smith’s	   ‘degree	   presentism’	   as	   an	   alternative	   to	   the	  moving	  spotlight	  view.	  	  	  10	  Fine	  denies	   that	   the	  only	  options	   are	   the	  B-­‐theorist’s	   ‘view	   from	  nowhere’,	  which	   takes	   the	  tenseless	  description	  to	  be	  the	  absolute	  truths,	  and	  the	  standard	  A-­‐theorist’s	  ‘view	  from	  within	  time’,	  which	  takes	  the	  absolute	  description	  be	  to	  tensed.	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multiple perceiving subjects (‘spiritual substances’ or persons), and the relations 
between them.  As no matter or sense data exists in reality, McTaggart says that 
each perceiving subject directly perceives the whole of this spiritual reality through 
introspection.  This direct perception of the whole of reality includes our perception 
of ourselves and other perceivers, and the relations between ourselves and other 
perceivers.  Moreover, McTaggart holds that all spiritual persons have parts, which 
are also substances with parts; thus each person’s direct perception is infinitely 
differentiated into detailed parts within parts.  These direct perceptions consist of the 
relations inclusive-of and included-in.   
 
McTaggart claims that each individual’s direct perception of reality is clear and 
distinct, and hence it cannot be in error.  Nevertheless, he presents a complicated 
argument to show that perceivers misperceive aspects of this reality as temporal.  
For example, he says that while the content of a person forms one inclusive system 
of coexisting states, nevertheless contained within this system are fragmentary 
perceptions of the very same objects already perceived.  These fragmentary 
perceptions do not add new content to what is already perceived, but McTaggart 
says that they explain the source of our misperceptions; this is because we 
misperceive these fragmentary perceptions as temporal perceptions.  He calls this 
series of perceptions the C-series.  However, even if McTaggart’s argument for the 
C-series is coherent, his account faces the same difficulty facing all theories of 
timelessness.  This is the problem of explaining how our ‘mistaken’ experience of 
the features of reality that we take to be temporal, itself seems to be temporal.  This 
is the greatest challenge facing all arguments for timelessness.  We should note that 
some other arguments for timelessness have even more radical conclusions than 
McTaggart’s.  For example, Parmenides argues for a timeless reality in which there 
can be no distinctions of any sort.  Hence, Parmenides’ timeless reality consists of a 
single unity or ‘one’, in which there are no distinct individuals.  Let us now turn to 
metaphysical theories of time, starting with the B-theory. 
 
Part 1 – Eternalism and the B-theory  
 
3.4  Eternalism: a general introduction  
 
The purpose of part one is to focus on B-theoretic accounts of eternalism, and in 
particular to consider the various B-theoretic accounts of change.  However, we 
begin with a brief introduction to eternalism in general.  This provides useful 
	   120	  
background for our discussion of the differences between the B- and A-theoretic 
versions of eternalism; and it also helps us see what distinguishes eternalist 
theories from non-eternalist theories.    
 
Eternalists hold that all times and their contents exist on a par.  On this view, non-
present objects, such as dinosaurs and (let’s assume) Martian outposts are just as 
real as present objects; non-present times, such as the year 1066 and the year 
3020, are just as real as the present time; and non-present events are just as real 
as presently occurring events.  For eternalists, all times, objects, and events are in 
the domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers; and because all these entities exist 
permanently, this domain never varies.  Thus in terms of ontological commitment, 
what separates eternalists from semi-eternalists and presentists is a disagreement 
about what is in the domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers, and whether this 
domain varies.  We can distinguish these ontological differences as follows. 
 
• For all eternalists, there is an unvarying domain, consisting of permanent 
existents (all past, present and future times and their contents).    
 
• For growing blockers, the domain consists of past and present times and 
their contents, but does not include any future entities.  The present is thus 
the frontier of reality.  Entities in the domain are ‘permanent’ existents in the 
sense that once they come into existence they never go out of existence.  
However, strictly speaking they are temporary existents, because there were 
times when they did not exist, and hence they do not always exist.  Thus the 
domain varies because new present moments and their contents are 
continually added to the block, as they come into existence.  So as the block 
grows, the domain grows, and entities in the domain continually change their 
A-properties, because they become increasingly more past as the block 
grows.11   
 
• Finally, for presentists who assume the Quinean view that all and only things 
that there are exist, the domain continually varies, as it only includes the 
transient present and its contents.  Thus, reality consists of temporary 
existents.  However, the neo-Meinongian presentists we meet in chapter 4 
deny this.  These presentists can say that we have a permanent and fixed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  On	  the	  shrinking	  tree	  model,	   the	  domain	  of	  possible	   future	  branches	  continually	  shrinks;	  as	  various	  possible	  futures	  cease	  to	  exist	  as	  each	  new	  present	  becomes	  fixed.	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domain, though things in the domain lack existence when they are past or 
future, and only have it when they are present.12   
 
Although all eternalists agree about their ontological commitments (that whatever 
exists, exists permanently), they disagree about their metaphysical commitments 
concerning the nature of change, temporal passage, and whether reality itself is 
dynamic.  For example, B-theorists deny that reality is dynamic in the following 
respects.  There is no metaphysically privileged present moment, which moves 
through time; hence, there is no ‘genuine’ passage of time; and as all truths are 
ultimately tenseless, there are no transient truths (a truth being a true proposition).  
For B-theorists, ‘temporal becoming’ is just explained in terms of an ordered series 
of successive events, in which there is no moving now.  Our intuition that time is 
flowing is explained in terms of our conscious perception of the present; a 
perspective from which we remember an apparently increasing amount of 
information about the past, but have very little information about the future.  For the 
B-theorist, this experience of being located at the present does not correspond to 
any objective or ‘metaphysically privileged’ perspective.  Rather, it is merely a fact of 
our psychology that ‘whenever’ we are located on our particular worldline, we 
experience that location ‘as present’.   
 
For the B-theorist, as there is no objective present, a token of the word ‘now’ just 
refers to the time at which it is uttered; much like a token of ‘here’ refers to the place 
at which it is uttered.  On the standard B-theoretic picture, objects are thought of as 
four-dimensional things, because they are both spatially and temporally extended.   
And objects persist or ‘perdure’ through time by having distinct proper temporal 
parts at distinct times.  Thus, a persisting object is a mereological sum of its 
temporal parts; for any perduring individual there will be many distinct temporal 
parts located all along the worldline of that individual, each thinking ‘it is now, now’.13 
And as there is no objective present, the apparent asymmetry between the past and 
future, which also accounts for the direction of time, is typically explained in terms of 
causation, the initial conditions of the universe, or entropy.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  A	   growing	   blocker	   could	   also	   take	   this	   neo-­‐Meinongian	   view,	   and	   claim	   that	   things	   lack	  existence	  when	  they	  are	  future,	  and	  only	  have	  it	  when	  they	  are	  past	  or	  present.	  13	  Not	   all	   B-­‐theorist	   accept	   perdurantism.	   	   For	   example,	   Mellor	   and	   Simons	   both	   argue	   for	   a	  combination	  of	  the	  B-­‐theory	  and	  endurantism.	  
	   122	  
For eternalist B-theorists, in addition to there being no temporary existents, there 
are no temporary truths.  B-theorists are anti-realists about tense and tensed facts; 
thus, all fundamental facts are tenseless B-facts, and whatever is true is 
permanently true.  On this view, the A-theoretic claim ‘the Battle of Hastings is past’ 
is made true by the permanent B-fact that 1066 is earlier than 2016.  In addition, B-
theorists claim that as there are no fundamental A-properties, the properties 
ascribed to temporal entities are permanent B-properties.  Thus, as an event, the 
Battle of Hastings has the permanent property of happening at 1066; and as a time, 
the year 1066 has the permanent property of being the time when the Battle of 
Hastings occurs.  So on this B-theoretic picture, change is neither explained in 
terms of a change in existence, nor in terms of a change in what is true, or any kind 
of A-property change (such as losing the property being present, and gaining the 
property being past).  Instead all change is explained in terms of some kind of 
variation in the manifold or spacetime block.  Because of this unchanging picture, B-
theoretic eternalism is sometimes described as the ‘static block’.  
 
While eternalist A-theorists agree that change does not involve a change in what 
exists, they deny that the B-theorist provides an adequate account of change.  
According to them, the B-theorist’s tenseless picture leaves out an important feature 
of reality; namely, a description of reality from a metaphysically privileged present 
moment within time.14   For eternalist A-theorists, the view from this privileged 
present is not merely perspectival.  Rather, they claim that an accurate description 
of reality involves tensed facts and tensed properties, which cannot be reduced to 
permanent tenseless facts or B-properties.  For example, the B-theorist’s ‘view from 
nowhen’ can tell us the permanent B-fact ‘the meeting is on day X’, but it cannot tell 
us the transient A-fact ‘the meeting is today’.  This is because it cannot tell us that 
day X has the property of being today.  According to the eternalist A-theorist, what 
the permanent B-picture leaves out is precisely what is necessary for a proper 
account of change.  Namely, a description of reality that provides a privileged and 
changing perspective from within time, according to which what is true now, has not 
always been true, and will not always be true.  (For example, the statement ‘the 
Battle of Hastings has ended’ is true now, but it has not always been true.)  For the 
eternalist A-theorist, what grounds this change in what is true at different times is 
not ontological change (a change in what exists).  Instead, some truths are transient 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  All	   A-­‐theorists	   hold	   that	   the	   present	   is	  metaphysically	   privileged,	   but	   eternalist	   A-­‐theorists	  deny	  that	  the	  present	  is	  ontologically	  privileged.	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because reality itself changes as time passes, and this typically involves objects 
losing and gaining their A-properties.15  
 
3.5  Motivating B-theoretic eternalism  
 
There are various motivations for B-theoretic eternalism.  An obvious motivation is 
the claim that the Special Theory of Relativity (hereafter SR) implies the B-theory.  
According to standard interpretations of SR, all times exist on a par in the four-
dimensional spacetime manifold.  Moreover, SR tells us that there is no such thing 
as absolute simultaneity, and hence that there is no absolute present within the 
manifold.  Instead, ‘the present’ is merely relative to the subjective viewpoint of an 
individual observer.  This not only means that what is present for one observer may 
not be present for another observer; it also means that all perspectives are equally 
valid, and there is no objective fact about which time is present.  Hence, the use of 
the temporal indexical ‘now’ reflects a merely subjective viewpoint, which much like 
use of the spatial indexical ‘here’ does not pick out an objectively privileged 
viewpoint.  According to SR, everything that happens in the world can be 
represented in one static four-dimensional spacetime diagram, in which the set of 
truths is fixed by the (complete) diagram.  SR is therefore obviously compatible with 
the B-theorist’s claim that past, present and future exist on a par in the ‘block 
universe’, and that there is no privileged present moment or ‘now’, which moves 
through time.   
 
There are also purely metaphysical motivations for B-theoretic eternalism.  All of 
these, in one way or another, relate to the B-theorist’s claim that you do not need to 
invoke tense to give a metaphysically adequate account of reality.  The first of these 
motivations is closely related to the neo-Quinean idea that there are only existent 
entities.  So I shall briefly say something about this, before saying how this idea fits 
nicely with the B-theory.   For Quine, to be is to exist.  So Quine takes being or 
existence to be univocal, in the sense that the only way ‘to be’ is to be in the sense 
captured by the existential quantifier ∃.  So if there is an x, then x exists.  Hence, 
Quine’s slogan, ‘to be is to be the value of a (bound) variable’.   According to Quine, 
this provides a principled way of making our ontological commitments clear, as it 
enables us to give clear identity conditions for anything that exists.  Moreover, it 
provides strategies for getting rid of unwanted ontological commitments; including 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  On	  the	  moving	  spotlight	  view,	  the	  only	  property	  objects	  gain	  and	  lose	  is	  the	  property	  of	  being	  under	  the	  spotlight.	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paraphrasing certain proper names, like ‘Pegasus’ into definite descriptions, which 
do not commit us to the existence of whatever such names are supposed to denote.   
 
For Quine, the identity conditions of existing things are spelled out in the following 
way.  First, consider material objects.  According to Quine: 
 
• If a and b are material objects, then a and b are identical, if and only if, a has 
the same spatiotemporal location as b.  
 
Quine claims that this provides a clear way of knowing when to count a material 
object as one thing, rather than as two things.16  Quine also accepts the existence of 
some abstract objects, such as sets.  Sets are collections of things; for example, the 
set of cats is the collection of all and only the things that are cats.  And in the case 
of individuals, such as my cat Wolfgang, the abstract set {Wolfgang} has only one 
member, namely the concrete individual Wolfgang.  So in the case of sets:  
 
• If a and b are sets, then a and b are identical if an only if a has the same 
members as b. 
 
According to Quine, sets have clear identity conditions, as they are things whose 
identity is fully determined by their extension; that is, the objects that are their 
members.  So sets are extensional entities.  In contrast, intensional entities, which 
are properties, do not have clear identity conditions.  This is because two distinct 
properties can have the same extension; so properties are not identical with their 
extensions in the way that sets are.  For example, cordate and renate are distinct 
properties, but share the same extension; namely, the set of all animals (as the set 
of things that have a heart is identical to set of things that have kidneys.)  For this 
reason, Quine does not accept intensional entities like properties into his ontology.  
(Quine has similar reasons for rejecting merely possible things and fictional things, 
as they do not have clear identity conditions either.)  However, since Quine does not 
accept properties, existence cannot be a property; instead, existence is expressed 
by the existential quantifier and the identity relation.  Let us now consider how 
Quineanism favours the B-theory.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Not	  everyone	  accepts	  that	  a	  lump	  of	  bronze	  and	  a	  statue	  are	  one	  and	  the	  same	  thing,	  but	  for	  Quine	  they	  are,	  as	  they	  have	  exactly	  the	  same	  spatiotemporal	  location.	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Like most A-theorists, the B-theorist accepts the neo-Quinean idea that what exists 
equals what there is.  And like the eternalist A-theorist, the B-theorist has within her 
domain all (so-called) past, present, and future existents.  As we have seen, for the 
B-theorist, the fundamental facts are tenseless facts; facts that are tenselessly true 
from no particular point within time.  So any facts about the world that hold relative 
to times (such as Socrates was sitting) are ultimately reduced to tenseless facts 
(such as Socrates sits a t).17  These tenseless facts are permanently true.  In 
contrast, the A-theorist holds that some of the facts are irreducibly tensed.  Hence 
for the A-theorist, the facts about how things were or will be do not hold relative to 
times, and cannot be reduced to a tenseless point of view.  Rather, they are facts 
about how things are absolutely; that is, tensed facts are irreducible and irreducibly 
tensed.  Thus for the A-theorist how things are absolutely changes, because time 
passes.  Hence the absolute fact ‘Socrates is sitting’ no longer obtains; instead, 
what now obtains is the absolute fact ‘Socrates was sitting.’   So the A-theorist holds 
that tensed facts can go from obtaining to not obtaining or vice versa with the 
passage of time.  
 
The B-theorist claims that in giving a tenseless account of reality, her ontological 
commitments are more transparent.  This is because the B-theorist is able to explain 
how temporal entities change and how time passes, using a purely extensional first-
order logic; such that she can describe how things in the world are at different times, 
just by using the quantifiers ‘some’ and ‘all’.  For example, the B-theorist either 
adopts an ontology of temporal parts to explain which temporal entities she is 
quantifying over, or she describes the different properties had by a single temporal 
entity as relations to times.  Either way, the existential commitments the B-theorist 
has are transparently shown in this extensional language, as the identity of the 
entity or entities concerned are clear; and in each case we know how to count the 
objects in question.18   
 
In contrast, the A-theorist claims that because reality is tensed, how things are 
changes over time, (whereas for the B-theorist, how things are either absolutely or 
relatively never changes over time).  So for the A-theorist, there is a difference 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  For	   example,	   if	   Socrates	   sits	   at	   t1	   and	   stands	  at	   t2,	   then	   relative	   to	   t2,	   the	   fact	   ‘Socrates	  was	  sitting’	  is	  true.	  	  However,	  for	  the	  B-­‐theorist	  the	  relative	  fact	  ‘Socrates	  was	  sitting’	  reduces	  to	  the	  
absolute	  tenseless	  fact	  ‘Socrates	  sits	  at	  t.’	  18	  	  Sally	  Haslanger	  suggests	  a	  different	  option.	   	  She	  says,	   the	  three-­‐dimensionalist	  can	  say	  that	  roundness	   is	   NOT	   a	   relation	   between	   a	   penny	   and	   a	   time;	   rather	   roundness	   is	   a	   monadic	  property,	   but	   a	   penny’s	   having	   roundness	   is	   a	   state	   of	   affairs	   that	  may	   obtain	   or	   not,	   where	  obtaining	  is	  a	  relation	  between	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  and	  a	  time.	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between how reality is, and how reality was and will be.  In order to express this 
change, the A-theorist gives up the idea that we can describe change just by using 
quantifiers, and introduces tense operators (i.e. intensional operators), such as P (‘it 
was the case’) and F (‘it will be the case’).   As will be explained, eternalist A-
theorists and presentists have slightly different ways of understandings how tense 
operators work, but we can ignore this here.19  Tense operators work by shifting the 
sentences (or formulas) in their scope to be evaluated at other times.  Thus, P 
(Socrates sits) is true, if and only if for some past time, ‘Socrates sits’ was true then.  
In this way, the sentence gets the correct truth-value, and the A-theorist adequately 
expresses how reality has changed.  However, compared to the B-theorist’s 
approach, which simply involves quantification over objects (or temporal parts of 
objects) and the properties they have at different times, the A-theorist’s approach is 
less transparent, because it is not clear which aspects of reality these tense 
operators reflect.  
 
Another motive for B-theoretic eternalism, which we have already seen, is 
McTaggart’s claim that the A-series is contradictory.  This is accepted by many B-
theorists.20  This objection to the A-theory is closely related to the claim that only the 
B-theory can account for change and temporal passage.  A-theoretic accounts of 
change rely on the idea of an objectively privileged present moment.  This privileged 
present either moves through time, making successive moments of time uniquely 
present; or in the case of presentism, the present is the only time that exists, such 
that things continually come to be and cease to be, as they become and cease to be 
present.   B-theorists, in contrast, deny that postulating this notion of an objectively 
privileged present can account for change.  One reason for this is that when the A-
theorist tries to explain the movement of this privileged present, including when they 
appeal to primitive tense operators, they run into McTaggart’s paradox in some form 
or another.  Dennis Dieks raises this objection, as he claims that primitive tense 
operators just mimic an additional realm of ‘supertime’, which just leads to a 
regress.21  (We consider this objection, and responses to it, in the context of the 
moving spotlight theory below.) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  For	  the	  presentist,	  truths	  about	  past	  and	  future	  things	  can	  only	  be	  determined	  by	  considering	  how	  things	  are	  now.	   	  Whereas	   for	   the	  moving	  spotlighter,	   the	   temporal	   truths	  about	  past	  and	  future	   things	   can	  only	  be	  determined	  by	  considering	  how	   things	   in	   the	  past	  and	   future	  are	   at	  those	  times.	  	  	  	  20	  For	  example,	  Mellor,	  Le	  Poidevin,	  Oaklander.	  21	  Dieks	  (2016),	  p.6.	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Another reason for claiming that the A-theorist cannot account for change is that 
many B-theorists agree with Fine’s objection to standard A-theories.22   According to 
Fine, the picture of reality standard A-theories present us with, which is of a series 
of distinct realities, each described from the viewpoint of a unique present moment, 
is too static to account for passage.  Fine’s objection is that a succession of distinct 
realities is not sufficient to explain a change in reality itself.  So while the A-theorist 
describes change between distinct realties, they do not adequately explain the 
content of that change.  (We return to this objection in §3.9 below.)  Finally, there is 
the objection, also made by Dieks, that in postulating this privileged and moving now, 
the A-theory introduces additional things, which are not there in the physical 
explanation of the four-dimensional manifold.  The important point, according to 
Dieks, is that ‘all this additional information brought in to explain our intuitions about 
the passage of time, can never play an explanatory role at the level of physics’.23  
As we have seen, this last objection is controversial, as there are interpretations of 
quantum mechanics which at least suggest that there may be something like an 
absolute present in physics.  However, B-theorists claim that they can give 
adequate accounts of change, in tenseless terms and without postulating a 
privileged present.  This is because B-theorists typically believe that variation in a 
thing’s properties over time (i.e. the difference between the properties a thing has at 
an earlier time, and the properties it has a later time) is sufficient for change.  And 
hence all we need for change and time is already there in the B-theoretic picture.   
Let us now consider some of these B-theoretic accounts of change, beginning with 
some background to the B-theory and the problem of change.  
 
3.6  B-theoretic accounts of change: a response to McTaggart 
  
According to B-theorists, all times and their contents (events and individuals) exist 
on a par.  For the B-theorist, this means that non-present times and their contents 
are as much a part of concrete reality as the present time and its contents are.  On 
this view, the present is not objectively special.  Instead, ‘presentness’ is merely a 
perspectival property, which is ascribed to a time or event when it happens to be 
simultaneous with our current experience.  According to the B-theory, all events in 
time are ordered by permanent B-relations (being earlier-than, simultaneous-with, or 
later-than one another).  Given eternalism and the B-series, the B-theorist holds that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  However,	   we	   should	   note	   that	   Fine	   also	   claims	   that	   B-­‐theoretic	   accounts	   trivialize	   change.	  	  This	  is	  why	  he	  argues	  for	  non-­‐standard	  realism	  about	  tense.	  23	  Dieks,	  ibid.,	  p.18.	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we can give a complete description of temporal reality in terms of the tenseless B-
relations between these events.  This description is held to be complete in that it is a 
‘once-and-for-all’ (unchanging) description, which is taken from outside the time 
series; the view from ‘nowhen’.   
 
As we have seen, McTaggart held that variation was not sufficient for change.  
McTaggart held that the only way things could change is by changing their position 
in the A-series, which involves losing and gaining various A-properties, as time 
passes.  Naturally, B-theorists deny this claim.  B-theorists claim that change can be 
accounted for in purely B-theoretic terms.  In the previous chapter, we saw that B-
theorists claim that all tensed facts can be reduced to tenseless or B-facts.  Thus 
the B-theorist claims that tensed facts (such as ‘the leaf was green’ and ‘the leaf is 
red’) merely reflect our subjective perspective on reality, whereas the fundamental 
facts are tenseless facts, which are permanently true.  Thus, if the leaf is green at t1 
and red at t2, there are two distinct tenseless facts about the leaf, which never 
change truth-value.  For example, it is permanently true that the leaf is green at t1 
and permanently true that the leaf is red at t2.  Hence, sentences reporting these 
tenseless facts report distinct facts, which are consistent with one another.  
 
In the example above, it is clear that there are two distinct tenseless facts about the 
leaf, which never change.  However, when it comes to explaining how objects 
themselves change over time, B-theorists do not want to say that there are two 
distinct objects that never change.  For example, they do not want to say that there 
is one leaf that is permanently green and another leaf that is permanently red.  
Rather, they want to say that one and the same leaf persists through time, and 
changes from being green to red.24  Thus, in order to report a change, it must be the 
same leaf that is green at t1 and red at t2.  This presents a problem, known as the 
problem of temporary intrinsics (or the puzzle of change).  The puzzle is this: how 
can one and the same object have incompatible intrinsic properties?25  We want to 
say that the leaf persists through time and changes by losing the property of being 
green and gaining the property of being red.  However, this seems to involve 
ascribing incompatible properties to the same leaf (being green and not-green).  
According to Leibniz’ law, if any two objects are identical, then they share all their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Henceforth	   understood	   as	   the	   claim	   that	   the	   leaf	   changes	   from	   being	   completely	   green	   to	  being	  completely	  red.	  25	  Intrinsic	  properties	  are	  properties	  that	  belong	  to	  an	  object	  itself,	  such	  as	  being	  round,	  red,	  or	  straight.	   	   Intrinsic	   properties	   are	   contrasted	  with	   relational	   properties,	   which	   are	   properties	  had	  in	  relation	  to	  something	  else,	  such	  as	  being	  an	  aunt,	  or	  being	  taller-­‐than	  X.	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properties.  So if an object has incompatible properties, then it seems that it cannot 
be the very same object after all.  Stated formally, the argument looks like this. 
 
1. Object O at time t is identical with object O at a later time t* 
2. O at t is F (e.g. green.) 
3. O at t* is not-F  (not green) 
4. Leibniz’s law: if two objects are identical, then they share all their properties. 
5. If O at t is green, then O at t* is also green 
6. If O at t* is not green, then O at t is also not green. 
7. O at t and O at t* are green and not green. 
 
So the problem for the B-theorist is to explain how the same object has incompatible 
properties at different times.  Let us consider how Lewis, who is a B-theorist, tackles 
this problem. 
 
3.6.1  Lewis on change and temporary intrinsics 
 
In On the Plurality of Worlds, Lewis considers the problem of temporary intrinsics, 
and comes up with three possible solutions.  Lewis begins by saying: 
 
Let us say that something persists iff, somehow or other, it exists at various 
times; this is a neutral word.  Something perdures iff it persists by having 
different temporal parts, or stages, at different times, though no one part of it 
is wholly present at more than one time; whereas something endures iff it 
persists by being wholly present at more than one time.  Perdurance 
corresponds to a way a road persists through space; part of it is here and 
part of it is there, and no part of it is wholly present at two different places.  
Endurance corresponds to the way a universal, if there are such things, 
would be wholly present wherever and whenever it is instantiated.  
Endurance involves overlap: the content of two different times has the 
enduring thing as a common part.  Perdurance does not.26 
 
Lewis says that in the temporal case he favours perdurance because it is closer to 
the counterpart theory he favours in the modal case.   However, his main objection 
to endurance is the problem of temporary intrinsics.  Lewis explains this as follows: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Lewis	  (1986a),	  p.202.	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Persisting things change their intrinsic properties.  For instance shape: when 
I sit, I have a bent shape; when I stand, I have a straight shape.  Both 
shapes are temporary intrinsic properties; I have them only some of the time.  
How is such change possible?  I know of only three solutions.27 
 
Lewis then outlines these solutions.  The first is to say that things like shape are not 
really intrinsic properties; instead they are disguised relations.  Consider the leaf, 
which changes from green to red.  Here, one and the same enduring object bears 
the green-at relation to some times, and the red-at relation to other times.  And 
similarly for all apparently intrinsic properties.  The problem with this account is that 
considered in itself, without its relation to other things (in this case, times), the leaf 
has no colour at all.  Hence according to Lewis, the ‘solution’ to the problem of 
temporary intrinsics is to deny that there are any temporary intrinsics.  He cannot 
accept this, because we know that things like shape and colour are properties and 
not relations. 
 
The second solution is presentism.  Presentism allows that the only properties a 
thing has are those it has at the present moment.  On this view, an object never has 
incompatible properties at the same time, as it only exists at one time, the present.  
Thus, if the leaf is presently green, it is not any other way.  Lewis explains that on 
this account, non-present times are like false stories and are ‘abstract 
representations, composed out of the materials of the present’.  Lewis suggests that 
in order to describe a change, the presentist has to hold that something has an 
intrinsic property (for example, the leaf has the property of being red) at one of these 
ersatz times.  But he says nothing has these properties (presumably because no 
non-present thing exists).  So according to Lewis, this presentist solution rejects 
endurance by rejecting persistence altogether.  Lewis cannot accept presentism 
because, as he understands it, saying that there is no genuine past and future goes 
against what we all believe.  For example, he says ‘no man, unless it be at the 
moment of his execution, believes that he has no future; still less does anyone 
believe that he has no past.’28 
 
Naturally, the presentist does not accept Lewis’ interpretation of their view.  
According to the presentist, what most people believe is that they are enduring 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Ibid.	  p	  204.	  28	  Ibid.	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individuals, who are wholly present at the present moment, but who have had a past 
and will have a future.  Lewis’ interpretation of presentism suggests that a man just 
exists in the present, without previously existing in the past; and this strange 
solipsistic view is not the view held by the majority of presentists.  However, even for 
B-theorists who do not interpret presentism as Lewis does, they cannot use this 
solution, as B-theorists are eternalists. 
 
Lewis’ third (and favoured) solution is to reject endurance and accept perdurance.  
According to perdurantism, we perdure by being made up of temporal parts.  On this 
view, we are temporally extended four-dimensional particulars, spread out in 
spacetime, much as the road is a spatially extended particular.  According to four-
dimensionalist ontology, O at t and O at t* are different (three-dimensional) temporal 
parts of the four-dimensional particular O.  So it is not the case that O has 
incompatible properties.  Rather, it is the distinct temporal parts of O which have 
these distinct intrinsic properties.  
 
On this view, the leaf is a four-dimensional particular.  If the leaf persists over a six-
month period, the leaf will have a worldline extending along a six-month section of 
spacetime.  And located at each stage of the leaf’s worldline are different temporal 
parts, which are ordered in time like slices; hence, a four-dimensional object is 
sometimes described as a ‘spacetime worm’.  So at one end of its worldline, the leaf 
has small green temporal parts, along the middle section it has larger green 
temporal parts, and towards the other end of its worldline it has red temporal parts 
and then brown temporal parts.  Each temporal part has distinct intrinsic properties, 
whereas the leaf itself is said to have the properties of being green-at-t and not-
green-at-t*.  Hence the perdurantist has no problem explaining how things can differ 
in their intrinsic properties. According to Lewis, perdurantism is the only viable 
solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics.  
 
It is no surprise that A-theorists, including eternalist-A-theorists, deny that a 
perdurantist account of change is ‘genuine’ change.  Perdurantism describes 
variation between the properties instantiated by permanently existing temporal parts 
of four-dimensionalist objects.  According to the A-theorist, this account of variation 
is not change, as each of these temporal parts instantiates these properties 
permanently.  This is correct, but this is also an objection other B-theorists can raise 
against Lewis.  For example, Lewis has criticized the relational account of change, 
on the grounds that ‘relationized’ properties are not intrinsic.  On Lewis’s account, 
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properties like being straight or red are intrinsic, but the problem is that they are not 
temporary intrinsics.   So Lewis has not given us an account of how intrinsic change 
is possible, but rather an account on which it is impossible; because what he has 
shown is that intrinsic properties are permanent properties.  We now consider the 
argument of a B-theorist (Mellor) who rejects the perdurantist account of change, 
and who argues for a combination of endurantism and the B-theory.  
 
3.6.2  Mellor’s B-theory of change 
 
In Real Time II, Mellor argues for an endurantist account of change.  He begins by 
making some important distinctions.  First he distinguishes truthmaking facts, such 
as the fact that Jim races on 2 June, from particulars like Jim.  Facts, for Mellor, are 
existing states of affairs, which correspond to sentences like ‘Jim races’, and make 
such sentences true. Secondly, he distinguishes things (particulars capable of 
change) from events (particulars incapable of change).  For Mellor, ‘things’ includes 
both living things (e.g. people, plants, and organizations), and inanimate things, (e.g. 
quarks and galaxies).29   
 
Mellor says that his B-theory of change is only going to apply to things.  According 
to Mellor, events do not change because they have temporal parts.  However, in 
contrast to events, Mellor denies that things have temporal parts ‘even when 
extended in time’.30  He takes this to mean that things are ‘wholly present at every 
moment within their B-times’.31  (We consider what this might mean below.)  Mellor 
also says that the type of change he is considering is not relational change, where 
we undergo property change in virtue of a change in something else.  Instead, he 
wants to account for real change, which he describes as follows: 
 
Real changes of properties need effects, and for them to be changes in the 
things to which we ascribe those properties, that is where their first effects 
must be.32 
 
Mellor calls this ‘the causal test for change’.  He says there is also a causal test for 
properties that are changeable.  This test disposes of necessary properties (which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Mellor	  (1998),	  op.	  cit.,	  p.	  85.	  30	  Ibid.,	  p.86.	  31	  Ibid.	  32	  Ibid.,	  p.88.	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never change), relational properties (which are changes in others), bogus properties, 
like Goodman’s grue (where no thing changes by ceasing to be grue), and 
properties like age, which Mellor says is related to the flow of time, which is 
something he denies.  (In contrast, real ageing produces changes like decay, with 
real causes and real effects in us.) 
 
With these distinctions made, Mellor says, ‘a change, then, is a thing having 
incompatible real properties at different times.’33  He explains that although events 
can also have different properties at different times, this is just apparent change.  
This is because in a temporal parts account of change, it is two different entities that 
have the different properties; whereas a real change needs the identity of a single 
(enduring) particular, as well as the difference in properties.34  So Mellor does not 
accept Lewis’ solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics. 
 
Mellor considers whether rejecting a temporal parts account of change, in the case 
of things, commits him to the idea that properties are relations to times.  He admits 
that this idea preserves identity; but he agrees with Lewis here that intrinsic 
properties like shape and colour are not relations.  However, Mellor says that 
denying both the temporal parts account of change and the relation account of 
change leaves the B-theorist with a problem.  For example, consider a ripening 
tomato, which undergoes a real change, by being green on Monday and red on 
Tuesday.  If the B-theorist accepts that intrinsic properties are not relations to times, 
she cannot say:  
 
• F (a, t)  : (the green-at relation holds between the tomato and Monday) and  
• F’ (a, t’)  : the red-at relation holds between the tomato and Tuesday. 
  
So if the B-theorist has also rejected the temporal parts account of change, Mellor 
says there is only option left.  This is to account for this change by saying that the B-
times t and t’ are ‘the temporal locations of non-relational facts, Fa and F’a, which 
constitute this change.’35  And Mellor says that to represent these facts, the B-
theorist should use temporal operators.  For example: 
 
• at t, Fa,  : e.g. Monday (the tomato is green) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Ibid.,	  p.89.	  34	  Ibid.	  35	  Ibid.,	  p.91	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• at t’, F’a  : e.g. Tuesday (the tomato is red)  
 
The problem here, Mellor says, is that ‘operators are supposed to be prefixed to 
sentences that express definite propositions [a proposition that can be given a 
definite truth-value].  But ‘Fa’ read as a B-sentence, does not do this.’36  For 
example, read as a tenseless or B-sentence, ‘Fa’ does not tell us when a is F.  
Because the ‘is’ here is tenseless, ‘Fa’ just tells us that a has the property F at some 
unspecified B time; which is why putting an operator (at t or Monday) in front of it 
does not give it a definite temporal location.  Consider the ripening tomato.  Green is 
not a permanent property of the tomato.  Hence, the tomato may be green and not-
green at different times, and the B-sentence ‘the tomato is green’ (tenseless is) will 
sometimes be true and sometimes be false.  But if we do not know when the tomato 
is green, we cannot get a single proposition (the proposition expressed by the 
sentence ‘the tomato is green’), with a single truthmaker.  Instead, the B-sentence 
‘the tomato is green’ will correspond to many different B-truthmakers, with different 
truth-conditions.  Hence Mellor says that the B-sentence ‘Fa’ will not have a single 
truth-value.  
 
Mellor says that this suggests that there is no B-fact Fa located at t, or B-fact F’a 
located at t’, contrary to what the operator approach says.  So it seems that the B-
times t and t’ cannot be locations after all, and that instead they are constituents of 
facts.  However, Mellor says that if the B-times t and t’ are constituents of the facts a 
is F at t and a is F’ at t’, ‘then it looks as if F and F’ must after all be relations 
between a and times.’37   
 
Mellor contrasts this with ‘Fa’ read as a tensed or A-sentence.  He says: 
 
‘Fa’, read as an A-sentence, always expresses the definite A-proposition ‘a 
is now F’.  And to prefix this with ‘at t’, whether t is a B-time like 3.15 or an A-
time, like ‘an hour hence’, is just to say when ‘a is now F.’38 
 
So, on the A-reading, whether we prefix ‘Fa’ (‘the tomato is green’) with On 2 July or 
Yesterday, we can evaluate the proposition.  On the B-reading we cannot, because  
‘Fa’ read as a B-sentence cannot express a definite proposition.    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Ibid.	  37	  Ibid.	  38	  Ibid.,	  p.91.	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Faced with this problem, Mellor considers the options.  Mellor thinks the temporal 
parts account is the worst option.  So he considers whether changeable properties 
could be relations after all, but concludes that they are not.  Hence he says that the 
operator approach must be correct.  He therefore reviews his arguments for the 
problems with that approach, and makes two amendments.  First, he says that 
operators need not be prefixed to sentences that express definite propositions.  To 
support this claim Mellor says that on ‘the view that there are many possible futures, 
none of which is yet actual, and the operator ‘it is possible that’ prefixed to future-
sentence ‘P’ …  On this view, ‘It is possible that P’ will be true even though ‘P’ lacks 
a truth-value.’  He then says that, albeit for different reasons, ‘at t, Fa’ may be true 
even if Fa lacks a truth-value.’39 
 
Secondly, Mellor says that he previously said that the B-sentence ‘Fa’ lacked a 
single truth-value because it has different B-truthmakers at different times (as 
opposed to a single truthmaker at t).  While Mellor still thinks this is the case, he 
amends the previous idea that B-times must be constituents of those B-truthmakers, 
to the idea that they need not be.  He accepts instead the idea that B-times can be 
the locations of those B-truthmakers.  This means that ‘at t, Fa’ can be made true by 
B-facts that differ only in their locations, t.  For example, if Fa has as its constituents 
the tomato and the property of being green, then the B-time Monday is the location 
of the truthmaker for Monday, Fa, and similarly for the B-time Sunday, when the 
tomato is also green.  
 
Mellor says ‘the B-sentence ‘Fa’ will still correspond to infinitely many B-truthmakers 
(e.g. all the B-times when the tomato is green).  So to give it a unique truth-value, 
something said … will have to pick out one of them, as ‘at t’ does.’40  However, he 
says this can be picked out by the single fact (state of affairs) Fa that is located at t.  
Mellor therefore concludes this his B-theory of change is preferable to the temporal 
parts account and the relational account, as it provides a B-theoretic way of 
explaining ‘the temporal nature of change, while requiring things to be …  wherever 
and whenever their properties are.’41  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Ibid.,	  p.	  94.	  40	  Ibid.	  41	  Ibid.	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Mellor admits that a cost of his account is that it violates the identity of indiscernibles.  
This is because his account allows that different B-facts share all their constituents.  
For example, the fact that on Sunday the tomato is green, shares the same 
constituents as the fact that on Monday the tomato is green; namely, the tomato and 
the property of being green.  So two different facts have the same properties.  
However, Mellor says that he already has a reason for rejecting the identity of 
indiscernibles.  This is his ‘criterion of identity for causal facts’; namely, ‘that such 
facts are identical if and only if they have the same causes and same effects.’  In 
this case, he says that a fact like Fa cannot be a single fact, as it will typically have 
many causes and effects at different times.42 
 
So Mellor supports his B-theory of change, by pointing out the defects in other B-
accounts of change, and then claiming that by treating B-times as temporal 
operators, we can explain how things that endure (persist by being wholly present) 
can have different intrinsic properties whenever they are located in time.  However, 
the A-theorist is unlikely to be convinced by this as a theory of change.  Mellor’s B-
theoretic operators allow him to describe B-change in terms of non-time-relational 
properties.  But as these properties belong to the entity in question permanently (as 
opposed to A-properties, which an enduring thing loses and gains), the A-theorist 
will just see this as variation over time.  Mellor accepts that his account is an 
account of variation.  Hence, for the A-theorist, in this respect Mellor’s account does 
no better than the relational account or the temporal parts account, as it just 
describes how things are permanently at different times. 
 
However, there is deeper problem with Mellor’s account.  I think Mellor is correct 
that the idea of merely being a temporal part of a particular thing or individual is 
unintuitive.  This is because we want to say that things, including ourselves, are 
wholly present wherever they or we are.  Mellor accepts that the events have 
temporal parts, which is why he says that events cannot change.  But unlike events, 
he says that enduring things are wholly present throughout every temporal part of 
the events that happen in their worldlines.  So on this picture, there exist temporally 
extended things, which are wholly present at all of the different times they are 
located at.  As these are B-times, they all exist on a par (with no time privileged), 
and the entities located at these B-times are concrete particulars.  The problem here 
is understanding how one and the same concrete entity can be wholly present at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Ibid.,	  p.	  95.	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different times throughout its history (or at the temporal parts of the event that is 
one’s life), when all these times are ‘equireal’ and no time is privileged.  The very 
notion of a concrete thing (the whole thing and not just a part of it) existing at one 
temporal location seems to exclude the possibility of that same thing existing at 
another temporal location, at least on the eternalism assumption that all times are 
‘equireal’.  On Mellor’s view, it seems that a single enduring object is wholly present 
at earlier and later times than itself. 
 
In the case of spatial location, if a particular thing, such as Nelson’s Column, is 
wholly present in Trafalgar Square, we say that it is there and nowhere else.  So if 
we do not accept that things can be wholly present in more than one place, why 
should it make sense to claim that things can be wholly present at more than one 
time, when all times are real, and no time is privileged over any other?  Mellor’s B-
picture describes a single enduring concrete particular that is extended in time, (and 
thus multiply located), which is nevertheless singly and wholly present at each time.  
This sounds like a contradiction in terms. 
 
In the temporal parts account, there is at least something intuitive about the idea 
that temporal parts belong to temporally extended things, analogous to the way that 
spatial parts belong to spatially extended things.  Consider the example of a road.  
The whole of Fifth Avenue is located in midtown Manhattan; rather, it has distinct 
spatial parts located midtown, uptown, and in Harlem.  Similarly, temporal extended 
things have distinct temporal parts at different times all along their worldlines (e.g. a 
four-dimensional person has childhood parts, adult parts, and elderly parts).  
Enduring things, in contrast, have no temporal parts.  So to say that an enduring 
thing is wholly present at a time, means that that thing is located at a time in its 
entirety, and ‘no-when’ else.  And this suggests that a thing that is wholly present is 
not a temporally extended thing.  (The spatial analogue is for something to be wholly 
located at one place and nowhere else.)   
 
Mellor is aware that co-existence is an issue for the B-theorist.  For example, he has 
two reasons for objecting to standard B-theoretic accounts of change.  First, it 
reduces change to changeless facts (permanently existing states of affairs); he 
writes: 
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If a poker is hot at 2.15 and cold at 3.15, then those always were and always 
will be its temperatures at those times.43  
 
And second, it cannot distinguish spatial variation from temporal variation.  He 
continues: 
 
What stops the poker’s being hot at one end and cold at the other being a 
case of change is precisely that its hot and cold ends co-exist in a single 
world, albeit in different B-places. [i.e. this is variation, not change.]  But then 
… on a B-theory, the hot poker and the cold poker also co-exist in a single 
world, albeit at different times.  So if, as everyone agrees, co-existence rules 
out change in the spatial case, how can it be compatible with change in 
time?44 
 
This second objection concerns things, not just facts.45  And regarding things, as 
Mellor accepts that co-existence rules out change in the spatial case, he needs to 
show why co-existence does not rule out change in the temporal case.  Moreover, in 
the spatial case, he accepts that if a thing is wholly present in one place, it cannot 
(at the same time) be in a different place.46  So why does he deny that the same 
applies in the temporal case?   
 
Mellor appeals to causation, as a way of distinguishing temporal variation from 
spatial variation.  For example, consider Mellor’s amendment to the operator 
approach above, in which logically independent facts can share the same 
constituents, but be distinguished by having different B-times as locations.  Such as, 
 
• Sunday (the tomato is green) 
• Monday (the tomato is green) 
 
Mellor says that although these facts are logically independent, they are not causally 
independent.  Hence, the tomato is not ripe on Monday because it is not ripe on 
Sunday.  (Mellor adds; this is the reason why causes always precede their effects.)    
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Ibid.,	  p.71.	  44	  Ibid.	  	  45	  For	   example,	   if	   facts	   exist	   permanently	   at	   B-­‐times,	   so	   too	   must	   the	   things	   which	   are	  constituent	  parts	  of	  those	  facts.	  	  (Facts,	  for	  Mellor,	  being	  existing	  states	  of	  affairs).	  46	  Ibid.,	  p.116.	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Mellor says more about how causation distinguishes time from space and makes 
time the dimension of change; most of which concerns temporal order and the 
direction of time.  Once this is established, he directly address the question, ‘how 
does causation enable things to be wholly present at different times but not (at the 
same time) in different places?’47   Mellor’s answer begins with rehearsing what has 
been previously said.  Variation occurs when incompatible properties are had at 
different points in spacetime.  Spatial variation is not change, as this is merely a 
difference between distinct spatial parts of the same thing (or between different 
things).  Similarly, in the case of events, temporal variation is not change, because 
this is merely a difference between distinct parts of an event; parts which do not 
change.  Thus, for temporal variation to involve change, we also need identity.  
Hence Mellor claims that for there to be change, there must be some enduring thing 
that remains the same, despite having incompatible propeties at different times.  
(For example, object x is hot at t1 and cold at t2.)  Thus Mellor says ‘change is 
variation in the property of things’.48  
 
Mellor explains that the identity and existence of objects depends on their properties. 
For example, some of Mellor’s properties are essential, such as being human; 
whereas other properties are inessential, such as being located at time t.  What is 
important, for Mellor, is which changeable properties are essential to a thing, such 
that it could not survive without them.  For example, if a is essentially human, then a 
can change from being a baby to an elderly man, provided that this is a gradual 
enough change, throughout which a keeps the sortal property ‘human’.  Or if being 
an animal is an essential property of Mellor, he suggests that he might be able to 
survive a radical change from human to a rhinocerous, provided it was a gradual 
enough change, throughout which he kept the sortal property ‘animal’.  His point is 
that the role of causation in explaning change means that unlike spatial variation 
(which can be abrupt and discontinuous), for an enduring thing to change over time, 
that particular thing needs the continuous possession of some (or enough) of its 
important properties to preserve its identity.  That is to say, some essential features 
of that thing must remain unchanged.  And Mellor says that when a changes, what 
keeps any properties of a unchanged, is causation; since causation is what links the 
facts about how a is at different times.49  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Ibid.	  p.116	  48	  Ibid.	  49	  Ibid.	  p.117.	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The problem here is that I do not see how Mellor’s appeal to causation really helps 
him.  Mellor appeals to a causal criterion of identity, to show that what matters for 
identity over time is not that a has all the same properties over time (as is required 
by the identity of indiscernibles), but rather, that the facts about how a particular 
thing is over time are linked in a particular (identity preserving) way.  And he 
contrasts this with facts about spatial variation, which need not be linked in this way.  
However, the issue here is not about how to preserve the identity of a thing that 
undergoes variation in its properties over time.  Rather, the issue is the need to 
explain why a thing can be wholly present at more than one time (given temporal 
parity), when that thing cannot be wholly present in more than one space (given 
spatial parity).  So I do not see how Mellor’s claim about facts being causally linked 
in a certain way answers this question. 
 
I think Mellor is correct to say that variation between different parts (temporal or 
spatial) of an object is not change, as this is merely a difference between the 
properties permanently belonging to different parts of that object.  Mellor wants to 
explain how a single enduring thing can change, not how distinct parts of that thing 
differ.  But it seems to me this is what Mellor cannot have as a B-theorist.  As we 
shall see below, certain eternalist A-theorists (Cameron, and Sullivan) also claim 
that objects persist by enduring.  However, in their attempts to make the 
combination of eternalism and endurantism plausible, these A-theoretic eternalist 
accounts involve three commitments that Mellor’s B-theory of change lacks. 
Namely: that the present is objectively special in some way; that existing non-
present objects lack certain key properties that present objects have (and hence 
change involves some kind of A-property change); and they endorse propositional 
temporalism (the view that the most accurate description of the world is subject to 
change.)   
 
As a B-theorist, Mellor cannot appeal to any of these things to try and explain why 
an enduring concrete object that is wholly present at a particular time, is not equally 
wholly present at all the other temporal locations at which it exists.  For example, for 
Mellor, there is nothing objectively special about the present or its contents; so he 
cannot claim that how a thing presently is, is how it is simpliciter (in contrast to how 
it is at non-present times).  Nor can he claim that three-dimensional objects only 
have properties such as having a shape, or being concrete when they are present.  
And since he holds that reality is tenseless, all tensed truths are reducible to 
tenseless truths, which are permanently true.  Hence he cannot say that what 
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makes facts about an enduring entity true, changes over time.  Moreover, if Mellor 
allows that a temporally extended object exists simpliciter at all of its different 
temporal locations, this suggests that it is spread out in time, much as a spatially 
extended object is spread out in space.  And in the spatial case, Mellor admits that 
this involves the objects having different spatial parts. 
 
The problem (as I see it) comes from trying to combine a tenselsess picture of 
reality, in which everything is permanently true, with endurantism.  Given Mellor’s 
acceptence of the existence of the four-dimensional block universe, he does not 
successfully explain how persisting things can be other than temporally extended 
wholes.  For example, Mellor claimed he could show that co-existence does not rule 
out change in the temporal case (whereas it does in the spatial case), but I do not 
think he does this.  Moreover, his account of B-theoretic change violates the 
indiscernability of identicals.  And since preserving this principle was one of the 
motivating factors in the problem of change (or problem of temporary intrinsics) in 
the first place, this is another cost of Mellor’s theory.  Mellor claims that he can give 
each B-sentence (e.g. Fa) a unique truth-value, which can be picked out by the 
single fact (state of affairs) Fa that is located at t.  However, even if this avoids the 
relational view (which Mellor claims it does), this B-fact is permanately true; in which 
case, if a is wholly present at more than one time, then there will be incompatible B-
facts about a.    
 
I therefore remain unconvinced that Mellor really answers the question about how 
an enduring particular can be wholly present (i.e. located) at different times, given 
temporal party.50  On the one hand, I understand his point that change requires 
identity.  On the other hand, his account leaves me unclear about how to think of my 
own identity, if I am wholly present now, and also wholly present at all other B-times 
at which I exist, since B-times are equireal.  That is to say, Mellor’s account 
suggests that I am wholly located at a single point in time (now) and also multiply 
located at each point along my timeline, and I struggle to make sense of this.  
Additionally, as we are considering B-theoretic eternalism, where everything always 
exists and no time is privileged, I am not sure what role causation actually plays, in 
the sense that (on the B-picture) causes do not actually produce their effects.   This 
is because the effects are always in existence.  For these reasons, I do not find 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  A-­‐theorists	   who	   argue	   against	   a	   combination	   of	   the	   B-­‐theory	   and	   endurantism	   include	  Cameron	   (2016),	   Carter	   and	   Hesteveld	   (1994),	   Craig	   (2000b),	   Ingthorsson	   (2016),	   Merricks	  (2007).	  	  Many	  B-­‐theorists	  accept	  that	  the	  B-­‐theory	  implies	  perdurantism.	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Mellor’s B-theory of change persuasive.  We now consider our final B-theoretic 
account of change, Oaklander’s R-theory. 
 
3.6.3  Oaklander’s R-theory 
 
Nathan Oaklander is a B-theorist who develops an alternative account of the B-
theory, in order to account for the passage of time, and change.  Oaklander says 
that the A-series is typically held to be a dynamic series, which involves ‘flow, 
transition or passage, from one temporal object to the next.’51  However, like Dieks, 
he claims that the A-theory is static, and hence that it cannot give us succession 
(which he says is ‘nothing more than one moment coming after the next’). 52 
Oaklander has two reasons for this.  First, he agrees with Fine that describing one 
term in the time series as being ‘present’ is not enough to give you passage or 
succession.53  Secondly, he claims that however the A-theorist tries to explain 
passage or succession (e.g. events coming into and going out existence, or A-
property change), they end up coming up against McTaggart’s paradox.   
 
However, Oaklander is also dissatisfied with standard B-theoretic accounts of 
temporal passage, because he claims they are too static.  For example, Oaklander 
says that the B-series is typically held to be ‘a static view of time that involves 
unchanging and fixed relations between temporal objects, and unchanging 
tenseless facts.’ 54  His criticism of this static view is as follows.  He says that when it 
comes to explaining the phenomenology of temporal passage (our experience of 
passage as dynamic): 
 
B-theorists typically develop anti-realist; that is, mind-dependent views of the 
dynamic aspects of temporal experience, and reductive analyses of tenses 
in becoming, that are compatible with the static or four-dimensional block 
universe.55 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Oaklander	  (2011)	  I9:45	  mins.	  	  52	  Ibid.,	  16	  mins.	  53	  Fine’s	   objecton	   is	   that	   in	   order	   to	   have	   passage,	   we	   need	   an	   account	   of	   the	   successive	  possession	  of	   the	  property	  of	  being	  present;	   i.e.	  passing	   from	  one	  time	  to	   the	  next	   in	   the	   time	  series.	  	  	  54	  Ibid.	  55	  Ibid.,	  17:24	  mins.	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Oaklander therefore presents his version of the B-theory, which he calls the R-
theory (or Russellian theory), as an alternative to the standard B-theory. 56  
Oaklander admits that there is a superficial agreement between his theory and 
standard B-theories, in that ‘they are both realists about temporal relations’. 57  
Despite this, Oaklander explains that R-relations are different from standard 
understandings of B-relations in two important ways.  
 
First, Oaklander says that in the standard B-theory picture, the temporal relations 
are ‘usually analysed in terms of causal relations or the physical relation of entropic 
increase.’  In contrast, he says that in the R-theory, R-relations are temporal 
relations that are ‘given in experience as phenomenologically simple relations, and 
are thus taken as unanalyzable and irreducible mind-independent entities in the 
ontology of time.’58  Oaklander gives three reasons for preferring the R-theory to 
standard B-theories.  The first is his claim that temporal succession is a fundamental 
phenomenon, which should be grounded on a simple entity, such as the R-relation.  
His complaint here is that the reductive analysis of the direction of time grounds 
temporal succession on relations that are ‘derived and complicated’.59  The second 
reason is his adherence to the principle that ‘we must be acquainted with the simple 
entities of one’s ontology.’60  His complaint here against the reductive analysis is 
that when we perceive temporal succession, we do not perceive causal or entropic 
relations; and hence we are not acquainted with the simple entities of one’s ontology.  
His third reason is his claim that as a ground for earlier-relations, causation and 
entropy are circular, because ‘they presuppose temporal succession and the 
direction of time’.61    
  
The second difference between standard B-theories and the R-theory concerns the 
dynamic or transitory nature of time.  According to Oaklander, standard B-theorists 
see the dynamic nature of time as something mind-dependent and subjective.62  
The idea here is that although our experience ‘as of’ passage is real, passage or 
transition is not an obejctive feature of the world.  The R-theorist, in contrast, is a 
phenomenological realist, who takes it that ‘a simple irreducible temporal feature is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  For	  Oaklander,	  this	  includes	  Mellor,	  Le	  Poidevin,	  Armstrong,	  Smart,	  Grünbaum,	  and	  Dyke.	  	  57	  Ibid.,	  23	  mins.	  58	  	  Ibid.,	  24	  mins.	  	  59	  Oaklander	  (2012),	  p.5.	  60	  	  Ibid.	  	  61	  	  Ibid.	  	  62	  	  Oaklander	  (2011)	  29	  mins.	  	  	  (See	  also,	  Oaklander	  (2012)	  p.14.)	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dynamic.’63  Thus, Oaklander says that in being acquainted with transition from 
earlier to later temporal items, we are acquainted with the mind-independent R-
relation – and this is ‘a dynamic relation, which has an intrinsic sense from one term 
to the next’.64  So the claim here is that passage of time is grounded on the dynamic 
and mind-independent R-relation, which we are acquainted with in our experience of 
one moment coming after the next.  
 
Thus for Oaklander, the R-theory has two advantages over standard versions of the 
B-theory.  First, as R-relations are primitive and unanalyzable, they cannot be 
reduced to either causal or entropic relations.65  Secondly, the R-relation provides a 
mind-independent account of the dynamic temporal relations holding between 
temporal items.  This enables the R-theorist to claim that succession is something 
that exists in the external world, without being committed to an A-theoretic ontology.  
 
As a consequence of the claim that temporal relations are irreducible, and the claim 
that there are no intrinsic temporal properties (such as A-properties), Oaklander 
says that ‘the only category of intrinsically temporal entites are relations’.66  Hence 
time, on the R-theory is relational.  According to Oaklander this means that ‘all 
ontological facts about time are understood as grounded in relations and that 
includes durations such as lasts as long as’ (and so on).67  
 
Oaklander then explains how the R-theory can account for dynamic transition and 
succession, even though reality consists of temporal facts, which are eternal and 
unchanging.  He says:  
 
A transition is a temporal succession of opposite states, and a succession is 
based on the earlier-than relation.  A temporal relational fact itself does not 
change; it is eternal, but it may be a change; and in that sense involves a 
transition from earlier to later events or particulars (or more neutrally, 
temporal items).68 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  	  Ibid.,	  27	  mins.	  64	  	  Ibid.,	  29	  mins.	  65	  Nor	   can	  R-­‐relations	   be	   generated	   from	  another	   source;	   in	   contrast	   to	  McTaggart’s	   B-­‐series,	  which	  can	  be	  generated	  from	  the	  application	  of	  the	  A-­‐series	  to	  the	  (non-­‐temporal)	  C-­‐series.	  	  66	  	  Ibid.,	  p.4	  67	  	  Ibid.	  68	  Ibid.,	  p.7.	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The picture we have is of there being eternal and unchanging R-facts, in addition to 
dynamic R-relations (occurring earlier-than).  To support this idea that the R-theory 
is eternal, even though it is composed of dynamic facts, Oaklander appeals to 
Russell’s ‘relational universal’.  To explain this, he cites Erwin Tegtmeier, as follows: 
 
What we hear according to Russell, when we hear the c-tone preceding the 
d-tone, is the relational universal of “occurring earlier than” together with its 
relata.  We hear nothing else.  Let us assume that we don’t recognise the 
first tone [as] a c and the second as a d.  Thus we hear only a temporal fact, 
which, as such, is a dynamic fact. … If the fact is dynamic, which one can 
take for granted, the relational universal in it must be dynamic.69  
 
For Oaklander, this is how unchanging temporal-relational facts (R-facts), such as ‘a 
is earlier than b', can nevertheless be dynamic, and hence be a change.  So the 
thought here is that our experience of a preceding b, involves us being acquainted 
with a dynamic relation; namely, the occurring earlier-than relation holding between 
two temporal items.  The temporal relational fact is dynamic, even though the fact 
itself is eternal and unchanging (because a is always earlier than b).  And the 
relation between a and b is dynamic, because it involves a transition from an earlier 
time to a later one.  Thus a feature of the R-theory is that times and durations are 
understood as relations.  For Oaklander, this is how primitive and unanalyzable R-
relations can ground the passage of time. 
 
Oaklander then explains the sense in which the R-relation is a timeless universal.  
He says: 
 
For the Russellian, R-facts, while they are not themselves in time, are indeed 
temporal, since they contain temporal relations.  R-facts [like a is earlier than 
b] are entities in their own right over and above their constituents, and as 
such, they are not in time, in that they do not exemplify non-relational 
temporal properties or stand in temporal relations.  In that sense time, 
understood as a Russellian series, composed of a conjunction of R-facts, is 
timeless.  This view gives some meaning to an aphorism I favour; namely, 
that time is timeless.  In other words, though time contains temporal relations, 
time does not exemplify them.  Time is timeless in the further sense that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Ibid.,	  p.8.	  
	   146	  
ontological ground of temporal phenomena are relations, and on the R-
theory, relational universals, such as ‘occurring earlier than’, are timeless. 70 
 
Thus according to Oaklander, given this realist (i.e. mind-independent) ontology of 
R-relations and R-facts, the R-theory can account for both the dynamic and the 
eternal aspects of time.   The dynamic aspect of time is grounded in a timeless 
universal (the earlier-than relation), which is given in experience in the specious 
present.  However for Oaklander, even though we experience this R-relation in the 
specious present, time is timeless.  This is because the conjunction of these 
dynamic facts (R-facts), which composes the whole of time, is not itself in time.  So 
according to Oaklander, R-facts are not in time; because they do not stand in 
temporal relations, or occupy moments of time, but they are temporal; because they 
‘contain temporal relations’.71   So the R-theory is the claim that time is eternal (i.e. 
timeless), and yet it is composed of dynamic facts.   
 
Having explained what the R-theory is, and its advantages over standard versions of 
the B-theory, Oaklander briefly states the advantages the R-theoretic account of 
transition has over various versions of the A-theory.  His main objection to all 
versions of the A-theory is that however they try to analyse transition or ground 
temporal relations (e.g. events coming into and going out of existence, or becoming 
present, or temporal relations only holding between terms that have A-
characteristics) McTaggart’s paradox (in one form or another) ends up making 
problems for their understanding of transition.  His other objection, mentioned above, 
is that without an adequate account of transition (or succession), A-theories are 
static theories, which cannot account for change.  Thus according to Oaklander, the 
R-theory is superior to both the A-series and the standard B-theory.  This is because 
it provides a realist (i.e. mind-independent) ontology, which is able to ground 
transition, without involving A-properties, and also ground the eternal aspects of 
time; i.e. eternal and unchanging facts.  
 
Oaklander’s account is interesting in itself.  However, what I find most significant is 
its contribution to the overall dialectic between the A- and B-theory.  For example, A-
theorists typically charge B-theorists with failing to provide adequate accounts of 
change, or temporal passage, but it is more unusual for a B-theorist to make this 
criticism of standard versions of the B-theory.  That Oaklander criticizes standard B-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  Ibid.,	  p.7.	  71	  Oaklander	  (2011),	  38	  mins.	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theoretic accounts of passage and change (because they are too static) is my main 
reason for including it here.  It might be objected that Mellor’s account offers the B-
theorist an account of change, which is not purely subjectve or mind-dependent.  
However, as explained above, Oaklander rejects causal accounts of change on the 
grounds that we do not perceive casual relations.  (Moreover, I remain unconvinced 
that Mellor’s is successful, because I find his account of endurance incompatible 
with B-theoretic eternalism.)  As for Oaklander’s criticisms of the A-theory, I agree 
that some eternalist versions of the A-theory run into McTaggart’s paradox, but I 
disagree that presentism does.  I also disagree that A-theorists cannot account for 
change.  
 
My main criticism of Oaklander’s theory is that it is underdeveloped in certain 
respects.  Oaklander claims that the R-theory provides the B-theorist with a way to 
claim that succession actually exists in the world.  He sees this as an advantage, as 
it provides the B-theorist with a realist account of passage.  However, Oaklander’s 
claim that the R-relation is dynamic, rests on his claim that we are acquainted with 
this unanalyzable R-relation in our experience (of one thing preceding another).  I 
find two problems with this.  First, Oaklander claims that R-relations are ‘given in 
experience as phenomenologically simple relations’.  This is important, as it 
underpins his claim that R-relations cannot be reduced to non-temporal relations (i.e. 
causal or entropic relations), which are compatible with a static four-dimensional 
universe.  However, Oaklander does not provide an independent argument to 
support his claim that R-relations are phenomenologically simple.  (His criticisms of 
the A-theory and standard versions of the B-theory, does not make a positive 
argument for the R-theory.)  So, without an independent argument, Oaklander’s 
claim that the R-relation is a primitive and timeless universal seems like mere 
stipulation.  Moreover, it is open to the B-theorist to respond by saying what matters 
is not that B-relations are primitive or irreducible, but that they cannot be reduced to 
A-properties. 
 
Second (and relatedly), it seems to me that Oaklander has not adequately shown 
that the R-relation is mind-independent, or that reality itself is dynamic.  This is 
because these claims are based on our experience of one event preceding another.  
So he needs to do something more to show that our experience of being presented 
with passage (in the specious present) is not mind-dependent (or that it does not 
involve us being acquainted with genuine A-properties).  Hence, without a stronger 
argument to show that the R-relation is mind-independent, I conclude that 
	   148	  
Oaklander has not successfully shown that the R-theory really offers the B-theorist a 
more dynamic account of passage.   A further criticism that could be made is that 
Oaklander’s notion of a timeless universal, which nevertheless has some duration, 
is just confused.  However, I shall not pursue this criticism here. 
 
Summing up.  What this section shows us is that B-theoretic accounts of change 
and passage are not without their problems.  It is not just A-theorists who criticize B-
theoretic accounts of change; B-theorists disagree among themselves about how to 
account for change.  For example, Lewis rejects the relational account of change, 
on the grounds that ‘relationized’ properties are not intrinsic, and claims instead that 
objects perdure by having temporal parts.  Like Lewis, Mellor rejects the relational 
account of change, but he also rejects the temporal parts account of change for not 
preserving identity.  Mellor seems correct to do this.  However, Mellor’s combination 
of endurantism and the B-theory is also problematic; and moreover, since it is an 
account of variation, it is not going to satisfy someone who wants more than mere 
variation from an account of change.  Oaklander suggests that standard B-theoretic 
accounts are committed to an anti-realist account of passage.  In contrast, he claims 
that the R-theory offers a realist B-theoretic account of change.  As we have seen, 
Oaklander’s account relies on the notion of the primitive R-relation (a primitive 
earlier-than relation), which is given in experience, although it is a mind-independent 
relation.  However, in order to provide a genuinely dynamic B-theoretic account of 
passage and change, Oaklander needs to provide a stronger argument to show that 
this primitive R-relation is a mind-independent relation.    
 
Nevertheless, the criticisms Mellor and Oaklander provide of various B-theoretic 
accounts of change and passage, add weight to the A-theorist’s claim that the B-
theory (standardly understood) cannot adequately account for change.  As we have 
seen, B-theorists also charge the A-theorist with not being able to adequately 
account for change; either because they are too static (Fine’s objection), or because 
they run into McTaggart’s paradox.  So let us now consider how the A-theorist might 
respond to these claims. 
 
Part 2 – Non-presentist A-theories of time 
 
We consider the various A-theoretic versions of non-presentism in three main 
sections:  
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• Eternalist A-theories  
• Semi-eternalism, and  
• Non-standard realism about tense.   
 
Under ‘eternalist A-theories’ we consider Brad Skow’s defense of the standard 
version of the moving spotlight, Ross Cameron’s moving spotlight theory, Meghan 
Sullivan’s version of ‘Williamsonian presentism’, and Quentin Smith’s ‘degree 
presentism’.72  The semi-eternalist theories we consider are the growing block and 
Storrs McCall’s ‘shrinking tree’.  And under ‘non-standard realism about tense’ we 
consider Kit Fine’s non-standard versions of the A-theory; external relativism and 
fragmentalism. 
 
3.7 Eternalist A-theories 
 
Eternalist A-theories endorse both eternalism and the A-theory.  While there are 
different versions of A-theoretic eternalism, they all share the following 
commitments:  
 
• All past, present, and future times and entities exist.   
• The present time is uniquely privileged over other times. 
• The property of being uniquely present is a temporary property. Hence 
reality is dynamic, because which moment is uniquely present continually 
changes. 
• Change involves losing and gaining A-properties (as opposed to properties 
that are held relative to times).  
• There exist absolute, tensed facts (i.e. facts that cannot be reduced to 
tenseless facts, or facts that are relative to times). 
• There are complete propositions, which can change their truth-value. 
• The ultimate true description of reality is subject to change.  
 
Given their eternalist ontology, eternalist A-theorists cannot characterize the 
privileged nature of the present in terms of existence.  Instead, the present is held to 
be metaphysically privileged in certain respects.  As was explained in the previous 
chapter, how each of the different versions of eternalist-A-theory characterizes this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  As	   noted	   above,	   both	   degree	   presentism	   and	   Williamsonian	   presentism	   are	   sometimes	  described	  as	  versions	  of	  the	  moving	  spotlight	  theory.	  	  However,	  I	  distinguish	  both	  these	  theories	  from	  the	  moving	  spotlight.	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non-ontologically privileged property of being present is what distinguishes them 
from one another.  For example, for the standard moving spotlight theorist, being 
uniquely present involves being ‘under the spotlight’.  For the Williamsonian 
presentist, being present involves being uniquely concrete.  For the non-standard 
spotlighter, Ross Cameron, being present involves uniquely having essential and 
non-essential properties.  And for the degree presentist, being uniquely present 
involves having maximal existence.  However, despite their different ways of 
characterizing the property of being present, for all eternalist A-theorists this 
temporary property of presentness is what grounds all ‘genuine’ change, and the 
passage of time.   We shall now consider each of these theories in turn. 
 
3.7.1  The Moving Spotlight 
 
The moving spotlight is the most familiar theory that combines the A-theory with 
eternalism.  Here we consider what I call the standard version of the moving 
spotlight theory.  The standard spotlighter takes the claim that past, present and 
future exist on a par to mean the following: that reality consists of a four-dimensional 
manifold of concrete objects and events, which exist permanently.73  On this view, 
objects located at past and future times are as much a part of concrete reality as 
present objects are.  Hence, dinosaurs are roaming around in their part of the 
manifold, Victoria is reigning in her part of the manifold, and people are celebrating 
the beginning of the fourth millennium in their part of the manifold. 74  Thus far, the 
standard spotlighter agrees with the eternalist B-theorist.   
 
However, like all A-theorists, the spotlighter thinks that B-theoretic accounts of 
change are not sufficient for genuine change.75  To explain this dynamism, which 
the B-view fails to capture, the spotlighter maintains that there is only one moment 
of time which has the objective property of being uniquely and absolutely (and non-
relatively) present; this is the property of being under the spotlight.  She also 
maintains that this property of being uniquely present continually moves from one 
time to the next, in a fixed and ordered direction throughout the manifold; from past, 
to present, to future.   So according to the spotlighter, although Victoria and future 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  As	  I	  am	  defining	  it,	  moving	  spotlight	  theorists	  claim	  that	  all	  existing	  entities	  exist	  concretely.	  	  This	   is	  opposed	  to	   the	  Williamsonian	  view,	  according	   to	  which	  non-­‐present	  entities	  exist	  non-­
concretely;	   and	   also	   Quentin	   Smith’s	   view,	   according	   to	   which	   non-­‐present	   particulars	   only	  possess	  relational	  properties.	  	  74	  Something	   like	   a	   moving	   spotlight	   theory	   was	   what	   McTaggart	   had	   in	   mind	   when	   he	  described	  and	  criticized	  the	  A-­‐series.	  	  	  75	  B-­‐theoretic	  accounts	  describe	  all	  change	  as	  some	  kind	  of	  variation	  in	  the	  manifold.	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persons exist just as concretely as present persons, it is not now the case that 
Victoria is Queen, or that people are celebrating the beginning of the fourth 
millennium.  Rather, it is only when those parts of the manifold where those objects 
and events are located are ‘under the spotlight’ that they have the property of being 
absolutely present, and hence can truly be said to be ‘happening now’.  For all other 
parts of the manifold, those times and their contents either have the property of 
being past (being previously under the spotlight) or the property of being future (yet 
to be under the spotlight).  
 
Although he criticizes the view, C.D. Broad provides the following spatial analogy, 
which nicely illustrates the spotlighter’s idea of an eternalist ontology with a 
privileged moving present.  He writes: 
 
We are naturally tempted to regard the history of the world as existing 
eternally in a certain order of events. Along this, and in a fixed direction, we 
imagine the characteristic of presentness as moving, somewhat like the spot 
of light from a policeman’s bull’s-eye traversing the fronts of the houses in a 
street. What is illuminated is the present, what has been illuminated is the 
past, and what has not yet been illuminated is the future.76 
 
As Broad’s description illustrates, the idea of the ‘moving spotlight’ is a metaphor for 
the passage of time.  The spotlight describes the movement of a privileged present 
moment of time, across the four-dimensional manifold.  The spotlight shines on one 
temporal location at a time, singling that time as ‘the present’.  Then as the spotlight 
moves, it shines on the next moment of time, singling that time out as ‘the present’, 
and then the next, and so on.  The passage of time is thus explained in terms of an 
ordered series of moments, each of which successively becomes present (and 
momentarily privileged) as it comes under the spotlight.  Similarly, Sider describes 
the moving spotlight as the view according to which ‘there is a monadic property of 
presentness, which is possessed by just one moment of time, and which moves, to 




 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  C.	  D.	  Broad	  (1923),	  p.59.	  	  77	  Sider	  (2011),	  p.	  259.	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3.7.2  Skow’s Moving Spotlight Theory 
 
We saw in the previous chapter that on the spotlight view, objects in the manifold do 
not change with respect to their ordinary concrete properties.  Instead, reality as a 
whole changes; this is because the tensed facts that are true when one part of the 
manifold is under the spotlight (or absolutely present), cease to be true when the 
spotlight shines on a different part of the manifold.  Hence the spotlighter describes 
a very minimal account of change, as the change occurs for different regions of the 
manifold, rather than for objects themselves.  In his paper ‘On the Meaning of the 
Question “How Fast Does Time Pass?”’, Bradford Skow worries whether this 
minimal account of change is adequate to account for objective becoming (or robust 
passage).  Skow’s worry is whether for time to genuinely pass, it must undergo a 
more robust change than it appears to in the moving spotlight theory.  To address 
this worry, Skow distinguishes two versions of the moving spotlight theory, and 
argues that by using primitive tense operators, one of these versions shows that 
robust passage does not require a robust change.78   
 
Skow says that the moving spotlight theory adds an extra fact to the B-theoretic 
picture.  This is a fact about which time is present or NOW, which cannot be 
reduced to a time-relational B-fact.79  The spotlighter also claims that this fact about 
which moment of time is NOW (or under the spotlight) keeps changing as the NOW 
moves towards the future.  Skow considers what the spotlight theory says about 
how the movement of the NOW along the time series should be understood.80  He 
says that on one version of the spotlight theory, the movement of the NOW, and this 
changing fact about which time is NOW, can be understood by postulating an 
additional and distinct time parameter, which he calls supertime T.  He calls this the 
moving spotlight theory with supertime (MST-ST). 
 
Skow explains that in MST-ST, there are definite distances between points in 
supertime, and these make it isomorphic to the real time series.  He then says that 
‘no time is NOW “absolutely”; instead, a time is NOW only relative to a point in 
supertime.’81  The idea here is that the movement of the NOW is explained by 
saying that the NOW is at t1 relative to supertime T1 and the NOW is at t2 relative to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  We	  should	  note	  that	  Skow	  has	  since	  amended	  this	  view	  slightly;	  see	  Skow	  (2015).	  	  79	  Skow	  (2011),	  p.	  3	  80	  Skow	  (2015),	  p.	  46.	  81	  	  Ibid.,	  p.13.	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supertime T2.  So the NOW is said to move into the future because at later points in 
supertime (e.g. T2 and T3), later instants of time (t2 and t3) are NOW.’  Skow notes 
some difficulties with the idea of an additional time series; first, that supertime is 
ontologically extravagant; and secondly, that it is really just the B-theory with two 
time dimensions.  However, Skow does not engage with these objections, as he 
only thinks of supertime as a metaphor.82  Instead, he turns his attention to the 
second version of the moving spotlight theory, as he says the above complaints do 
not apply to it.   
 
This second version of the theory, which Skow calls the moving spotlight theory with 
primitive tense operators, or MST-PT, does not postulate an additional supertime.  
Instead, primitive tense operators merely mimic these supertime results.  (For 
example, Skow says ‘MST-PT uses primitive tense operators and the (monadic) 
property t is NOW to do the work that supertime and t is NOW relative to s [a point 
in supertime] do in MST-ST.’)  The important difference is that on MST-PT the NOW 
does not become a relative thing, as it did in MST-ST; instead, the NOW is a 
‘fundamental monadic property of instants of time.’83  The basic idea here is that 
there is only one time that is NOW (or absolutely present), but we can explain the 
movement of this NOW into the future by saying that ‘it will be the case that a later 
time is NOW; and it was the case that an earlier time is NOW.’84  So the facts about 
which time is NOW are non-relative facts.  
 
Skow adds some more detail to explain how these primitive tense operators are 
metric operators, which mimic supertime.  For example, he says that ‘for every 
positive real number r, there are primitive tense operators ‘It will be the case that in r 
superseconds...’ and ‘It was the case r superseconds ago that....’85  Skow explains 
that he uses the term ‘supersecond’ instead of ‘second’ at this fundamental level in 
order to explain the rate at which the Now moves; which he says is one second per 
supersecond.  The point here is that these metric tense operators are primitive, so 
for any moment that is r seconds earlier- or later-than the time that is NOW, we 
analyse this in terms of primitive superseconds, and not in terms of some additional 
dimension of time, such as supertime (and supertime-seconds).  Skow says that 
one advantage of this is that we do not have to think of some second-level of time 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  Skow	  says	  that	  he	  thinks	  the	  idea	  of	  supertime	  is	  nonsense.	  	  Skow	  (2015)	  p.47.	  83	  Skow,	  Ibid,	  p.	  15.	  84	  Ibid.	  85	  Ibid.	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passing, or explain how fast this second-level passes, which would involve a 
regress of postulating yet more time-levels.   
 
Skow is aware that some people might object to the idea of superseconds, so he 
discusses ways of formulating the theory without using metric tense operators.  That 
is to say, just using standard primitive tense operators ‘it will be the case’ and ‘it was 
the case’.  Skow thinks that this can be done, but he says it is a merit of MST-PT 
that it can explain the rate of passage as one supersecond per second.  In contrast, 
on the standard operator approach, the rate of passage can only be explained as 
one second per second, which some people claim is not a rate at all.  Skow seems 
to agree with this objection, as he says that he is not sure if he understands such 
theories that explain the rate of passage as one second per second.  Skow 
therefore concludes that this version of the moving spotlight theory can be 
understood in such a way as to provide a robust account of passage, without 
needed to provide a robust account of change. 
 
3.7.3  Problems with the Moving Spotlight Theory 
 
In his discussion of Skow’s account, Oliver Pooley suggests that it is ‘deeply 
problematic’.  According to Skow, the primitive tense operators in MST-PT, which 
rely on superseconds, only mimic the points in supertime.  However, Pooley 
questions whether Skow’s MST-PT really does avoid postulating a second time 
series.  To explain this worry, Pooley contrasts MST-PT with presentism.  He says 
that in the case of presentism, genuine change is explained by facts about how 
things are now, and how they were or will be.  So the primitive tense operators work 
by combining the tensed facts about how things are now, with tensed facts that are 
not now true, but were or will be true.  Hence Pooley says, ‘one simply cannot 
accept all the present, tensed truths without accepting that what is true undergoes 
genuine change.’86  Pooley’s point here (in favour of the presentist account) is that 
the presentist’s picture of reality is not like a block with a privileged centre; rather, 
for the presentist, the viewpoint from the ontologically privileged absolute present 
captures everything that is, was and will be true. 
 
Pooley says that in Skow’s moving spotlight theory (understood as MST-PT), the 
primitive tense operators used to explain change and passage, work differently from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  Pooley	  (2013),	  p.9.	   	  This	  is	  precisely	  what	  Fine	  denies	  that	  presentism	  can	  do,	  which	  is	  why	  Fine	  claims	  that	  presentism	  cannot	  account	  for	  change.	  	  So,	  Pooley	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  disagreeing	  with	  Fine	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the presentist’s primitive tense operators.  For the spotlighter, parts of the domain 
which are no longer under the spotlighter do not correspond to how things were; 
rather they are how concretely existing past times are.  The spotlighter’s primitive 
tense operators mimic supertime, in that they appeal to times that are r 
superseconds earlier- or later than NOW.  However, from the perspective of 
supertime (which they mimic), objects located at different times are always as they 
are at those times.  For example, Pooley gives the example where he stands at t0, 
sits at t1, and stands at t2, and says that from the perspective of every point in 
supertime, it is always true that he is located in these ways at those times (standing 
at t0, sitting at t1, and standing t2).  So he says that if T2 is held to depict the absolute 
facts, and hence that t2 is held to be present, how should the spotlighter understand 
the claim ‘I sat down’ uttered at t2?   
 
Pooley says that this claim (I sat down uttered at t2) can be understood in two ways.  
First, it can be made true by how reality is simpliciter (from the perspective 
analogous to the that of T2).  He says this is undesirable, as the spotlighter (unlike 
the presentist) does not understand all past and future talk in terms of how reality 
‘currently’ is.87  Alternatively, it can be made true by the primitive metric tense 
operators.  In this case, Pooley suggests that the t2 utterance of ‘I sat down’ might 
mean that at an earlier perspective in supertime (T0) I am standing, and at a slightly 
later perspective in supertime (T1) I am sitting.  Pooley says, ‘in other words, the 
utterance is currently true because of primitive tensed facts like the following’: 
 
• WAS10m (P)  
 
In English: it was the case 10 minutes ago (t is present and I am standing at t) 
  
• WAS9m (P) 
 
In English: it was the case 9 minutes ago (t’ is present and I am standing at t’) 88 
 
The problem here, says Pooley, is that it becomes unclear what the role of these 
existing but non-present times are, as MST-PT makes how most of reality is (i.e. is 
at non-present times) irrelevant to our ordinary tensed talk.  Hence Pooley 
concludes that the moving spotlight theory is not plausible.  On the one hand, it 	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  p.	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holds that reality is constituted by concretely existing things which are certain ways 
at past, present, and future times, and on the other hand, it makes these contents of 
past and future times irrelevant to our ordinary tensed talk. 
 
3.7.4  Cameron’s Moving Spotlight Theory 
 
There are other problems with the moving spotlight theory.  To consider these, we 
turn to Ross Cameron’s moving spotlight theory, as Cameron claims that his version 
of the theory avoids the problems faced by the standard view.  Like the standard 
version of the moving spotlight, Cameron holds that all temporal entities exist 
permanently and concretely.  However, Cameron tries to spell out what is involved 
in existing ‘concretely’ in such a way that it makes his theory more plausible than 
standard versions of the theory.  We should note that like many A-theorists, 
Cameron discusses A-characteristics in terms of monadic properties rather than 
relations. 
 
In his book The Moving Spotlight, Cameron identifies the following problems with 
standard versions of the moving spotlight theory: 
  
• It does not escape McTaggart’s paradox. 
• It fails to give an adequate account of what it is for the present to be 
privileged, or of what ‘presentness’ is. 
• It cannot provide evidence of how we can know that ‘this’ is the present time. 
• It does not give a satficatory account of the open future.  
 
Cameron begins by explaining why McTaggart’s paradox is a problem for standard 
versions of the spotlight.  Cameron accepts that if we assume time is not circular, 
then McTaggart is correct to hold that past, present, and future are incompatible 
properties.  He also accepts that the natural objection (the objection that things only 
have these A-properties successively) leads to an infinite regress. However, 
Cameron claims that this infinite regress is benign.  This is because he holds that at 
each stage the explanation is successful, despite the fact that at each stage a new 
demand for explanation is generated.89  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	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Nevertheless, Cameron identifies a different reason why the non-presentist A-
theorist does not escape McTaggart’s paradox.  He says this is due to a principle he 
calls ‘Past Record’: 
 
• Past Record: If something was the case, then it is the case in the past90  
 
Cameron says that the presentist will not accept Past Record.  For the presentist, 
the past does not exist; hence nothing is the case in the past, rather things were the 
case.  However, he says that it looks as though the moving spotlighter should 
accept Past Record, as she accepts that the past exists.91  Hence it looks as though 
what happened in the past, such as Caesar crossing the Rubicon, continues to be 
part of reality.  Cameron explains that according to Past Record ‘because there 
were dinosaurs, there are dinosaurs – where the “are” is to be understood 
atemporally, describing how reality is across time’.92  Likewise, the “is” in Past 
Record is atemporal in this sense.  Cameron also points out that accepting Past 
Record is typically held to be an advantage for the non-presentist A-theorist 
because, unlike the presentist, it provides them with a way of explaining what makes 
claims about the past true.   
 
However, Cameron says that Past Record makes the following McTaggartian 
problem for the moving spotlighter.  For example, given eternalism, if M is now 
present, then M was future.  So, Cameron says that according to Past Record: 
 
M’s being future is (atemporal “is”) the case, in the past.  But M is now 
present, and how things are now is also part of how things atemporally are 
across time.  So both M’s being present and M’s being past are the case, 
atemporally.93      
 
According to Cameron, this means that when we ask what M is like simpliciter, we 
find ourselves under pressure to say that M is both present and future simpliciter, 
which it cannot be.  For example, consider the tomato that was green, but is now 
red.  How is the tomato simpliciter?  Unless one is a presentist, how a thing is 
simpliciter, does not mean how it is now; rather it means how that thing is across 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  Cameron	  (2015),	  p.64	  91	  He	  adds	  that	  the	  same	  is	  true	  for	  the	  growing	  blocker,	  as	  far	  as	  the	  past	  is	  concerned,	  although	  she	  would	  not	  accept	  its	  future	  equivalent.	  92	  Ibid,	  p.64	  93	  Ibid.	  p.65.	  
	   158	  
time.  So although the tomato is green and not-green at different times, the problem 
is it cannot be both green and not-green simpliciter.  
 
Presented in this way, Cameron says that McTaggart’s argument is similar to the 
problem of temporary intrinsics.  So he considers whether the standard responses 
to that problem can help.  As we have seen, these responses aim to avoid the 
contradiction by saying that properties are disguised relations to time, or that they 
are properties belonging to distinct temporal parts of a persisting object.  Cameron 
explains the problem as follows: 
 
Just as I can ask what height I am simpliciter, so I can ask whether Caesar’s 
crossing the Rubicon is past simpliciter.  Not past then, not past now, just 
whether it is past.  And surely the A-theorist must answer that it is past 
simpliciter.  It is before the objective now, thus it is past – end of story.  But it 
was past, so by Past Record it must be present in the past.  But the only 
place that it is is in the past, so it must be present simpliciter as well.  So it is 
past simpliciter, and it is present simpliciter.  But those are incompatible 
properties!94 
 
Cameron explains that we cannot escape the paradox in the ways used to solve the 
problem of temporary intrinsics.  For example, we cannot say that there is a 
temporal part of Caesar’s crossing the Rubicon that is past, and another temporal 
part that is present, because the whole event is past.  But it is not past simpliciter, 
because by Past Record, it is present in the past; so it seems that it is past and 
present simpliciter, which it cannot be.  However, Cameron says that trying to 
escape the paradox by saying that A-properties are disguised relations (or that they 
are properties only had in a t-ly way) does not work either.  This is because doing so 
would be to abandon the A-theorist’s claim that only one time is uniquely and 
objectively present.  
 
Cameron notes again that the presentist does not have these problems.  For 
example, the presentist denies that times other than the instantaneous present exist.  
Hence for the presentist, it never is the case that reality contains the same thing 
located at two different times, instantiating incompatible properties at those times.   
Rather, how M is now, is how M is simpliciter, and how M was is not part of how 	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reality is now.  So the presentist denies that there is a comparison to be made 
between facts across time, because non-present facts do not obtain.  So when the 
presentist uses primitive tense operators, such as ‘it was the case that…’, Cameron 
says ‘she denies the claim that its truth-conditions are given by “it was the case in 
the past that… ”.’95  In contrast, the spotlighter faces the above problem, because as 
an eternalist she is making a comparison between facts across time.  Hence the 
spotlighter accepts that how things were (and how they will be) is part of how reality 
is.  That is to say, how something was, is part of how reality is in the past.  
 
Cameron’s solution is to give up Past Record.  According to Cameron, unlike 
standard versions of the theory, the moving spotlight theory should not be construed 
as an enriched B-theory; that is to say, a B-theory of co-existing events, with the 
addition of an objectively privileged present moment, which somehow moves along 
the time series.  Instead, the moving spotlight theory should be thought of as an 
enriched presentism.  The idea here is to accept the presentist’s claim that how 
things are simpliciter is how they are now, but to augment this by adding another 
claim; that non-present entities are also some way now.  This is why Cameron 
distinguishes his theory from presentism.96  Cameron claims that an advantage of 
his spotlight theory (over presentism) is that it is rich enough to provide truthmakers 
for claims about non-present entities, and an advantage (over the standard spotlight 
theory) is that it avoids the problem of temporary intrinsics because it accepts that 
the only way things are simpliciter is how they are now.   Like presentism, it avoids 
McTaggart’s paradox, and it can provide a more robust account of change and 
passage than the standard version of the moving spotlight.  Let us consider some of 
the details of Cameron’s theory.   
 
The key claim of Cameron’s spotlight theory is that while how things are now (in the 
present) is how they are simpliciter, nevertheless past and future entities are some 
way now.  So in what sense are past and future entities some way?  First, let us 
consider how Cameron distinguishes his theory from presentism and the standard 
spotlight.  Cameron explains that: 
 
• The presentist does not admit non-present entities, because for the 
presentist, they are not among the things that there unrestrictedly are.  So 
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for the presentist, our first-order quantifiers (some and all) range solely over 
presently existing entities.  Non-present objects are not some way. 
   
• The standard spotlighter does admit non-present entities, because to be 
non-present is simply to be located at other times.  
 
• Cameron’s spotlighter admits non-present entities because it helps with the 
project of truthmaking to say that non-present things are now a certain way.  
However, he says ‘this will not let the spotlighter say what it is for something 
to have been the case in the past, but it will let her say what makes it the 
case that each historical truth was the case.’97  
 
So it seems that saying how non-present things are now, involves being able to say 
‘what makes it the case that each historical truth was the case’.  So what does this 
mean?  According to Cameron, what it does not mean is that presently existing 
things have Lucretian properties.  For example, the view known as ‘Lucretian 
presentism’ maintains that present entities have past-orientated properties, and 
these are used to provide truthmakers for historical truths.98  Lucretian presentists 
claim that what makes my assertion ‘I used to be 4ft tall’ true is my presently having 
the property of having been 4ft tall.  Cameron says that critics of Lucretian 
properties claim that they are ‘suspicious’ properties, but struggle to say exactly 
what is wrong with them.  What Cameron finds wrong with Lucretianism is that 
having the property of having been 4ft tall is not part of the intrinsic nature of a thing 
now.  What he wants for his spotlight theory is to enrich presentism enough to make 
it the case that past and future properties are part a thing’s intrinsic nature now.  
However, Lucretianism only tells us that such properties were part of a thing’s 
intrinsic nature. 
 
Instead, Cameron appeals to Josh Parsons’ notion of distributional properties, which 
say how a thing is across space.  For example, Parsons says that an object that is 
black and white and polka dotted has a certain distributional property; namely, being 
white with black spots (in a certain way).99  Cameron adapts this idea and says ‘a 
temporal distributional property says how a thing is across time, just like is polka 
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dotted says something about how a thing is across space.’100 Cameron says that for 
any persisting entity, it has the temporal distributional properties it has throughout its 
life, plus one other property, age, which is the property that tells us how far along a 
thing’s life that thing is.  Cameron claims that temporal distributional properties and 
age enable us to explain ‘how facts concerning how present things used to be and 
will be are made true by the way things are now.’101  For example, Cameron’s being 
4ft tall is a past event ‘M’.  But since Cameron denies Past Record, M is not present 
in the past; so the presentness of M is not part of reality.  However, reality makes it 
the case that M was present.  This is because the way Cameron is now, plus his 
age, makes it the case that when he was younger he was 4ft tall.  
 
Suppose we grant that the way a present object (such as Cameron) is now, is what 
makes it true that how things about Cameron were (or will be) are now part of reality. 
But how does Cameron’s theory work in the case of non-present entities, such as 
Caesar?  According to Cameron:  
 
You do not need to be located in the present in order to presently be a 
certain way; it simply needs to be now true that you exist.102 
 
He says this is because:  
 
Each thing bears a location relation to some four-dimensional region of 
spacetime; and this relational fact is one that always obtains, because the 
relation fixes not where the thing is at a time, but where it is across time.103  
 
So, on this picture, Caesar exists now and is located in the past.  And part of the 
way Caesar is now, involves Caesar bearing a certain location relation to a certain 
part of the manifold, which fixes how Caesar is across time.  Moreover, in addition to 
having this ‘location relation’, Caesar is now a certain way simpliciter because of the 
temporal distributional properties he always has, plus the age he is now, which 
continually increases as time passes.  Cameron states that this gives his theory an 
advantage over presentism, as the presentist cannot say that non-present things 
exist and are now some way.   	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However, when Cameron continues to explain how Caesar is now, his theory 
becomes problematic.  For example, he explains that Caesar used to have a certain 
height at one time, and a different height at another.  Hence Cameron says: 
 
He had those heights because of the different ages he had at each time in 
combination with the same temporal distributional property; and that he had 
those properties at those times is made true by his now having the temporal 
distributional property and age he has – the properties he has simpliciter.   
And Caesar’s now having those properties makes it the case that now he 
has no height.104 
 
So, on the one hand, Caesar is a concrete individual who exists now and is some 
way, because he has the temporal distributional properties he always has, a location, 
plus an age, which follows from these.  On the other hand, Cameron denies that 
Caesar has a height, shape or mass, or any of the other properties we normally 
associate with concretely existing things.   
 
Cameron admits that this is a cost of his theory.  For example, he says that there is 
a very strong intution to think that: 
 
If a concrete thing exists now, it must now be some height, some mass, 
some 3D shape, etc.105   
 
Despite this, Cameron defends his view by claiming that most other theorists are in 
no position to push this objection.  For example, he says that the perdurantist also 
denies that concretely existing individuals have properties such as shape and mass.  
This is because the perdurantist only attributes the having of such properties to 
distinct temporal parts of (so-called) perduring worms.  Similarly, the eternalist-
endurantist who holds that properties are disguised relations, also denies that 
persisting individuals have properties such as mass, height and shape.106  Cameron 
also rejects ‘Williamsonian presentism’, such as Sullivan’s eternalist A-theory 
(discussed below), according to which, all past, present and future objects exist, but 
only present objects exist concretely.  On this eternalist-enduarntist view, non-	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present objects exist, but do so as ‘merely logical existents’, which have no location, 
and are not alive.  Since Cameron takes being concrete to be part of what it is to 
exist, he says that this ontology is an even less attractive option than the standard 
spotlighter’s.107  Cameron admits that the presentist has an advantage over other 
theories in this respect; but he adds that because presentism has other defects (e.g. 
its lack of truthmakers for non-present objects), it does not have the overall 
advantage as a plausible metaphysical theory of time.  
 
So although Cameron acknowledges that his own theory has the unintuitive result 
that non-present objects cannot have properties like height, shape and mass, he 
claims that his theory has the advantage of being able to combine eternalism and 
endurantism.  This is because his theory allows that things have their properties 
simpliciter when (and only when) they are present.  He contrasts this with the 
standard spotlight view, which holds that all past, present and future objects have 
their properties simpliciter (and hence cannot avoid McTaggart’s paradox).  He also 
contrasts this with B-theoretic-endurantism, which is a position he finds untenable. 
For example, Cameron says that B-theoretic-endurantism cannot account for 
genuine change, and when it explains ‘apparent change’ it collapses into 
perdurantism; hence ‘endurantism requires the A-theory.’108 
 
Cameron explains the other advantages his theory has over the standard spotlight 
theory.  First, he claims that his theory can adequately account for what it is to be 
present, or what ‘presentness’ is.  The standard spotlight just postulates that being 
present involves being under the spotlight, but gives no real content to what that 
amounts to, as all past, present, and future things never lose or gain any other 
intrinsic properties.  Cameron says that this just amounts to adding a primitive 
property of things (associated with being under the spotlight) on to the B-theory 
picture.  On Cameron’s view, how things are simpliciter (globally) is not how they 
are at any other times.  For example, nothing ever has the age it has at one time, at 
any other time.  Moreover, Cameron explains that why he is (now) 6ft tall is not 
because he is under the spotlight; rather it is his being 6ft tall simpliciter that 
explains what is for the spotlight to be shining on him.  Hence in Cameron’s spotlight 
theory, presentness is just the way things are simpliciter; and how things are 
simpliciter (their temporal distributional properties, location, and current age) makes 
the difference between how things are, were, or will be.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	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  108	  	  Ibid.,	  p.156.	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In this way, Cameron is able to give content to the idea of ‘being present’, and in 
doing so, he claims that his spotlight theory gives a more robust account of change 
than the standard view.  This is because as time passes, the age of concrete 
objects not only increases, but they also lose and gain certain other non-essential 
properties, such as mass, height, shape, when they cease to be present.   
 
A final advantage Cameron claims for his theory is that it can give a better account 
of the asymmetry between the past and the future.  Cameron rejects branching time 
accounts of the open future, because he claims that while such accounts can 
explain the semantics of future contingents, they do not give a satisfactory account 
of the underlying metaphysics of this picture.109  In contrast, Cameron explains that 
his theory allows that the way reality is now is such that it is indeterminate whether 
some fact x about the future obtains.  For example, he says ‘there is some way that 
things will turn out, it is just indeterminate how things will turn out.’110  Cameron 
claims this preserves bivalence, and he contrasts this with the growing blocker’s 
account of the open future, which is the view that reality is such that there may be 
no fact of the matter whether fact x obtains.111  Cameron says that his account of the 
open future is preferable, since his account provides him with what he needs to say 
what makes statements about the future true or false.  For example, Cameron says 
that if he predicts that it will rain tomorrow, his spotlight view has an extensive 
enough ontology to make that prediction true or not.   Hence he says ‘one way or 
another, there is a fact of the matter.  But this is perfectly consistent with it being 
indeterminate which fact of the matter obtains.’112  In contrast, the growing blocker 
typically has to say that there is no fact of the matter, which Cameron finds 
unintutive. 
 
Cameron’s moving spotlight theory is thus a thorough attempt to try to systematize 
many of our intuitive ideas about time.  This is why he describes it as ‘enriched 
presentism’, in a contrast to the ‘enriched B-theory’ of the standard spoltlight.  I 
agree that Cameron’s theory does present a more robust account of change, and of 
what it is to be present (understood as being a certain way simpliciter), than the 
standard spotlight theory.  Cameron acknowledges many of the advantages of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  Ibid.,	  p.180.	  110	  Ibid.,	  p.201.	  111	  Ibid.,	  p.173.	  112	  Ibid.,	  195.	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presentism, but his main metaphysical objection to presentism is that it lacks the 
resources to give a satisfactory account of truthmakers for past and future truths.   
However, it is Cameron’s own account of the nature of these non-present objects, 
which he claims gives him an advantage when it comes to truthmaking, that I find 
the most problematic.    
 
For example, we have seen that Cameron avoids McTaggart’s paradox, by 
‘accepting the presentist’s thesis that what is the case simpliciter is what is now the 
case’.  And he says that this means accepting that ‘what was and will be the case 
has no reality at all.’113  A consequence of this is that in order to account for truths 
about how things were or will be, Cameron (like the presentist) must say that how 
things were or will be, are made true by things now being a certain way.  However, 
unlike the presentist, Cameron admits the existence of non-present entities.  He 
claims that his theory of truthmaking works better (than the presentist’s) because it 
allows that ‘some non-present things are nonetheless some way now.’114  The idea 
here is that a past thing, such as Caesar, is located in the past, and that is what 
makes true the tensed truth that Caesar once existed.  That Caesar exists also 
makes true the non-qualitative facts concerning Caesar, such as his spatio-temporal 
location and essential properties, such as being human.  Thus according to 
Cameron, Caesar is now a certain way simpliciter, because Caesar now has a 
certain age and the temporal distributional property that makes true all the facts 
about how Caesar was at the various times at which Caesar was present.115  These 
properties include, being such that he crossed the Rubicon and was an emperor n 
number of years ago. 
 
What I find most troubling about Cameron’s account is the dubious nature of these 
existing but non-present entities.  According to Cameron, Caesar exists concretely, 
is human, and has a location, but he has no height, mass or shape.  This is a 
strange way to exist concretely.  Moreover, if an individual thing exists in this way (is 
concrete, human, and located in the past), it is hard to accept that that thing is not 
some way in the past.  Cameron bases his argument for avoiding McTaggart’s 
paradox on the claim that he gives up Past Record; and hence gives up the idea 
that non-present things are some way in the past or future.  Thus Cameron denies 
that Caesar is some way in the past, because he denies that Caesar now has 	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certain intrinsic properties.  But in the case of past things, where there is no 
indeterminism involved concerning what was the case, it is hard to see how 
something that exists in the way Cameron describes (being concrete, human, and 
having a location), is not some way in the past.  
 
Cameron describes his account as an enriched presentism, but it is a bit rich (no 
pun intended) to describe it as such, since his theory violates the core claim of 
presentism; namely that only present objects exist.  Cameron is trying to distinguish 
between existing and being some way, but I do not find this convincing, given his 
account of what it is for non-present things to exist.  I therefore think that Cameron 
would be better off becoming a presentist, and adopting one of the options open to 
presentists to account for truths about non-present (and non-existing) things. 
 
To sum up.  Both versions of the moving spotlight we have considered are trying to 
give an A-theoretic account of change.  That is, they are trying to provide an 
account of change in terms of how the world objectively is, was, and will be, which 
cannot be reduced to variation between permanently true tenseless B-facts.  As we 
have seen, both these versions have problems.   We now turn to Meghan Sullivan’s 
eternalist A-theory, which she claims avoids the problems of Cameron’s theory, as 
she denies that non-present entities are concrete. 
 
3.7.5   ‘Williamsonian presentism’ 
 
The position known as ‘Williamsonian presentism’ is an eternalist A-theory, which 
holds that past and future entities exist permanently, but, unlike presently existing 
entities, they are non-concrete.  The view I describe is Sullivan’s version of (so-
called) Williamsonian presentism.  Sullivan is involved in a bigger project, which is to 
develop a version of the A-theory that does without temporal operators.116  Her 
reasons for this are explained below.  Sullivan describes her view as the ‘temporal 
analogue of Williamson’s recent work in modal logic.’ 117  I shall therefore begin by 
explaining Williamson’s view. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  116	  	  In	  this	  respect,	  Sullivan	  differs	  from	  Williamson,	  because	  Williamson	  treats	  modal	  operators	  as	  primitive.	  	  	  117	  	   In	  discussion	  of	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   “An	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  without	  Operators”	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  Workshop	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  Barcelona	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3.7.5.1  The modal case: Williamson’s necessitism  
 
In Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Williamson focuses on the modal dispute between 
necessitism and contingentism.  However, he draws some interesting parallels 
between the modal dispute and the dispute between metaphysical theories of time.   
Regarding the temporal dispute, Williamson abandons the labels ‘eternalism’ and 
‘presentism’, as he finds the dispute between eternalism and presentism ‘hopelessly 
muddled’.118  Instead, he prefers the labels ‘permanentism’ and ‘temporaryism’ as 
he believes they make the debate about the existence of temporal entities clearer.  
(Nevertheless, temporaryism typically corresponds to the views on existence held 
by presentists and growing blockers, as they have a varying domain, consisting of 
temporarily existing entities; and permanentism typically corresponds to eternalism, 
as eternalists have an unvarying domain of permanently existing entities.)  The 
modal-temporal parallels Williamson draws are between necessitism-permanentism 
on the one hand, and contingentism-temporaryism on the other.   
 
Williamson argues in favour of necessitism; the claim that necessarily everything is 
necessarily something.119  This is because Williamson accepts the Barcan formula, 
which he says is a schema with many instances.120  For example: 
 
• BF 1:   ∀x□F →   □∀xF 
 
In English: if for all x, necessarily x is F, then necessarily for all x, x is F. 
 
Williamson says that contraposed in existential form we can understand the Barcan 
formula as: 
 
• BF 2:  ◊∃xF → ∃x◊F 
 
In English: If possibly, for some x, x is F, then for some x, possibly x is F. 
 
In this form (BF2), we can see how the Barcan formula is very counterintuitive, as 
we naturally want to affirm the antecedent, and deny the consequent.  For example, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  	  Williamson	  (2013),	  p.25.	  119	  	  Ibid.,	  p.14.	  	  Williamson	  stresses	  that	  here	  the	  quantifiers	  ‘everything’	  and	  ‘something’	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  absolutely	  unrestricted.	  	  	  120 	  Williamson	   explains	   that	   the	   Barcan	   formula	   raises	   fundamental	   issues	   about	   the	  contingency	  or	  necessity	  of	  existence	  in	  modal	  logic.	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I do not have a younger brother.  However, I want to say that it is possible I could 
have had a younger brother.  And I can wonder whether he would have looked like 
me, or like my mother, and so on.  But I do not want to say just because I could 
have had a younger brother, that there is such a thing as my possible younger 
brother, which is not among the things that there actually are.  To affirm this (the 
consequent of BF2) is to affirm the existence of a merely possible person.  And this 
raises questions about what sort of thing this ‘merely possible person’ could be, if he 
is not among the things that there actually are.  
 
Despite its counterintuitive nature, it turns out to be extremely difficult to develop a 
modal logic which denies the Barcan formula. (A discussion of this is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.121)  Faced with the difficulties in denying the Barcan formula, 
there are various options.  We consider two of these in the next chapter on 
presentism; Prior’s rejection of the Barcan formula, and the neo-Meinongian 
approach (which involves accepting that various things are true about my possible 
younger brother, even though he does not exist).  As Williamson does not want to 
take either of these options, he accepts the Barcan formula and affirms that 
anything that can possibly exist, does exist.  This is understood as affirming the 
necessary existence of everything.  Williamson admits this involves an ‘ontological 
inflation’, but he recommends that the necessitist should accept it, and argue that it 
is harmless.122  
 
Williamson explains the existence of merely possible things in the following way.  
Consider the possible child that Wittgenstein could have had.  (Wittgenstein had no 
actual children.)  According to Williamson, this merely possible person is not an 
actual person; however, it is an actual object, which exists non-concretely.  This 
means it has no spatiotemporal location in the actual world, and it is not alive.  So 
according to Williamson there is a ‘contingently non-concrete object’ that is a 
possible child of Wittgenstein, which could have been a child of Wittgenstein.  
 
3.7.5.2  The temporal case: permanentism 
 
Williamson takes it that just as the fundamental structure of modal things is fixed 
(everything that possibly exists, does exist), the fundamental structure of temporal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  For	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  why	  Kripke’s	  attempt	  to	  invalidate	  the	  Barcan	  Formula	  fails,	  see	  Williamson	  (2010),	  pp.	  51-­‐74.	  	  122	  Williamson	  (2013),	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things is also fixed.  Hence, the natural temporal analogue of the Barcan formula is 
permanentism: 
 
• Permanentism: whatever exists at anytime, exists at all times. 
 
We can understand this as meaning that always, everything always exists.  While 
this obviously suggests eternalism, Williamson does not interpret permanentism in a 
B-theoretic way.  Instead, he takes it that just as possible things necessarily exist 
but do so non-concretely, past and future objects exist at all times (or permanently), 
but they do so non-concretely.  This suggests an A-theoretic way to understand 
eternalism, which differs from the moving spotlight view, which holds that all 
temporal entities always exist concretely.  Let us now see how Meghan Sullivan 
explains this in her ‘Williamsonian’ eternalist-A-theory.  
 
3.7.5.3  Sullivan’s Minimal A-theory  
 
Sullivan is an eternalist A-theorist who characterizes the A-theory in the following 
way.  Sullivan says that A-theorists typically claim that objects persist by enduring.  
Thus, in order to explain change and the passage of time, A-theorists claim that 
enduring entities only have their A-properties temporarily.  That is to say, they gain 
and lose their A-properties as time passes.  Sullivan calls this the principle of ‘A-
property change’, which she defines as follows: 
 
A-Property Change: There is at least one enduring object, x, and at least one 
non-time-relational property, C, such that x is C only temporarily.123 
 
Sullivan acknowledges that different A-theorists disagree as to how A-property 
change is satisfied.  For example, for presentists and growing blockers, this typically 
involves ontological change, whereas eternalist A-theorists deny this.  However, she 
says that what unites all A-theorists is the claim that ‘at least some kind of change in 
the world cannot be explained as mere variation in a spacetime manifold.’  In 
contrast, she says that B-theorists ‘explain all change as variation in the spacetime 
manifold.’124  (Sullivan takes B-theoretic accounts of change to be the relational view 
and the temporal parts account.)  
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Sullivan also endorses propositional temporalism (the idea that propositions can 
change truth-value), and she says that this is what makes the A-theory dynamic.  
She describes this dynamic component as follows: ‘the most accurate description of 
reality is subject to change.’125  Hence, what is true now, has not always been true, 
and will not always be true.  Sullivan says this is what B-theorists deny.  For 
example, B-theorists maintain that all tensed truths are reducible to tenseless truths, 
which are permanently true.  
 
As an eternalist, Sullivan claims that all past, present, and future objects exist 
permanently.  However, she distinguishes her eternalist A-theory from the moving 
spotlight, in the following way.  According to Sullivan’s theory, only present objects 
are concrete objects, which have their interesting properties, like being located in 
spacetime, or being alive, or having a colour, etc.  She claims that when non-
present objects recede into the past, they stop having their core properties, such as 
being located in spacetime, or being alive, or being red, and so on.  Following 
Williamson she says that non-present objects are non-concrete objects.  They have 
merely past properties, and have become merely past objects.  So non-present 
entities exist as merely logical existents.  
 
Sullivan distinguishes her A-theory from ‘standard’ A-theoretic accounts in another 
way.  She says that A-theorists standardly assume that their theories require a 
tense logic with Priorian tense operators; this is in order to formalize their views 
about change, the types of properties they think are instantiated, and (for presentists 
and growing blockers) their views about temporary existence.  Moreover, she says 
that these primitive tense operators are held to ‘reflect a primitive “tensed” structure 
of reality.’126  Sullivan challenges these assumptions for the following reasons.  First, 
she challenges the idea that tense-operators reflect some metaphysically 
fundamental aspect of reality, claiming that it is obscure what this is.  Secondly, she 
challenges the idea that primitive tense operators are indispensible as a means for 
A-theorists to express their views about property change.  Thirdly, she challenges 
the idea that primitive tense operators are indispensible as a means for expressing 
the A-theorist’s claim that some propositions are only temporarily true.  Finally, she 
challenges that idea that primitive tense operators enable ‘temporaryists' to express 
truths about merely past and merely future objects.  This is because she challenges 
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the claim that tense operators block (unwanted) ontological commitment to such 
objects.  
 
To avoid these problems she finds with the ‘operator approach’, Sullivan proposes 
an alternative ‘operator-free’ logic.  Here, I focus on giving a brief outline of the 
metaphysical picture that her operator-free A-theory gives us.127  Sullivan’s proposal 
involves enriching the standard stock of predicates, which express what she calls 
‘core’ properties (such as, ‘is alive’, ‘is located’, ‘is red’), with new predicates that 
express the past and future analogues of these core properties – and which result 
from applying tense-modifiers to the original stock of predicates.  Sullivan 
distinguishes two versions of this account; one in which the predicate modifiers are 
‘simple’, and one in which they are ‘expanders’.128  As Sullivan prefers the expander 
approach, I shall focus on that version here.   
 
According to Sullivan, the predicates that express core properties, such as ‘is 
running’ or ‘is President’, are either present tensed or tenseless.  Hence she says ‘at 
least some of these [core] predicates do not have time-slots, and they denote 
properties that are not held relative to a particular time.’129  Sullivan then proposes 
using ‘was’ and ‘will’ as new predicate modifiers.  She says these do two things.  
First, they modify the tense of core predicates.  For example, she says they ‘act on 
a stock of tenseless or present-tensed predicates like “is running” or “is President” to 
yield past or future-tensed predicates like “was running” or “will be President”.’130  
Secondly, they take us to new predicates that are time relations.  For example, 
Sullivan says they ‘expand the arity of the predicate they modify by one argument 
place – a time slot.’131  Thus, if X is President but was not always President, we can 
say that X exemplifies the core property is President, but also the past analogue 
relational property of being not-President at t (where t is earlier than the time at 
which X exemplifies the core property.)   
 
Sullivan therefore claims that A-theorists do not need tense operators in order to 
express change.  For example, on her operator-free theory, the A-property change 	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  or	  will	  be	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  or	  not	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principle is satisfied in the following way:  there is an enduring object X, which has a 
core property (is President), and lacks either the past or future time analogue of that 
property; therefore it has the property, was not-President at a time.132  Here, the 
property denoted by the core predicate is a temporary property (being President).  
And since the temporary property need not be time-relational, only the past and 
future analogue properties are time-relational.  Hence Sullivan says ‘tense modifier 
logic can express a consistent A-theory without collapsing into a version of the 
relational B-theory.’133  
 
Sullivan considers three possible objections to her operator-free A-theory.  The first 
is the objection that all temporal properties, including core properties, should be 
treated as time relations.  In response, Sullivan says that non-time-relational core 
properties are indispensible to the A-theorist.  For example, she explains that 
propositional temporalism is central to the A-theorist’s explanation of the flow of time 
and change.  Hence, she says that if ‘all changing properties are fixed relations 
between an object and a time, then the most accurate description of reality never 
changes’.134  So this objection would count as an objection against all A-theories.  
However, Sullivan denies that propositions expressed by sentences such as ‘X is 
President’ are incomplete (and thus need a time-context to complete them).  Hence 
she denies that core properties should be treated as time relations.  
 
The second objection is what she calls the too many properties objection.  
According to this objection, Sullivan’s A-theory is not dynamic enough, because it 
only expresses how ‘an object varies with respect to two distinct properties – the 
core property and the past or future analogue property’.  So, the objection here is 
that rather than explaining how a single object changes by directly instantiating the 
changing property, in the operator-free account distinct temporal parts stand-in as 
the instantiators.135  Sullivan’s response is that one should not take this objection too 
seriously.  She says this is because there is no reasonable common belief as to how 
things persist, and change, and have properties at times; and ‘every theory of 
change … has a surprising entailment.’136  I find Sullivan’s response acceptable.  
This is because on her account, the instantiation of concrete core properties is 
temporary; whereas in the B-theory, the instantiation of all properties is permanent.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  132	  Ibid.	  133	  Ibid.	  	  134	  Ibid.,	  p.21.	  135	  Ibid.,	  p.22.	  136	  Ibid.	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Moreover, the temporal analogue relational properties (ascribed to distinct temporal 
parts, which stand-in as the instantiators) are merely past or future properties, 
belonging to non-concrete objects.  In the B-theory, concrete properties are 
(permanently) instantiated by concrete temporal parts of objects.  So Sullivan’s 
account describes a more genuine account of change than the B-theory.  
 
The third objection is that past and future analogue properties are incoherent.  
Sullivan says that A-theories typically assume that the present time is fundamental; 
and based on this assumption, they maintain that ‘present facts ought to ground all 
other facts about an object’. 137  However, in her theory, present facts do not ground 
other facts about an object.  (For example, the fact that X is President does not 
ground the fact that X was President.)  So the objection is that temporal analogue 
properties are either ungrounded, or grounded in past or future facts about an object, 
which violates the assumption that the present is fundamental.  Sullivan’s response 
is to deny that the present is fundamental.  She says that A-theorists hold there is a 
fundamental distinction between the present and other times, but this does not 
necessarily mean that the present is more fundamental.  Hence Sullivan says that 
while analogue properties are similar to core properties, this does not mean that 
they are grounded in core properties.  Rather, there is a primitive similarity between 
core properties and analogue properties; just as is drinking and is apparently 
drinking are importantly similar, even though the former does not ground the latter. 
 
Thus Sullivan claims that her operator-free approach is preferable to the operator 
approach in three respects.  First, she says that since Priorian tense operators are 
intensional operators, even though A-theorists claim that they reflect something 
metaphysically fundamental, it is unclear what aspect of reality intensional operators 
reflect.138  In contrast, her theory uses logical devices that modify predicates, which 
can be ‘mapped to more familiar categories like objects and properties’; hence it is 
clear what aspect of reality they reflect. 139  She also says that her theory has no 
problem dealing with ‘cross-temporal relations and inferences that involve temporal 
anaphora’.140  For example, sentences such as ‘there were at least two distinct 
times when somebody named Elizabeth was Queen,’ which are problematic for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  137	  Ibid.	  138	  For	  example,	  when	  the	  proposition	  Victoria	  is	  Queen	  is	  embedded	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  a	  tense	  operator,	   it	   is	   obscure	  which	   part	   of	   reality	   the	   embedded	   proposition	   is	   describing.	   	   This	   is	  because	  P(Victoria	  is	  Queen)	  does	  not	  map	  onto	  an	  object	  with	  properties.	  	  	  	  139	  Ibid.,	  p12.	  140	  Ibid.	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Priorian tense logic, are not problematic for her A-theory.  And, most importantly for 
Sullivan, her theory avoids the problems Priorian tense logic inherits from modal 
logic.  For example, the problems with the Barcan formulas, which cause presentists 
to adopt very complicated systems of logic to block unwanted ontological 
commitments to non-existent objects.   
 
In addition to her dislike of tense operators, Sullivan says that her eternalist A-theory 
is preferable to the moving spotlight theory, because her theory provides a more 
robust account of change.  As mentioned above, this is because Sullivan claims that 
enduring objects lose their core properties when (for example) they recede into the 
past, and become merely past objects.  In contrast, on the spotlight theory, past and 
future objects still have concrete properties such as being located and alive.  This 
seems correct.  Her theory also avoids the problem of temporary intrinsics.  For 
example, since non-present objects do not have any of their core properties, it is 
never the case that an enduring object has incompatible intrinsic properties at 
different times.  This also seems correct.  In a similar way, Sullivan can also escape 
McTaggart’s paradox.  For example, consider a presently existing object, such as 
Queen Elizabeth II.  As we have seen, the problem McTaggart’s paradox raises for 
the A-theorist is this.  If Elizabeth is present, then in the past, she was future; and 
given eternalism, this means that she is both past and present, which are 
contradictory properties.  On Sullivan’s account, it is not the case that when 
Elizabeth is present, she is also past.  This is because it is only when Elizabeth is 
present that she is a concrete object and has the property of being located in 
spacetime.  So it is never the case that an enduring object has the property of being 
located any-when other than the transient present.   
 
So on this view, although all regions of spacetime exist permanently, as do all 
objects, existence does not entail location.141  Sullivan explains that presentists and 
growing blockers typically explain ‘flow’ in terms of ‘regions of spacetime changing 
with respect to existence.’  In contrast, on her theory, she says that the ‘flow of time’ 
is due to the fact that ‘one and only one region of spacetime has a special, complex 
temporary property—it is the only region that figures in any (untensed) location 
relations.  Other times were … or will be the locations of objects, but temporarily are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  141	  Sullivan	  (2012)	  ‘The	  Minimal	  A-­‐theory’	  p,	  19.	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not the location of anything.’142  I shall now consider some criticisms of Sullivan’s 
view.  
 
Like other eternalist A-theorists, Sullivan describes passage and change; however, 
on her account it is not clear why change and passage occurs.  For example, she 
does not explain why the world is such that one and only one region of spacetime 
has the ‘complex temporary property’ she describes.  Nor does she explain why only 
one region of spacetime is such that objects are located at it and have their other 
core properties, such as being alive or concrete.  Sullivan says that propositional 
temporalism is central to her account of change, but she does not appeal to factors 
such as causation, or the asymmetry between the past and future, to explain why 
reality changes in this way.   Her complaint against tense operators is that it is 
mysterious which aspect of reality they reflect; but I find her account guilty of being 
mysterious about the mechanism of change.  
 
Another criticism is this.  Sullivan says that one of her starting assumptions is the 
idea that existence is univocal.  Thus, having a domain of permanently existing 
entities provides her with a straightforward way for accounting for truth and non-
present entities.  Sullivan sees it as an advantage of eternalist theories that they 
have an unvarying domain.  As we have seen, Sullivan claims that tense operators 
are problematic when presentists and growing blockers use them to block unwanted 
ontological commitment to past and future things, because they inherit from modal 
logic the problems that are familiar in discussions of the Barcan formulas and 
actualism.143  Sullivan says it is notoriously difficult to deny the Barcan formula in the 
modal case, and it is similarly difficult to deny the temporal equivalent.  Thus she 
claims that her theory is preferable, because it avoids the complex and awkward 
logics that temporaryists have to employ.  
 
In response to this, it is not clear how much of a problem varying domains really are 
for growing blockers and presentists.  For example, in Prior’s tense logic, he 
develops ways around the Barcan formula (see Chapter 4).  The neo-Meinongian 
position we consider in Chapter 4 also provides another way to avoid the Barcan 
formula.  Moreover, by trying to accommodate the Barcan formula and give an A-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  142	  Ibid.	  143	  	   That	   is,	   they	   face	   the	   formal	   challenge	   of	   assigning	   truth-­‐values	   to	   formulas	   in	  worlds/at	  times	  where	   objects	   denoted	   in	   the	   formula	   do	   not	   exist.	   	   (For	   example,	   just	   as	   ‘Possibly	   (p)’	  logically	  implies	  that	  there	  is	  (exists)	  a	  possible	  p,	  so	  too	  Past	  (p)	  logically	  implies	  that	  there	  is	  (exists)	  a	  past	  p.)	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theoretic account of change, Sullivan stretches this ‘univocal’ notion of existence to 
its limits.  For example, we typically think that living things exist when (and only 
when) they are alive, and that existence involves being located in spacetime.  So 
the idea of existing non-concretely is very counterintuitive.   
 
Sullivan’s A-theory is motivated by her assumption that existence is univocal and 
her dislike of tense operators.  Because of this, she denies that A-property change 
rests on there being some primitive tensed structure in the world, in which the 
present is fundamental.  Instead, she claims that the fundamental distinction 
between the present and other times rests on the fact that her predicate modifiers 
(tense modifiers) map onto a set of entities (non-concrete entities with merely past 
and future properties), which are completely distinct from those picked out by 
unmodified predicates (concrete entities, with concrete properties).  As mentioned 
above, although Sullivan describes A-property change in terms of this distinction, I 
find Sullivan’s account of the mechanism of this change mysterious.  For these 
reasons, I do not think that Sullivan’s operator-free theory has the advantages over 
standard A-theories that she claims it does. 
 
3.7.6  Quentin Smith’s Degree presentism 
 
Our final eternalist A-theory is Quentin Smith’s degree presentism.  Although degree 
presentism is sometimes described as an alternative version of the moving spotlight, 
I do not class it as such.  This is because in some respects degree presentism is 
more like Williamsonian presentism, in that it holds that non-present entities are 
stripped of all their interesting intrinsic properties.144  However, there is an important 
respect in which degree presentism differs from Williamsonian presentism; this is 
Smith’s claim that there are ‘degrees of existence’.  On this view, all past, present, 
and future entities exist, but only present entities have what Smith calls ‘maximal 
existence’.  (For example, Smith says ‘the present is existence itself’.145)  In contrast, 
past and future entities exist by less than maximal degrees, which depend on their 
distance to the present.  Hence degree presentism rejects the neo-Quinean idea 
that existence is a univocal notion. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  144	  Like	  Williamsonian	  presentism,	  Smith’s	  ‘Degree	  Presentism’	  strips	  all	  non-­‐present	  objects	  of	  their	  interesting	  intrinsic	  properties.	  	  See	  Zimmerman	  (2008),	  p.	  125.	  145	  Quentin	  Smith	  (2002),	  p.127.	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Smith calls his theory ‘presentism’ because he distinguishes it from what he calls 
‘solipsistic presentism’ (the view I call ‘standard presentism’).   Smith cannot accept 
so-called ‘solipsistic presentism’ because he finds it incoherent.  For example, he 
says it is incoherent to claim that: 
 
Only the present exists in any meaningful sense of ‘exists’, and it is not the 
case that any past or future event or things exists in any sense 
whatsoever.146  
 
Smith finds this view logically self-contradictory, as he claims it does not make 
sense for the present to exist in relation to anything unreal or non-existent; namely, 
the past or the future.  Hence Smith claims that degree presentism is a logically 
unproblematic alternative to ‘solipsistic presentism’.   
 
Smith’s theory is a tensed theory because he takes tensed truths and tensed states 
of affairs as basic.  He also says that ‘every fact involves a relationship to the 
present’.147  However, Smith denies that there are monadic properties of pastness 
and futurity, which belong to existing events or non-present entities.  Instead, he 
says that monadic predicates (of past or future events) are ‘abbreviations of 
relational predicates’.  Smith says this is because ‘a nonmaximal degree of temporal 
existence requires every determination of a particular to be a relationship to the 
present, in relation to which the degree to which the past or future particular exists is 
determined.’ 148   
 
To explain what he means, Smith considers how a non-present entity (Socrates), 
with a nonmaximal degree of existence, can stand in a relation to the present.  He 
says:  
 
Socrates does not presently have the nonrelational [monadic] property of 
being alive.  Nor does he presently have the relational property of having 
been alive over 2,000 years earlier than the present time.  But this past 
Socrates can stand in relations to the present of being earlier than it.149   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  146	  Ibid.,	  p	  123.	  147	  Ibid.,	  p.129.	  148	  Ibid.,	  p.126.	  149	  Ibid.	  
	   178	  
Smith explains that having been alive is ‘analyzable into the property of aliveness 
and the state S of the thing tenselessly being alive earlier than the present time.’  
However, he says that it is not Socrates’ tenseless exemplification of being alive that 
stands in relation to the present; rather ‘it is the whole complex, the state S, that 
stands in this relation to the present.’150  Smith says that since he does not identify 
exemplification with existence, he takes exemplification to have a primitive tenseless 
meaning.  Thus Smith says the semantic content of a phrase, such as ‘having been 
alive’, is that ‘Socrates exemplifies (tenselessly) the relational property being alive 
over 2,000 years earlier than the present time.’151   Hence Smith says that every fact 
includes a relationship to the present, and this is why he holds that there are only 
tensed facts.152  
 
The ontological picture Smith presents us with is one in which Socrates exists (to a 
nonmaximal degree) but is not alive.  Smith says that as a past item, Socrates can 
have no non-relational (monadic) properties, such as being spatial or mental and so 
on.  This means that Socrates is not a substance.  Smith says that Socrates was a 
substance when he existed; but now Socrates is no longer an existent.  However, 
he still exists ‘to some degree’.  Smith describes this ‘degree’ as partial being, which 
is neither total being nor non-being.  I find this hard to make sense of. 
 
Smith claims that degree presentism explains our phenomenological experience of 
time, because we do experience present things as more real than past things.  
Smith sees this as an advantage over (standard) presentism, which denies that 
there is anything earlier or later than the present that could stand in any relation to 
the present.   He also sees degree presentism as having an advantage over the B-
theory, because it allows that the present has more reality than the past and future.  
The B-theory, in contrast, treats all times equally.  It is not clear that Smith is totally 
correct about our experience of time.  For example, some of our memories can be 
very vivid and ‘real’ to us, even when they happened long ago, whereas things that 
happened yesterday can be forgotten.  And we also attach greater emotional 
importance to some past events than we do to many present events.   Moreover, the 
presentist has alternative ways of explaning how truths about the past are grounded 
in present truths. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  150	  Ibid.	  151	  Ibid.,	  p.127	  152	  Ibid.,	  p.129.	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Smith has more to say about the exemplification of the relational properties 
mentioned above.  For example, he says they are tied to Socrates in an atemporal 
way, and yet in another sense they are temporal, as they belong to ‘complex states’, 
which involve being earlier than the present time.  However, in his detailed critique 
of degree presentism, Oaklander criticizes Smith for being inconsistent here.  For 
example, Oaklander claims that on Smith’s view, the only thing that makes 
something present (or maximally existent) is that present entities have non-relational 
or monadic properties.153   Oaklander then argues that if the complex state of 
Socrates’ (tenselessly) being alive is earlier than the present, it is past.  But since 
being alive is a monadic property of Socrates, and only present particulars have 
monadic properties, he says that it follows that Socrates’ being alive is present.  
Moreover, he says that if Socrates is alive, Socrates must be maximally existent.  
But then if Socrates is also earlier than the past, Socrates is also less than 
maximally existent.   
 
I take it that Oaklander is pointing out that Smith’s degree presentism runs into the 
problem of temporary intrinsics, as Socrates cannot be both maximally existent and 
less than maximally existent.  Oaklander considers whether Smith can avoid this 
contradiction.  For example, Oaklander asks what the ontological status is of the fact 
(or complex state) that (e.g.) Socrates (tenselessly) exemplifies by being x minutes 
earlier than the present time.  That is, is the fact timeless or temporal?  If it is a 
timeless fact, Oaklander says that ‘the present time’ is neither a B-time nor A-time, 
which means it is repeatable.  He says this leads to an absurd conclusion that the 
same ‘present time’ could denote different and incompatible times.  (For example, 
Socrates exemplifying being x minutes later than the present time.)  In which case 
degree presentism remains contradictory.  However, if facts have different present 
times, Oaklander says that degree presentism avoids the contradiction but collapses 
into the B-theory.154  This is because the present time would no longer be privileged.  
Oaklander concludes his critique by saying that degree presentism cannot be 
defended. 
 
To sum up, I find degree presentism even less plausible than Williamsonian 
presentism.  It seems to me that degree presentism creates more problems than the 
ones it is trying to solve, and I find it hard to understand what his notion of less-than-
maximal-existence actually means.  I also find Oaklander’s criticism correct; the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  153	  Oaklander	  (2009),	  p.158.	  	  	  	  	  154	  Ibid.,	  p.162.	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notion of the privileged present, which Smith is trying to defend, either leads to a 
contradiction or collapses into the B-theory. 
 
3.8  Semi-eternalism 
 
In this section we briefly consider two theories, the growing block and the shrinking 
tree.  We begin with the growing block, which is the most familiar version of semi-
eternalism. 155  As we shall see, the main advantages of the growing block are held 
to be the following:   
 
• It provides a ‘genuine’ tensed account of change. 
• It provides a robust account of temporal passage.   
• It straightforwardly provides truthmakers for statements about the past.  
• It accounts for the direction and asymmetry of time.  
• It accounts for the open future, as the future is not fixed.   
 
3.8.1  The Growing Block 
 
The growing blocker holds that reality consists of the past and the present, but the 
future is unreal.  The present is the leading edge of the growing block; hence, the 
universe is seen as a continually expanding 4-dimensional spacetime manifold, 
whose expanding edge coincides with an objective present moment.  So in the 
growing block, everything that is earlier than the present exists, but nothing exists 
that is later than the present.  The growing blocker is thus committed to the view that 
objects exist temporarily.  This is because they do not always exist.  It is only once 
objects come into existence as they become present that they continue to exist 
permanently in the block.  
 
Semi-eternalist theories are sometimes called ‘hybrid A-B theories’ because people 
claim that they incorporate aspects of B-eternalism with aspects of presentism.156  
This is not how I understand these theories.  For example, in the case of the 
growing block, this would only be the case if the past section of the block were 
viewed like the static and unchanging block of the B-theorist; a ‘grown block’ as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  155	  Growing	  Blockers	   include,	   C.	  D.	   Broad,	   Peter	   Forrest,	   Robert	  M.	  Adams,	   Graeme	  A.	   Forbes,	  Fabrice	  Correia,	  and	  Sven	  Rosencrantz.	  	  156	  For	  example,	  this	  is	  how	  Broad	  describes	  the	  growing	  block.	  	  Merricks	  and	  Braddon-­‐Mitchell	  seem	  to	  think	  of	  it	  in	  this	  way	  too.	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opposed to a ‘growing block’.  However, most growing blockers do not think of the 
past section of the block in this ‘B-theoretic’ way.  For although the past section of 
the block is permanent, they also consider it to be dynamic and changing in an A-
theoretic way.  This is because things in the past are continually receding further 
and further into the past, as new things come into existence in the present.  So on 
this understanding, change not only involves new things coming into existence in 
the present; it also involves things ceasing to be present and receding further into 
the past.   
 
As we saw in chapter 2, the growing blocker can also explain change in terms of 
previously open propositions becoming fixed.  The idea here is that because reality 
is significantly tensed, the future isn’t fixed.  For example, we might think that 
although the past is all settled, there are multiple possibilities open to us in the 
future; and they will be settled by what happens today and tomorrow, and so on.  So 
there is a multiple branching future (of possibilities), and the actual world selects 
one of these routes.  So, looking backwards there is always one line, but looking 
forwards there are multiple branches, consisting of multiple possibilities.  And it is 
because there are multiple branches that most propositions concerning the future do 
not have a determinate truth-value.  This is typically described as the infixity of the 
future, but we might also call it the unreality of the future.  On this view, reality 
consists of all there is now and has been; but because reality is forever growing, as 
reality gets bigger, it encompasses more and more facts. 
 
There is disagreement between growing blockers about how to understand the 
nature of past inhabitants of the block.  Some theorists, such as Broad, have 
claimed that other than ceasing to be on the present edge of the block, there is no 
difference between being in the past sections of the block and being present.  To 
understand the growing block in this way is to think of the past inhabitants as 
concrete, alive and conscious.  This leads to the problem that we cannot know when 
‘now’ is now; that is, whether ‘now’ refers to the objective present.  On this 
understanding, Caesar is alive and thinking that he is located in the present, in the 
same way that we are.  We know that Caesar would be mistaken to think that he is 
located at the present; but we have no way of knowing whether we are in a similar 
position to Caesar.  For example, we could be equally wrong in thinking that we are 
located at the objective present, and that this moment is now.  For all we know, this 
moment could be located in the past, and the future could already be in existence in 
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later parts of the block.  This is known as the ‘when am I?’ problem.  Braddon-
Mitchell and Merricks have also made this criticism against the growing block theory.  
 
In response to this problem, many growing blockers deny that past inhabitants of the 
block are concrete or alive.157  For example, Peter Forrest, blocks this sceptical 
worry with his ‘dead past’ hypothesis.  On this view, it is only beings on the growing 
edge of the block that are alive and conscious, so it is never the case that past 
inhabitants are mistakenly thinking that now is now.  So there are (there exist) past 
inhabitants, but they are not doing anything like thinking, because they are dead.  
And for those who are conscious and thinking, this is enough to guarantee that we 
are located at the objective and privileged present, which is the edge of the growing 
block.  The only type of change these wholly past inhabitants of the block undergo is 
a mere Cambridge change.  On this ‘dead past’ view, all ‘genuine’ change takes 
place in the present, which is where things come into being and are active.   
 
The ‘dead past’ solution to the ‘when am I’ problem works by identifying this single 
present instant on the edge of the block, which is the only part of the block where 
things happen.  However, this naturally raises questions about whether this single 
instant (the present) is too small for anything to happen in or for anything to move 
in.158  If this is correct, it seems that we either have too much happening, as things 
happen at past times, in which case we still have the ‘when am I’ problem.159  Or we 
have the situation where nothing happens, as the present is too short for anything to 
happen at it.   
 
Correia and Rosenkrantz offer the following response to this question (in support of 
the ‘dead past’ hypothesis).  They claim that the growing blocker can give an 
adequate description of how things change, such that the issue about how things 
‘happen’ in the present is covered.  Correia and Rosenkrantz state that they take the 
debate between the growing block theory and its rivals to be a debate about what 
‘there is’ ‘where this is understood in terms of the most fundamental notion of 
quantification.’160  (By ‘fundamental’ they mean that they are excluding any abstract 
objects.)  They take ‘there is’ to be a tensed notion of present existence (or being 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  157	  For	  example,	  G.	  A.	  Forbes,	  Correia	  and	  Rosenkrantz,	  and	  Forrest.	  	  158	  Le	  Poidevin	  (2002,	  p.68)	  raises	  this	  as	  an	  objection	  to	  presentism,	  but	  it	  seems	  that	  it	  equally	  applies	   to	   this	   understanding	   of	   the	   growing	   block.	   We	   consider	   this	   as	   an	   objection	   to	  presentism	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  159	  The	  ‘when	  am	  I’	  problem	  also	  applies	  to	  the	  moving	  spotlight.	  160	  Correia	  &	  Rosenkrantz	  (2014).	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present), and they claim that the present is rigidly designated by ‘NOW’.  They also 
introduce the idea of ‘alwaysations’ in order to say how things always are (or what is 
always true) in their growing block theory (so they treat always as a tense operator), 
and they define two notions; being later-than, and being on the edge.  Then they 
claim: 
 
• Always, an object x is later than an object y provided that sometimes y is 
present while x will be present.   
• Always, object x is on the edge of reality, provided that x is such that nothing 
is later than x. 
 
They also make the assumption that: always, everything is instantaneous.161 
 
They then argue that many things are true according to their version of the growing 
block.  For example: 
 
1. Always, everything is present or was present. 
2. Always, something is present and something was present. 
3. Always, everything that is present will always be something. 
4. Always, nothing will be present. 
5. Always, everything that is present always in the past was nothing.162 
 
Claims 1-3 are sufficient for the growing block theory, but 4 and 5 make it clear that 
the future things are non-existent and hence cannot be quantified over. 
 
They then claim that it is always the case that: 
 
6. Always, EVERYTHING that is present is on the edge. 
 
They take this to show that for anything that is present or NOW, it must be on the 
edge.  They then address the worry about the present being too small for anything 
to happen at it.  Their response is that since their argument concerns a fundamental 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  161	  They	  do	  not	  claim	  that	  the	  growing	  block	  theory	  rests	  on	  the	  truth	  of	  this	  assumption;	  they	  make	  it	  to	  simplify	  their	  response	  to	  the	  ‘when	  am	  I’	  problem.	  162	  In	  their	  paper	  they	  use	  metric	  operators	  (it	  always	  that	  case	  that	  n	  days	  earlier-­‐than	  0,	  where	  0	  is	  the	  present).	  	  However,	  in	  their	  discussion	  of	  the	  paper,	  they	  put	  these	  less	  technical	  terms	  of	  the	  Priorian	  operators	  EVERYTHING	  and	  SOMETHING.	  (PERSP	  Workshop	  on	  the	  As	  and	  Bs	  in	  
the	  Philosophy	  of	  Time.	  	  Barcelona	  19-­‐20	  September	  2013.)	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ontology of instantaneous entities, this does not have to include events or 
happenings or processes.  So they can just avoid the charge that the present is too 
small for anything to happen.  They claim that they can describe how things change 
in a Russellian at-at idea, so they can always explain how things are at different 
times.    
 
Correia and Rosenkrantz provide a metaphysical account of how entities change, 
even though they are only alive in the present.  But it is not clear whether they have 
really explained how a physical entity can change if that entity exists only at an 
instant.  (We return to this worry in the next chapter.)  However, by restricting their 
most unrestricted quantifier to what there is, as many presentists do, they are (at 
least) able to say how reality is NOW, and how past things were.  So they do not 
have to say how past things are.  And like the presentist, they hold that what there is 
changes over time. 
 
It also seems that the growing blockers like Correia and Rosenkrantz can use the 
primitive tense operator ‘there is’ to give as complete a description of how reality is 
and was, without running into McTaggart’s paradox.  For example, consider the two 
Queens, Elizabeth I and Elizabeth II.  The growing blocker can say ‘there is’ (or 
‘there are’) two things; one is presently the Queen called Elizabeth, the other one 
used to be a Queen called Elizabeth.  For the growing blocker, the fact that we 
cannot describe how some aspects of how reality will be is not due to any 
psychological limitation on our part; rather, it is because reality is such that the 
future is not yet fixed.  That truths about the future are not fixed is seen as an 
advantage of the theory.  This is because it provides a straightforward way to 
explain the direction of time, and it also explains the symmetry of time (why we 
remember the past and not the future).  The growing blocker claims that her view 
has an advantage over presentism.  This is because she can account for past truths 
and cross-temporal relations in a straightforward way.  We now turn to a different 
version of semi-eternalism; the shrinking tree. 
 
3.8.2  Storrs McCall’s ‘Shrinking Tree’  
 
Storrs McCall’s ‘shrinking tree’ is a semi-eternalist theory which tries to incorporate 
aspects of quantum physics.  I shall not attempt to explain the physics elements of 
the view, but shall instead describe the metaphysical picture it gives us.  The 
shrinking tree is sometimes called ‘the branching universe’.  The shrinking tree 
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theory can also be interpreted as an eternalist A-theory.  Whether or not one 
chooses to interpret it in this way depends on whether or not one reifies the 
branching structure of the universe it describes.  My reason for classifying it as a 
semi-eternalist theory is due to the fact that the branches need not be reified.  (This 
is explained below.) 
 
As we have seen, according to the growing block theory, reality consists of the past 
and the present.  On the growing block view, the future is not real; there are just 
many possible ways that how things are now could go.  Thus, reality grows as the 
block grows; and as it grows it encompasses more and more facts.  The shrinking 
tree views this process differently.  For example, we can think of the shrinking tree 
as starting off as a shrub (i.e. a tree with no trunk).  Here, reality begins by 
consisting of all possible physical futures (or branches), and no fixed past (or trunk).   
McCall says that the present is the ‘first branch-point’, and as it moves up the tree, 
the tree undergoes the process of branch-attrition, as various branches or possible 
states of affairs are eliminated from the way physical reality actually is.  Throughout 
this process of branch-attrition, the present remains the point where the single fixed 
past (the trunk) meets the open future (the various branches). 
 
In many ways, this might sound quite similar to the growing block theory.  However, 
there is an important difference; namely, that McCall holds that all possible states of 
affairs are just as real as any actual states of affairs.   So on his view, the branches 
are just as real as the trunk.  This means that where reality progressively increases 
for the growing blocker, for McCall reality shrinks in the sense that various physical 
possibilities no longer have the option of becoming actual.  In this sense, McCall’s 
theory resembles Lewis’s modal realism, as all the possible futures are just as real 
as the actual past and present; just as for Lewis, possible worlds are on an 
ontological par with the actual world.  So for McCall, it never is the case that new 
possibilities are created as the past becomes settled, as all possibilities are real 
from the outset. 
 
In this way the shrinking tree provides a dynamic account of temporal passage in 
terms of settling of previously unsettled irreducibly tensed facts.  The present is 
seen as an objective moment within the four-dimensional spacetime manifold, at 
which various possible future branches are eliminated.  Oliver Pooley suggests that 
	   186	  
we should understand this as a ‘non-standard open-future model’.163  By this he 
means that we should view the ‘shrub’ (the primary structure prior to branch attrition) 
as capturing how things might turn out, but not how they will turn out.  Pooley says 
that here it is important to note that the ‘sequence of trees [the various stages within 
the process of branch-attrition] does not represent how reality is absolutely, as 
conceived from no particular point of view.’164  What he means is that at any point in 
the sequence, it should not be that ‘the tensed facts as of one time can be read off 
from those that hold at another.’165  If the tensed facts could be read-off other tensed 
facts in this way, he says that it would be unclear what being irreducibly tensed 
would mean.  This is because the B-theorist’s block universe does give us a unique 
representation of reality, from which perspectival facts can be derived.  Hence, 
Pooley concludes that the branches in the shrinking tree model should be 
understood as corresponding to facts that are genuinely unsettled.  This is what it 
means to not reify the branches, in the way the B-theory would. 
 
I lack the expertise to comment on the physics, which McCall claims underpins his 
theory.  However, I note that if his theory is taken as understanding the branches as 
deterministic (as opposed to open possibilities), it suggests a branching multiverse.  
In which case, there is the question of whether his theory requires an absolute 
present (understood as involving a relation of absolute simultaneity), understood as 
the collapse of the wavefunction.  If it does, his theory would not sit easily with 
standard interpretations of the special theory of relativity.   
 
3.9  Kit Fine’s Non-standard A-theory  
 
In Modality and Tense, Fine argues that standard realists about tense cannot 
adequately account for change and temporal passage.166  He claims that this is 
because the picture of reality which they provide is just as static as the B-theorist’s 
block picture.  He therefore says that if one wants to be a realist about tense, one 
should become a non-standard realist about tense.  Fine presents two versions of a 
non-standard A-theory (external relativism and fragmentalism), which he claims 
avoid the problems that standard A-theories face when they try to account for 
passage and change.  He therefore recommends adopting one of these non-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  163	  Pooley	  (Op.	  Cit.)	  164	  Pooley,	  Ibid.,	  p.	  26.	  165	  Ibid.	  166	  Standard	  realists	  include	  A-­‐theoretic	  eternalists,	  semi-­‐eternalists,	  and	  presentists.	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standard positions, if we want to hold on to the idea that tense is real and reality is 
dynamic.  
  
Fine describes realism about tense as typically involving a combination of two 
views; the view that reality is tensed, first-personal, and ‘aspectual’, and the view 
that there is a privileged viewpoint (the present) from which this aspectual character 
is discerned.167  The central claim of Fine’s view is this; that while these two views 
naturally go together, one can hold on to the first without accepting the second.  So 
Fine thinks there can be tensed facts, without there being a privileged viewpoint.  
Hence, between anti-realism about tense (the B-theory), and standard realism about 
tense (the A-theory), Fine thinks there is room for this third position.  We can 
already see that this sets him apart from standard A-theorists, as one of the key 
claims of standard A-theories is that the present is objectively privileged in some 
important way.  
 
Fine spends some time introducing his ‘reality operator’, which can be read as ‘it is 
constitutive of reality that…’.  Fine wants to put this operator to work in order to 
distinguish between ‘mere reality’ and ‘metaphysical reality’.  The idea here is that 
he is trying to set up a way to distinguish between how things merely are, and how 
they really are.  His particular interest is in whether the tensed aspect of a statement 
‘may be an impediment to its faithfully representing that fact.’168  For example, 
suppose I utter the tensed statement ‘Elizabeth is Queen’.  What Fine wants to 
know is whether reality is constituted by tensed facts like Elizabeth is Queen, such 
that reality itself is intrinsically tensed; or whether it is merely the case from my 
tensed and aspectual perspective that Elizabeth is Queen.  However, Fine is not 
taking that idea of a ‘merely’ tensed perspective to involve anything like a reduction 
of the reality of this tensed fact to the tenseless B-fact that Elizabeth is Queen at t.  
He says that this would be to misunderstand the issue in question.  So Fine wants to 
use the reality operator to argue for an alternative to both the B-theorist’s ‘view from 
nowhere’ (which takes the tenseless description to be the absolute truths) and the 
standard A-theorist’s ‘view from within time’ (which takes the absolute truths to be 
tensed).169   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  167	  Fine	  (2005),	  p.	  262.	  168	  Ibid.,	  p.268.	  169	  The	   B-­‐theorist	   claims	   that	  we	   can	   derive	   the	   tensed	   facts	   for	   all	   times	   from	   the	   tenseless	  description;	  whereas	  the	  A-­‐theorist	  claims	  that	  we	  can	  derive	  a	  tenseless	  description	  of	  reality	  from	  the	  tensed	  truths.	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As we saw in chapter 2, Fine reconstructs McTaggart’s argument in terms of the 
following four commitments, which he claims are inconsistent:   
 
• Realism: Reality is constituted (at least in part) by tensed facts.  
• Neutrality: No time is privileged; the tensed facts that constitute reality are 
not orientated towards one time as opposed to another.  
• Absolutism: The constitution of reality is an absolute matter, i.e. not relative 
to a time or other form of temporal standpoint.  
• Coherence:  Reality is not contradictory; it is not constituted by facts with 
incompatible content.170   
 
As we also saw, Fine then characterises the standard positions in the metaphysics 
of time, in terms of which of one these four commitments is rejected.  For example:  
 
• B-theorists reject realism (but accept neutrality, absolutism and coherence).  
For the B-theorist, the fundamental facts that constitute really are tenseless.  
So it is not constitutive of reality that Elizabeth is Queen or that Elizabeth 
was Queen.   Rather, it is constitutive of reality that Elizabeth is Queen at t 
and that Elizabeth is not Queen at t’. 
 
• Standard A-theorists accept realism, absolutism and coherence, but they 
reject neutrality because they privilege the present.  The presentist claims 
that the present is ontologically privileged, whereas other A-theorists claim 
that the present is metaphysically privileged in some other way.  A-theorists 
then use the notion of the privileged present in various ways to account for 
change and to avoid McTaggart’s paradox.  
 
Although these two approaches are the standard ways to account for change, and 
to respond to McTaggart’s paradox, Fine is not satisfied with either.171  Fine says 
that in rejecting realism, the B-theory trivializes temporal passage.  The idea here 
seems to be that in denying that the present is special in any objective sense at all, 
the B-theorist denies our intuitive sense that time passes.  Thus Fine does not 
consider that mere variation is sufficient for change.  However, in rejecting neutrality, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  170	  Ibid.,	  p.	  271.	  171	  The	  B-­‐theorist’s	  response	  to	  McTaggart	  is	  to	  deny	  that	  we	  need	  A-­‐characteristics	  in	  order	  to	  account	  for	  change.	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Fine says that the standard A-theory fails to account for passage at all.  He explains 
this objection as follows: 
 
The standard realist faces a greater difficulty.  For suppose we ask: given a 
complete tenseless description of reality, then what does he need to add to 
the description to render it complete by his own lights?  The answer is that 
he need add nothing beyond the fact that a given time t is present, since 
everything else of tense-theoretic interest will follow this fact and the 
tenseless facts.  But how could this solitary “dynamic” fact, in addition to the 
static facts that the anti-realist is willing to accept, be sufficient for the 
passage of time?   We naturally read more into the realist’s tense-logical 
pronouncements than they actually convey.  But his conception of temporal 
reality, once it is seen for what it is, is as static or block-like as the anti-
realist’s, the only difference lying in the fact that his block has a privileged 
centre.172 
 
Hence Fine’s claim is that the realist’s notion of a privileged present is too static or 
‘frozen’ to account for passage.  The objection seems to be that by objectively 
privileging a single present moment in their descriptions of reality, the A-theorist 
describes a succession of distinct realties, each privileging a different time.  
Whereas what is wanted is not a change between the descriptions of reality, but 
rather something that explains how there is a change in the content of reality.   
Hence Fine seems to think that dynamism requires neutrality in order to capture the 
relation between one time being privileged (in some non-standard way) and another 
time being privileged (in some non-standard way), such that the privileging of both 
these times is constitutive of reality. 
 
Naturally the standard A-theorist will disagree with Fine here.  For example, some 
A-theorists might claim that the whole point of their dynamic theory of time is that 
because the complete description of reality changes over time, you cannot describe 
that change from within any single time at which you are present.  Others might 
claim that the change is to be located in the single description, because contained in 
any one time, is not just how things are, but also how they were and will be. 
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  Ibid.	  p.	  287.	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However, given his rejection of standard realism, Fine says that if we want to be 
realists about tense we should be non-standard realists about tense.  His two 
versions of this non-standard A-theory, which both combine realism with neutrality, 
are:  
  
• External Relativism.  This is the claim that what is constitutive of reality itself 
varies with time.  This is because reality obtains relative to perspectives, but 
none of them is privileged over any other.  This involves upholding 
coherence by rejecting absolutism. 
 
• Fragmentalism.  This is the claim that there are true claims such that ‘it is 
constitutive of reality that p’, and ‘it is constitutive of reality that q’, where 
somehow p and q do not cohere together.  This involves rejecting coherence.  
 
According to external relativism, all the tensed facts that obtain at various times are 
objectively present, but only relative to particular times at which they are present.  
Here Fine considers whether a tensed time ‘the present’ can be a constituent of a 
tensed fact such that, for example, it is constitutive of reality that at t1 ‘Elizabeth is 
Queen’ is objectively present, but only relative to t1.  And it is also constitutive of 
reality that at t0 ‘Victoria is Queen’ is objectively present, but only relative to t0.  Fine 
calls these ‘alternate realities’.  The idea here is that reality is coherent, because 
these views are not incompatible with each other (and hence external relativism 
avoids McTaggart’s paradox); but this is only because there is no absolute or more 
fundamental reality of which these viewpoints are parts.  So there is no complete 
description of reality.  This is why Fine suggests that Dummett might be an external 
relativist.173 
 
However, it is not clear what it means to say that it is constitutive of reality that at t1, 
p is present at t1 (or alternatively, that it is a fact at t1 that t1 is present).  Fine seems 
to share this worry, and accepts that we cannot give sensible content to claims that 
allow times to be among the fundamental constituents of reality.  So he tries to 
analyse this in terms of a is F at t.  But that then becomes a tenseless claim, which 
is acceptable to the B-theorist.  Fine admits that he is not sure if external relativism 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  173	  Ibid.	  p	  279n.	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can be sensibly expressed without some reference to times.  Hence he concludes 
that we seem to be ‘forced into favouring fragmentalism.’174   
 
According to fragmentalism, all the tensed facts from all times constitute reality 
absolutely, but since they are not all compatible, reality itself must be irreducibly 
contradictory.175  So it is constitutive of reality that p is present and it is constitutive 
of reality that not-p is present.  On this view, reality is constituted by the tensed fact 
‘Elizabeth is (now) Queen’ and by the tensed fact ‘Victoria is (now) Queen’.  So why 
is fragmentalism not simply the view that there can be true contradictions?  Fine’s 
answer is this.  Reality is fragmentary such that one fragment contains the 
representation of the tensed fact that Elizabeth is Queen, and another fragment 
contains the representation of the fact that Victoria is Queen.  But no fragment 
contains both of these representations.  So the idea seems to be that there is not an 
explicit contradiction; there is only a contradiction under the scope of an operator 
(the reality operator).  Hence the truth conditions of each of these propositions relate 
to different fragments of reality.  To put this another way, we could say that within 
the scope of the reality operator, both these tensed facts obtain, and hence 
constitute reality in an absolute way.  However, they do not cohere, because they 
belong to different fragments (or subsets) of reality; thus although these fragments 
are coherent in themselves, they are parts of a larger and incoherent reality. 
 
Fine’s idea seems to be this.  The external relativist avoids incoherence by using the 
notion of relative times as fundamental, and uses this to reject absolutism.  Hence, 
times are used to explain the basic facts.  (Thus, Fine’s worry is that this reduces to 
a tenseless account.)  In contrast, the fragmentalist is not using times as 
fundamental.  Instead, it seems that one’s attitude towards coherence is the more 
basic thing, and this is then used to identify times.  For example, the fragmentalist 
does not worry that reality as a totality is incoherent, because there are sub-portions 
of reality that are coherent.  So, within these sub-portions, times are defined as 
maximal fusions of facts (i.e. coherent facts).  Hence times are understood as the 
limits of coherence; and where we get incoherence, we get the incompatibility that 
arises from changes over time.  So the fragmentalist accepts incoherence, but 
claims to limit its effect.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  174	  Ibid.,	  p.	  310.	  175	  See	  Deng	  (2012),	  p.9.	  
	   192	  
Let us contrast this view with the standard A-theory.  When the standard A-theorist 
holds that the tensed fact p obtains and that the tensed fact not-p obtains, we have 
two incompatible tensed facts.  The standard A-theorist typically claims that they 
avoid this contradiction by placing either p or not-p within the scope of a primitive 
past- or future-tense operator.   As we saw above, Fine’s objection to this is that he 
claims this just describes two distinct realities, each of which has a single and static 
present.  And Fine claims that this is not sufficient for change.  With fragmentalism, 
both facts (p and not-p) are part of the same reality – and hence we can describe a 
change in reality, by recognizing where distinct fragments do not cohere.   The idea 
here is that taking change seriously involves taking seriously the multiple realities 
that constitute reality; so the fragmentalist acknowledges these multiple realities (or 
distinct fragments), even though these do not cohere. Hence, it seems that 
accepting that reality is incoherent somehow makes such incompatible facts non-
contradictory.  According to Fine, this allows the fragmentalist both to describe 
change and avoid McTaggart’s paradox, because the incompatible facts belong to 
distinct fragments of reality.  
 
Hence, Fine claims that unlike standard A-theories, fragmentalism enables the non-
standard realist to avoid McTaggart’s paradox and account for passage.  As we 
have seen, standard A-theorists disagree since they claim that they can account for 
change and avoid McTaggart’s paradox.  Fine also has another reason for rejecting 
the standard realism, which is his claim that tensed propositions cannot change 
truth-value; and hence, that different utterances of the same tensed proposition can 
be contradictory.  However, since Fine does not give good reasons for denying that 
tensed propositions can change their truth-value in the first place, the standard A-
theorist can just disagree with Fine here. 176   Standard A-theorists endorse 
propositional temporalism as part of their account of how tensed facts change over 
time.  Hence they use primitive tense operators to explain how the same tensed fact 
can be true and not true at different times, without making contradictory claims.  For 
example, within the scope of a tensed operator, the tensed fact expressed by the 
sentence ‘it is raining’ can have different truth-conditions at different times (e.g. true 
on Monday and false on Tuesday).  Hence, because standard A-theorists do not 
accept Fine’s claim that it is a distinct tensed fact that is expressed at different times, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  176	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  this	  issue,	  see	  Cameron	  (Op.	  Cit.),	  pp.	  95-­‐102.	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they can use tense operators to describe how reality changes, without making 
contradictory claims.177    
 
In the case of fragmentalism, the standard realist might also question whether it 
really makes sense to claim that we avoid contradictions because reality itself is 
contradictory in some way.  Moreover, it is not even clear that fragmentalism itself is 
sufficient for change.  For example, Fine says: 
 
For the fragmentalist, each time t is objectively present simpliciter – i.e. 
reality is constituted by the absolute fact that t is present.  …  Presentness, 
in so far as it is a genuine feature of reality, applies equally to all times.  
Presentness is not frozen on a particular moment of time and the light it 
sheds is spread equitably throughout all time.  Of course, this feature, by 
itself, does not account for the passage of time. …  So clearly, something 
more than the equitable distribution of presentness is required for the 
passage of time.  But at least, on the current view, there is no obvious 
impediment to accounting for the passage of time in terms of successive 
nows. 178 
 
So it seems to me that Fine’s objection to the standard A-theorist’s way of 
accounting for passage is unwarranted.  This is not only because he does not give 
good reasons for rejecting propositional temporalism, or because the standard A-
theorist can claim that she can explain dynamism, even from the perspective of a 
single moment.  It is also because Fine fails to give an alternative account of 
passage with his non-standard view.  Fragmentalism is a radical option, because 
even it were intelligible, it comes with the cost of giving up the idea that reality forms 
a coherent whole.  Moreover, both versions of non-standard realism ultimately seem 
unintelligible on their own terms.  So I conclude that Fine’s non-standard realism 
does not succeed in showing that standard versions of the A-theory fail to provide 
dynamic accounts of time.    
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  177	  Fine	  has	  a	  third	  argument	  against	  standard	  A-­‐theories.	  	  Fine	  claims	  that	  standard	  realism	  is	  hard	   to	   square	  with	   the	  Special	  Theory	  of	  Relativity	   (SR).	   	   Fine	   says	   that	   if	  we	  accept	   SR,	   the	  standpoint	  from	  which	  tensed	  facts	  are	  said	  to	  obtain	  becomes	  merely	  frame-­‐dependent.	  	  	  So	  if	  we	   are	   taking	   tensed	   facts	   to	   be	   constitutive	   of	   reality,	   SR	   implies	   that	   there	   is	   no	   reason	   for	  preferring	  one	  person’s	   reasons	   for	  privileging	   their	   tensed	   standpoint	   to	   another’s.	   	   I	   do	  not	  discuss	  this	  argument.	  178	  Ibid.,	  p	  228.	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An interesting point, which Fine makes in his rejection of standard realism, is the 
claim that all standard A-theories are too static for dynamism.  This objection is 
typically made as an objection to presentism, as opposed to other A-theories.  In 
this chapter, we have aleady seen how non-presentist A-theories claim to account 
for change.  In the next chapter, we consider how the presentist deals with Fine’s 
claim that a single present is too static to account for passage and change.  As we 
shall see, the presentist claims that they can account for change because reality as 
a whole changes as time passes.  Moreover, the presentist claims that she has the 
resources to adequately describe how things were or will be, without having to 
accept the existence of other times.   Nevertheless, Fine’s argument touches on 
many of the issues we have considered in this chapter; namely, whether the 
different versions of the B-theory and A-theory can account for change – and in the 
case of the A-theorist, how they can avoid McTaggart’s paradox.  
 
3.10  Conclusion  
 
As we have seen, the various metaphysical theories in the philosophy of time do not 
fall easily into neat categories.  However, we have identified some important ways of 
characterizing the various debates between these theories.  A-theorists are 
motivated by the idea that reality is more dynamic than the reality described by B-
theorists in their tenseless block universe.  This is because A-theorists do not think 
that the B-theorist provides adequate account of change or the passage of time, or 
of our intuition that the present is special in more than a merely perspectival way.  
Among the A-theoretic accounts, presentism seems to be at the other end of the 
spectrum from the B-theory.  The permanent four-dimensional manifold or block 
universe is very different from the temporally ‘thin’ and transient three-dimensional 
manifold of the presentist.  As we shall see in the next chapter, much of the criticism 
of presentism stems from the view that standard presentism is just too ‘thin’ as an 
account of reality, and therefore it fails to provide an adequate account of change, 
passage, and temporal succession, as well as failing to provide truthmakers for non-
present things and other grounds for cross-temporal relations.   
 
B-theorists, on the other hand, accuse the A-theory of falling prey to McTaggart’s 
paradox in various ways, or of being unable to account for dynamism for reasons 
similar to those given by Fine.  They also have the additional complaint that SR 
implies that there is no uniquely privileged present.  So the B-theorist claims that 
change is variation, and that the A-theorist is looking for something ‘more’ which is 
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not there in reality.  However, we have seen that B-theorists are not a united group.  
For example, they disagree about how to account for change, and in particular, 
about how to explain persistence.  Although I do not think that Mellor’s B-theory of 
change is successful in providing a B-theoretic account of endurantism, as an A-
theorist, I find his rejection of the temporal parts account of change encouraging.   
 
So what this chapter has shown us is that, thus far, there is no clear ‘winner’ 
emerging from among the various attempts to provide a more accurate account of 
the nature of temporal reality, and what it is to exist at a time.  In the next chapter, 
we consider how the presentist claims to give a better account than its non-
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Chapter 4.  Varieties of Presentism 
 
4.1  Introduction   
 
In this chapter, we explain what the various versions of presentism are, and how 
they respond to the objections raised against presentism.  We mentioned in chapter 
one that the label ‘presentism’ does not describe a single theory of time; rather it 
describes a variety of subtly different theories, all of which hold that the present is 
ontologically privileged.  (To say that the present is ontologically privileged means 
that only the present time and its contents exist.)  As presentists all agree that only 
present objects exist, we might wonder why there are so many different versions of 
presentism (or what there is for presentists to disagree about).  The reason for this 
is that because presentists confine reality to the existence of a single present 
moment, they come under pressure to admit past and future things into their 
ontology.  This is in order to explain what makes claims about past and future 
entities true, or to explain various cross-temporal relations, which seem to require 
the existence of non-present things.  So each of the different versions of presentism 
develops different ways of accounting for the truth of statements about (or involving) 
non-present things.  For example, the Priorian presentist claims that using primitive 
tense operators provides us with all we need to explain what makes statements 
about non-present things true or false. Lucretian presentism (or property 
presentism) allows that there presently exist properties about how the world was in 
the past.  Ersatzer presentists allow that there presently exist such things as 
abstract non-present times, or an ersatz B-series.  And a different type of 
presentism, neo-Meinongian presentism, accepts that there are non-existent past 
and future things, even though they do not presently exist.  So these are the issues 
that the different versions of presentism disagree about.   
 
4.2 Chapter plan 
 
I said earlier that presentism is best understood in terms of what it rejects, in 
contrast to what other metaphysical theories of time accept.  For example, unlike 
her non-presentist rivals, the presentist does not think that past things such as 
dinosaurs and Queen Victoria exist, or that future things like Martian outposts exist.1  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	   growing	   blocker	   agrees	   with	   the	   presentist	   about	   the	   non-­‐existence	   of	   wholly	   future	  things.	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So presentism can be understood in terms of what it rejects, and the objections to 
presentism all relate to the issues about the things that it rejects.  Hence in this 
chapter, I explain what the various versions of presentism are (and the issues they 
disagree about), in terms of how these different versions of presentism respond to 
the objections presentism faces.  The plan of the chapter is as follows.  After 
introducing the various objections to presentism, we discuss how presentists 
respond to these objections in two main groups.  The first group consists of versions 
of presentism, which I loosely call ‘standard presentists’.  These are presentists who 
accept the Quinean idea that what exists equals what there is.  The second type of 
presentist, which I call the neo-Meinongian presentist, rejects the Quinean idea that 
the only things there are are things that exist.  These presentists allow that there are 
things that do not presently exist.  As will be explained, the different versions of 
presentism have very different ways of meeting the various objections presentism 
faces.  However, before we turn to these objections, I shall briefly consider the 
reasons in favour of presentism.  
 
In the final section of Chapter 1, I argued that presentism is the common-sense view 
of time.  This is because presentism is implied by many of our ordinary intuitions 
about the nature of time, and what it is to exist at a time.  For example, these 
include the immediacy of our experience of being located in the present and nowhen 
else, which makes it natural to believe that the present is the unique place where 
things exist and happen.  The second key claim of presentism, that time passes, 
also fits with our experience of being located at a transient present moment.  This is 
because the transient present appears to be the thin slice of reality, which separates 
the no-longer-real past, from the yet-to-be-real future.  Or for those who think that 
the past is real in the sense that it is fixed, the present is what separates the fixed 
past from the yet-to-be fixed future.  That presentism appears to be the common-
sense view of time is held to be the most compelling reason for adopting presentism. 
 
I agree that appearing to cohere with our intuitive or common-sense ideas about 
time is the most compelling reason for being a presentist.  And this is how most 
people understand the view.  But if presentism is to be a credible theory, it needs to 
do more than cohere with common sense.  It also needs to explain how it accounts 
for things like change, persistence, causation, and our relations to non-present 
entities and truths involving such entities.  For example, the presentist does not 
think it is part of commonsense to say that it is true that Socrates exists; but she still 
needs to explain what makes statements, such as ‘Socrates taught Plato,’ true, or 
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what makes claims such as ‘I admire Socrates true’.  As presentists reject the 
existence of such wholly past entities, critics of presentism either claim that 
presentism cannot account for the truths of such statements, or that presentism 
involves such complicated ‘metaphysical gymnastics’ that it becomes far removed 
from common sense.  As we have seen in chapters two and three, non-presentist 
theories also involve some ‘metaphysical gymnastics’ when it comes to explaining 
how existing things change, or how time passes, or explaining how tensed 
statements are reduced to tenseless ones.  However, the additional challenge 
facing presentism is that it appears to have limited resources available to account 
for such things, as they involve things which presentists deny the existence of.  
Nevertheless, if presentism is to be a credible theory, it must give us a credible 
account of such things.    
 
To be credible, presentists need to show that presentism is not incompatible with 
our best current physics.  Even though the average person is unlikely to understand 
what the special theory of relativity or quantum mechanics tells us about time, it is 
still part of our common-sense ideas that a metaphysical theory of time should not 
be incompatible with our best current physics.  So while I am not competent to 
discuss the details of these theories, let me repeat what was said in Chapter 1.  If 
physics had unanimously shown us that there could not be such a thing as absolute 
simultaneity, then presentism would be very difficult to defend.2  This is because SR 
tells us that simultaneity is just a frame-relative relation, which implies that times 
other than the one we consider to be present are equally real.  But physics has not 
unanimously shown us that there is not, or could not be, such a thing as absolute 
simultaneity.  And this is all the presentist needs to be able to show that her theory 
is not ruled out by physics.3   So the objections to presentism that we consider here 
are the metaphysical objections.  Let us now turn to those objections.   
 
4.3  Objections to presentism 
 
Truth and Reference: As already mentioned, the objections to presentism all relate 
to issues about the things that it rejects.  The first objection we consider concerns 
truths about non-present things.  As the presentist holds that only present objects 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Some	   presentists	   (e.g.	   Hinchcliff)	   have	   tried	   to	   make	   presentism	   compatible	   with	   SR.	   	   As	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  One,	  this	  makes	  being	  present	  a	  relative	  matter,	  as	  opposed	  to	  an	  absolute	  one;	  hence	  this	  is	  not	  an	  attractive	  option	  for	  traditional	  presentist.	  3 	  Presentists	   who	   hold	   this	   view	   include	   Prior	   (1969,	   p.50.),	   Markosian	   (2004,	   p.75),	   &	  Zimmerman	  (2011,	  pp.163-­‐245).	  	  Zimmerman	  has	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  these	  issues.	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exist, she denies that Socrates exists.  But if Socrates does not exist, how does the 
presentist explain what makes the statement ‘Socrates taught Plato’ true?  As the 
presentist takes tense seriously, she takes the fact expressed by this sentence to be 
irreducibly tensed.4  To put the problem in more general terms; in virtue of what are 
propositions about the past and future true?  As Sider explains, in our ordinary talk 
and thoughts, we appear to quantify over lots of non-present objects, but in doing so 
presentists appear to ‘commit themselves to more than their ontological scruples 
allow’. 5   (The eternalist has no problem quantifying over non-present objects, 
because eternalists accept that merely past and merely future entities exist.)  The 
idea here is that every true proposition must have a truthmaker; which is something 
in the world that makes that proposition true.  As the presentist denies that Socrates 
exists, there is nothing to ground the truth that Socrates taught Plato. So it seems 
that to be consistent with her ontological scruples, the presentist must deny that the 
statement ‘Socrates taught Plato’ is true. 
 
There is also a distinct (but closely related) problem with how we refer to non-
existent objects.  This concerns singular propositions about concrete objects.  A 
singular proposition is a proposition that is not a disguised general proposition.  
According to presentists like Prior, singular propositions depend for their existence 
upon their subjects.  So if Socrates does not exist, then according to presentism 
there can be no singular propositions about Socrates.  This means we cannot 
quantify into the position of that name (Socrates).  According to Prior, if an individual 
does not exist, there are no singular propositions about it available to be true or 
false.  So it seems that there is nothing that ‘Socrates’ refers to, and again, that a 
sentence expressing a proposition about Socrates is neither true nor false.  
 
As we shall see, when we look at the various versions of presentism, standard 
presentists typically go one of two ways here.  They can either deny that past and 
future truths need truthmakers and offer certain paraphrasing strategies.  Or they 
can claim that there exist, in the present, truthmakers that make such claims true.  
In contrast, the neo-Meinongian presentist can appeal to truthmakers that are in the 
past or future.  This is because she holds that reality extends beyond the domain of 
presently existing things.  Thus the domain of presently existing things is just a sub-
domain of the things that there are. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Hence	   it	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  a	   tenseless	   truth,	  such	  as	   the	   truth	  expressed	  by	  the	  sentence	  ‘Socrates	  taught	  Plato	  at	  time	  t’,	  or	  analysed	  in	  terms	  of	  B-­‐relations.	  	  	  5	  Sider	  (2001),	  p.325.	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Cross-temporal relations: There is also the objection that the presentist cannot 
account for cross-temporal relations.  Cross-temporal relations are relations that 
hold across times (i.e. between two different times).  The idea here is that temporal 
relations, just like any other relations, can only hold between relata that exist.  This 
immediately raises a problem for the presentist, as they deny the existence of any 
times except the present and any objects except presently existing objects.  Cross-
temporal relations include things like causation, where a cause always precedes its 
effect.  Cross-temporal relations include other relations, such as admiring Socrates, 
or being the descendent of my great-great grandmother.  However, according to 
presentism, wholly past people do not exist. Hence it seems that I cannot admire 
Socrates, as there isn’t anything that I can stand in the admiring relation to.   (And 
similarly for being the descendant of my great-great grandmother.)  Nor does it 
seem that causes can be related to their effects. 
 
Change: We have already mentioned Fine’s objection that the A-theory cannot 
account for change.  We consider it here as an objection to presentism.  The 
presentist claims that change involves the coming into existence and going out of 
existence of a succession of single (present) moments, as time passes.  However, 
Fine claims that a series of single unique present moments is too static to account 
for change.  According to Fine, what we need for there to be a change is a change 
in reality.  However, a series of static moments does not give us that, as it involves a 
succession of distinct realties.  Rather, it gives us a change of reality.  
 
4.4  Presentism  
 
As mentioned above, in order to see how the various versions of presentism 
respond to these objections, we discuss these by separating them into two distinct 
categories.  I call these ‘standard presentism’ and ‘neo-Meinongian presentism’.  
Standard presentism consists of the versions of presentism that accept the neo-
Quinean idea that there is only one type of existence; the type captured by the 
existential quantifier.  So while there are many different versions of what I am calling 
‘standard presentism’, they all accept that what exists is what presently exists, and 
‘what there is’ is what there presently is.  Neo-Meinongian presentism consists of 
versions of presentism, which do not accept the neo-Quinean idea that what there is 
equals what exists.  For these presentists, what exists is what presently exists, but 
‘what there is’ does not equal what there presently exists.  For these presentists, the 
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domain of what there is is fixed and permanent, and it is only the sub-domain of 
what exists which varies over time.   As we shall see, because neo-Meinongian 
presentists accept that there are non-existent things, they have the resources to 
respond to many of the objections to standard presentism; namely, how things can 
be true about various objects which do not exist, and how we can stand in relations 
to objects that do not exist.    
 
While these two groups of presentists have quite different ideas about ‘what there is’, 
they all have they following commitments in common.  For example, all presentists: 
 
• Take tense seriously.  (Hence they are realists about tense.)  They also 
claim that: 
• Only the present time and its contents exist.  Hence they are realists about 
the present, but antirealists about other times. 
• Tensed or A-properties, such as being past, present, or future, are 
irreducible and cannot be analysed in terms of tenseless B-relations. 
• Some of the fundamental temporal facts are tensed facts; that is to say, facts 
involving A-properties (including facts about which times are past, present, 
and future). 
• There are tensed propositions, which are capable of being true and false at 
different times.  
• Time passes.  
 
We now turn to standard versions of presentism. 
 
4.5  Standard versions of Presentism  
 
Standard versions of presentism accept that there is only one type of existence.  
This is the type of existence which is captured by the existential quantifier.  Hence, if 
there is some x, then that x exists.  In this respect, these presentists agree with their 
eternalist rivals, who also accept that to be or to exist is to be in the domain of our 
most unrestricted quantifiers.  The disagreement between them concerns what is 
included in our most unrestricted domain.  Let us remind ourselves of Markosian’s 
list.  When Markosian introduces presentism, he writes: 
 
Presentism is the view that only present objects exist.  According to 
Presentism, if we were to make an accurate list of all the things that exist – 
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i.e. a list of all the things that our most unrestricted quantifiers range over – 
there would not be a single non-present object on the list.  Thus, you and I 
and the Taj Mahal would be on the list, but neither Socrates nor any future 
grandchildren of mine would be included.6   
 
For the presentist, not a single non-present object is on the list.  For the eternalist, 
all past, present, and future objects are on the list.  (We can think of Quine’s 
catalogue here.)  In this way, because standard presentists (hereafter presentists) 
agree with eternalists on the language of quantification, it is very clear what the 
dispute between them is about.  For the presentist, claims like ‘there are dinosaurs’, 
‘Socrates exists’, and ‘there are temporal parts’ are false.  In contrast, for the 
eternalist, the list of all the things that our most unrestricted quantifiers range over 
includes past, present, and future objects.  Hence, the eternalist has a very inclusive 
ontology when it comes to temporally located objects, because being non-present 
does not mean being non-existent.  The eternalist thus has all the temporal objects 
he needs, when it comes to explaining what makes statements about merely past 
and merely future objects true, or finding relata for relations in which at least one of 
the relata is a non-present object.7  For example, the eternalist holds that it is 
because dinosaurs exist, albeit in an earlier part of the manifold, that dinosaurs can 
be the truthmakers for statements about dinosaurs.  And it is because Socrates 
exists, albeit in the fifth century BC part of the manifold, that I can stand in the 
admiring-relation to Socrates.   
 
We shall now look in some more detail at standard versions of presentism (versions 
that hold that our most unrestricted quantifiers range solely over presently existing 
entities).  Within this group there are Priorian presentists, Lucretian presentists, and 
ersatzer presentists; that is, presentists who accept the existence of ersatz times.  
As these presentists restrict reality to the present, and deny the existence of past 
and future things, this view is sometimes called ‘temporal solipsism’.  So let us 
examine whether presentism deserves this title.   
 
Robin LePoidevin calls presentism ‘temporal solipsism’ to distinguish it from Quentin 
Smith’s degree presentism (which I categorize as a version of eternalism).  However, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Markosian	   (2004),	   p.47.	   	   Markosian	   adds	   the	   following	   footnote	   to	   this	   definition:	   ‘more	  precisely,	  it	  is	  the	  view	  that,	  necessarily,	  it	  is	  always	  true	  that	  only	  present	  objects	  exist.’	  	  	  	  7	  For	  the	  A-­‐eternalist	  this	  is	  very	  straightforward.	   	  The	  B-­‐eternalist	  has	  to	  claim	  that	  all	  tensed	  statements	   are	  made	   true	  by	  B-­‐facts;	   but	   once	   they	  have	  done	   this,	   they	  have	  no	  difficulty	   in	  explaining	  what	  grounds	  those	  facts.	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the term ‘temporal solipsism’ is not meant to describe the extreme view that past 
times never existed or that future times never will.  (This would be to misunderstand 
presentism.)  Rather, Le Poidevin uses the term to identify presentism with the 
following doctrines: 1) the extension of the existential quantifier is restricted to 
presently existing objects, because no past or future objects exist.  2) Cross-
temporal relations are analysed in terms of some present fact.  3) The present truth 
is truth simpliciter.  4) Times are logical constructions out of propositions.  And 5) 
Past and future statements are made true by present facts.8  As we shall see in this 
chapter, what Le Poidevin means by ‘temporal solipsism’ should be acceptable to 
standard presentists.  
 
4.5.1 Priorian presentism  
 
The first version of presentism we consider is Priorian presentism.  Prior’s version of 
presentism is the temporal analogue of his version of actualism; the modal thesis 
that only actual objects exist.  Hence in order to explain Priorian presentism, I shall 
begin by explaining Priorian actualism. 9  
 
Prior’s version of actualism is motivated by his dislike of unmodified talk about mere 
possibilia.  This is because Prior does not want ‘possibly F’ to entail that there is a 
thing that is a possible F.  For example, suppose that F is the brother I could have 
had, if my parents had produced a son.  Although I could have had a brother, Prior 
wants to deny that my possible brother is among the things that there actually are.  I 
can wonder whether he would have been blue-eyed like me, but Prior denies that 
there is such a thing that has the property of being genetically similar to me.  Prior 
also rejects any type of Meinongianism, the view that we can ascribe properties to a 
thing that does not exist, or say true things about it.    
 
Prior expressed his dislike of mere possibilia by rejecting the Barcan formula.   
 
• Barcan Formula: ◊∃x(Fx) → ∃x◊(Fx)  
 
In English: If possibly, for some x, x is F, then there is an x, which is possibly F. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Le	  Poidevin	  (1991),	  p.36.	  	  9	  In	   this	   section	   I	   am	   indebted	   to	   Zimmerman’s	   handout	   and	   workshop	   presentation	   of	  	  ‘Presentism,	   the	   Moving	   Spotlight	   Theory	   of	   Time,	   and	   Timelessly	   Eternal	   Things’	   at	   PETAF	  ‘Space	  and	  Time	  Workshop’.	  University	  of	  Barcelona,	  13-­‐15	  December	  2012.	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The Barcan formula says that for anything that could possibly exist, that thing does 
exist.  Hence some regard this as affirming the necessary existence of everything.10  
 
As Prior rejects the Barcan formula, he can affirm the antecedent, but deny that it 
entails the consequent.  For Prior, the actual world is ontologically privileged, 
because it is the only concrete world that actually exists.  Hence there is nothing 
that is not actual.  Possible worlds are just abstract things (maximal, consistent 
propositions), which play a role in our modal talk about the ways things could be and 
the ways things must be. 
 
Prior’s way of avoiding the Barcan Formula involves holding that singular 
propositions depend for their existence on their subjects.  Thus Prior holds the 
following: 
 
• Necessarily, if the proposition that Fa is singular with respect to a, and true, 
then there exists an x such that Fx. 
 
So whenever you have a proposition about a particular thing, you can quantify into 
the position of that name (meaning you can say ‘there is at least one x such that…’).  
 
• Necessarily, if the proposition that it is possible that Ga is singular with 
respect to a, and true, then there exists an x such that, possibly, Gx.  
 
• Necessarily, if the proposition that it was the case that Ga is singular with 
respect to a, and true, then there exists an x such that it was the case that 
Gx.11 
 
So Prior applied this idea to both the modal and the temporal case.  Given these 
assumptions, and his rejection of Meinongianism, Prior held the following. 
 
• If an individual does not exist, there are no true singular propositions about it 
available to be true or false; if it could have failed to exist, then it is possible 
that there be no true, available singular propositions about it; and if it did not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  For	  example,	  Williamson.	  11	  Zimmerman	  (2012),	  p.1.	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(or will not) exist, then there were (or will be) no true, available singular 
propositions about it.12 
 
Prior’s rejection of the Barcan formula led him to distinguish between two kinds of 
necessity and possibility.  (And he made a similar division in the temporal case.)   
 
For Prior, ‘necessity’ and ‘possibility’ can mean two pairs of things.  
 
• Weak necessity and Strong possibility 
• Strong necessity and Weak possibility 
  
Weak necessity for a proposition means that in no possible world is the proposition 
available to be true or false, and it’s false there.   
 
This is a very weak form of necessity.  For example, take the proposition Wolfgang 
is feline.  Since Wolfgang is essentially feline, the proposition Wolfgang is feline will 
be necessary, even though Wolfgang is not a necessary existent.  Thus, in no world 
where we find singular propositions about Wolfgang, is the proposition Wolfgang is 
non-feline true.  However, since Wolfgang does not exist in every possible world (as 
Wolfgang is not a necessary existent), in some worlds there is no truth about 
Wolfgang.  This has the odd result that the proposition Wolfgang exists is weakly 
necessary.  (Odd because we want to say that it’s possble that Wolfgang does not 
exist.)  However, if we understand what weak necessity means for Prior, it seems 
understandable.  For example, in Prior’s system, even though the statement 
‘Wolfgang exists’ is logically true, and hence can never be false, it is not always true, 
because it is not ‘always statable.’13  This is because in worlds where Wolfgang 
does not exist, there are no facts about Wolfgang; hence the proposition is not 
available to be true or false.  
 
Strong possibility can be defined in terms of weak necessity. A proposition is 
strongly possible if it is somewhere available to be true or false, and it’s true there.   
So Wolfgang does not exist is not strongly possible.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Ibid.	  	  	  	  	  13	  Prior	  (1957),	  p.37.	   	  Hence	   in	  Prior’s	  system	  Q	  (first	  presented	   in	  Prior	  1957),	  necessity	  and	  possibility	  are	  not	  interdefinable.	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Strong necessity means that a proposition is everywhere available and it’s true.  
Thus, truths about mathematics are strongly necessary, and more general truths, 
like ‘all cats are mortal’.  However, Wolfgang is feline, is not strongly necessary. 
 
Weak possibility can be defined in terms of strong necessity.  It means that the 
proposition is somewhere either not available, or true.  This is a very weak kind of 
possibility, because Wolfgang does not exist is weakly possible, which seems 
reasonable; but it also means that Wolfgang is not feline is also weakly possible, 
which is odd (given that Wolfgang is essentially feline).   But if we understand these 
notions in terms of the availability of propositions, and their truth in the worlds where 
they are available, then these notions capture what we want to say about things that 
do not necessarily exist.   
 
A brief digression.  Not everyone likes Prior’s way of denying the Barcan formula, or 
his division of necessity and possibility.  Hence, other philosophers (such as, 
Plantinga and Robert Adams) have tried to appeal to haecceities in order to show 
that names do not introduce singular propositions in the case of non-existent objects.  
(And others have appealed to free logic to try to show the same.14)  The idea is that 
haecceities are properties, which are identical to the property of being a particular 
individual (Socrates for example), such that they can only be exemplified by that 
unique object (Socrates).  So Socrates’ haecceity only comes into existence when 
Socrates comes into existence.  However, the claim is that when Socrates goes out 
of existence, his haecceity ‘Socraticity’ remains in existence; thus, the sentence 
‘Socrates was a philosopher’ can express a singular proposition about Socrates 
even though Socrates no longer exists.  This is because the sentence expresses a 
proposition that there was a unique x who exemplified Socraticity, and this is held to 
involve Socrates in virtue of having Socraticity as a constituent.15    
 
There is not space to discuss this approach in detail.  However, I shall briefly 
mention a couple of points against the haecceties approach, which Markosian raises.  
First, Markosian points out that this approach can only work for propositions about 
past objects.  He sees this as a defect, as he says that presentism should be able to 
provide an account for singular propositions about both past and future non-existent 
objects.  Secondly, this approach requires an ontological commitment to the 
haecceities of non-existent objects; and Markosian says that as a presentist, he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  I	  do	  not	  discuss	  this	  approach.	  	  15	  See	  Markosian,	  (2004),	  p.55.	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cannot accept this.  He therefore finds the haecceity approach of no help to the 
presentist.  
 
Let us return to Prior.  Prior’s formulation of actualism enables him to express some 
entailments and entailment failures involving possibility, which are consistent with 
his actualism and his rejection of the Barcan formula.  For example, we saw above 
that Prior held that: If ‘Fa’ is singular with respect to ‘a’, then from the truth of ‘◊Fa’ 
one can infer the truth of ‘∃x◊(Fx) (there is something, which is a possible F).16  
However, since Prior denies the Barcan formula ◊∃x(Fx) → ∃x◊(Fx), he claims that 
the sentence having the form of ‘◊∃x(Fx)’ (possibly for some x, x is F) can be true, 
even though there is no sentence with the form ‘◊Fa’ (possibly a is F) that expresses 
a truth.   
 
For example, I can say that it is possible that I could have had a brother, and we 
could have been friends.  For example, let ‘C’ describe my brother who could have 
existed: 
 
1. ◊(∃x) (Rax & Cx)  
 
In English: possibly, there could have been someone, with whom Rose is friends, 
who is Rose’s brother.   
 
There is no problem if (1) entails (2): 
 
2. ∃y◊∃x(Ryx & Cx)  
 
In English:  there is someone, and there could have been someone, such that the 
first one is friends with the other one, and they are siblings.  
 
But we would not want (1) to entail (3)  
 
3. ∃y∃x◊(Ryx & Cx)  
 
In English: there are two things, and, possibly, the first one is friends with the other 
one, who is the former’s brother.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Zimmerman	  (2012),	  p.3.	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We do not want (3) to follow from the fact that I could have had a brother and I could 
have been friends with him. 
 
So by rejecting classical possibilism, and taking  and ◊ as primitive operators, 
Prior avoids Meinongianism and necessitism in the modal case.  Prior thought that 
accepting either Meinongianism, about things like Pegasus, or accepting that 
everything necessarily exists (so there are these merely possible persons), was all 
superstition.17  And Prior thought the same applied to the temporal case.  For 
example, he thought the same was true with respect to past things like Socrates; for 
Prior, it is superstition to believe that there is (exists) such a thing as Socrates.  So 
just as Prior held that only actual things exist, and hence what is actually true is 
what is true simpliciter, he also held that only present objects exist, and hence what 
is presently the case is what is true simpliciter. 
 
As we saw in previous chapters, Prior’s simple tense operators are: 
 
• P  = ‘it was the case that’ 
• F  = ‘it will be the case that’   
 
There is no present tense operator (N meaning ‘it is now the case’), because Prior 
took the present to be redundant, given that whatever is presently true is true 
simpliciter.18   
 
For Prior, P and F are weak tense operators, which are similar to ‘possibly’.  For 
example, 
 
• P is a weak was; understood as meaning ‘it has at some time been the case’.   
• F is a weak will be; understood as meaning ‘it will at some time be the case.’ 
 
Prior’s two other tense operators H and G are strong tense operators, which are 
similar to ‘necessarily.’ 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Prior,	  A.	  (1967),	  p.139.	  18	  Prior	   takes	   it	   that	   ‘there	   is’,	   ‘there	   are’,	   and	   ‘there	   exists’	   in	   their	   basic	   English	   usage	   are	  tensed.	  	  Hence	  for	  Prior,	  ‘∃x’	  is	  the	  formalization	  of	  ‘there	  is’	  in	  ordinary	  language,	  which	  implies	  ‘there	  now	  is’.	  	  Prior	  (2003),	  p.171.	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• H = ‘it has always been the case that’ 
• G = ‘it will always be the case that’   
 
Hence ¬P¬ is an analogue of necessity in relation to the past.  This is equivalent to 
Hp: it has and always has been the case that.  This is a strong was always. 
 
And ¬F¬ is an analogue of necessity in relation to the future.  This is equivalent to 
Gp: it is and always will be the case that.  This is a strong will always.   
 
Hence, in the temporal case, the same kind of interpretations open up as they did in 
the modal case.  For example, if we allow that what was the case, has not always 
been the case; or that what will be the case, has not always been going to be the 
case, then there are going to be singular propositions which are not available at 
different times.   Thus, we get the temporal versions of the Barcan formula, where 
Prior claims that there are instances of these where the antecedent is true and the 
consequent is false.  
  
• BF(temporal version):  ‘P∃x(Fx) → ∃xP(Fx)’  
  
If Fa is genuinely singular, then from ‘P(Fa)’ one could infer that ‘there is something 
that is a former F.’  So, in order to deny the temporal versions of the Barcan formula, 
Prior says that sentences with the form P∃x(Fx) (‘it was the case that there is an F’) 
can be true, even though there is no singular statement with respect to an individual 
that says of that individual that it is F.   
 
Thus Prior’s formulation of presentism (understood as the thesis that only present 
objects exist, and that the tenses (it will be, and it was the case) are primitive) 
enables him to get these entailments and failure of entailments, which are 
consistent with his rejection of the temporal version of the Barcan formula.    For 
example: 
 
 (1*) P(Rab)  E.g. ‘Rose and Emma went to a party’.   If that is true, 
that entails that there are a couple of things that (in the past) went to a party.  
 
  And (1*) entails (2*): 
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 (2*) ∃x∃yP(Rxy) E.g. ‘There are two things, one of which went to a 
party with the other.’ 
 
However, let 'C' uniquely describe someone who no longer exists, like my friend 
‘Piers.'  
 
 (3*) P(∃x)(Rax & Cx)  E.g. ‘Rose went to the party with the person 
who was Piers.’   
 
  (3*) entails (4*): 
 
 (4*) ∃yP∃xP(Ryx & Cx) E.g. There is someone and there was 
someone, and the first one went to a party with the other, who was Piers. 
 
  But we do not want (3*) to entail (5*) 
 
 (5*) ∃x∃yP(Ryx & Cx) E.g. There are two people, and the first one 
went to the party with the other, who was Piers.   
 
This is because the presentist does not want to say there is a person who is Piers 
(at least if we think that Piers no longer exists).   
 
So by applying modal logic to tense, Prior replaces worlds with times.19  And in the 
temporal case, his distinction between a weak was and a strong was always, 
enables him to say that something that was the case, is not always the case.  (And 
similarly for what will be the case.)  So we have these entailments and failures of 
entailment, which are consistent with his rejection of the temporal Barcan formula.  
 
The challenge facing Prior (as an actualist and as a presentist) is explaining how 
things can be true about various objects, which do not exist (i.e. merely possible 
objects, and non-present objects).  On the one hand, in the modal case there is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  In	   the	   temporal	   case,	   the	   relevant	   accessibility	   relation	   is	   preceding,	   as	   the	   underlying	  ordering	  of	   times	   is	   one	   time	  being	   earlier	   than	   another.	   	  Note	   that	   in	  Prior’s	   tense	   logic,	   the	  accessibility	  relation	  needs	   to	  be	  weaker	   than	  S5.	   	   (In	  modal	   logic,	  S5	  embeds	   the	  assumption	  that	  every	  world	  is	  accessible	  from	  every	  world.	  	  This	  means	  that	  if	  something	  is	  necessary,	  then	  it's	   necessarily	   necessary,	   and	   if	   something	   is	   possible,	   then	   it's	   necessarily	   possible.)	   	   Prior	  needs	  the	  accessibility	  relations	  to	  be	  weaker	  than	  this.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  his	  tense	  logic	  he	  needs	  to	  show	  that	  certain	  propositions	  are	  not	  available	  at	  all	  times;	  i.e.	  at	  earlier	  and	  later	  times.	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pressure to accept necessitism; the view that necessarily, everything necessarily 
exists.  And in the temporal case, there is pressure to accept eternalism; the view 
that always, everything always exists.  On the other hand, by rejecting the Barcan 
formula, there is a ‘danger’ of getting pushed into some sort of Meinongianism; and 
Prior wants to avoid this, because he accepts the Quinean idea that what exists 
exactly equals what there is.  However, Prior is able to avoid both of these 
‘extremes’, because he shows how we can talk about non-existent things, without 
there being singular propositions about those things.  For example, Prior says ‘the 
function of the operator F is … forming a future-tense statement from the 
corresponding present-tense one, and the future-tense statement is … about 
whatever the present-tense statement is about.’ 20   He therefore avoids the 
entailment that statements about what was or will be the case, depend on the 
existence of past and future things. 
 
Prior’s account has been criticized for having some counterintuitive results.  For 
example, Plantinga complains that if it is weakly possibly (sometimes not false) that 
Socrates exists, then it is weakly possible (sometimes not false) that Socrates ≠ 
Socrates.  Plantinga’s objection is that while it should be genuinely possible that 
Socrates does not exist, it should not be genuinely possible that Socrates ≠ 
Socrates; hence his complaint is that Prior’s notion of weak possibility does not 
distinguish between Socrates’ non-existence and his non-identity.21  However, as Kit 
Fine explains, Plantinga has in mind a classical notion of possibility; understood as 
true at a world, regardless of the existence of individuals.  In contrast, Prior’s weak 
possibility only requires the existence of the proposition in the world in question.  
Thus, understood as Prior intended, weak possibility is harmless, because in any 
world where Socrates exists, Socrates = Socrates.  Fine says that what Plantinga’s 
criticism highlights is the fact that Prior is rejecting the classical concept of possibility, 
which assumes that we can stand outside all the worlds and survey their contents.22  
Indeed, Fine says that Prior’s purpose in introducing the notion of weak possibility is 
to find an alternative way of expressing what is expressible using the classical 
notion of possibility.23    
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Prior	  (1957),	  p.	  8.	  21	  Fine	  (2005),	  p.207.	  22	  Ibid.,	  p.	  204	  23	  Ibid.,	  p.206.	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Prior has a similar purpose in his tense logic; namely to provide an alternative way 
of expressing what is expressed by eternalism.  Prior’s project has been nicely 
summed up in the following way by John. P Burgess, who writes:  
 
The traditional main task of temporal logic, Prior’s project, has been to 
understand how assumptions about the structure of time, expressed in the 
tenseless regimented language, with explicit quantification over “times” or 
“states”, correspond to assumptions about the validity of various argument 
forms in the tensed autonomous language that do not involve such 
quantification. 24 
 
In my opinion, Prior’s view is an invaluable contribution for those who want to 
describe temporal reality as something dynamic and genuinely changing; and for 
those who endorse propositional temporalism.  That is to say, descrbing temporal 
reality in A-theoretic terms, which cannot be reduced to B-relations, in order to 
explain how what holds true at one time does not hold true at another.  Moreover, 
for presentists, Prior provides a way of explaining how things can be interestingly 
true and false about objects that do not exist (wholly past and wholly future objects).  
For example, in saying what was the case, Prior shows that we need not be 
quantifying over wholly past objects, or expressing singular propositions about 
objects that no longer exist (and similarly for future objects).  As we shall see, some 
presentists do not think that Prior’s approach is entirely satisfactory.  We shall 
consider one of the versions below (ersatzer presentism.)  However, first I want to 
consider two more presentist approaches; Markosian’s presentism, and Bigelow’s 
Lucretian presentism.  We begin with Markosian.  
 
4.5.2  Markosian’s presentism   
 
In certain respects, Markosian has a similar approach to Prior.  Markosian develops 
an interesting account of how to solve the problem of there being no singular 
propositions about non-existent objects, which we consider below.  However, first I 
explain Markosian’s account of what the presentist should say about non-present 
(and hence non-existent) times.  Markosian explains that Prior treats a possible 
world as a maximal, consistent proposition.  According to Markosian, we can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  	  John	  P.	  Burgess	  (2009),	  p.20.	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understand this as an ‘abstract actual world’.25  He explains what he means as 
follows: 
 
Consider the actual world.  There are really two of them.  There is the 
abstract actual world, which is a maximal, consistent proposition.  There are 
many things that are similar to the abstract actual world in being maximal, 
consistent propositions.  Each one of them is a possible world.  The abstract 
actual world is only one of these of all these possible worlds that happens to 
be true.  And then there is the concrete world, which is the sum total of all 
the actual facts.  The concrete actual world is the only concrete world that 
exists, and it is what makes the abstract actual world true.26 
  
The idea here is that there are many possible ways things could be (possible 
worlds).  And among the possible ways things could be are three possible worlds; 
one where snow is white, one where snow is pink, and one where snow is black.  As 
snow is white in the concrete actual world, it is the concrete actual world that makes 
the abstract possible world in which snow is white true.  Markosian continues: 
 
The presentist can say that it is the same with the present time.  There are 
really two of them.  There is the abstract present time, which is a maximal, 
consistent proposition.  There are many things that are similar to the abstract 
present time in being maximal, consistent propositions that either will be true, 
are true, or have been true.  Each one is a time.  The abstract present time 
is the only one of all these abstract times that happens to be true right now.  
And then there is the concrete present time, which is the sum total of all 
present facts.  It is the only concrete time that exists, and it is what makes 
the abstract present time true.  Talk about non-present times can be 
understood as talk about maximal, consistent propositions that have been 
true or will be true.27 
 
Markosian claims that the passage of time can also be understood in terms of 
maximal, consistent propositions.  The idea here is this.  Suppose that the time 
2416 years ago (when Socrates was born) can be identified with a maximal, 
consistent proposition, called 'T'.  T is false now, but it was true 2416 years ago.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Markosian	  (2004.),	  p.76.	  26	  Ibid.	  27	  Ibid.	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According to Markosian, this means that the past-tensed proposition that it was that 
case 2416 years ago that T is true right now.  As time passes, in one year from now, 
the past-tensed proposition it was the case 2417 years ago that T will be true.  
Similarly for all other past- and future-tensed propositions; they will either become 
less future or further past, as time passes.  Markosian says;  
 
Here, then, is the sense in which there are non-present times:  there are 
some maximal, consistent propositions that will be true or have been true, 
but are not presently true.  (This is analogous to the sense in which there are 
some non-actual worlds: there are some maximal, consistent propositions 
that are not actually true.)28 
 
So like Prior, Markosian constructs times as sets of present-tense propositions.  He 
then claims that as there is only ever one concrete time (the concrete present), the 
concrete actual world is identical to the concrete present world, such that it is the 
sum total of all the current facts.  However, from this sum total of current facts, we 
can also say that what was and will be the case is true right now.  This is because 
talk about past and future truths are understood as talk about maximal consistent 
propositions that have been or will be true.  
 
Markosian has an interesting solution to the objection that, for the presentist, there 
cannot be singular propositions about non-present things. Markosian borrows 
Sider’s notion of quasi-truth and uses this to develop an account of truths about 
non-present things, which are not literally true, but are ‘good enough’ in everyday 
circumstances.  Markosian considers the sentence:  
 
(1)  Socrates was a philosopher.  
 
 He rejects the idea that this sentence can be analysed or paraphrased as:   
 
(1a)  P (∃x) (x is the referent of ‘Socrates’ and x is a philosopher).  
 
This is because he says it does not have the same meaning as sentence (1), 
because that sentence was about a man, while the paraphrase is about a name.  
Secondly, sentence (1) expressed a singular proposition, whereas the paraphrase 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Ibid.,	  p.78.	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(1a) expresses a general proposition.  And thirdly, he says that the two sentences 
would not have had the same meaning when Socrates was alive, so why would they 
have the same meaning just because Socrates is no longer alive. 29    
 
Markosian therefore suggests an alternative paraphrasing strategy.  His idea is 
based on the following scenario.  He imagines a situation with two worlds, the actual 
world w and a possible world w1.  In the actual world w, George W. Bush is 
president of the US, but in w1 we are deceived into thinking that someone called 
George W. Bush is president, when he is not.   Markosian says in that case, the 
sentence: 
 
George W. Bush is president of the US 
 
does not express a singular proposition in w1.  This is because there is no such man 
in w1.  However, he says this does mean that the sentence is meaningless in w1.  
Markosian says that declarative sentences can have two types of meaning.   It can 
simply be the proposition expressed, which he calls the propositional content; or it 
can have a linguistic meaning, which is associated with the truth-conditions of that 
sentence.   
 
Markosian says that this distinction enables us to deny that the above sentence has 
any propositional content in w1, but to hold that it has linguistic meaning in w1.  This 
is because in both worlds, w and w1, the sentence has the same truth-condition.  
Namely: 
 
‘George W. Bush is president of the US’ is true iff (∃x) (x is the referent of 
‘George W. Bush’ and x is the president of the US). 
 
 Hence the sentence is true in w and false in w1, because in w1 it fails to refer to 
anything, or express a proposition, and thus it has no propositional content.30   
 
Markosian says that the citizens in w1 will be convinced that the sentence expresses 
a true proposition in their world.  We know, from our vantage point in the actual 
world, that they are wrong, but for them, the sentence still has linguistic meaning.  
Markosian says that we should apply the reasoning to the original sentence: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Ibid.,	  p.	  58.	  	  30	  Ibid.,	  p.	  67.	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(1)  Socrates was a philosopher   
 
According to Markosian, the sentence has no propositional content, as Socrates no 
longer exists, but it still has linguistic meaning.  He suggests that it has the following 
truth condition: 
  
(TC1g) ‘Socrates was a philosopher’ is true iff (∃x) [(x is the referent of 
‘Socrates’ and P(x is a philosopher)].31  
 
Now, the sentence is not true, and it has no propositional content, but it does have 
linguistic meaning.  Markosian notes that people could object to this, on the grounds 
that what matters to people is whether what they say is true.   
 
Markosian’s reply is quite pragmatic.  First, he says that most English speakers are 
inclined to say that what is expressed by the sentence ‘Socrates was a philosopher’ 
is true.  He says this may be because people tend to think more like non-presentists 
about past things.  Speaking as presentist, he thinks they are wrong to think that (1) 
expresses a singular proposition, but he also says that this explains why they think it 
is true.  Secondly, he notes that most people in their ordinary lives do not spend all 
their time worrying about ontology and metaphysical theories of time. Markosian 
says that it is enough to think that the sentence is quasi-true.  By this he means that 
the sentence does not have to be literally true in order for it to be good enough for 
our everyday purposes.  He defines quasi-true for a sentence as follows. 
 
S is quasi-true = df S is not literally true, but only in virtue of certain non-
empirical or philosophical facts.32 
 
Thirdly, he says that the reason why people will want to say that what (1) expresses 
is true, is that they make mistakes about the truth conditions of such sentences.  For 
example, he says that they blur a distinction between two kinds of truth-conditions, 
which he calls grabby truth conditions and searchy truth conditions.  Applied to the 
original sentence, these are as follows: 
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  Ibid.,	  p.	  68.	  	  Markosian	  explains	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  subscript	  in	  (TC1g)	  shortly.	  32	  Ibid.,	  p.69.	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(TC1g) Socrates was a philosopher’ is true iff (∃x) [(x is the referent of 
‘Socrates’ and P(x is a philosopher)]. 
 
(TC1s) ‘Socrates was a philosopher’ is true iff P(∃x)(x is the referent of 
‘Socrates’ and x is a philosopher). 
 
Markosian then says: 
 
The difference between (TC1g) and (TC1s) has to do with the scope of the 
past-tense operator on the right-hand side of the biconditional.   In (TC1g) the 
past-tense operator has narrow scope, while in (TC1s) it has wide scope.  
(TC1g) tells us, in effect, to grab the thing that is now the referent of 
‘Socrates’, and then go back to see whether there is some past time at which 
that thing is a philosopher.  (TC1s), on the other hand, tells us, in effect to go 
back to past times and search for a thing that is the referent of ‘Socrates’ 
and that is a philosopher.  Thus, the difference between (TC1g) and (TC1s) 
illustrates a difference between what might call grabby truth conditions and 
searchy truth conditions for sentences combining names with modal 
operators.33 
 
The question, says Markosian, is which truth-conditions should we apply (assuming 
presentism).  Markosian says that if we apply (TC1s) to (1) it may turn out to be true.  
But if we apply (TC1g) then (1) turns out to be false.  However, Markosian then 
claims that we should apply the latter (TC1g).   
 
He says that in the case of  
 
(1) Socrates was a philosopher. 
 
The current truth of (1) depends on how things have been with the person who is 
currently the referent of ‘Socrates’.  But if that sentence had a searchy truth 
condition; 
  
(TC1s) ‘Socrates was a philosopher’ is true iff P(∃x)(x is the referent of 
‘Socrates’ and x is a philosopher). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Markosian	  (2004),	  p.70.	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The searchy truth condition could be true now in virtue of the fact that someone else 
was formerly the referent of ‘Socrates’ and a philosopher, even if our current 
Socrates was never a philosopher.  (The idea here seems to be that things in the 
past could have been different from how we currently think they were.)  So instead, 
Markosian says that we should apply the grabby truth condition;  
 
(TC1g) ‘Socrates was a philosopher’ is true iff (∃x) [(x is the referent of 
‘Socrates’ and P(x is a philosopher)]. 
 
In the case of the grabby truth condition, its linguistic meaning will stay the same, 
even when (1) no longer has any propositional content (i.e. when Socrates goes out 
of existence).   So Markosian claims that: 
 
These considerations suggest that the conventions of English are such that 
two things will normally be true of any standard sentence combining 
standard uses of names and a past-tense operator: (i) like other sentences 
containing standard uses of names, that sentence will express a singular 
proposition about the referent of that name, if it expresses any proposition at 
all; and (ii) that sentence will have a grabby truth condition.34 
 
This means that assuming presentism, sentence (1) ‘Socrates was a philosopher’ 
will not be true.  But Markosian says that this does not really make much difference, 
as the difference between the grabby and searchy truth-conditions are quite subtle.  
Moreover, although the grabby truth condition mean that (1) is not literally true, but 
quasi-true, it has a linguistic meaning, which remains stable and captures what most 
English speakers normally want to say when they say that Socrates was a 
philosopher.  Markosian also points out that most people would say that the 
sentence ‘Socrates was a philosopher’ is true because there was a person called 
Socrates who was a philosopher, and not because there is a person who was a 
philosopher.  
 
I think that Markosian makes an interesting argument in favour of presentism.  If we 
cannot refer to Socrates or express singular propositions about him, as he no longer 
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  Ibid.,	  p.71.	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exists, then I think the notion of quasi-truth is good enough for most our purposes.35  
Moreover, I find his account of non-present times persuasive.  This is because it not 
only offers the presentist a way to talk about other times; it also enables them to 
explain how truths change as time passes.   
 
4.5.3 Lucretian presentism  
 
We now consider our third version of ‘standard’ presentism, John Bigelow’s 
Lucretian presentism.  I shall only summarize the main points of this argument.  In 
‘Presentism and Properties’ Bigelow is concerned to address the problem of cross-
temporal relations.  Bigelow addresses two aspects of this objection.  The first 
objection, which Bigelow calls the argument from relations, goes like this: 
 
(P1)  Relations can only hold between two existing things.   
(P2)  Present things do seem to stand in relations to non-existent things. 
(C)  Contrary to presentism, non-present things exist.    
 
In response, Bigelow says he grants the first premise, as he considers it an a priori 
truth that a two-place relation can only hold between two things, and therefore there 
must be two things which stand in that relation.36  
 
The second objection, which Bigelow calls ‘the argument from causation’, is as 
follows: 
 
Causation is existence symmetric: if an event exists and is the cause of 
some other events, then that other event exists.  And if an event exists and it 
is caused by some other event, then that other event exists.  Some present 
events are caused by events that are not present.  And some present events 
are the causes of other events which are not present.  Therefore things exist 
which are not present.  
 
In response to these two arguments, Bigelow considers how the two types of 
Hellenistic philosophers managed to hold on to presentism in the face of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  	  Ingthorsson	  makes	  a	  similar	  point.	  	  Given	  that	  the	  past	  and	  future	  do	  not	  exist,	  he	  questions	  whether	  it	  is	  serious	  problem	  if	  there	  are	  no	  truths	  about	  the	  past	  and	  future.	  	  He	  suggests	  that	  having	   rationally	   justified	   beliefs	   about	   non-­‐present	   things	   might	   be	   good	   enough.	   	   See	  Ingthorsson	  (2016),	  p.136.	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  Bigelow	  (2010),	  p.129.	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argument from causation.   The Stoics appealed to the idea that the causal relation 
holds between two presently true propositions.  For example, the causal relation 
holds between two true propositions at one time (the man is wounded and the man 
will die), and at a different time, the causal relation holds between the two true 
propositions (the man is wounded and the man is dying).  So as a former 
proposition ceases to exist, another one replaces it.  Bigelow says that this account 
of propositions changing their truth-value is similar to Prior’s account; except that for 
Prior propositions did not cease to exist, they just ceased to be true.37  However, 
Bigelow says that both accounts preserve presentism by appealing to the present 
existence of propositions.  Hence they deny that cause is prior to effect; since both 
cause and effect are present propositions.38  
 
According to Bigelow, Lucretius was not willing to accept the existence of 
propositions, as he believed reality only consisted of atoms and voids.  So to 
preserve presentism, Lucretius claimed that whatever events take place in the 
physical world, that location retains the tensed property of having been the place 
where (for example) the Trojan’s were conquered.  Lucretius described past events 
as accident of matter, which can be thought of as accidental properties that the 
physical world retains.  
 
Bigelow adapts this idea, and says: 
 
I suggest a modification of the Lucretian doctrine.  One of the things that 
exists is the whole world, the totality of things that exist.  The world can have 
properties and accidents, just as its parts may have.  It is a present property 
of the world, that it is a world in which Helen was abducted and the Trojans 
were conquered.39 
 
Bigelow’s idea is that the Stoic’s true propositions are now identified with a property 
that world as a whole acquires, such that it retains past-tensed properties for every 
event that occurs within it. Thus, when the Trojan’s were conquered, the world 
acquired the property being such that the Trojan’s were conquered.  And so on for 
every event throughout history. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  	  Since	  Prior	  holds	  that	  the	  same	  proposition	  can	  be	  true	  or	  false	  on	  different	  occasions.	  38	  	  Ibid.,	  p.133.	  39	  	  Ibid.,	  p.135.	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According to Bigelow, this merging of the Stoic’s idea with Lucretius’ idea of tensed 
properties, which are retained by the world, provides the presentist with a way to 
answer the argument from relations and the argument from causation.  The casual 
relation only holds between presently instantiated properties and hence relations do 
not have to hold between things that exist at other times.   
 
The idea of these presently existing properties with traces of the past is quite 
appealing to the presentist.  However, Bigelow does not explain anything more 
about the content of these properties, or how the world would be different if they did 
not exist; I mean, how are we to know whether they do continue to exist?  Bigelow 
does say that ‘at any given time, you can grasp truths which transcend your present, 
and describe the world sub specie aeternitatis’.40  The idea being that one could 
collect all the temporal truths.  So perhaps this hints at an answer to how these 
traces are preserved.   
 
4.5.4 Ersatzer presentism   
 
The final version of standard presentism we consider is ersatzer presentism.  
Ersatzer presentists, such as Thomas Crisp and Craig Bourne, are concerned with 
the problem of how presentists can provide truthmakers for contingent truths about 
non-present objects, such as the truth that Socrates existed.  Unlike Priorian 
presentists, they do not appeal to primitive A-properties in order to ground truths 
about the past and future, or explain facts involving cross-temporal relations.  Nor 
do they appeal to the idea that the past leaves traces in the present.  Instead, they 
appeal to an abstract or ersatz B-series, which is analogous to the eternalist’s 
concrete time series, but exists at no temporal distance from the present.  I consider 
Bourne’s account here. 
 
Bourne claims that his version of presentism is an improvement over Priorian 
presentism.  He says this is because ersatzer presentism has a more adequate 
account of what makes propositions about non-present objects true.  Bourne also 
claims that ersatzer presentism can accommodate truth-value links across times, 
whereas other versions of presentism cannot.  For example, Bourne says that 
versions of presentism which hold that the present contains all of the facts needed 
to make past, present, and future-tensed propositions true, have no mechanism to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Ibid.,	  p.136.	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guarentee that if p holds presently, that PFPp must hold in the future.  Moreover, he 
says there cannot be any transtemporal links across times, since other times are 
held not to exist.41  
 
Bourne explains that he goes ‘some way with Prior … in constructing times out of 
sets of present-tensed propositions.’42  However he says that ersatzer presentism 
differs from Prior’s presentism in important ways.  First, Bourne distinguishes 
present-tensed propositions containing either P or F operators, which he calls 
‘embedded propositions’ (or e-propositions), from those that do not, which he calls 
‘unembedded propositions’ (or u-propositions).  He gives the following examples: 
   
• An e-proposition: it is now the case that it was the case that Socrates is 
sitting (i.e. NPp).   
• A u-proposition: Socrates is sitting (i.e. Np), or simply; Socrates is sitting (i.e., 
p.).43   (So u-propositions are ‘tense-operator-free propositions’.) 
 
Bourne’s criticism of Prior is that he ‘required the present to be equated with e-
propositions in order for the present to supply all of the truths we believe there 
are.’44  The problem here, according to Bourne, is that in the case of e-propositions, 
such as, NP(Socrates is teaching Plato), it is unclear what makes such propositions 
true.45  For example, he says that Prior invokes the primitive present fact that 
Socrates taught Plato, but he is unable to say how this fact is structured.  This is 
because its constituents cannot be Socrates or Plato (since they no longer exist).  
And there cannot be some mysterious object, such as a present-past Socrates.  
Thus Bourne says that Priorian presentism ‘leaves us with an obscure ontology’.46 
 
Bourne notes that Prior holds that the question of what makes such truths true does 
not need answering.  For example, he says ‘for Prior, there is nothing more to say 
about the nature of time than is said by a perspicuous tense logic’.47  (The idea 
being that tense logic enables the presentist to say that it is (now) the case that 
certain propositions (e.g. Socrates is teaching Plato) were true, and other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  	  Bourne	  (2006),	  p.	  45.	  	  	  42	  Ibid.,	  p.52.	  43	  Ibid.,	  p.53.	  44	  Ibid.,	  p.43.	  45	  Since	  Prior	  held	   that	   the	  present	   tense	  operator	  N	  was	  redundant,	  he	  would	  express	   this	  e-­‐proposition	  as	  P(p).	  46	  Ibid.,	  p.44.	  47	  Ibid.,	  p.43.	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propositions will be true, although they are not true now.  This gets the truth 
conditions right, and allows the truth-values of propositions to vary over time.)  
However, Bourne says that since for Prior ‘propositions are themselves “logical 
constructions” out of the objects they are about’, more needs to be said about how 
such propositions can be true.48  This seems to be a fair point.  
 
Bourne therefore proposes ‘constructing times using maximally consistent sets of u-
propositions.’  He says these u-propositions would ‘give a complete, maximally 
specific description of what is true at that time.’49  Thus, for each past and future 
time, there is a set of propositions that gives a complete description of how the 
world was or will be at that time; and according to Bourne, these sets of propositions 
are times.  Additionally, these times then need to be ordered by the tenseless B-
relation earlier-than (which Bourne calls the E-relation).  Bourne’s idea is that the E-
relation orders the ersatz time series such that it is ‘structurally similar to a real time 
series, so that it can be taken to be a sufficient substitute.’50  He explains this as 
follows: 
 
We can introduce the ordered triple <T, E, t>, where T is a set, E is a relation 
on T, and t ∈ T.  Intuitively, T is the set of times, E is the ‘earlier than’ relation, 




Times I take to be more than sets of present-tensed propositions; first, they 
consist of sets of u-propositions; second, they also contain a ‘date’.  That is, I 
take times … to be ordered pairs of the form t = <µ, n ∈ >, where µ is a set 
of u-propositions and n ∈  is the date.  Times can now be defined as those 
ordered pairs of the form t = <µ ,n ∈ > that are members of the set of sets 
of ordered pairs of the form t = <µ ,n ∈ > that are E-related.51  
 
On this view, all times are abstract times (sets of propositions), including the present.  
Although this means we do not inhabit the concrete present time, Bourne says that 
the presentist can say that ‘we inhabit the concrete realization of the present time’.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Ibid.,	  p.44.	  	  (Prior	  never	  reached	  a	  settled	  view	  about	  what	  such	  propositions	  are	  about.)	  	  	  49	  Ibid.,	  p.53.	  50	  Ibid.	  51	  Ibid.,	  p.54.	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Thus ersatzer presentism is not the view that only one time exists.  Rather it is the 
view that only one time has concrete realization.52   
 
The E-relation is therefore not the genuine earlier than relation, since it does not 
relate concrete objects in the spatiotemporal manifold.  However, Bourne says it 
represents ‘the earlier than relation in the way that it relates times.’  That is, ‘the 
properties the E-relation has matches whatever we take to be the properties of the 
genuine earlier than relation.’ 53  Hence Bourne says the ersatzer presentist has 
available an ersatz time series, related by the earlier than relation ‘without being 
committed to existence of real, or rather concretely realized, relata.’54  According to 
Bourne, this gives the ersatzer presentist an advantage over other presentists, as 
she can take such relations as basic.  She therefore has all the relata she needs to 
account for various transtemporal relations, and ground truths about non-present 
objects.  Moreover, she has a clear ontological basis for her claims about such 
objects.  
 
Bourne also explains that the E-relation is also suited to a one-many relation in the 
direction of present to future; i.e. ‘the direction in which dates increase with 
magnitude.’55  He says that this gives the presentist good reason for adopting a 
branching structure, which can explain the direction of time, and account for the 
open future.  Because of this, Bourne holds that certain contingent future-tensed 
statements presently have indeterminate truth-values.  However, the E-relation is a 
one-one relation in the direction of the past.  The importance of this concerning 
past-tensed propositions is explained below. 
 
The second way in which ersatzer presentism is importantly different from Priorian 
presentism is that Bourne distinguishes between truth simpliciter and truth-at-a-time.  
(This is analogous to the modal distinction between true simpliciter and true-at-a-
world.)  Bourne says that ‘truth simpliciter is an absolute non-time relative notion’, in 
contrast to the time-relative notion of truth-at-a-time.  For example, Bourne holds 
that propositions that are true relative to the present time are true simpliciter.   Thus, 
he says:  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Ibid.	  53	  Ibid.	  54	  Ibid.,	  p.55.	  55	  Ibid.	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• ‘Socrates is sitting’ is true-at-a-time iff there is a time, i.e., E-related ordered 
pair <µ ,n ∈ >, such that µ includes the u-proposition that Socrates is 




• ‘Socrates is sitting’ is true simpliciter iff Socrates (i.e. an actual, concrete, 
flesh and blood Socrates) is presently sitting.56  
 
(Hence it is not true simpliciter that Socrates is sitting.)   However, Bourne says that 
past-tensed truths can also be true simpliciter, although in a very different way.  For 
example, he says:    
 
• It was the case that p is true simpliciter iff p is a member of a set <µ ,ni ∈ > 
actually E-related to the presently instantiated ordered pair <v ,nj ∈ >, 
where v is the set of u-propositions that is true simpliciter, and ni< nj.57 
 
Thus for Bourne, what makes past-tensed propositions (such as it was the case that 
Socrates is sitting) true simpliciter are ‘actually E-related ordered pairs of u-
propositions and dates.’58  Here the date index (ni) is smaller than the date index of 
the time that obtains (nj); the time that is present.  By ‘actually’, Bourne means the 
only (i.e. single) E-related branch that is accessible from the concretely realized time 
(the present) in the direction towards the past.  The idea here is that being actually 
E-related ‘grounds which E-related branch we should use for finding truthmakers for 
past-tensed statements.’59 
 
The advantage Bourne sees for this account over Prior’s is this.  Prior held that what 
is true now is what is true simpliciter.  For Prior, what is now true is P(Socrates is 
sitting).  And as we have seen, Bourne complains that it is unclear what the 
constituents of this proposition are.  In contrast, Bourne claims that the proposition it 
was the case that Socrates is sitting is true simpliciter, and that this proposition is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Ibid.,	  p.56.	  57	  Ibid.,	  p.57.	  58	  Ibid.	  59	  Ibid.	  Bourne	  allows	  that	  some	  future-­‐tense	  propositions	  are	  true	  simpliciter.	   	  Namely	  future-­‐tense	  propositions	  that	  are	  determinately	  true.	  	  Here	  the	  dates	  in	  question	  are	  greater	  than	  the	  one	  that	  obtains	  (in	  the	  present).	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made true by pairs of E-related propositions and dates, where one date is smaller 
than the other date of the time presently realized.  According to Bourne, the ersatzer 
presentist can explain what makes such facts true, since its constituents are not 
mysterious.   
 
To complete this picture, Bourne discusses quantification in tensed sentences.  
Bourne takes the existential quantifer as tenseless.  He says that (∃x)Fx should be 
read in ‘the standard objectual way’, such that ‘‘(∃x)Fx’ is true simpliciter iff there is 
at least one object in the domain of quantification that is F.’60  Bourne adds that 
‘despite being read tenselessly (∃x)Fx might change truth-value … because of the 
continually changing concrete facts and subsequent change in domain 
quantification.’  Thus: 
 
‘P(∃x)Fx’ is true at <T, E, t> (and it is true simpliciter iff the set of propositions 
at t is true simpliciter) iff (∃x)Fx is a member of some µ element of a time 
earlier than t (understood in an ersatz way), where (∃x)Fx is true-at-a-time 
<T, E, <µ ,n ∈ > > iff (∃x)Fx ∈ µ.61 
 
Hence Bourne’s view differs from eternalism here, since the eternalist’s domain of 
quantification never changes.  This is important, since Bourne characterizes the flow 
of time as the change in truth-value of tensed propositions over time.62 
 
Next Bourne considers the case of de re claims, such as ‘(∃x)PFx’, where the 
operator falls within the scope of a quantifier.  Here, Bourne explains what makes a 
de re claim true, when it concerns how a presently existing individual x was in the 
past.  He says first, a de dicto claim about how x tenselessly was in the past must 
be true. (e.g. P(∃x)Fx’) is true).  Secondly, the de re proposition must be 
‘appropriately connected’ to this de dicto claim in a way that guarantees that the x 
identified in the de re proposition is the same as the x identified in the de dicto 
proposition.  (Hence both propositions are about the same individual.)  Bourne says 
that this depends on whether ‘presentism can help itself to the idea of a causal 
connection across different times.’63  We return to this point shortly.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Ibid.,	  p.58.	  61	  Ibid.,	  p.58.	  62	  Ibid.,	  p.77.	  63	  Ibid.,	  p.60.	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Bourne also appeals to causation to explain how, in the case of merely past 
individuals such as Socrates, we can determine that our use of the name ‘Socrates’ 
is about Socrates and not someone else.  Bourne has already ruled out that the 
proposition Socrates is sitting can be about the real (flesh and blood) Socrates, or 
his individual essence.  However, he wants to know what are we talking about when 
talk about merely past objects; since he says that there must be something.64  
Bourne claims that his account, which involves ontological commitment to times, 
provides a solution.65   
 
For example, Bourne says that his ability to talk about Socrates is the ‘result of the 
name being passed from one person to another along a causal chain (consisting of 
appropriately connected facts).’66  The idea here is that all we need to talk about 
Socrates is that there was an initial naming ceremony for the real Socrates, in which 
he was referred to.  Subsequent uses of the name ‘Socrates’ are then connected in 
an appropriate causal way to the fact that someone referred to Socrates.  Bourne 
explains that once Socrates ceased to exist, abstract times represent Socrates; and 
the causal connections between all the facts that represent Socrates, guarantee the 
truth-value links between them.67  Hence, there is no ontological commitment to past 
and future objects in transtemporal relations, but the ersatzer presentist can quantify 
over causally related abstract objects, which represent Socrates in the ersatz B-
series.  Thus, Bourne reduces transtemporal relations to causal relations, but denies 
that causal relations are genuine relations holding between concretely existing 
relata. 
 
In these ways, Bourne claims that ersatzer presentism is able to say what makes 
certain statements about merely past objects true.  For example, the ersatzer 
presentist can say what the constituents of facts about them are, and explain certain 
transtemporal facts by explaining the truth-value links between such facts. Bourne 
also claims that ersatzer presentism provides an easy way to escape McTaggart’s 
paradox.  This is because all concrete facts are present facts, and all other facts are 
abstract, and hence tenseless; hence it is never that case that facts instantiate more 
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  Ibid.	  p.	  101.	  65	  Ibid.,	  p.103.	  66	  Ibid.,	  p.104	  67	  Ibid.,	   p.59.	   Bourne’s	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   of	   how	   causal	   connection	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than one tense.68  Since ersatzer presentists quantify over ersatz times, they have 
available the same range of times as the B-theorist.  However, the contents of these 
times are not concretely existing objects located in the B-series. Thus Bourne says 
that ersatzer presentism cannot be said to be the tenseless theory under another 
name, because the constituents of ersatz past and future times are radically 
different from those of the tenseless theorist.69   
 
Bourne therefore claims that the advantages of ersatzer presentism is that it allows 
us to ‘state truths about the past; it wears its ontological commitments on its sleeve; 
and it ensures that truth-value links are preserved.’70  Additionally, he claims that it 
accommodates common-sense ideas about time and is ontologically parsimonious.  
Is he correct to claim these things?  
 
My main criticisms of Bourne are as follows.  His discussion of causation is unclear 
and he does not commit to a particular account.  This is frustrating, given that his 
account of truth-value links between facts depends on there being an appropriate 
causal connection between them.  Suppose we grant that causation can be 
accommodated in his theory; questions remains about how truth-value links work 
when there is no current ‘witness’ to a particular fact.  For example, when there is no 
present evidence for a past-tensed fact.  Bourne does not offer an explanation of 
how we can guarantee the truth-value of past-tensed statements in such cases.  
 
A second worry is whether we should accept that abstract entities, which merely 
represent pastly and futurely existing objects, are the right sort of thing to serve as 
truthmakers for statements about the past and future.  The worry here is that truth is 
not grounded in the concretely existing present, which is something presentists 
should want. (For example, ersatz times cannot make it that case that Socrates 
taught Plato.)  On Bourne’s view, truth is grounded in abstract representations of 
non-existent pasts and futures.  Here again, Bourne’s account rests heavily on the 
claim that truth-value links can be guaranteed in a causal-history of naming, which 
connects truths across time to their original referents.  These are issues that Bourne 
needs to address to make his account of truthmakers for non-existent objects more 
plausible, and ontologically transparent.  We might also question whether Bourne’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  Ibid.,	  78.	  69	  Ibid.,	  pp.66-­‐67.	  70	  Ibid.,	  p.64.	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presentism is ontologically parsimonious, given that it relies on postulating an 
(additional) ersatz B-series.   
 
Finally, Bourne offers an account of change in reality, claiming that ersatz B-times 
provide the necessary relata.  Hence Bourne is sympathetic to Fine’s objection that 
a single present is too static for change.  As we have seen, the Priorian presentist 
can respond by saying that a change of reality is precisely what change and 
passage consists in.  However, since Bourne provides an account that involves 
claiming that the present set of concretely realized objects changes as time passes, 
his account appears to offer the presentist a satisfactory ‘alternative’ account of 
change; that is, an account that involves a change in reality.   
 
4.6 Neo-Meinongian Presentism 
 
In this section, we discuss a different type of presentism; one that does not hold that 
what exists (or what is real) is exhausted by what there is now.   On this account, 
what there is extends way beyond what there is now and what exists now.  This is a 
neo-Meinongian approach.  However, in order to distinguish it from standard 
Meinongianism, we need to explain what Meinong held to be the case.  And in order 
to do this, it is helpful to begin by contrasting Meinong’s ideas with what Quine held 
to be the case. 
 
4.6.1 Quine’s anti-Meinongianism  
 
As we have seen, Quine held that terms like ‘thing’, ‘there is’, ‘there exists’, 'there 
actually is’, and ‘there actually exist’, all have exactly the same extension.  Thus, 
according to Quine, for any thing that is or exists or is actual, that thing must be 
within the domain of our most unrestricted existential quantifier.  For Quine our most 
unrestricted domain therefore includes all past, present, and future entities, and 
non-concrete (i.e. abstract) things like sets, which have clear identity conditions.  
This meant that Quine had to employ various paraphrase techniques to explain our 
talk about fictional entities, and also merely possible entities, which he held do not 
exist.   Quine also held that expressions such as ‘thing that exists now’ just pick out 
a sub-part of the whole domain.  They do not, as the standard presentist would 
claim, pick out the entire domain.  Hence for Quine, there are dinosaurs.  So when 
we say ‘there aren’t dinosaurs now’, we are just talking about the restricted part of 
the domain where we happen to be.    
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Quine also held that people tend to get confused when they talk about things that 
are not concrete.  For example, my phone is a concrete object that is in my bag, but 
my concept of my phone is not in my bag; it is in my mind.  And whereas my phone 
has certain properties, such as a shape and a weight, my concept of my phone does 
not have those properties.  But Quine says that when people are not considering 
things like concrete particulars, they get more confused, and fail to distinguish the 
concept of x from x itself.  For example, people have the concept of Pegasus, but 
they also think that Pegasus does not exist, so they get muddled about what sort of 
object they are talking about when they talk about Pegasus.  Quine also thought that 
people get muddled when it comes to truths about things that do not exist.  There is 
this idea that there are certain truths about what does not exist (i.e. singular 
negative existentials) that require that Pegasus be either something, or something 
there was, or both; even though Pegasus does not exist.  (And clearly, the truth of 
‘Pegasus does not exist’ cannot require the existence of Pegasus, since the 
sentence says ‘Pegasus does not exist'.)  But a lot of people have thought that it did 
require that there be something, which was Pegasus.   
 
Similarly, Quine thought that people get muddled about things like the round square, 
or Atlantis.   So the thought is that when people say ‘the round square doesn’t exist’, 
they somehow refer to the round square.  So you are referring to something, so 
something is the round square; and since there is something that you are referring 
to, something that there is, is the round square. Obviously round squares do not 
exist; but to explain why it is true that round squares do not exist, what you need is 
some kind of referent for ‘the round square’.  And similarly, you need some kind of 
referent for ‘Pegasus’, when you say ‘Pegasus does not exist’.   
 
According to Quine, part of the problem here is due to confusion between meaning 
and naming.  Hence Quine’s strategy for dealing with these issues involves here 
providing various paraphrases for these things for non-existent objects.  So Quine 
appeals to paraphrasing strategies, such as Russell’s theory of descriptions.  Quine 
also allowed that definite descriptions could involve strange predicates, such as 
‘pegasizes.’  Here ‘Pegasus’ translates into the description ‘the x that pegasizes’, 
which we can refer to without referring to a non-existent object like Pegasus.  The 
idea is that such paraphrases get rid of the things that do not exist, because we are 
just referring in a general way to things there are; and saying something about the 
features that they have and don’t have.  Hence, for Quine, these sorts of strategies 
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give us a way to explain why certain negative existential statements are true.  And 
this removes the need for any type of Meinongianism, which posits things that do 
not exist.  
 
4.6.2  Meinong’s theory of objects 
 
In Meinong’s ontology, there are objects that exist and objects that do not exist.   An 
object, for Meinong, is the thing towards which a thought (or mental state) is always 
directed.  Meinong’s theory of objects was developed as a means of examining 
these objects of thought.  For Meinong, objects of thought include real objects, such 
as tables and chairs; ideal objects, such as the number of chairs around the table; 
possible but non-existent objects, such as the golden mountain; and impossible 
objects, such as the round square.  He argued that if we can think about an object, 
there must be ‘some sense’ in which that object exists.  For example, if we can think 
about a possible-but-non-existent object, such as the golden mountain, then even 
though it does not exist in the real world, it must exist ‘in some sense’ in the realm of 
thought.  Similarly, if we can think about an impossible object, such as the round 
square, then there is ‘some sense’ in which that object exists.  This is what enables 
us to refer to that object, even though it does not exist.   
 
An object can roughly be thought of as a thing that can bear properties.  Thus the 
round square may bear the properties of being round and being square.  Meinong 
distinguished between the Sein of objects (their existential status), and their Sosein 
(their having of certain properties).  He claimed that an object can have a set of 
properties even if it doesn’t exist.  Meinong called this the ‘Principle of 
Independence’.  According to Meinong, we can refer to, and quantify over, 
nonexistent objects.  Thus ‘Pegasus is a winged horse’ can be taken at face value, 
treating the singular term occurring as the grammatical subject as a genuine 
referring name.  Hence this avoided the need for all the paraphrasing that Quine 
had to do. 
 
In Meinong’s ontology, the most extensive term is ‘some’ or ‘thing’, whereas the 
term ‘thing there is’ is less extensive.   So Meinong’s idea is not that we can say 
‘there are more things than there are’, as that is a contradiction, but rather that we 
can say ‘there are some things that there aren’t.’  For Meinong, talk about the 
golden mountain or the round square does not mean that there is something that is 
a golden mountain or the round square.  Hence for Meinong, although everything is 
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something or other, not everything is something or other that there is.  The set of 
things that there are is a proper sub-set of the set of things.  And some things there 
aren’t.  
 
4.6.3 Neo-Meinongianism  
 
Not many people want to endorse full-on Meinongianism.  This is because very few 
philosophers want to say that there are some things that there aren’t.  Hence Neo-
Meinongians adopt a more moderate view than Meinong.   For example, in contrast 
to Meinong, the neo-Meinongian holds that everything is something there is, but 
they deny that there are things that there aren’t.  And in contrast to Quine, they deny 
that everything that there is is something that exists.  So there are more things than 
there exists; so there is is more extensive than there exists. 
 
There are number of a neo-Meinongians, including Francesco Berto, Dale Jacquette, 
Ernst Mally, Terence Parsons, Graham Priest, Richard Routely, and Edward Zalta.  
Each neo-Meinongian theory has its own comprehension principle and identity 
criterion for objects, which due to lack of space I cannot discuss in any detail.71  
However, the point of these identity criteria is to enable them to identify a unique 
object, and hence give it clear identity conditions.  These neo-Meinongians believe 
that there are some objects that do not exist, and that we can generally refer to 
them, and make true claims about them because they are in the domain of our most 
unrestricted quantifier.   This gives them the advantage of being able to explain why 
we can say things that are true about things that do not exist, such as the golden 
mountain, or Atlantis.  Like Meinong, neo-Meinongians also hold that non-existent 
objects can bear properties, such as being gold and being a mountain.  
 
Chisholm identifies a number of statements that cannot be paraphrased by Russell’s 
theory of descriptions.  These are statements about things which neo-Meinongians 
have no difficulty in making true claims about.  For example, ‘the mountain I am 
thinking about is golden’ would only come out false if it was paraphrased in the 
Russellian way.  (And similarly so statements about fearing ghosts or worshipping 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  For	  example,	  Parsons,	  Routely,	  and	  Jacquette	  adopt	  a	  Nuclear	  Comprehension	  Principle.	  	  This	  	  	  distinguishes	  between	  nuclear	  properties,	  which	   constitute	   the	  Sosein	   of	   an	  object,	   and	  extra-­‐nuclear	  properties,	  which	  do	  not.	  	  Here	  existence	  is	  held	  to	  be	  an	  extra-­‐nuclear	  property.	  	  Mally	  adopts	  a	  Dual	  Copula	  Comprehension	  Principle,	  which	  exploits	  an	  ambiguity	   in	   ‘is’	   in	  order	   to	  distinguish	  between	  two	  types	  of	  predication,	  such	  that	  non-­‐existent	  objects	  encode	  properties,	  but	  do	  not	  exemplify	  them.	  	  	  Priest	  has	  a	  modal	  Meinongian	  theory,	  which	  involves	  reference	  to	  possible	  and	  impossible	  worlds.	  	  See	  Berto	  (2015),	  pp.	  110-­‐112.	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the same God.)   So neo-Meinongians can say that all the things there are are 
values of bound variables, although she will deny that being the value of a bound 
variable, or being among the things there are, is the same as (or is sufficient) for 
existing. This gives her an advantage over Quineans, who believe that what there is, 
is what is in the domain for quantifiers to range over, and that ‘what there is’ equals 
‘what exists’.   
 
4.6.4  Neo-Meinongian presentism 
 
So certain philosophers argue for neo-Meinongianism for reasons to do with how we 
refer to non-existent entities and make true statements about them.  For example, it 
enables them to talk about such things and refer to them, without having to go 
through lengthy paraphrasing strategies employed by Russell and Quine.  However, 
philosophers do not typically think of applying neo-Meinongianism to presentism.  I 
think that presentists are missing an opportunity here.  Neo-Meinongianism provides 
presentists with many of the things they need in order to meet the various objections 
to presentism.  For example, it provides then with ways of explaining truths about 
non-present things and various cross-temporal relations.   
  
One of the objections to presentism is that the presentist cannot account for certain 
cross-temporal relations.  For example, the objection says that the presentist cannot 
give us an account of what it is to be, for example, the great-great-granddaughter of 
Charles Dickens, or what it is to stand in the admiring relation to Socrates.  And 
similarly for truths about non-existent objects, or past objects, such as ‘Socrates 
taught Plato’.  The objection to the presentist (as we have seen) is that presentists 
cannot account for truths about Socrates, and neither can they refer to Socrates, 
because Socrates does not exist. 
 
A second issue concerns events.  We think of ordinary non-instantaneous events as 
extending and spreading out over time.  So it is unclear how a presentist is 
supposed to accommodate this; if indeed she can accommodate it at all. (Prior 
denied the existence of events.)  So take a non-instantaneous event, like reading 
this chapter (call this event x).  It is easy enough to believe in a non-instantaneous 
event like x.  What we want to say is something like this; only part of x is happening 
now.  And that seems right.  Not every part of this x is happening now.  Only the 
present part of x is happening now.  But if we say that only part of this x is 
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happening now, if that is true, then there are parts of this x that are not happening 
now.  So if only some of x is happening now, then some of x is not happening now.   
 
So talking about events involves a quantifier of the sort that presentists will have 
trouble with.  For example, standard presentists think that the only things and 
individuals that there are, are things and individuals there are now, and the only 
events that take place are events that take place now.   So it is unclear how you can 
say something like, ‘some parts of the event, which is the reading of this chapter, 
are not happening now’ if you are a presentist. 
 
When these objections are directed at standard presentism, they put presentists 
under a lot of pressure to explain truths about non-present objects, or to explain how 
present things can stand in relations to non-present things.  But for a neo-
Meinongian presentist, the worry about admiring Socrates does not seem 
particularly pressing.  This is because I can say that, if I’m thinking about Socrates, 
then we have an X and a Y, such that X is me and Y is Socrates, and X stands in 
the thinking about relation to Y.  The X is real, and the Y is not real.  This relation 
can hold between me and Socrates, because there is such a thing as Socrates, 
even though he does not exist.    
 
So the neo-Meinongian presentist can say that she is a presentist (and accepts that 
only present objects exist), but also that does not mean that she thinks that the only 
things there are, are the things that there are now.  She can be happy to say that 
there are things that there aren’t now, but used to be.  And she can be happy to say 
that there are things that there aren’t now, but will be.  But the things that there 
aren’t anymore, or the things that there aren’t yet, are things that do not exist.    
 
In this way we get a version of presentism, which says the existent, or the real, is 
exhausted by what there is now, but what there is extends beyond what there is now.  
And if that kind of neo-Meinongianism is defensible, then it seems like none of these 
arguments about quantifiers, like with the Dickens case (above), tell against 
standard presentism.  Because the basic structure of those arguments is that 
presentists have to deny that there is an x and there is a y, such that x is Dickens 
and y is ‘her’ (i.e. his great-great granddaughter).  But presentists do not have to 
deny that if they can be neo-Meinongians, because their quantifiers can go beyond 
what exists and go beyond what is real.  
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Similarly so for events.  If you are a neo-Meinongian, then you could say that there 
are the parts of the event, and then there are parts of the event that exist.  So you 
can say not all of the event is happening now, but all of the event that is real is 
happening now.  So while neo-Meinongianism is often thought about in connection 
to fictional objects, it has a strong connection to presentism.  So if neo-
Meinongianism is viable, then a very standard objection to presentism (that it 
involves quantifying over things that do no exist), looks at best inconclusive.  This is 
because neo-Meinongianism gives the presentist a way of going round that. 
 
So if we are neo-Meinongian presentists, we can have a very extensive domain, and 
have available all the things that eternalists have available to quantify over in their 
most unrestricted domain.  It is also not difficult to see that there are some very 
strong parallels between quasi-Meinongian presentism and Williamsonian 
presentism.  The major point of difference between the two views is that what the 
neo-Meinongian presentist calls non-existent (i.e. things in the past and the future), 
the Williamsonian presentist calls non-concrete. 
 
4.7  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have considered what the various versions of presentism are, 
and how different presentists might respond to the objections made against 
presentism.  And as we have seen, there are various ways that both standard and 
non-standard presentists can respond to these objections. The Priorian presentist 
holds that tense logic is sufficient to explain the nature of change and temporal 
passage, avoid McTaggart’s paradox, and offer an account of what makes truths 
about the past and future true.  Other standard presentists feel that more needs to 
be said.  For example, Markosian invokes the notion of quasi-truth to explain what 
most English speakers normally want to say when they make claims about the past.    
Bigelow appeals to Lucretian properties, existing in the present to provide 
truthmakers for our statements about the past, and Bourne appeals to an ersatz B-
series to explain what makes propositions about non-existent objects true.  If neo-
Meinongianism is a viable theory, then it gives the presentist an easy way to 
respond to these objections, as it provides the presentist with the resources it needs 
to explain how we can refer to, and make true statements about, non-existent 
objects, and also to explain cross-temporal relations that involve quantifying over 
things that exist at past and future times.  I think this is an area that presentists 
should seriously consider and explore.  In the final chapter, we consider where this 
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leaves presentism, in terms of being a viable theory; including how presentists might 
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Presentism is the thesis that only present objects exist.72  The question this thesis 
considers is: is presentism is a viable theory?  The purpose of this chapter is to 
argue that presentism is a viable theory, and explain why I think this is so.  This is, 
first and foremost, a defensive claim.  I shall argue that presentism can fulfill the 
various desiderata identified in Chapter 1, and therefore that presentism is 
defensible.  However, I shall also suggest that as presentism also preserves many 
of our pre-theoretic opinions about time and what it is to exist at a time, there may 
be good reasons to prefer presentism to its non-presentist rivals.  As will be 
explained, this is because non-presentist theories only fulfill the desiderata identified 
at the cost of many of our common-sense opinions about time. 
 
In Chapter 1, I argued that presentism is the common-sense view of time because 
many of our ordinary ideas about time imply much of presentism.  These include 
ordinary ideas about change, the passage of time, and our beliefs about the non-
existence of merely past and merely future objects, and what we can say is true of 
such objects, and our ideas about how we persist in time.  The challenge for 
presentism, to use Lewis’ phrase, is to ‘expand these ideas into an orderly system’.  
As we have seen, critics of presentism claim that it cannot do this, since presentism 
lacks the resources to account for change, temporal passage, cross-temporal 
relations, and explaining what makes truths about the past and future true.  
Moreover, in accounting for change, presentism needs to meet the challenge facing 
all A-theories; namely, to explain how they avoid McTaggart’s paradox.  There is 
also the challenge from physics; the objection that presentism is inconsistent with 
The Special Theory of Relativity (SR), and should therefore be rejected.   
 
In the section on methodology, I considered various desiderata for an adequate 
metaphysical theory of time.  I agreed with Dyke that compatibility with our best 
current physics is a key desideratum for a metaphysical theory of time.  (For 
reasons explained below, I now amend this to ‘to be consistent with our best current 
physics if that is possible.’)  However, in contrast to Dyke, I also agreed with Lewis 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  Markosian	  (2014),	  p.47.	   	   	  Marksioan	  adds	   in	   footnote	  1:	   ‘more	  precisely,	   it	   is	   the	  view	  that,	  necessarily,	  it	  is	  always	  true	  that	  only	  present	  objects	  exist.’	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that respecting our pre-existing or common-sense opinions about time is a key 
desideratum.  As we saw, Lewis argues that the role of philosophy is to find ways of 
expanding our pre-existing opinions into an orderly system.73  Lewis explains that 
this is not in order to justify these opinions, or treat them as infallible; rather, he 
says: 
 
It’s just that theoretic conservatism is the only sensible policy for theorists of 
limited powers. … The proper test … is a simple maxim of honesty: never 
put forward a philosophical theory that you yourself cannot believe in your 
least philosophical and most commonsensical moments.74   
 
Since I think Lewis is correct here, I take it that the most important desiderata are 
being consistent with our best physics (if that is possible), and respecting our 
common-sense ideas about time.  Other issues identified by Dyke, such as 
compatibility with ordinary language, elegance, and ontological parsimony will be 
considered of less importance.  
 
We can list the five desiderata for an adequate metaphysical theory of time, as 
follows:   
 
1. To be consistent with our best current physics, if that is possible. 
2. Offer an explanation of the nature of change. 
3. Avoid McTaggart’s paradox 
4. Make sense of the intuitive notion of the passage of time. 
5. Offer an account of what makes truths about the past and future true.  
 
5.2 The thesis question: Is presentism a viable theory?   
 
In order to answer this question, I want to invert it.  For example, as someone who 
has strong pre-theoretic opinions about time, which imply much of presentism, I am 
happy to call myself a presentist.  And as a philosopher who has journeyed through 
this thesis, I also feel entitled to speak on behalf of the man and woman on the 
Clapham omnibus at ‘reflective equilibrium’.  So the question I ask is this:  
 
• Have I discovered anything that gives me a reason not to be a presentist? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  Lewis	  (1973),	  p.87.	  74	  Lewis	  (1986a),	  p.134.	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And in order to give a satisfactory answer, I ask a second question: 
 
• What would it take to persuade me not to be a presentist? 
 
The desiderata come into play regarding this second question.  For example, I can 
think of three main things that would make me change my mind about presentism. 
 
1. If presentism is shown to be inconsistent with our best current physics.  
(Subject to the proviso mentioned above.)  
 
2. If accepting presentism forces me to give up other important common-sense 
opinions I have.  For example, if accepting presentism forces us to give up 
our common-sense views on change or persistence, that is a good reason to 
abandon presentism.  And since part of accounting for change and passage 
involves explaining how presentism avoids McTaggart’s paradox, presentism 
needs to do this too.  The inability to explain what makes past and future 
tensed truths true, might not be a reason to abandon presentism.  However, 
it is still a desideratum that presentism can explain this, given that other 
theories can explain what makes truths about the past and future true.  Thus 
we can say that if the presentist thesis (that only present objects exist) 
cannot be embedded in a presentist metaphysics, which expands our firmly 
held pre-theoretical opinions into an orderly system, this might be thought of 
as a reason not to accept presentism.  
 
3. If an alternative metaphysical theory of time could systematize my pre-
existing opinions about time, and what it is to exist at a time, in a way that is 
superior to any presentist theory of time. 
 
I shall therefore discuss each of these things in turn, under the following headings. 
 
• The Challenge from Physics.  Here I discuss the claim that presentism is 
inconsistent with our best scientific evidence about time. 
 
• An Orderly System?  Here I consider how the presentist can expand our pre-
existing opinions about time into an orderly system.  This includes 
accounting for:  
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o Change  
o Avoiding McTaggart’s paradox 
o Explaining temporal Passage 
o Explaining what makes truths about the past and future true. 
 
• Superior Alternatives?  Here I consider whether alternative metaphysical 
theories of time can expand our pre-existing ideas about time into a system 
in a way that is superior to presentism. 
 
I shall then weigh up the pros and cons of the various positions we have considered 
in the metaphysics of time, and say what my preferred version of presentism is.  
 
5.3 The Challenge from Physics 
 
As we have seen, the challenge to presentism from physics comes from the Special 
Theory of Relativity (SR).  According to standard interpretations of SR, reality 
consists of a four-dimensional spacetime manifold.  Within this picture there is no 
privileged frame of reference, since we have no way of establishing this.  This is 
taken to show that there is no such a thing as absolute simultaneity, and hence that 
there is no property of absolute presentness.  As presentism implies that there is a 
property of absolute presentness, it is claimed that if SR is true, presentism is false.  
In contrast, the picture of reality SR that gives us sits well with eternalism, since 
according to eternalism all times exist on a par in the four-dimensional manifold. 
 
Presentists typically respond by pointing out that although SR entails that we have 
no way to observe whether two events are absolutely simultaneous, this does not 
entail that there is no such thing as absolute simultaneity.75  Moreover, I have 
argued that there are enough unresolved issues within physics itself to show that 
the question of whether there is such a thing as absolute simultaneity is not settled.  
For example, questions about the measurement problem in quantum mechanics, 
and issues concerning the incompatibility of general relativity with quantum 
mechanics, are as yet unresolved.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  For	   example,	   the	   neo-­‐Lorentzian	   response	   challenges	   the	   verificationist	   assumptions	   in	  standard	   interpretations	   of	   SR.	   	   (Neo-­‐Lorentzians	   claim	   that	   physics	   does	   not	   show	   that	   the	  speed	  of	  light	  is	  constant	  in	  both	  directions.)	  
	   241	  
There are two things to say here.  The first is that if physics has not got its house in 
order (i.e. if physics itself contains inconsistent theories), then it is an unreasonable 
demand to make of any philosophical theory that it be consistent with physics.  So (if 
physics has not got its house in order) presentism does not need to show that it is 
consistent with physics, as this would be impossible for any theory.   
 
The second is that physics has some theories that might even speak in favour of 
presentism.  For example, understanding the collapse of superposition in ways that 
make it look presentist-friendly (i.e. ways that suggest there is superluminal 
communication).  So although there are other things in physics that speak against 
that, it looks as though physics is not sure what to say about absolute simultaneity.  
In which case, we can say that physics leaves presentism defensible.  
 
5.4 An orderly system? 
 
If physics leaves presentism defensible, as I have claimed it does, this means that 
the ordinary opinion that ‘now’ is unique in a way that ‘here’ is not (which implies 
presentism) can be treated as a respectable (as opposed to naive or unreasonably 
egocentric) part of the presentist system.  More specifically, we can say that it has 
not been shown that the presentist’s claim that only present objects exist is refuted 
by physics.  We now consider whether presentism can accommodate other 




Lewis claims that presentists cannot account for change because they do not 
believe in the past and the future.  According to Lewis, change involves an object 
having incompatible properties at different times.  He says that since presentists 
restrict reality to the present (and therefore deny the existence of non-present 
objects), they cannot describe change, because they deny that there is (exists) 
anything to have incompatible properties at non-present times. 
 
In response, the presentist can say that Lewis’ argument is question-begging.  
Lewis says that if you are a presentist, you cannot believe that you have a future.  
But this is not the case, since presentists certainly believe that they have a future 
(and had a past).  So Lewis does not show that you cannot believe that you will exist 
in the future (or did exist in the past), unless you believe that there is more to reality 
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than the present.  That is to say, Lewis does not show us that believing that there is 
more to reality than the present is a necessary condition for believing that you will 
exist in the future or that you did exist in the past.  The presentist could add that 
Lewis’ perdurantist account of change is not an account of ‘change’ anyway.  This is 
because on Lewis’ temporal parts account, intrinsic properties are permanent 
properties (of their subjects); that is, all intrinsic properties are had by their bearers 
whenever they exist.  
 
Similarly, Fine complains that presentism is too static to account for change, 
because he claims that change involves a change in reality.  In contrast, the 
presentist typically holds that the passage of time involves a change of reality.  
However, even if there is some reason for thinking that there has to be change in 
reality, and not just change from reality to reality, Fine has not shown that that is so.   
 
As we have seen, standard presentists construct times out of maximal, consistent, 
propositions, which they use to describe how reality (itself) changes with the 
passage of time.  The Priorian presentist uses primitive tense operators to describe 
what is true right now, including what was true and what will be true.  Since Prior 
holds that propositions can vary in truth-value, he holds that what is (now) the case, 
is not always the case.  Prior has an ontology of things, which change as one 
qualitative state ceases to exist and another begins to exist, and he uses primitive 
tense operators to describe how things change.  Hence for Prior, change is not a 
cross-temporal relation (involving abstract times); rather it is a basic feature of the 
world. 
 
Ersatzer presentists include abstract times in their ontology, understood as sets of 
maximal consistent propositions that form an ersatz B-series.  Since ersatzer 
presentists allow quantification over these abstract B-times, they have available all 
the relata (which Lewis and Fine seemingly require) to describe how objects and 
reality are at different times.76   Similarly, neo-Meinongian presentists can also 
describe how reality changes.  This is because their domain of what there is, is 
more extensive than their domain of what exists (which is restricted to present 
objects).  So the neo-Meinongian presentist also has available all the relata she 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  As	  we	  have	   seen,	   this	   is	   fairly	   straightforward	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   changes	   involving	   existing	  concrete	   (i.e.	   presently	   existing)	   objects.	   	   However,	   the	   ersatzer	   account	   becomes	   less	   clear	  when	   this	   involves	  merely	  past	  objects,	  as	   it	   relies	  on	  an	  account	  of	   casually	  connected	   truth-­‐links.	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needs in order to describe a change.  That is, she can quantify over things that there 
used to be, even though these things do not exist.  She therefore can use these 
things that do not exist to develop an account of truthmakers for claims such as, ‘the 
leaf was green (then)’ when she explains how the leaf changes from green to red. 
 
To sum up.  The arguments of Lewis and Fine do not show that presentists cannot 
account for change.  Presentists have a number of ways to describe change.  
Priorian presentists use primitive tense operators to describe a change of reality.  
Ersatzer presentists can describe how reality changes by describing changes 
between things that exist at the concretely realized present time, and things that are 
represented by abstract B-times, (where this includes non-existing objects).  Neo-
Meinongian presentists can describe how reality changes by describing changes 
between things that exist (presently existing concrete objects), and things that there 




McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time, involves the claim that time requires 
change, and change requires the A-series.  However, McTaggart claims that the A-
series is contradictory, and hence that there is no change, and time is unreal.  As 
we have seen, all A-theorists have to explain why their particular version of the A-
theory avoids McTaggart’s paradox.  It is generally acknowledged that the presentist 
has an advantage here.77  This is because presentism provides an easy answer; 
namely, that the structure of reality prevents there from being incompatible tensed 
facts.  Thus, according to presentism, if I am sitting (now), I am not any other way.  
 
Mellor argues that what McTaggart’s argument shows is that tense is unreal, since 
an account of change involving A-properties is contradictory.  Mellor claims that 
tensed statements can be given tenseless truth-conditions (i.e. explained in terms of 
properties of times); and thus that there are no genuine tensed facts (or A-facts).  If 
Mellor is right that tense is unreal, then presentism is false, since presentism implies 
the doctrine of the reality of tense.  However, all that Mellor’s argument shows is 
that the conjunction of tense and eternalism is untenable.  And since presentism 
rejects eternalism, Mellor’s argument does not worry the presentist.  Moreover, 
Mellor’s claim that the B-theory is sufficient for the reality of time rests on his claim 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  For	  example,	  as	  noted	  by	  Cameron	  (2015),	  p.68.	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that the B-theory can account for change.  As was explained in Chapter 3, I find 
Mellor’s account of change unconvincing, because his account of B-theoretic-
endurantism appears to involve diachronic bi-location, and I cannot see how to 
make sense of this.78  Nor do I find other B-theoretic accounts of change convincing.  
This is because they either suggest that objects do not have any intrinsic properties, 
or that different temporal parts of objects have intrinsic properties permanently, 
which seems to rule out intrinsic change. 
 
To sum up: the presentist can avoid McTaggart’s paradox; and Mellor’s argument to 
show that tense is unreal does not undermine this claim.  
 
5.4.3 Temporal Passage 
 
Temporal passage is closely related to change and McTaggart’s paradox.  We have 
already seen (above) that the presentist can explain the passage of time in terms of 
tensed propositions being true at different times.  The presentist does not think of 
the passage of time in the way that McTaggart described it; that is, as an A-series 
moving along a B-series.  Rather, as Prior points out, ‘the flow of time’ is just a 
metaphor.79  And the presentist uses this metaphor to express the truth that there 
are irreducible tensed facts, which change over time.  
 
On the presentist’s picture, reality changes from moment to moment, as moments of 
time lapse as new moments of time become actualized.  Some philosophers think 
that this idea is problematic because it requires a hyper-time in order to explain the 
rate at which time passes.  I agree with Prior that this line of thinking is confused.  
For example, Prior responds to the question of the ‘rate of change’ as follows:  
 
Surely the answer to this question is obvious.  I am exactly a year older than 
I was a year ago; it has taken me exactly a year to become a year older; and 
quite generally, the rate of this change is one time-unit per time-unit.  Nor 
does any mysterious ‘supertime’ enter into this calculation.  It has taken 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78 	  As	   noted	   already,	   Lewis	   and	   many	   other	   B-­‐theorists	   accept	   that	   the	   B-­‐theory	   implies	  perdurantism.	   A-­‐theortists,	   such	   as	   Cameron	   (2016),	   Carter	   and	   Hesteveld	   (1994),	   Craig	  (2000b),	   Ingthorsson	   (2016),	   Merricks	   (2007)	   also	   deny	   that	   the	   B-­‐theory	   can	   be	   combined	  with	  endurantism.	  	  	  79	  Prior	  (1962),	  p.1.	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exactly one year of ordinary time for my age to increase by one year of 
ordinary time, and that is all there is to it.80 
 
Prior can therefore can side-step this issue, since his answer fits with his view that 
to be present is simply to exist.  I think this is a good response.  
 
The presentist also has an advantage, since she can claim that our experience of 
the present and our experience of temporal passage support her belief in the 
objective reality of tense.   In contrast, the B-theorist has to explain the experience 
of presence in terms of something else, such as tenseless facts.  (As Mellor says, 
‘the inescapable presence of experience is something we B-theorists must explain 
away.’81)  As we have seen, such accounts ultimately rest on the B-theorist’s 
accounts of change, which I have argued are unpersuasive.  
 
Our experience of passage also gives the presentist grounds for explaining the 
direction of time.  For example, we experience reality from the perspective of a 
transient present moment, which appears to be continually replaced by a new 
present moment, which has never been present before, and will never be present 
again.  However, we remember times that have been present, whereas the future 
seems yet to be; moreover, we age, and things grow and decay.  So our experience 
of passage sits well with the idea that temporal reality is future directed.  Unlike the 
eternalist A-theorist, the presentist does not have to worry about the ‘when am I?’ 
problem.  This is because according to presentism, only present objects exists, so if 
we are aware of being present, we can be certain that we are in the present.   
 
To sum up: presentists can provide various ways to account for our intuitive notion 
of the passage of time. 
 
5.4.5 Truths about the past and the future. 
 
The issue of what makes truths about the past and the future true is held to be 
problematic for presentists.  This is because presentists do not have the obvious 
resources that eternalists have, when it comes to saying what makes facts about the 
past and future true.  This is to say, they do not have an unrestricted domain 
containing past, present, and future existing objects.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  Ibid.	  p.2.	  81	  Mellor	  (1998),	  p.44.	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Prior was happy to say that what is true now is true simpliciter.  For the Priorian, as I 
type the sentence ‘Rose is typing’ that is just true; and what that sentence reports is 
a fact.  But when you read that sentence, what it reports will no longer be true; 
instead, what will be true is P(Rose is typing).  Prior held that some of the facts are 
just irreducibly temporal facts (just as some of the facts are irreducibly modal).  
According to Prior, we do not have to think that there is a further entity, which makes 
the sentence that expresses that fact true.  
 
However, others object that Priorian presentism suffers from a lack of truthmakers 
for truths about the past and future.  (We should note that this criticism involves the 
assumption that the presentist should be able to supply truthmakers for claims about 
the past and future.)  The objection to invoking primitive tense operators is that they 
do not tell us what makes true statements, such as P(Socrates taught Plato), or 
P(dinosaurs exist), since they do not have anything in their ontology to ground these 
statements. 82  On Prior’s view, the fact that Socrates taught Plato is not about 
Socrates and Plato; and many people find this unsatisfactory. 
 
Markosian’s notion of being ‘quasi-true’ does not really tell us what the proposition 
that Socrates was a philosopher is about, or what makes it true.  But it does provide 
a way of explaining how the sentence ‘Socrates was a philosopher’ has a linguistic 
meaning, which stays stable even when Socrates ceases to exist.  Hence, 
Markosian says that although the sentence ‘Socrates was a philosopher’ is not 
literally true, as it has no propositional content (as Socrates no longer exists), we 
can say that it is ‘quasi-true’.  Markosian says this is ‘good enough’ for everyday 
purposes.83   In contrast, Bigelow’s account of Lucretian properties, the idea that the 
past leaves traces in the present, is too vague to provide an account of what makes 
the sentence ‘Socrates was a philosopher’ true.       
 
Ersatzer presentists try to say more about what makes statements about the past 
and future true.  The ersatzer presentist claims that the ersatz B-series is 
constituted by ordered sets of propositions, and that these can represent merely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  For	  Prior,	  putting	  a	  sentence	  in	  the	  past	  (or	  future)	  tense	  by	  prefixing	  it	  with	  a	  primitive	  past	  (or	   future)	   tense	   operator,	   involves	   specifying	   a	   mode	   of	   unreality	   regarding	   whatever	   the	  sentence	  is	  about.	  83	  We	  should	  note	   that	   for	  Markosian	   the	  sentence	   ‘Socrates	  does	  not	  exist’	   is	   literally	   true,	  as	  Socrates	   is	  not	  part	  of	  reality.	   	  So	  this	  respects	  presentism’s	  appeal	   to	  the	  common-­‐sense	   idea	  that	  when	  we	  say	  ‘x	  no	  longer	  exists’	  or	  ‘x	  does	  not	  yet	  exist’	  what	  we	  say	  is	  literally	  true.	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past individuals, such as Socrates.  The ersatzer presentist claims that she can 
explain what makes propositions about merely past individuals true, and also 
explain what the constituents of such propositions are (abstract objects that 
represent real objects).  As we have seen, the success of this account depends on 
there being an appropriate causal connection between facts across time, which I 
have suggested would benefit from further development. 
 
Finally, the neo-Meinongian presentist can explain what makes truths about the past 
and the future true, as she holds that the domain of what there is includes all the 
things that there were or will be, which do not exist now.  The neo-Meinongian 
presentist can quantify over these things, and make true statements about them.  
Since Neo-Meinongians distinguish between ‘there is such a thing as x’, and ‘x 
exists’, they have to face various questions, such as what properties things that do 
not exist have, and how they avoid violating the law of non-contradiction.  Although I 
have not elaborated on the details of the various neo-Meinongian accounts, I 
believe that neo-Meinongians can provide answers to these questions.  I think neo-
Meinongian presentism is a good option, as I find it a primitively quite intuitive idea 
that there are things that do not exist.   
  
Presentists therefore have a number of ways to explain what is true, including what 
was true and what will be true.  However, presentists have a harder time giving a 
systematic account of what makes what is true, true.  While not all of these accounts 
provide truthmakers for truths about objects that no longer exist, or do not yet exist, 
others do; namely, ersatzer presentism and neo-Meinongian presentism.  So as 
long as presentists accept that there are some kinds of abstract entities, they can 
offer some account of what makes truths about the past and future true.  In this 
respect, it is not clear that the presentist’s position is any worse off than the modal 
actualist’s position.  So, although these presentist theories leave us with certain 
questions and puzzles, such as how reality is rich enough to make it true that 
Socrates taught Plato, these puzzles do not strike me as unsolvable.  
 
To sum up: presentism can account for our ordinary ideas about intrinsic change, 
the intuitive notion of the passage of time, and the possibility of time.  Although 
presentism has a hard time providing a fully worked out account of truthmakers for 
past and future-tensed statements, this does not show that presentists could not 
have such an account.  It therefore seems that we can build a systematic theory of 
change, and of the passage of time, and the possibility of time, which includes the 
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presentist’s thesis that only present objects exist.  The ontological picture of reality 
that presentism gives us (that reality does not expand beyond the present) is a fairly 
commonsensical one.  And since presentism is not refuted by physics, the claim that 
only present objects exist is a viable one.  I therefore conclude that presentism is a 
viable theory. 
 
5.5. Superior Alternatives? 
 
I claim that presentism is a viable theory.  However, presentism leaves us with 
certain puzzles.  And in responding to various objections, presentism takes us some 
way from common-sense opinion.  (For example, talk of maximal consistent 
propositions, quasi-truths, ersatz times, and things that there aren’t, are not part of 
common-sense thinking.)  Moreover, presentist accounts like Prior’s involve quite 
complicated logic, which might be seen as inelegant or unparsimonious.  So is there 
a metaphysical theory of time that can systematize our ordinary opinions about time 
in a superior way to a presentist theory of time? 
 
The major defect that A-theorists find with the B-theory is that it cannot account for 
change and temporal passage in an adequate way.  For the B-theorist, all change is 
explained as some kind of variation in the manifold.  Similarly, temporal passage is 
either reduced to being located at t at one time and t’ at another, or involves an 
account of causation or entropic increase, in which there is no ‘genuine’ change 
(change that is not merely variation).  B-theoretic accounts of change do not sit well 
with common sense.  
 
The B-theorist is typically seen to have an advantage when it comes to truthmaking, 
since she has available all times and their contents to explain what makes various 
facts true at different times, and she does not have to invoke ideas about abstract 
entities. However, the B-theorist’s account of truthmaking is not very 
commonsensical.  For example, the B-theorist holds that ‘dinosaurs exist, but not 
now’; and this is likely to leave most people baffled.  And similarly so for individuals 
we consider to be dead.  For example, we do not ordinarily say ‘Queen Victoria 
exists, but not now’; we say that she did exist, but no longer exists.84 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  Eternalists	  like	  Lewis	  appeal	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  often	  restrict	  the	  domain	  to	  things	  that	  exist	  now;	   and	   that	   with	   that	   restriction	   in	   place,	   ‘Queen	   Victoria	   exists,	   but	   not	   now’	   will	   be	  necessarily	  false.	  	  But	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  this	  is	  the	  right	  account.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  spatial	  case,	  Lewis	  would	  admit	  that	  we	  can	  say	  ‘there’s	  no	  beer	  here’	  (e.g.	  in	  the	  fridge)	  and	  have	  that	  come	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Moreover, although the B-theorist claims that she can explain what makes the 
proposition Socrates taught Plato true, if she is a perdurantist, this really means that 
a temporal slice of Socrates taught a temporal slice of Plato at time t.   Once again, 
this is not what people ordinarily mean when they think of Socrates teaching Plato.  
Nor is this how we ordinarily think of persisting individuals.  As Prior remarked: 
 
One thing that tense logic is designed precisely to facilitate is talk of 
persisting objects, and one thing that it is designed precisely to avoid is the 
introduction of pseudo-entities, like ‘me-at-t’, ‘me-at-t’’, etc.’85  
 
Some might think that eternalist-A-theories (and semi-eternalist theories) are closer 
to common sense, as they claim that reality changes as time passes, and that this 
involves some sort of ‘genuine’ change, which is not mere variation in the manifold.   
However, in order to avoid McTaggart’s paradox, non-presentist A-theories go to 
some lengths to distinguish presently existing objects from past, or past and future, 
objects.  This includes employing some of the strategies used in Cameron’s moving 
spotlight theory, or Sullivan’s version of ‘Williamsonian presentism’.  I find these 
ideas unappealing as they postulate very unintuitive ways of ‘existing’.  For example, 
ideas such as, existing but not concretely, or existing concretely but not having a 
shape or colour, are not part of our common-sense thinking about existence and 
change.  There are similar worries with the status of past existents in the growing 
block, and Smith’s idea of having degrees of existence seems highly counterintuitive.  
 
5.6  Weighing things up 
 
So we have all these different views, and it seems that with each of them we are not 
going to avoid certain puzzles or counterintuitive ideas.  Each of the theories 
considered have their strengths and weaknesses.  B-theoretic accounts do not have 
to invoke abstract or intensional objects.  However, according to A-theorists, B-
theorists provide inadequate accounts of change.  And not only do B-theoretic 
accounts of persistence fail to cohere with our ordinary ideas about how we persist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  out	  true	  in	  the	  restricted	  domain,	  but	  also	  say	  ‘there	  is	  beer,	  but	  not	  here’	  (meaning	  there	  is	  beer	  elsewhere.).	   	  But	  in	  the	  temporal	  case	  it	   is	  not	  clear	  that	  we	  can	  truly	  say	  ‘Queen	  Victoria	  does	  exist,	  but	  not	  any	  longer’,	  and	  explain	  this	  in	  the	  context	  of	  domain	  restriction.	  	  This	  is	  because	  it	  still	  sounds	  like	  a	  contradiction.	  85	  Prior	  (1967),	  p.170.	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through time, B-theorists disagree among themselves about change and 
persistence.   
 
Non-presentist A-theories disagree about the status of existing but non-present 
objects, and invoke complicated and counterintuitive accounts of what it is to exist at 
non-present times.  In comparison, presentists can give a relatively simple view of 
existence, change and persistence (presentism just comes out as an endurantist 
theory).  The major difficulty for presentism, as we have seen is explaining what 
makes truths about the past and future true.  However, the abstract entities invoked 
by some presentists provide them with ways of doing this.  
 
5.7  Presentism 
 
Which is my preferred version of presentism?  Speaking personally, as someone 
who is not convinced that we need truthmakers in order to justify our claims about 
the past and the future, I am happy to accept Priorian presentism and adopt 
Markosian’s notion of quasi-truths.  However, I am aware that is a minority view, 
which is unacceptable to philosophers for whom the issue of providing truthmakers 
is a serious one.  Presentists who share this opinion (that truths require 
truthmakers) have the option of either adopting ersatzer presentism or neo-
Meinongian presentism.  Of these options, I think that neo-Meinongian presentism 
has more going for it.  In many respects, Neo-Meinongian presentism comes very 
close to Sullivan’s ‘Minimal A-theory’ and Cameron’s spotlight theory.  The major 
difference being that the neo-Meinongian presentist does not have to provide 
complicated and counterintuitive accounts of what is involved in ‘existing’ at non-
present times.  If neo-Meinongianism is viable, which I think it is, then neo-
Meinongian presentism offers the presentist a positive alternative to standard 
presentism.  I think this option should be explored. 
 
5.8  A simple maxim of honesty 
 
Lewis recommends that we: 
 
Never put forward a philosophical theory that you yourself cannot believe in 
your least philosophical and most commonsensical moments.86 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  Lewis	  (1986a),	  p.134.	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Presentism has various puzzles, and presentists often have complicated accounts 
of how to explain how things can be true at non-present times, which involve 
abstract objects, maximal consistent propositions, and quasi-truths.  However, I do 
not find a theory involving such things hard to believe in.  What I cannot believe in is 
a theory that suggests that I am a temporal part of a four-dimensional object, which 
is spread out along a timeline in the spacetime manifold.  Nor can I believe that 
Queen Victoria exists, but not now.  It might be comforting to think of lost loved ones 
concretely existing at previous times, and to think of ourselves as somehow existing 
eternally in this way, but that is not something I can believe.  And since I also do not 
believe the Quinean maxim that what exists equals what there is, I am happy to 
prefer presentism to eternalist A-theories.  That is to say, I do not think that non-
present things have to exist in order for there to be truths about them, or in order to 
for us to be able to explain change or temporal passage.  As presentism is a 
defensible theory, and since I think presentism is closer to our common-sense ideas 
about time and existing in time, I see no reason not to be a presentist, and I think 
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